CNN Anthrax Attacks Propaganda Exposed!

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

Good ole' history commons:

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October 2, 2001: Letter Calling Muslim Scientist Potential Biological Warfare Terrorist Arrives Days before First Signs of Anthrax Attacks
   

Ayaad Assaad.Ayaad Assaad. [Source: Salon]Three days before the anthrax attacks are first made public, a letter is received by the FBI in Quantico, Virginia, warning that Dr. Ayaad Assaad, employed until 1997 (see May 9, 1997) as an anthrax researcher at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland, is a "'a potential terrorist,' with a grudge against the United States and the knowledge to wage biological warfare against his adopted country." This is the latest in a series of verbal attacks against Assaad since the early 1990s, which includes anonymous, long hateful and derogatory poems about him (see 1991-1992). The author of the letter says he is a former colleague of Assaad. The letter seems like a not-very-subtle attempt to frame Assaad for the anthrax attacks about to come. The letter strongly suggests the attacks could have been by someone at USAMRIID with a long time grudge against Assaad. [Hartford Courant, 12/9/2001; Salon, 1/26/2002] The FBI questions Assaad about the letter one day later (see October 3, 2001).

October 3, 2001: FBI Interviews Possible Anthrax Attacks Patsy Assaad
   
Scientist Ayaad Assaad is interviewed by the FBI. Just one day before, the FBI received a letter that was mailed to an FBI office on September 26 (see September 26, 2001) and seems to point the blame for the upcoming anthrax attacks at Assaad. He is living in Washington, DC, at the time, and is interviewed by FBI agents Mark Buie and Gregory Leylegian at the FBI's Washington field office. His lawyer, Rosemary McDermott, is also present. The agents read him the entire letter aloud and briefly show it to him, but will not allow him to make a copy of it.
  The one page, single-spaced letter says "Dr. Assaad is a potential biological terrorist," and he is planning to mount a biological attack against the US. It adds he has the "means and will" to succeed.
  It continues, "I have worked with Dr. Assaad, and I heard him say that he has a vendetta against the US government and that if anything happens to him, he told his sons to carry on."
  Assaad worked at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapon laboratory, until he was laid off in 1997, and the letter gives accurate details about Assaad's security clearances when he worked there.
  Since 1997, Assaad has worked at the Environmental Protection Agency, and the letter gives accurate details about his job there as well.
  The letter mentions slightly inaccurate details about Assaad's commute from his home in Frederick, Maryland, to his EPA job in Virginia.
  It states that Assaad is a "religious fanatic." (Assaad is a Christian but many assume he is Muslim due to his Egyptian ancestry.) [Washington Times, 2/26/2002; Philadelphia Inquirer, 2/28/2002; Hartford Courant, 2/17/2004]
  It makes reference to "further terrorist activity" by Assaad without mentioning what his supposed previous terrorist activity was. [Vanity Fair, 9/15/2003]
  The letter is not signed.
Several days later, after the anthrax attacks are made public, Assaad contacts the FBI and gives a list of the former co-workers he suspects could have been behind the letter. It is not clear if the FBI does anything with this however, as they rebuff his repeated attempts to be interviewed. Despite the obvious potential connection to the anthrax attacks, which first become known two days after this interview, the FBI will not interview Assaad again on the matter until May 2004 (see May 11, 2004). [Washington Times, 2/26/2002; Philadelphia Inquirer, 2/28/2002]

October 5, 2001: Scientist Confirms Deadly Anthrax Is Ames Strain
   
On October 3, 2001, doctors determine that Robert Stevens in Florida has been infected with anthrax (see October 3, 2001). A culture of anthrax bacteria is grown from a sample of his spinal fluid and quickly flown by corporate jet to Paul Keim. Keim is a geneticist at Northern Arizona University who had recently developed a means to distinguish between strains of anthrax. He and his team gets the sample on October 4 and work all night. By Friday morning, they tell investigators that it is the Ames strain of anthrax. [Philadelphia Inquirer, 9/1/2008] The media will first report that the anthrax was the Ames strain on October 10. [Associated Press, 10/10/2001] Despite Keim's findings, the FBI will approve the destruction of a vital repository of Ames samples, also on October 10 (see October 10-11, 2001).

October 5-November 21, 2001: Anthrax Letters Kill Five, Heighten Terrorist Attack Fears
   

The five fatal victims of the anthrax attacks, from to right: Josep Curseen Jr., Thomas Morris, Ottilie Lundgren, Robert Stevens, and Kathy Nguyen. The five fatal victims of the anthrax attacks, from to right: Josep Curseen Jr., Thomas Morris, Ottilie Lundgren, Robert Stevens, and Kathy Nguyen. [Source: Reuters and Associated Press] (click image to enlarge)Two waves of letters containing anthrax are received by media outlets including NBC and the New York Post (see September 17-18, 2001), and Democratic senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy (see October 6-9, 2001). The letters sent to the senators both contain the words "Death to America, Death to Israel, Allah is Great." Five people die:
  October 5: Robert Stevens, 63, an employee at the Sun, a tabloid based in Florida.
  October 21: Thomas Morris Jr., 55, a postal worker in Washington, DC.
  October 22: Joseph Curseen Jr., 47, a postal worker in Washington, DC.
  October 31: Kathy Nguyen, 61, a hospital employee in New York City.
  November 21: Ottilie Lundgren, 94, of Oxford, Connecticut.
At least 22 more people get sick but survive. Thirty-one others test positive for exposure. As a result of these deaths and injuries, panic sweeps the nation. On October 16, the Senate office buildings are shut down, followed by the House of Representatives, after 28 congressional staffers test positive for exposure to anthrax (see October 16-17, 2001). A number of hoax letters containing harmless powder turn up, spreading the panic further. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 12/8/2001; Associated Press, 8/7/2008] Initially it is suspected that either al-Qaeda or Iraq are behind the anthrax letters (see October 14, 2001, October 15, 2001, October 17, 2001, and October 18, 2001). [Observer, 10/14/2001; BBC, 10/16/2001] However, by November, further investigation leads the US government to conclude that, "everything seems to lean toward a domestic source.... Nothing seems to fit with an overseas terrorist type operation (see November 10, 2001)." [Washington Post, 10/27/2001; St. Petersburg Times, 11/10/2001]

Shortly After October 5, 2001: White House Officials Pressure FBI to Prove Link between Anthrax Attacks and Al-Qaeda
 

In August 2008, the New York Daily News will report that after Robert Stevens is the first to die in the anthrax attacks on October 5, 2001 (see October 5-November 21, 2001), White House officials repeatedly press FBI Director Robert Mueller to prove the attacks were conducted by al-Qaeda. According to an unnamed retired senior FBI official, Mueller was verbally "beaten up" during President Bush's daily intelligence briefings for not producing proof linking the attacks to al-Qaeda. "They really wanted to blame somebody in the Middle East," this FBI official will say. But within days, the FBI learned the anthrax was a difficult to make weapons-grade strain. "Very quickly, [experts at Fort Detrick, Maryland] told us this was not something some guy in a cave could come up with. [Al-Qaeda] couldn't go from box cutters one week to weapons-grade anthrax the next." But several days after this conclusion is reached, Bush and Cheney nonetheless make public statements suggesting al-Qaeda was the culprit (see October 15, 2001 and October 12, 2001). [New York Daily News, 8/2/2008]

October 10-11, 2001: FBI Permits Destruction of Original Batch of Ames Strain Anthrax
 

The FBI allows the original batch of the Ames strain of anthrax to be destroyed, making tracing the type of anthrax used in the recent anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001) more difficult. The Ames strain actually originates from a dead cow in Texas, but Iowa State University in Ames has kept many vials of Ames and other anthrax strains collected over more than seven decades. This entire collection is destroyed. It is unclear who wanted the collection destroyed or why. The FBI learned the anthrax used in the attack letters was the Ames strain on October 5 (see October 5, 2001), but this will not be publicly confirmed until October 25. The FBI denies it approved the destruction and say they only did not oppose it, but university officials say the FBI gave explicit approval. [New York Times, 11/9/2001; South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 12/8/2001] The Ames strain is one of 89 known varieties of anthrax and is commonly used in US military research. The Washington Post will later report that "The [Ames strain identification], as compelling as a human fingerprint, shifted suspicion away from al-Qaeda and suggested another disturbing possibility: that the anthrax attacks were the work of an American bioweapons insider." The identification of the Ames strain focuses much attention on two top US Army bioweapons laboratories in particular that have heavily used Ames: USAMRIID in Maryland and Dugway Proving Ground in Utah (see Late 2001). [Washington Post, 9/14/2003]

After October 9, 2001: Government Response to Anthrax Attacks 'Ineffectual,' 'Farcical,' Author Later Claims
 
Despite the fact that two US senators, Tom Daschle (D-SD) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT), had letters laced with anthrax mailed to their offices (see October 6-9, 2001), the Bush administration's response is, as later characterized by author Frank Rich, lackadaisical. "Bush said little about it," Rich will write in 2006, instead "delegating the problem to ineffectual Cabinet members like [Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy] Thompson and the attorney general, John Ashcroft. The rank incompetence of these two Cabinet secretaries, at most thinly disguised by a veneer of supercilious officiousness, was farcical. They were Keystone Kops, in the costumes of bureaucrats, ready at any time to slip on a banana peel." [Rich, 2006, pp. 34-35]

October 14, 2001: 'Strange Coincidence' Briefly Increases Suspicions Al-Qaeda Is behind Anthrax Attacks
 

Gloria Irish.Gloria Irish. [Source: AP / St. Petersburg Times]The FBI confirms that Gloria Irish rented an apartment to two of the 9/11 hijackers. Her husband is Michael Irish, who is an editor of the Sun, a Florida tabloid newspaper, and the first victim of the anthrax attacks earlier this month. Bob Stevens, who also worked at the Sun, and several others at the tabloid offices were injured. The FBI says that Irish rented different apartments in Delray Beach, Florida, to hijackers Marwan Alshehhi and Saeed Alghamdi during the summer of 2001. But one FBI spokesperson says, "Right now it looks like a coincidence," and another calls it a "strange coincidence." Two of the hijackers, including Mohamed Atta, also had subscriptions to the Sun. [Knight Ridder, 10/14/2001; Guardian, 10/16/2001] But Irish says "there is no way" the hijackers could have known about any Sun connection through her. [Washington Post, 10/15/2001] Michael Irish is a licensed pilot who was a member of the Civil Air Patrol based at Lantana Airport. Atta reportedly rented a plane at that airport in August (see August 16-19, 2001). Stevens, who died of anthrax on October 5, also lived in Lantana. But there is no evidence that Irish or Stevens crossed paths with Atta. [St. Petersburg Times, 10/15/2001] The story will quickly die after nothing more is found to the connection.

Mid-October 2001: Future Anthrax Attacks Suspect Ivins Helps Handle Anthrax Letters for FBI Investigation
   

Not long after people start dying from the anthrax attacks in October 2001 (see October 5-November 21, 2001), future suspect Bruce Ivins works with the FBI team investigating the attacks. Ivins works at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory. He and about 90 USAMRIID colleagues work long hours to test thousands of samples of suspect powder to see if they contain real anthrax. [New York Times, 8/7/2008; Wall Street Journal, 8/7/2008] There are about 100 people in USAMRIID's bacteriological division, including technicians and assistants. [New York Times, 8/9/2008] Within days of the attacks being discovered, there are about six people crowded at Ivins's desk working on the anthrax, and other desks at USAMRIID are similarly crowded. Ivins helps analyze one of the letters containing real anthrax, the one sent to Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD), and goes to the Pentagon to discuss the results of his testing with officials there. Court documents will later claim that Ivins also repeatedly offers the FBI names of colleagues at USAMRIID who might be potential suspects in the attacks. The FBI will later claim he was attempting to mislead the investigation. [New York Times, 8/7/2008; Wall Street Journal, 8/7/2008]

October 19, 2001: New York Times Suggests Link between Anthrax Attacks and 9/11 Hijackers, despite Lack of Evidence
   
The contents of the anthrax letter to the New York Post.The contents of the anthrax letter to the New York Post. [Source: FBI]The New York Times suggests there could be a link between the recent anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001) and the 9/11 hijackers. The Times reports that investigators "say they suspect that the rash of contaminated letters is related to the Sept. 11 attacks and are investigating the possibility that al-Qaeda confederates of the hijackers are behind the incidents.... Senior government officials said investigators were focusing on the ability of the hijackers or their accomplices to obtain highly refined anthrax from a foreign or domestic supplier. While they have not ruled out the possibility that another criminal could be behind the anthrax attacks, investigators are looking intensely at evidentiary threads linking the letters to the hijackers."
Little to No Evidence behind this Theory - FBI agents are said to have recently searched the Jersey City home of three men arrested on suspicion of links to the 9/11 attacks after learning they kept some magazines and newspaper articles about biological warfare there. These men include Ayub Ali Khan and Mohammed Azmath. Both men will later be cleared of having any al-Qaeda ties (see October 20, 2001). The hijackers did show some interest in crop dusters, which could be used in a biological attack, but a senior government official says no actual evidence has appeared linking any of the hijackers to the anthrax attacks in any way.
Domestic Loner Theory - The article notes that the FBI is also pursuing a competing theory, "that a disgruntled employee of a domestic laboratory that uses anthrax carried out the attacks." However, no evidence has emerged yet to support this.
Iraq Not Likely - The article is dismissive of theories that Iraq or another foreign government was behind the attacks. It notes that the anthrax letters used the Ames strain of anthrax, and experts say the Iraqi government never obtained that strain. For instance, former UN weapons inspector Richard Spertzel says, "The Iraqis tried to get it but didn't succeed." [New York Times, 10/19/2001]

October 25-29, 2001: Top Government Officials Claim Some Anthrax Letters Were 'Weaponized'
   
Maj. Gen. John Parker.Maj. Gen. John Parker. [Source: Public domain]On October 25, 2001, Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge tells reporters that the anthrax used in a letter sent to Sen. Tom Daschle (D-SD) was "highly concentrated" and "pure" and that a binding material was used, resulting in small spore clusters that are more easily spread. In contrast, the anthrax in a letter sent to the New York Post was coarser and less concentrated. Both letters used the same Ames strain of anthrax bacterium. (The Post letter was part of a less sophisticated first wave of letters (see September 17-18, 2001) and the Daschle letter was from the second wave (see October 6-9, 2001).) On October 29, Major General John Parker, commanding general of USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory, makes similar comments at a White House briefing. He says silica was found in the Daschle letter anthrax and the anthrax spore concentration in the Daschle letter was ten times that of the New York Post letter. The presence of a binding agent like silica supports theories that the anthrax used in the attacks was "weaponized" (highly sophisticated and deadly) and more likely made by a government team than a single individual. But in 2006, the FBI will reverse course and say there was no silica or any other type of binding agent in any of the anthrax letters (see August 2006). An anonymous former government official will later claim, "Those judgments were premature and frankly wrong." He will say that top government officials with no scientific background received briefings from people who also were not scientists and "the nuances got lost." [Chemical and Engineering News, 12/4/2006] But the idea of the data being lost in translation does not jibe with Parker's comments at the time, especially since Parker is a qualified scientist. For instance, he says, "I have looked at the specimen under the microscope, both the electron microscope and the scanning microscope, and I can say that the sample was pure spores." [ABC News, 11/1/2001]

October 27, 2001: US Government No Longer Considers Al-Qaeda Likely Suspect in Anthrax Attacks
   
The US government no longer thinks al-Qaeda is behind the anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). The Washington Post reports in a front-page story: "Top FBI and CIA officials believe that the anthrax attacks... are likely the work of one or more extremists in the United States who are probably not connected to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist organization, government officials said yesterday." An unnamed senior official adds, "Everything seems to lean toward a domestic source... Nothing seems to fit with an overseas terrorist type operation." The Post suggests neo-Nazi and/or right-wing hate groups could be behind it. [Washington Post, 10/27/2001] Not long after, the FBI releases a profile of the perpetrator of the anthrax attacks. He is suspected of being a lone, male domestic terrorist, with a scientific background and laboratory experience who could handle hazardous materials. [St. Petersburg Times, 11/10/2001]

November 10, 2001: FBI Thinks Anthrax Attacks Were Caused by American Loner, Not Al-Qaeda or Iraq
 
Th Los Angeles Times reports, "The FBI is increasingly convinced that the person behind the recent anthrax attacks is a lone wolf within the United States who has no links to terrorist groups but is an opportunist using the Sept. 11 hijackings to vent his rage..." The FBI is said to base this conclusion on "case studies, handwriting and linguistic analysis, forensic data and other evidence." FBI investigators say they are looking for "an adult male with at least limited scientific expertise who was able to use laboratory equipment easily obtained for as little as $2,500 to produce high-quality anthrax." They believe he is an "anti-social loner" who "has little contact with the public and carries deep-seated resentments but does not like direct confrontation." However, these investigators admit that psychological profiling is a rough science, especially since they have little more than a small number of words written on the anthrax-laced letters. The letters appear to have tried to frame Muslims for the attacks. For instance, each letter contains the phrase "Allah is great." Investigators say they are not completely ruling out an overseas connection to the letters, such as an Iraqi or Russian connection, but they consider it very unlikely. Investigators have not explained why they are so confident the attacks were caused by only one person. [Los Angeles Times, 11/10/2001]

November 12, 2001: FBI Publicly Suspect Three Muslims over Anthrax Attacks Due to Dubious Tip
   

Asif Kasi.Asif Kasi. [Source: New York Times / Jessica Kourkounis]The FBI investigates three Pakistani-born city officials in Chester, Pennsylvania, for possible roles in the recent anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). The three are Asif Kazi, an accountant in the city's finance department, Dr. Irshad Shaikh, the city's health commissioner, and his brother Dr. Masood Shaikh, who runs the city's lead-abatement program. Kazi is in his city hall office when FBI agents burst in and interrogate him. He is questioned for hours about an unknown liquid he had been seen carrying out of his house. In fact, the dishwasher had broken down and he was bailing out his kitchen. Meanwhile, agents with drawn guns knock down the front door to his house while his wife is cooking in the kitchen. Dozens of boxes are carried out of the house. Agents in bioprotection suits also search the Shaikh brothers' house and carry away their computers. None of the three ever had any connection to anthrax and none of them are arrested. The searches are national news for several days, severely damaging their reputations. Three days after the raid, an FBI agent tells the Washington Post that the raid did not pan out. The FBI learns that a disgruntled employee had called in a bogus tip. But the FBI never publicly clears them. [Washington Post, 11/15/2001; Newsweek, 8/4/2002; New York Times, 8/9/2008] Even a year later, an FBI spokesperson says the raids are still "a pending matter." [Associated Press, 9/5/2002] Trouble for the three men will continue. The Shaikh brothers' applications for US citizenship is blocked, their visas run out, and they both eventually have to leave the US. Kazi is already a US citizen, but he is put on a no-fly watch list. He is searched and interrogated for a couple of hours every time he travels in or out of the US. His name will finally be taken off the list in 2007. [New York Times, 8/9/2008]

Mid-November 2001: Harmless Second Anthrax Letter Sent to Sen. Daschle, Increasing Attention on Suspect Hatfill

In mid-November 2001, a second anthrax letter appears in Senator Tom Daschle's office. According to a later Washington Post article, "This [letter] had passed through irradiation equipment to kill anthrax spores, and the powdery material packed in the envelope tested benign." Details about the letter are scanty, but it is known that it is postmarked in mid-November from London. The white powder apparently is harmless talc. The letter contains similar language to the real anthrax letters, except the phrase "Stop the bombing" is added. Scientist Steven Hatfill, who is already starting to come under suspicion for the anthrax attacks (see Late 2001), is in Britain at the time, attending a specialized training course to become a UN weapons inspector in Iraq. The course takes place about 70 miles from London. This increases suspicions on Hatfill and the FBI asks British police to help retrace his every move. But it is never shown that he had anything to do with the letter. It is unknown if the letter contains any writing or other clues that would match the deadly anthrax letters. [Associated Press, 1/4/2002; Washington Post, 9/14/2003]

Late 2001: FBI Anthrax Investigation Begins Focusing on about 50 to 100 US Scientists as Suspects, Including Steven Hatfill
   
After investigators discover in mid-October 2001 that the anthrax used in the anthrax attacks comes from the Ames strain (see October 10-11, 2001), the FBI investigation largely discards theories that al-Qaeda or Iraq was behind the attacks and begins to focus on domestic suspects. Within weeks, FBI investigators draw up lists of thousands of suspects who have access to anthrax or the scientific knowledge to work with it. Much of the initial investigation focuses on the US military's bioweapons program, and especially the two US Army bioweapons laboratories, USAMRIID (in Maryland) and the Dugway Proving Ground (in Utah) which have heavily used the Ames strain. Mark Smith, a veteran handwriting analyst, studies the anthrax letters and speculates that the suspect has worked for or had close ties to US military intelligence or the CIA. An FBI agent who is also a microbiologist is sent to the Dugway Proving Ground and spends weeks questioning more than 100 employees there. Scientists there are repeatedly asked who they think could have committed the attacks. Several people suggest Steven Hatfill. There is no actual evidence against Hatfill, but he is a larger than life figure with a curious background. The Washington Post will later comment: "Hatfill was not some mild-mannered, white-coated researcher who'd spent his career quietly immersed in scientific minutiae. With his thick black mustache, intense eyes and muscular, stocky build, he looked—and behaved—more like a character in a Hollywood action flick." He is a serious scientist, but colleagues call him "flamboyant," "raunchy," and "abrasive." He has worked with a number of US agencies, including the CIA, FBI, DIA, and Defense Department, on classified bioweapons projects. He has a mysterious background working and studying in South Africa and Zimbabwe for a number of years. For instance, a South African newspaper will report that he carried a gun into South African medical laboratories and boasted to colleagues that he had trained bodyguards for a white separatist leader. He is one of a core group of about 50 to 100 people that the FBI begins focusing on. [Washington Post, 9/14/2003]

Late 2001: Security Records Point Suspicion at Scientist Bruce Ivins
   
Security records indicate that Bruce Ivins, a scientist at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory, extensively uses a "hot suite" laboratory in the evenings and at weekends around the times when the 2001 anthrax attacks letters are mailed (see Mid-August-October 2001). The security records are based on swipes of magnetized plastic access cards, and Ivins is the only one out of a handful of anthrax researchers at USAMRIID make such use of the laboratory. The Los Angeles Times will later note that these records were easily available to investigators in late 2001, but it is unknown when investigators first make note of them. [Los Angeles Times, 8/15/2008] Ivins will not be questioned about his after hours lab work until 2005 (see March 31, 2005).

Winter 2001: Future Anthrax Attacks Suspect Ivins Passes at Least One Polygraph Test, Continues to Work with FBI
   
Bruce Ivins handling the Ames strain of anthrax. The timing of the photo is unknown, but he sent this picture to a friend in an e-mail on November 14, 2001. Bruce Ivins handling the Ames strain of anthrax. The timing of the photo is unknown, but he sent this picture to a friend in an e-mail on November 14, 2001. [Source: Associated Press]At some point in the winter of 2001, the FBI has Bruce Ivins take a polygraph test over the recent anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). Ivins is a microbiologist with expertise in anthrax, and works at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory. The FBI's investigation soon focuses on the possibility that the anthrax attacks could be caused by a single person working at a US lab such as USAMRIID (see November 10, 2001), so Ivins is a likely suspect. But at the same time, he is also assisting the FBI with the anthrax investigation (see Mid-October 2001). Ivins passes the test and retains his role assisting with the investigation. In 2002, more and more USAMRIID employees are given polygraph tests, but Ivins is not tested again. Gerry Andrews, Ivins's boss at the time, will later explain that Ivins is already considered to be in the "safety zone" of cleared suspects. According to the Wall Street Journal, Ivins is never polygraphed again. [Wall Street Journal, 8/7/2008] However, WorldNetDaily will claim that Ivins is given a second polygraph test years later, after he becomes a prime suspect, and he passes that as well. The FBI will later grow so frustrated at the polygraph results that in October 2007 they will ask a judge for permission to search his home and cars specifically to look for any materials, such as books, that could have helped him "defeat a polygraph." FBI handwriting analysts also are unable to match samples of Ivins's handwriting with the writing on the anthrax letters. When this analysis is made is unknown. [WorldNetDaily, 8/7/2008] Justice Department official Dean Boyd will later say, "[Ivins] was told he had passed [the polygraph] because we thought he did." But after Ivins comes under increased suspicion, the FBI had experts re-examine the polygraph results and concluded he had used "countermeasures" such as controlled breathing to cheat the test. However, the FBI has not publicly released the polygraph results and details of the testing remain murky. [Newsweek, 8/9/2008]

December 2001: FBI Questions USAMRIID Scientists about Anthax Attacks
   

FBI agents begin questioning scientists at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory, about the recent anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). One person apparently questioned at this time is Bruce Ivins. [Los Angeles Times, 8/4/2008]

December 2001-May 2002: Anthrax Attacks Suspect Ivins Cleans Up Anthrax Traces near His Desk, Delays Report on It
   
Shortly after the October 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001), suspicions focus on USAMRIID, the US Army's top biological laboratory, as one of the few places where people would have the skills to make the anthrax. In December 2001, one USAMRIID scientist raises the issue of possible anthrax contamination in the lab. Another USAMRIID scientist, Bruce Ivins, takes it upon himself to investigate. He discovers traces of anthrax near his desk, which is away from the lab facilities where he and others work with anthrax and other dangerous substances. He swabs the area clean and decontaminates it. Then he delays filing a report about this for three months. The FBI is suspicious of this, and begins to consider Ivins as a possible suspect. But in sworn statements to the Army in May 2002, Ivins says he avoided filing a report because he did not want to cause an uproar in the facility with people worrying that they were contaminated. He also suggests that a sloppy lab technician could have spread anthrax from secured work spaces to unsecured ones including the desk area. The Army finishes a 300-plus page report that same month. The report concludes the anthrax contamination was accidental and not potentially deadly, and no discipline is recommended against anyone. But after Ivins's death in 2008, the unnamed officer who wrote the report will say: "Of course I think [Ivins's cleaning of the area] was a cover-up.... He was trying to clean up the material" used in the anthrax letters. The report is made available to the FBI, but it is unknown if the FBI makes use of it at the time. By this time, the FBI is more interested in investigating former USAMRIID scientist Steven Hatfill and they put aside their concerns about Ivins. Instead, Ivins remains deeply involved in assisting the FBI's anthrax investigation (see April 2002). [ABC News, 8/1/2008; Los Angeles Times, 8/15/2008]


December 9, 2001: FBI Still Has Not Questioned Some Possible Anthrax Attacks Suspects and Witnesses
   
On October 3, 2001, Ayaad Assaad was questioned by the FBI because a letter written by an unnamed former colleague of his said he was a potential biological terrorist who could attack the US (see October 3, 2001). Just days later, the anthrax attacks became publicly known, and there is speculation that the letter may have been an attempt to frame Assaad for the attacks. Assaad worked at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory where many believe the anthrax used in the attacks originated. Before Assaad left USAMRIID in 1997, some of his colleagues in an informal group called the Camel Club harassed him due to his Middle Eastern background (even though he is Christian and a US citizen—see 1991-1992). In the early 1990s, some members of the Camel Club were found to be working on unauthorized projects at USAMRIID even after no longer being employed there, at a time when anthrax and other deadly germs went missing from the lab (see Early 1992). On December 4, 2001, a military spokesman says that FBI investigators are seeking to question current and former USAMRIID employees. However, on December 9, the Hartford Courant reports that most of the members of the (apparently defunct) Camel Club say they have yet to be questioned by the FBI. An FBI spokesman also says that the FBI is not tracking the source of the anonymous letter blaming Assaad. [Hartford Courant, 12/9/2001] Don Foster is a professor and linguistic analyst helping with the FBI's anthrax investigation. Foster will only find out about the letter after the Courant publishes their December 9 article. He will also discover that many others in the FBI's investigation know nothing of it, either. For instance, top FBI profiler and threat-assessment expert James Fitzgerald, who hired Foster to work on the investigation, has never heard of it. Foster will later comment, "What, I wondered, has the anthrax task force been doing?" [Vanity Fair, 9/15/2003] The FBI will not question some of Assaad's co-workers until 2004 (see February 11-March 17, 2004), and will not question him again until 2004 as well, even though officials say off the record that the Assaad letter remains intriguing (see May 11, 2004).

Shortly After December 9, 2001: Expert Possibly Identifies Author of Letter Blaming Assaad for Anthrax Attacks, but FBI Is Uninterested
   
Ayaad Assaad.Ayaad Assaad. [Source: Public domain]In mid-October 2001, the FBI hires professor Don Foster to help with the anthrax attacks investigation because he is an expert at discovering the authors of unknown texts by an analysis of word usage. He has already helped the FBI with many cases. In early December 2001, he reads a newspaper article about a letter mailed shortly before the anthrax attacks became publicly known that accuses former USAMRIID scientist Ayaad Assaad of planning to launch a biological attack on the US (see October 3, 2001). FBI investigators are largely ignorant of this letter, even though the FBI already strongly suspects that the anthrax used in the attacks came from USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory (see December 9, 2001). Foster asks for and receives a copy of the letter, known as the Quantico letter because it was mailed to a government office in Quantico, Virginia. He looks through documents written by about 40 USAMRIID employees and finds "writings by a female officer that looked like a perfect match." He writes a report to the FBI about this, but the FBI fails to follow through, as the Quantico letter has already been declared irrelevant even though few FBI investigators are even aware of it yet. Foster will write of his experience with the letter in a September 2003 article in Vanity Fair. [Vanity Fair, 9/15/2003] Apparently, this will lead to a renewed interest in the letter. The FBI will finally question Assaad about the letter in 2004, and will express their knowledge of Foster's Vanity Fair article when they talk to him. [Associated Press, 5/16/2004] However, it is unknown if the woman Foster identified is ever questioned. The FBI does show particular interest in questioning one person about the letter in early 2004, but that person is a man (see February 11-March 17, 2004).

December 2001-Early August 2002: FBI Takes Seven Months to Test which Mailbox Was Used to Mail Anthrax Letters
   
The FBI claims the anthrax letters were sent from the middle mailbox of these three mailboxes on Nassau Street, Princeton.The FBI claims the anthrax letters were sent from the middle mailbox of these three mailboxes on Nassau Street, Princeton. [Source: Richard Smith]In mid-October 2001, investigators mistakenly believe that the anthrax letters were mailed from somewhere in West Trenton, New Jersey and are said to have narrowed down the location of the mailbox to a one square mile radius. [New York Times, 10/19/2001] But around December 2001, contamination at a New Jersey postal processing center indicates that the letters in the anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001) had been mailed on one of a limited number of routes near Princeton, New Jersey. However, seven months pass before FBI investigators test hundreds of mailboxes and identify the mailbox where the letters were mailed from. Congressman Rush Holt (D-NJ), whose congressional district includes the area where the letters were mailed from, will later say that he was surprised by how slow and shoddy the investigation was. He will point out, "Within two days they could have dispatched 50 people to wipe all those mailboxes." He will also say that he was surprised when anthrax was found in his Congressional office in October 2001, but investigators never returned to conduct systematic testing to trace the path of the anthrax spores. [New York Times, 8/4/2008] The FBI tests about 600 mailboxes for several weeks and finds and removes the right one in early August. It is located in Princeton, New Jersey, on the corner of Nassau and Bank Streets and opposite the Princeton University campus. [New York Times, 8/14/2002] However, there are doubts that the right mailbox was identified (see August 14, 2002).

December 17, 2001-January 13, 2002: Government Officials Confirm FBI Believes Domestic Loner Caused the Anthrax Attacks
   
On December 17, 2001, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer speaks of the anthrax attacks investigation and says that it is "increasingly looking like it was a domestic source." On January 13, 2002, Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge similarly states, "the primary direction of the investigation is turned inward." [Salon, 2/8/2002] This is confirmation of earlier reports that the investigation is focusing on the profile of a disgruntled American scientist acting alone (see November 10, 2001).


December 21, 2001: FBI Investigating Profit Motive for Anthrax Attacks
   
The FBI is now investigating "whether potential profit from the sale of anthrax medications or cleanup efforts may have motivated" the anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). Battelle, a company doing anthrax work for the CIA, mostly at the Battelle Memorial Institute in Ohio, is the company most discussed in a Washington Post story about this. Dozens of scientists at Battelle have been interviewed by the FBI already because it is one of only a few places where weaponized anthrax has been made. [Washington Post, 12/21/2001] The story comes one day after ABC News reported a Battelle scientist is under investigation for the anthrax attacks, but that story is quickly denied (see September 18-28, 2001).

December 22, 2001: New York Times: Bush Administration Tried but Failed to Pin Anthrax Attacks on Iraq
   
The New York Times reports, "Shortly after the first anthrax victim died in October, the Bush administration began an intense effort to explore any possible link between Iraq and the attacks and continued to do so even after scientists determined that the lethal germ was an American strain, scientists and government officials said." However, the effort eventually fizzled out when no evidence was found to back up the claim. A top federal scientist involved in the investigation says, "I know there are a number of people who would love an excuse to get after Iraq." An unnamed senior intelligence official says: "We looked for any shred of evidence that would bear on this [Iraq connection], or any foreign source. It's just not there." As a result of this Iraq focus, only recently have FBI investigators concentrated on suspects within the US. The anthrax used in the attacks was from the Ames strain, which is a strain most commonly used in US bioweapons programs. Initial evidence strongly suggested that the Iraqi government was never able to obtain the Ames strain, but investigators nonetheless spent a considerable amount of time looking into the issue. Investigators promoted the idea that the anthrax spores were coated with bentonite, an additive supposedly used by Iraqi scientists. But the anthrax used in the attacks actually did not have bentonite coating. The Times notes that investigators say they are not close to identifying any suspect, and, "Some senior Bush administration officials have begun to worry privately that the case might take decades to solve..." [New York Times, 12/22/2001]

Early-Late 2002: Scientists Map Anthrax Genome to Help Anthrax Attacks Investigation, but Make No Breakthroughs
   
Claire Fraser-Liggett.Claire Fraser-Liggett. [Source: University of Maryland]In late 2001, the FBI decides to try to decode the entire DNA sequence of the anthrax genome in an attempt to generate new leads for its anthrax attacks investigation. There are about five million units in the genome. The Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR), a leader in decoding microbe genomes, is given this task. TIGR director Claire Fraser-Liggett forms a small team of scientists. By early 2002, this TIGR team completes the genome. Then they compare the anthrax used in the letter sent to the Sun tabloid to a sample of the same strain, the Ames strain, maintained at Porton Down, the British biological weapons facility. The team finds several differences between the samples, raising the possibility that they could learn exactly which laboratory the anthrax used in the attacks came from. The team then looks at the original Ames strain, taken from a dead cow in Texas in 1981, to attempt to see how the anthrax in the letter evolved from the original. By late 2002, this task is finished but investigators are disappointed to learn that there are almost no noticeable differences between the original Ames strain and the anthrax used in the attacks. [New York Times, 8/20/2008]

January 2002: FBI Begins Subpoenas of Anthrax Labs After Substantial Delays
   
The FBI finally begins subpoenaing laboratories that worked with the Ames strain of anthrax used in the attacks. But when the labs start to send their samples, they are told to wait another month because a new storage room for the sample needs to be built. The Hartford Courant reports, "The FBI's delay in requesting the samples - and the government's lack of readiness to receive them - is part of a pattern." Other examples include taking seven months to begin testing mailboxes surrounding Princeton, New Jersey, where the anthrax letters were postmarked (see December 2001-Early August 2002), and nearly a year to go back into the American Media building in Boca Raton, Florida, to hunt for the source of anthrax that killed the first victim there. [Hartford Courant, 9/7/2002]

January 2002: FBI Interviews Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill for First Time
   
Steven Hatfill, later to emerge as a suspect of the anthrax attacks, is interviewed by FBI investigators for the first time. He is then given a lie-detector test as part of a wide-ranging FBI review of the scientific community. Hatfill is later told he gave satisfactory answers on the test. The FBI returns for a two-hour interview in March. [Washington Post, 8/11/2002]


February-April 2002: Writing Analyst Encourages FBI to Investigate Hatfill for Anthrax Attacks
 
Don Foster.Don Foster. [Source: Al Novak]October 12, 2001, the FBI contracted Don Foster to help with the newly formed anthrax attacks investigation. Foster is a professor of English literature at Vassar College who has been advising the FBI and other government agencies for years due to his expertise in writing analysis. He has sometimes correctly guessed the identities of anonymous authors by analyzing their word usage, not their handwriting styles. By studying news reports of hoax anthrax letters, Foster begins to get interested in Steven Hatfill as a potential suspect. Hatfill had appeared as an expert on biological attacks in some articles dating back to 1998, and he has a curious history while living in Zimbabwe and South Africa in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a time when the racist white government of Zimbabwe (then known as Rhodesia) possibly launched an anthrax attack on their own black citizens. Foster will write in 2003, "When I lined up Hatfill's known movements with the postmark locations of reported biothreats, those hoax anthrax attacks appeared to trail him like a vapor cloud." Around February 2002, Foster suggests Hatfill's name to FBI headquarters as a candidate suspect. But he is told that Hatfill has a good alibi. A month later, he puts forward Hatfill's name again but is told that people in the Defense Department, State Department, and the CIA have vouched for Hatfill. William Patrick, one of the most respected bioterrorism experts, is Hatfill's mentor and also vouches for him (see Early March 2002). In April 2002, Foster meets with Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a professor and biological arms control expert, who has been publicly putting forth theories on who she thinks is behind the anthrax attacks (see February-June 2002). He learns that she has independently come to the same conclusion, that Hatfill should be the prime suspect. Foster will later write that the FBI was "prodded publicly by Rosenberg and privately by myself" to investigate Hatfill more closely. Foster will apparently be eased out of the FBI's anthrax investigation when he requests some documents to analyze and the FBI does not show them to him. He will write an article in Vanity Fair in 2003 that will strongly imply Hatfill could be behind the anthrax attacks. [Vanity Fair, 9/15/2003]

February-June 2002: Professor's Theories Help Drive FBI's Interest in Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill
   
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg.Barbara Hatch Rosenberg. [Source: Public domain]In February 2002, Dr. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg claims in a public speech at Princeton University that she knows the identity of the killer behind the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). Rosenberg is a professor of molecular biology at the State University of New York at Purchase, and a biological arms control expert. She states: "There are a number of insiders—government insiders—who know people in the anthrax field who have a common suspect. The FBI has questioned that person more than once... so it looks as though the FBI is taking that person very seriously." She also claims that the FBI is not that interested in going after this suspect because "[t]his guy knows too much, and knows things the US isn't very anxious to publicize" (see February 8, 2002). In June 2002, she puts out a paper that details her theory about this suspect. She states that "a number of inside experts (at least five that I know about) gave the FBI the name of one specific person as the most likely suspect." That same month, she presents her ideas to Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy, both of whom had been targeted in the anthrax attacks. She also is invited to brief the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee (see June 24, 2002). Immediately after this, the FBI searches Hatfill's home while reporters watch, putting him in the public eye as a possible suspect (see June 25, 2002). Rosenberg later denies ever mentioning Hatfill by name. However, one reporter later claims that Rosenberg had specifically given Hatfill's name as the lead suspect. Furthermore, the description of her suspect exactly matches Hatfill. Hatfill will later blame Rosenberg for the FBI's interest in him. He will say: "She's crazy. She caused it." [Washington City Paper, 7/25/2003] In 2008, Hatfill will be officially cleared of any involvement in the anthrax attacks (see August 8, 2008).

February 8, 2002: FBI's Anthrax Investigation Casts Wide Net, Despite Relatively Small Number of Likely Suspect Laboratories and Scientists
 
Salon exposes details about the FBI's anthrax investigation. The FBI appears to be casting a very wide net, for instance approaching all 40,000 members of the American Society of Microbiologists and putting out flyers all over New Jersey asking for information. Yet nearly all the evidence so far suggests that the Ames strain of anthrax used in the attacks was only given to about 20 laboratories in the US, and most likely only four US laboratories have the capability for "weaponizing" dry anthrax. Two of these labs are the US Army's USAMRIID in Fort Detrick, Maryland, or the US Army's Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. There are probably less than 50 scientists in the US with the necessary skills. Meanwhile, the FBI has not yet subpoenaed employee records of the few labs that used the strain of anthrax used in the attacks. Numerous anthrax experts express puzzlement. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a professor and biological arms control expert, believes the FBI is dragging its heels for political reasons. She is convinced the FBI knows who mailed the anthrax letters, but is not arresting him, because he has been involved in secret biological weapons research that the US does not want revealed. "This guy knows too much, and knows things the US isn't very anxious to publicize. Therefore, they don't want to get too close." It will later turn out that she is referring to anthrax suspect Steven Hatfill (see February-June 2002). [Salon, 2/8/2002]

February 22-27, 2002: Anthrax Attacks Suspect Ivins Submits Anthrax Sample to FBI Investigators
 
Anthrax under magnification.Anthrax under magnification. [Source: T. W. Geisbert / USAMRIID]Scientist Bruce Ivins submits a sample of the anthrax he has been using to FBI investigators. Ivins works at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory, and is helping with the anthrax investigation even though the FBI has reason to believe the anthrax could have come from USAMRIID (see Mid-October 2001 and Winter 2001). Ivins is using a variety of the Ames anthrax strain known as RMR-1029. A subpoena dated February 22, 2002 is issued to Ivins and other scientists, telling them to submit samples of their anthrax. Ivins submits his sample on February 27, apparently before he receives the subpoena. He is the only scientist to submit a sample before getting the subpoena. He had been discussing with investigators what kind of protocol to use for the samples, so he is familiar with the desire for the samples and how to submit them, but he does not completely the protocol with his sample. The FBI will soon destroy the sample he submits because it has not been prepared using the protocol, which is necessary for it to be used as valid evidence in trial. In April 2002, Ivins will submit a second anthrax sample. Around 2004, scientists will discover some unique genetic markers to the anthrax used in the 2001 attacks and will start comparing that anthrax to other anthrax. No match will be found between Ivins's April 2002 sample and the anthrax used in the attacks. However, Paul Keim, a biologist at Northern Arizona University and an expert at distinguishing various strains of anthrax, keeps duplicates of all the anthrax samples sent to the FBI. In early 2007, it will be discovered that he still has a copy of Ivins's February 2002 sample. A match will be discovered between that RMR-1029 sample and the sample from the attacks (see Early 2007). However, at least 100 scientists had access to this sample (see Late 2005-2006). [US Department of Justice, 8/18/2008; New York Times, 8/20/2008]

March-April 2002: Some Report Possible 9/11 Hijacker Link to Anthrax Attacks, Despite Thin Evidence
 
In June 2001, Ahmed Alhaznawi visited the emergency room of Holy Cross Hospital in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and was treated for a skin lesion. He was accompanied by Ziad Jarrah. In October 2001, after a series of mysterious anthrax attacks in the US became front-page news (see October 5-November 21, 2001), the treating doctor told the FBI he recognized the two hijackers and thought the wound was consistent with cutaneous anthrax exposure. However, the FBI discounted the possibility that the anthrax attacks originated with the hijackers or al-Qaeda. In March 2002, the New York Times reports that FBI spokesman John Collingwood "said the possibility of a connection between the hijackers and the anthrax attacks had been deeply explored. 'This was fully investigated and widely vetted among multiple agencies several months ago... Exhaustive testing did not support that anthrax was present anywhere the hijackers had been.'" [New York Times, 3/23/2002] The FBI is criticized by the neoconservative Weekly Standard for focusing its investigation on a possible domestic perpetrator rather that Iraq or al-Qaeda: "Based on the publicly available evidence, there appears to be no convincing rationale for the FBI's nearly exclusive concentration on American suspects. And the possibility is far from foreclosed that the anthrax bioterrorist was just who he said he was: a Muslim, impliedly from overseas." [Weekly Standard, 4/29/2002] In March 2002 it is also reported that US forces in Afghanistan have discovered installations that could have been used by al-Qaeda to produce biological weapons. "US forces recently discovered a site near the southern Afghan city of Kandahar that appeared to be an al-Qaeda biological weapons lab under construction. At the lab, 'there was evidence of the attempt, by bin Laden, to get his hands on weapons of mass destruction, anthrax, or a variety of others,' Gen. Tommy Franks, head of the US Central Command, said... in an interview." [CBS News, 3/23/2002] However, little new evidence will subsequently come out suggesting al-Qaeda was behind the October 2001 anthrax attacks.

Early March 2002: Bioweapons Expert Finally Interviewed by the FBI, Invited to Join Anthrax Investigation despite Close Ties to Main Suspect
   
William Patrick.William Patrick. [Source: Public domain]William Patrick is interviewed by the FBI in relation to the anthrax attacks. He is the inventor of the US anthrax weaponization process. He retired from decades of government employment in 1986, but continues with private consulting work. Patrick is surprised that the FBI did not interview him earlier. He is also a former superior to Steven Hatfill, who is emerging as the FBI's prime suspect around this time (see February 1999). [BBC, 3/14/2002] Additionally, Hatfill is considered Patrick's main protege. One bioterrorism expert says their close relationship is "like father and son." [Washington Post, 9/14/2003] After passing a lie detector test, the FBI invites Patrick to join the inner circle of technical advisers to the anthrax investigation. [Baltimore Sun, 6/27/2002] Later in 2002, the FBI searches Patrick's house with bloodhounds, but apparently fail to gain any leads. [Washington Post, 9/14/2003] It is later noted that "many of the experts the FBI has turned to for help are also, almost by definition, potential suspects. That has put FBI agents in the uncomfortable position of having to subject their scientist-consultants to polygraph tests, and then, afterward, ask those same experts to help analyze evidence." [Hartford Courant, 9/7/2002]


In February 2002, scientist Bruce Ivins submitted a sample of the anthrax he has been using to FBI investigators, but it was destroyed because it was not submitted according to strict protocols. As a result, he is asked to submit a second sample in April 2002, and does. Ivins works at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory, and is helping with the anthrax investigation even as the FBI has reason to believe the anthrax could have come from USAMRIID (see Mid-October 2001 and Winter 2001). Ivins is using a variety of the Ames anthrax strain known as RMR-1029. Around early 2004, scientists will discover some unique genetic markers to the anthrax used in the 2001 attacks and will start comparing that anthrax to other anthrax. No match will be found between Ivins's April 2002 sample and the anthrax used in the attacks. As a result of this discrepancy, the FBI will raid Ivins's lab in July 2004 and seize more samples of RMR-1029 (see July 16, 2004). Additionally, Paul Keim, a biologist at Northern Arizona University and an expert at distinguishing various strains of anthrax, keeps duplicates of all the anthrax samples sent to the FBI. In early 2007, it will be discovered that he still has a copy of Ivins's February 2002 sample. A match will be discovered between that RMR-1029 sample and the sample from the attacks (see Early 2007). However, at least 100 scientists had access to this sample (see Late 2005-2006). [New York Times, 8/20/2008] It remains unknown if Ivins altered the sample he submitted. Keim will later say that the genetic markers found in other samples of RMR-1029 should have been found in Ivins's sample. He will note that "the FBI is implying he did it on purpose." However, he will say that "Ivins may simply have failed to collect a representative sample." [Philadelphia Inquirer, 9/1/2008] In an August 2008 press briefing (see August 18, 2008), a government official will be asked if the sample submitted was not RMR-1029. The official will reply, "I don't want to speculate that far." [US Department of Justice, 8/18/2008]

April 2002: FBI Supposedly Suspects Ivins for Anthrax Attacks, but Allows Him to Continue Helping Anthrax Investigation
 
ABC News will later report that the FBI begins suspecting scientist Bruce Ivins for the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001) in early 2002. The FBI first begins to suspect Ivins in April when it is discovered he had failed to quickly report anthrax had been found near his desk, away from the laboratory area where he usually works with anthrax. Ivins claims he did not report the leak in a timely manner because he did not want to cause an uproar (see December 2001-May 2002). One of Ivins's colleagues will later confirm that Ivins knew he had been under suspicion for years, and hired a criminal defense lawyer not long after the attacks. However, the FBI is already focusing their suspicions on a different scientist, Steven Hatfill (see February-June 2002), and largely dismisses concerns about Ivins. Ivins had passed a polygraph test (see Winter 2001), and directly assists the FBI with the anthrax investigation (see Mid-October 2001). Not only does he help analyze the anthrax letters, but he participates in strategy meetings on how to find the person responsible. [ABC News, 8/1/2008] Court documents will later claim that Ivins also repeatedly offers the FBI names of colleagues at USAMRIID who might be potential suspects in the attacks. In a 2007 search of his house, the FBI will find an e-mail from 2002 in which he names two fellow scientists and gives 11 reasons for their possible guilt. He sent the email from a personal account to his Army account, but it is not known if he sent it to anyone else. The FBI will later claim he was attempting to mislead the investigation. [New York Times, 8/7/2008; Wall Street Journal, 8/7/2008] Brad Garrett, a former FBI agent involved in the anthrax investigation, will later say, "If he in fact was the correct person, he was actually put in charge of analyzing the evidence of his own crime." [ABC News, 8/1/2008]

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

April 7, 2002: Government Sources Claim Some Anthrax Used in 2001 Attacks Was Very Sophisticated and Hard to Produce

The envelope to the Patrick Leahy letter.The envelope to the Patrick Leahy letter. [Source: FBI]Newsweek reports that "government sources" say a "secret new analysis shows anthrax found in a letter addressed to Senate Judiciary Committee chairman Patrick Leahy was ground [or milled] to a microscopic fineness not achieved by US biological-weapons experts." The letters to Leahy and Sen. Tom Daschle are believed to have contained a more sophisticated form of anthrax than those in the other letters. Newsweek says these two letter were "coated with a chemical compound unknown to experts who have worked in the field for years; the coating matches no known anthrax samples ever recovered from biological-weapons producers anywhere in the world, including Iraq and the former Soviet Union." [Newsweek, 4/7/2002] The belief that these two anthrax letters used a very sophisticated form of anthrax is widespread by this time (see October 25-29, 2001). However, from 2006 onwards, the FBI will assert there was no coating or milling on any of the anthrax letters at all (see August 2006).

May 2, 2002: DNA Sequencing Shows Anthrax Used in Attacks Most Likely Came from USAMRIID
 

USAMRIID.USAMRIID. [Source: Public domain]After extensive testing, the DNA sequence of the anthrax sent through the US mail in 2001 is deciphered, and it strongly supports suspicions that the bacteria originally came from USAMRIID, the US Army's biological laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Furthermore, analysis of genetic drift determines that the attacker's anthrax was not separated from the source anthrax at USAMRIID for many generations. It suggests that USAMRIID or USAMRIID samples given to Dugway Proving Ground in Utah and/or Porton Downs in Britain are the most likely sources of the anthrax used in the attacks. [New Scientist, 5/2/2002]

May 21-24, 2002: Pressure Mounts on FBI to Solve Anthrax Case

A New York Times column by Nicholas Kristof says it's time to "light a fire under the FBI in its investigation of the anthrax case. Experts in the bioterror field are already buzzing about a handful of individuals who had the ability, access, and motive to send the anthrax." [New York Times, 5/24/2002] Similarly, the Guardian suggests that the FBI investigation is moving deliberately slow because the federal authorities have something to hide, stating "there is surely a point after which incompetence becomes an insufficient explanation for failure." [Guardian, 5/21/2002]

 
May 24-August 13, 2002: New York Times Columnist Repeatedly Suggests Hatfill Was Responsible for Anthrax Attacks
 

Nicholas Kristof.Nicholas Kristof. [Source: Publicity photo]Columnist Nicholas Kristof writes a series of articles in the New York Times suggesting that Steven Hatfill could be responsible for the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). His columns start out vague. In his first column on the subject on May 24, 2002, he speaks of an unnamed "middle-aged American who has worked for the United States military bio-defense program and had access to the labs at Fort Detrick, Maryland. His anthrax vaccinations are up to date, he unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax, and he was upset at the United States government in the period preceding the anthrax attack." [New York Times, 5/24/2002] Kristof writes in his next column: "Some in the biodefense community think they know a likely culprit, whom I'll call Mr. Z. Although the bureau has polygraphed Mr. Z, searched his home twice and interviewed him four times, it has not placed him under surveillance or asked its outside handwriting expert to compare his writing to that on the anthrax letters." [New York Times, 7/2/2002] His next column suggests Mr. Z could have been behind a fake anthrax scare in 1997 (see April 24, 1997). [New York Times, 7/12/2002] In his final column, he reveals that Mr. Z is in fact Steven Hatfill, the FBI's prime suspect at the time. Kristof writes: "There is not a shred of traditional physical evidence linking him to the attacks. Still, Dr. Hatfill is wrong to suggest that the FBI has casually designated him the anthrax 'fall guy.' The authorities' interest in Dr. Hatfill arises from a range of factors, including his expertise in dry biological warfare agents, his access to Fort Detrick labs where anthrax spores were kept (although he did not work with anthrax there) and the animus to some federal agencies that shows up in his private writings. He has also failed three successive polygraph examinations since January, and canceled plans for another polygraph exam two weeks ago." [New York Times, 8/13/2002] Many of the allegations in Kristof's articles will turn out to be incorrect. The US government will finally clear Hatfill of any connection to the anthrax attacks in 2008 (see August 8, 2008).

Summer 2002: FBI Allegedly Harrasses Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill's Girlfriend
   

Steven Hatfill, the FBI's prime suspect in the anthrax attacks at the time, has an unnamed Malaysian-born girlfriend that he has been involved with for several years. According to a complaint by Hatfill's lawyer, in the summer of 2002 the FBI shows up at her Pacific Northerwest condominium with a search warrant and tells her that Hatfill has "killed five people." They reportedly tear her home apart, leaving it "look[ing] like a war zone." [Washington Post, 9/14/2003] These tactics will closely parallel how the FBI will pressure relatives of anthrax attacks suspect Bruce Ivins several years later. In early 2007, FBI agents will reportedly confront Ivins's wife and son in public and ask his wife, "Do you know he killed people" (see March 2008)?

June 2002: Scientists Determine Anthrax Used in Attacks Is Two Years Old or Less
   

Scientists working with the FBI's anthrax attacks investigation determine that the anthrax used in the attacks was relatively new. A series of nuclear weapons tests in the US in the 1950s left traces of carbon-14. Every year, the quantity of carbon-14 diminishes at a predictable rate. So, by "calculating the ratio of carbon-14 to the normal kind in residue of plants eaten by the cow from which the [anthrax] was made," investigators learn that the anthrax had been grown within the last two years. The anthrax is no more than two years older than when it was sent, which would mean the anthrax cannot be older than roughly September 1999. [New York Times, 6/23/2002; New York Times, 8/5/2008]

June 23, 2002: Lax Security Alleged at USAMRIID; Scientists There Inexperienced with Dry Anthrax
   

Arthur Friedlander.Arthur Friedlander. [Source: Defense Department / Larry Otsby]The New York Times reports that the FBI is investigating the possibility that the anthrax used in the 2001 anthrax attacks was smuggled out of USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Arthur Friedlander, a senior USAMRIID scientist, says that researchers at USAMRIID use wet anthrax only and have no idea how to make dry powders (the anthrax used in the attacks was a dry powder). But FBI agents are questioning USAMRIID scientists about the possibility that someone could smuggle out some of the anthrax and refine it elsewhere. Luann Battersby, a microbiologist who worked at USAMRIID from 1990 to 1998, says FBI agents interviewed her for three hours on June 12 about the smuggling theory. She says: "I said it was extremely easy to do.... A quarter-million micro-organisms fit in the period at the end of a sentence. It doesn't take any great strategy to take this stuff out." [New York Times, 6/23/2002]

June 24, 2002: Professor's Congressional Briefing Precedes FBI's Public Focus on Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill
   

A curious Congressional briefing takes place on June 24, 2002. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a professor and biological arms control expert, has been publicly hinting that she knows who is behind the 2001 anthrax attacks. She has been describing a profile that perfectly matches Steven Hatfill without actually naming him or giving any other name (see February-June 2002). On this day, she takes part in a closed door meeting with congressional staffers from the Senate Judiciary Committee to discuss her theories. Van Harp, the head of the FBI's anthrax investigation, Robert Roth, a top manager of the investigation, and other FBI officials also attend the meeting. Rosenberg lays out her theories but fails to name her sources or give any hard evidence. At one point, Harp asks her in frustration: "Do you know who did this? Do you know?" She say she does not. Harp has a private conversation with Rosenberg after the meeting. [Washington Post, 9/14/2003] It is unknown what is said, but the next day, the FBI searches Hatfill's apartment and tips off the media to the search, beginning a public focus on Hatfill as the FBI's main suspect (see June 25, 2002).

June 25, 2002: FBI Searches Home of Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill; Tips Off Media in Advance
   

Brad Garrett.Brad Garrett. [Source: ABC News]The FBI search the home of a scientist who worked at USAMRIID, the US Army's biological laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland. [Associated Press, 6/25/2002] This scientist remains anonymous in most stories, but some name him as Steven Hatfill. The search comes just one day after professor Barbara Hatch Rosenberg briefed a senate committee and FBI officials on her theory that Hatfill was responsible for the anthrax attacks (see February-June 2002 and June 24, 2002). The FBI announces that the search found nothing and Hatfill is not a suspect. In the wake of all these stories, one microbiologist states, "Their intent was clearly to put [Hatfill's] name in the public eye. The only question is why." [Hartford Courant, 6/27/2002]
Media Tip Off - The media is tipped off in advance to the search. Even as Hatfill is signing a search authorization, news helicopters are already seen flying towards his apartment. Within minutes, droves of reporters arrive. FBI agent Robert Roth, who is part of the search, will later admit in court that "probably several hundred" people knew in advance about the search. Hatfill will continue to cooperate with the FBI.
Tip Off Called Inappropriate - But FBI agent Brad Garrett, also involved in the search, will later comment, "I wouldn't have spoken to us after that [media tip off]." Asked if it was appropriate to tip off the media beforehand, he will reply, "Absolutely not..... t's clearly not appropriate or even responsible to do that in reference to the person you are searching. He's not been charged. He has not gone to court." Additionally, it could forewarn "people you are coming to search" and tip off accomplices. [Los Angeles Times, 6/29/2008]

July 2002-Late 2003: FBI Openly and Constantly Monitors Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill
   

An FBI agent checking a dumpster near Steven Hatfill's apartment.An FBI agent checking a dumpster near Steven Hatfill's apartment. [Source: WUSA]In July 2002, anthrax attacks suspect Steven Hatfill is put under 24-hour surveillance. The surveillance comes after bloodhounds allegedly link Hatfill to the anthrax letters at some point in July. (This bloodhound evidence will be quickly debunked by the media, but apparently this does not dissuade the FBI (see August 4, 2002)). [Vanity Fair, 9/15/2003] The surveillance is quite open and obvious at times. In December 2002, Hatfill alleges that a virtual caravan of unmarked vans and cars are keeping him under constant surveillance, following him on errands and to restaurants, and driving past his house with a video camera pointed out the window. He also believes that his telephone is being wiretapped. [United Press International, 12/23/2002] In May 2003, Hatfill walks up to one of the agents following him attempts to videotape him. The agent drives into Hatfill and runs over his foot. Remarkably, the driver is not punished but Hatfill gets a five-dollar ticket for "walking to create a hazard." Mike Hayes, a retired 20-year FBI agent specializing in surveillance, says to a reporter regarding the FBI's behavior with Hatfill, "What you're describing—really obvious surveillance—doesn't make a lot of sense." [Baltimore Sun, 5/20/2003] Shortly after the incident, USA Today reports, "FBI officials believe they can't risk the embarrassment of losing track of Hatfill, even for a few hours, and then being confronted with more anthrax attacks." Privately, Hatfill's lawyer suggests that Hatfill could be outfitted with a satellite-guided tracking device and allow an FBI agent to stay with him at all times, but the FBI rejects the offer. [Los Angeles Times, 6/29/2008] The surveillance continues until late 2003 and is very intermittent after that. [Baltimore Sun, 7/21/2004] The FBI will later admit that this type of open surveillance of a suspect is against FBI guidelines. However, when the FBI's focus turns to Bruce Ivins in 2007, they will use the same technique on him (see Autumn 2007-July 29, 2008).

July 21, 2002: Time Magazine: FBI Anthrax Investigation Still Hasn't Narrowed
   

In an article titled, "Anthrax: the Noose Widens," Time magazine reports, "Despite recent claims by some in the bioterrorism community that the investigation should be homing in on one particular American bioweapons expert, the FBI appears to be moving in the opposite direction. US government officials say the investigation is still ranging far and wide and that the FBI has not ruled out a foreign connection." [Time, 7/21/2002] The unnamed expert is a clear reference to Steven Hatfill. The FBI will name him a "person of interest" in the investigation days later (see August 1, 2002).

August 1, 2002: FBI Names Hatfill as 'Person of Interest'; Other FBI Agents Speculate Hatfill is Being Framed
   

The FBI names Steven Hatfill as a "person of interest" in the anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001), the first person to be so named. The same day, the FBI conductis a second search of his house after tipping the media off in advance (see August 1, 2002). [Associated Press, 8/1/2002; London Times, 8/2/2002] CBS News initially reports: "Federal law enforcement sources told CBS News that Dr. Steven Hatfill was 'the chief guy we're looking at' in the probe. The sources were careful not to use the word suspect, but said they were 'zeroing in on this guy' and that he is 'the focus of the investigation.'" But later in the day their story is changed and that text is removed. Instead, Hatfill is referred to as "a bio-defense scientist on the FBI's radar screen for months who's now emerged as a central figure in the anthrax investigation." [CBS News, 8/1/2002] On the same day, Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, one of the world's top anthrax specialists, is interviewed by FBI agents who ask her whether a team of government scientists could be trying to frame Hatfill. Rosenberg has been very publicly critical of the FBI investigation. [Washington Times, 8/3/2002] She actually appears to be a key figure in getting the FBI to focus on Hatfill in the first place (see February-June 2002). Newsweek follows with a lengthy article purporting to detail the entire anthrax investigation, but it focuses entirely on Hatfill and fails to mention others involved in suspicious activities. [Newsweek, 8/4/2002] The Washington Post does a similar story focusing on Hatfill only, and even claims the US biowarfare program ended decades ago, despite revelations in late 2001 that it is still continuing. [Washington Post, 8/4/2002] Attorney General John Ashcroft calls Hatfill a "person of interest" on August 6. [Los Angeles Times, 6/29/2008]

August 1, 2002: FBI Sends Email to LSU: Cease and Desist Employing Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill on Government Programs

A Justice Department grants administrator sends an e-mail to Louisiana State University's biomedical research and training center, telling it to "immediately cease and desist" from employing researcher and 2001 anthrax attacks suspect Steven Hatfill on department-funded programs. The next day Hatfill is placed on administrative leave. [CNN, 9/5/2002; Los Angeles Times, 6/29/2008] On September 4, he is fired. [Associated Press, 9/4/2002] A day after that, the person who hired him is fired as well. [Associated Press, 9/5/2002] The LSU center relies on funding from the Justice Department for 97 percent of its money. [Weekly Standard, 9/16/2002] The New York Times will later report that "several senior law enforcement officials expressed embarrassment over the e-mail incident, saying the domestic preparedness office acted improperly because Mr. Hatfill has never been charged with any wrongdoing and has not been [officially] identified as a suspect." [New York Times, 9/5/2002] Attorney General John Ashcroft and five FBI officials will later testify that they knew of no other instance in which the government had forced an investigative target out of a non-governmental job. [Los Angeles Times, 6/29/2008]

August 1, 2002: FBI Conducts Second Search of Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill's Apartment, Tips Off Media in Advance Again
   
A television film crew at Steven Hatfill's apartment on August 1, 2002.A television film crew at Steven Hatfill's apartment on August 1, 2002. [Source: Alex Wong / Getty Images]The FBI conducts a second search of Steven Hatfill's apartment on the same day he is officially named a "person of interest" in the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). FBI agents are seen investigating his trash. [Associated Press, 8/1/2002; London Times, 8/2/2002] As with the first search of his apartment in June (see June 25, 2002), the media is tipped off in advance. An FBI agent involved in the search, Brad Garrett, will later say, "Obviously, someone told them we were going to do that search." FBI agent Robert Roth, also part of the search, will call the tip offs "just ridiculous." The fact that the search is made with a court issued warrant is also leaked to the media, implying that Hatfill is no longer cooperating with investigators when in fact he still is. [Los Angeles Times, 6/29/2008]

August 1, 2002 and After: FBI Neglects Other Leads after Publicly Naming Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill
   

After the FBI publicly names Steven Hatfill as a "person of interest" in the anthrax investigation on August 1, 2002 (see August 1, 2002), FBI leaders become increasingly fixated on him and fail to follow up on other leads. One anonymous FBI agent involved in the case will later say: "They exhausted a tremendous amount of time and energy on him... I'm still convinced that whatever seemed interesting or worth pursuing was just basically nullified in the months or year following when 'person of interest' came out about Hatfill." Other possibilities are neglected because it is assumed in the FBI that "sooner or later they'll have this guy nailed." Another anonymous FBI investigator will say: "Particular management people felt, 'He is the right guy. If we only put this amount of energy into him, we'll get to the end of the rainbow.' Did it take energy away? It had to have. Because you can't pull up another hundred agents and say, 'You go work these leads [that] these guys can't because they're just focused on Hatfill.'" The Los Angeles Times will later comment, "The preoccupation with Hatfill persisted for years, long after investigators failed to turn up any evidence linking him to the mailings." [Los Angeles Times, 6/29/2008]

After August 1, 2002: FBI Director Mueller Prevents Criminal Probe of Media Leaks in Anthrax Attacks Investigation
   
On June 25, 2002, and again on August 1, 2002, the FBI conducts searches of Steven Hatfill's apartment, and the media is tipped off in advance. Some FBI agents are upset at the lax security allowing the leaks (see June 25, 2002 and August 1, 2002). At some point after the second search, an unnamed FBI official recommends a criminal probe of the leaks with mandatory polygraph tests. However, according to later court testimony by FBI agent Robert Roth, FBI Director Robert Mueller opposes the idea. Mueller says: "I don't want to do that.... It's bad for morale to go after these people." Apparently, no action is taken and the leaks continue. [Los Angeles Times, 6/29/2008] In at least one media leak in August 2002, it will later be found that one of the leakers was Van Harp, the head of the FBI's anthrax investigation (see August 4, 2002).

August 4, 2002: FBI Smears Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill with Improbable Bloodhound Story
   
Roscoe Howard Jr.Roscoe Howard Jr. [Source: Associated Press]Newsweek reports that bloodhounds have recently been used in the search for the killer in the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). Supposedly, the dogs were presented with "scent packs" lifted from anthrax-tainted letters mailed the year before, even though the letters had long since been decontaminated. The dogs reportedly showed no reaction wherever they were sent, except when taken to the apartment of anthrax suspect Steven Hatfill, where the dogs reportedly become agitated and go "crazy." It is said they showed similar reactions at the apartment of Hatfill's girlfriend and a Denny's restaurant in Louisiana where Hatfill had eaten the day before. [Newsweek, 8/4/2002] However, three days later, the Baltimore Sun reports that managers at all 12 of the Denny's in Louisiana say they have not been visited by federal agents with bloodhounds. Furthermore, three veteran bloodhound handlers are interviewed and say they are skeptical that any useful scent could have remained on the letters after so much time, as well as after the decontamination. Former officer and bloodhound handler Weldon Wood says, "Anything is possible. But is it feasible, after this length of time and what the letters have been through? I would doubt it." The Sun suggests, "the possibility exists that the story was a leak calculated to put pressure on Hatfill." [Baltimore Sun, 8/8/2002] Investigators will later conclude that the dogs' excitement is useless as evidence. Van Harp, the FBI official in charge of the anthrax investigation, and Roscoe Howard Jr., the US attorney for Washington, DC, will later admit they leaked the bloodhound story to Newsweek. [Los Angeles Times, 6/29/2008]

August 11, 2002: FBI Concedes Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill Does Not Have Skills to Make Anthrax Used in Attacks
   
It is reported on ABC World News Tonight that Steven Hatfill is "known as a person who has worked around anthrax experts, although the FBI concedes he could not himself make anthrax, does not have what they call 'the bench skills' to make it." Hatfill is the FBI's only publicly named suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks at this time (see October 5-November 21, 2001 and August 1, 2002). [ABC News, 8/11/2002] But despite this, the FBI will continue to focus on Hatfill for years and apparently will not even consider the possibility of accomplices.

August 11, 2002: Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill Publicly Claims He Is Being Set Up as 'Fall Guy'
   
Hatfill holding a press conference on August 11, 2002.Hatfill holding a press conference on August 11, 2002. [Source: Associated Press / Rick Bowner]Anthrax suspect Steven Hatfill defends himself in a public speech and Washington Post interview. He claims that he is being set up as the "fall guy" for the anthrax attacks. He says his life "has been completely and utterly destroyed," and he has twice lost a job due to the allegations. His lawyer also accuses the FBI of leaking documents to the press and conducting searches of Hatfill's residence in a highly visible way when a more discreet method could have been arranged. [Washington Post, 8/11/2002; Fox News, 8/12/2002]

August 14, 2002: FBI's Identification of Mailbox Used in Anthrax Attacks May Be Incorrect

The FBI claims the anthrax letters were sent from the middle mailbox of these three mailboxes on Nassau Street, Princeton.The FBI claims the anthrax letters were sent from the middle mailbox of these three mailboxes on Nassau Street, Princeton. [Source: Jill Becker / The New York Times]The Times of Trenton, a Trenton, New Jersey, newspaper, reports that there are doubts about the FBI's recent claim that the mailbox where the anthrax letters were sent has been found (see December 2001-Early August 2002). The newspaper reports, "nvestigators say it is impossible at this point, and might never be determined, whether the Nassau Street mailbox was a point of origin for one of the letters or if it became contaminated through contact with other mail or equipment containing traces of anthrax." FBI agent Ken Shuey, in charge of the FBI's temporary field office based in Trenton, says, [W]e can't say with certainty where the letters entered the mail system until we have some other corroboration or someone confesses." The difficulty is that the mailbox served two purposes: members of the public could drop letters in it, but it was also used to hold sorted mail for letter carriers to deliver. The mailbox is the only one out of about 650 mailboxes in the area to test positive for anthrax, but there seems to be no way to tell if the anthrax was from letters placed directly into it or cross-contamination by letters from other nearby mailboxes that were passing through it. State Health Commissioner Clifton Lacy says he suspects cross-contamination is to blame for the anthrax detection. FBI spokesperson Bill Evanina says: "We have no idea. It could be something that was placed in the box or it could be cross-contamination. It is way, way too early to tell." [Times of Trenton, 8/14/2002] Other newspapers fail to report on the cross-contamination problem and, as of September 2008, the FBI has yet to make public information explaining any solution to the problem.

August 15, 2002: Seeking Witnesses to Anthrax Mailing, FBI Shows Only Hatfill's Photo
   
Trace elements of anthrax have been found in a post office box across the street from Princeton University in New Jersey. [MSNBC, 8/12/2002] The FBI declares Steven Hatfill has not "received any more attention than any other person of interest in the investigation." [Fox News, 8/12/2002] Yet Hatfill is the only named "person of interest," and his photo is the only one being shown by the FBI to residents of the neighborhood near the mailbox. [Associated Press, 8/15/2002] The New York Times will later report, "Criminologists said that only by showing photos of a number of people could investigators have confidence in an eyewitness identification of Dr. Hatfill or any other suspect." [New York Times, 8/4/2008] Several months later, a law enforcement official admits to the Los Angeles Times that, "to be honest, we don't have anybody that is real good [as a possible anthrax suspect]. That is why so much energy has gone into Hatfill—because we didn't have anybody else." [Weekly Standard, 9/16/2002]

August 18, 2002: Washington Post Criticizes FBI's Hatfill Treatment, Media Coverage
   
A Washington Post editorial blasts the FBI's treatment of anthrax attacks suspect Steven Hatfill. "Each slipshod case whittles away our collective liberties, our self-respect, our confidence in the legal system." The Post also blasts the media's coverage: "Wittingly or unwittingly, reporters and government investigators may collude, creating the appearance of a posse mentality that discredits them both." [Washington Post, 8/18/2002]

August 18, 2002: FBI Linguistics Expert Expresses Frustration at Anthrax Investigation Problems

An FBI forensic linguistics expert says the anthrax mailer was probably someone with high-ranking US military and intelligence connections. He says he has identified two suspects who both worked for the CIA, USAMRIID, and other classified military operations. He expresses frustration about accessing evidence. "My two suspects both appear to have CIA connections. These two agencies, the CIA and the FBI, are sometimes seen as rivals. My anxiety is that the FBI agents assigned to this case are not getting full and complete cooperation from the US military, CIA, and witnesses who might have information about this case." He also says the killer seems to have tried implicating two former USAMRIID scientists who had left the laboratory in unhappy circumstances by posting the letters from near their homes in New Jersey. [BBC, 8/18/2002]

August 26, 2002: Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill Releases Photos; Claims FBI Trashed his Apartment
   
A picture of Steven Hatfill's apartment after the FBI went through it.A picture of Steven Hatfill's apartment after the FBI went through it. [Source: Alex Wong / Getty Images]Anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001) suspect Steven Hatfill releases photos he claims show that the FBI "trashed" his girlfriend's apartment. The photos "evoked an uneasy sense of recognition among law enforcement experts," who have seen these kinds of strong armed tactics when the FBI is desperate for a conviction. "Veteran FBI-watchers suggest the Bureau, looking at Steven Hatfill off and on for nearly a year, does not have the goods on him. Law enforcement sources confirm he passed a polygraph test administered by the FBI last fall... Apparent absence of evidence suggests either incompetence at the level of false accusations in the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Park bombing—or something worse." [New York Post, 8/3/2002]

Autumn 2002: Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill Helps Train US Special Forces while FBI Investigates Him
   
In autumn 2002, US Delta Force units train on a mobile biological weapons factory to prepare them for dealing with mobile biological weapons factories in Iraq. The factory is just like the factories the US accuses the Iraqi government of having but which it does not have. The chief designer of the factory is Steven Hatfill, who is also the FBI's main suspect at the time for the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). Hatfill began designing the factory while working for Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), a contractor for the US military and the CIA. He begins gathering parts to build it in 2000, and construction began in September 2001, at a metalworking plant near Fort Detrick, Maryland. SAIC fired him in March 2002, after he failed to get a high-level security clearance and he came under suspicion for the October 2001 anthrax attacks. But Hatfill continues to work on the half-built factory on his own, for no pay, until it is finished later that year. Once it is done, Hatfill continues to advise the US military about it, and sometimes supervises Delta Force training exercises on it at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. However, at the same time, the Justice Department and the FBI is heavily investigating Hatfill for the anthrax attacks, and there is a conflict between agencies over Hatfill's continued role with the factory. The FBI wants to confiscate the factory, but the military will not give it up. Its equipment includes a fermenter, a centrifuge, and "a mill for grinding clumps of anthrax into the best size for penetrating human lungs," according to experts familiar with it. However, its components are not connected and it is never used to make lethal germs. The FBI examines the unit but finds no anthrax spores or any other evidence linking it to the anthrax attacks. [New York Times, 7/2/2003] Hatfill will be cleared of any connection to the anthrax attacks in 2008 (see June 27, 2008).

September 10, 2002: FBI Searches Hatfill's House Third Time for Anthrax Residue

The FBI searches Steven Hatfill's house for anthrax residue for a third time. Hatfill had moved out several weeks earlier. He is the FBI's main suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002]

October 22, 2002: FBI Is 'Very Confident' Hatfill Is Responsible for Anthrax Attacks
   
Peter Jennings reports on ABC News' World News Tonight, "The FBI tells ABC News it is very confident that it has found the person responsible" for the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). Reporter Brian Ross explains, "That's right, Peter, Steven Hatfill. And while there's no direct evidence, authorities say they are building what they describe as a growing case of circumstantial evidence." [Salon, 8/10/2008] In 2008, Hatfill will be exonerated and given a large cash settlement after a federal judge states there "is not a scintilla of evidence" linking him to the anthrax attacks (see June 27, 2008).

October 28, 2002: Many Scientists and Experts Believe One Person Could Not Have Caused Anthrax Attacks; Suggest State Sponsor Such as Iraq Instead
   
The Washington Post reports in a front-page story, "A significant number of scientists and biological warfare experts are expressing skepticism about the FBI's view that a single disgruntled American scientist prepared the spores and mailed the deadly anthrax letters that killed five people last year." More than a dozen experts suggest investigators should "reexamine the possibility of state-sponsored terrorism, or try to determine whether weaponized spores may have been stolen by the attacker from an existing, but secret, biodefense program or perhaps given to the attacker by an accomplice." These experts suggest that making the type of anthrax used could take a team of experts and millions of dollars. The article focuses on the possibility that Iraq could be to blame, and mentions that unnamed senior Bush administration officials believe Iraq was behind the attacks (see October 28, 2002). However, even though the Post claims "a consensus has emerged in recent months among experts," only one expert, Richard Spertzel, is named who supports the Iraq theory. Spertzel was the chief biological inspector for the UN Special Commission from 1994 to 1998. He says: "In my opinion, there are maybe four or five people in the whole country who might be able to make this stuff, and I'm one of them. And even with a good lab and staff to help run it, it might take me a year to come up with a product as good." [Washington Post, 10/28/2002] Although the article doesn't mention it, the other scientists Spertzel say could make the anthrax are renowned bioterrorism expert William Patrick and several unnamed scientists at Dugway Proving Ground, the US Army's bioweapons laboratory in Utah, that Patrick trained in anthrax production in 1998. [Vanity Fair, 9/15/2003] This renewed focus on an Iraq-anthrax link coincides with the US push to go to war with Iraq, and will fade after the Iraq war starts.                      

Late October 2002: Anthrax Attacks Suspect Drinks Himself to Death
   
In 2002, microbiologist Perry Mikesell came under suspicion as the anthrax attacker. Mikesell is an anthrax specialist who worked with Bruce Ivins and others at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory, in the 1980s and 1990s. Since then, he had worked at the Battelle Memorial Institute, a private contractor in Ohio working on classified government bioweapons programs. According to family members, he begins drinking heavily after the FBI starts suspecting him, consuming up to a fifth of hard liquor a day. One relative will later say, "It was a shock that all of a sudden he's a raging alcoholic." He dies in late October 2002. The relative will say, "He drank himself to death." His connection to the anthrax investigation will not be revealed until 2008, and it still is completely unknown why the FBI was focusing on him. Two weeks before his suicide (see July 29, 2008), Ivins will liken the pressure he is facing from the FBI to the pressure that had been put on Mikesell. He will reportedly tell a colleague, "Perry [Mikesell] drank himself to death." [New York Times, 8/9/2008]

Late 2002: Head of FBI's Anthrax Attacks Investigation Changes, but Focus on Suspect Hatfill Remains
   
On October 15, 2001, FBI Director Robert Mueller appointed Van Harp, a 32-year FBI veteran, head of the anthrax attacks investigation. By late 2002, Harp is ready for retirement and senior FBI agent Richard Lambert takes over as the new head. However, like Harp, Lambert seems focused on suspect Steven Hatfill and little interested in other potential suspects. Eventually, some FBI agents will seek a review of Lambert's administration. One agent will later say: "There were complaints about him. Did he take energy away from looking at other people? The answer is yes." [Los Angeles Times, 6/29/2008] The FBI will finally drop its interest in Hatfill in late 2006, when Lambert is replaced (see Autumn 2006).

December 12-17, 2002: Future Anthrax Suspect Ivins Mingles with FBI Investigators During Search

Bruce Ivins working as a Red Cross volunteer in 2003.Bruce Ivins working as a Red Cross volunteer in 2003. [Source: Associated Press]During a several day search of a pond near Frederick, Maryland, by FBI investigators for clues to the anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001), Scientist Bruce Ivins is there with the investigators, working as a Red Cross volunteer. Ivins will commit suicide in 2008 after coming under scrutiny as the FBI's main suspect in the anthrax attacks (see July 29, 2008). The pond search is highly publicized at the time, and is an unsuccessful effort to find evidence connecting the attacks to Steven Hatfill, the FBI's main suspect at the time (see December 12-17, 2002). The pond is near USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory where Ivins works and Hatfill used to work. As a Red Cross volunteer, Ivins serves coffee, donuts, and snacks to FBI agents and other investigators in a military tent. He is eventually removed after officials realize he is an anthrax researcher who could compromise the investigation. Apparently, Ivins is a regular Red Cross volunteer at the time. Miriam Fleming, another Red Cross volunteer working at the pond search, will later recall that Ivins "was kind of goofy, but he was always in a good mood. He seemed so normal." [New York Times, 8/7/2008]

Early 2003-2005: Scientists Gradually Able to Identify Unique Signiature to Anthrax Used in 2001 Attacks

Jacques Ravel.Jacques Ravel. [Source: New York Times / Brendan Smialowsk]In 2002, scientists mapped the anthrax genome in an attempt to generate new leads for the anthrax attacks investigation. Initially, the results are disappointing because the anthrax used in the letters, which is from the Ames strain, do not seem to differ in any way from the original Ames strain used in many laboratories (see Early-Late 2002). But around early 2003, an unnamed US Army microbiologist at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory, makes a breakthrough. He discovers a morph (also known as a morphotype) that allows scientists to detect differences between the genetic structure of the anthrax used in the attacks and other anthrax. Jacques Ravel, a leading member of the scientific team at the The Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR) that is decoding the anthrax genome, is asked to decode more morphs. After two years, the team is able to decode a total of eight morphs. The head of TIGR will later comment that it was not clear why the FBI did not ask other laboratories to share the task and speed up the process. Other scientists working with the FBI select four of the morphs as having the most reliable unique genetic differences, known as indels. All of the anthrax letters used anthrax containing these four indels. The FBI finally has a unique signature for the anthrax used in the attacks and starts looking for laboratories that have used an exact match. [New York Times, 8/20/2008] Apparently, by early 2004 scientists already know enough to notice a discrepancy with a sample scientist Bruce Ivins has submitted to the investigation, and the FBI raids Ivins's lab in July 2004 to seize more samples from him (see Early 2004 and July 16, 2004).

June 9-28, 2003: FBI Searches Pond for Evidence Against Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill, but Finds Nothing

The pond drained by investigators.The pond drained by investigators. [Source: Tom Fedor / Maryland Gazette]From June 9 until June 28, 2003, the FBI conducts a highly public search of a pond near Frederick, Maryland. Investigators completely drain 1.45 million gallons of water from the pond and then search in the mud for clues. This search is said to be based on a comment by anthrax attacks suspect Steven Hatfill, who once spoke hypothetically about how he might dispose of contaminated materials in water. The pond is located about eight miles from USAMRIID, the US Army's top biological laboratory, where Hatfill worked in the late 1990s. Once the search is over, the FBI admits that nothing of interest was found in the pond. Investigators say they knew the search was a long shot, but did it just to be thorough. The pond search is expected to cost about $250,000. [Washington Post, 6/29/2003; Washington Post, 8/1/2003] The Washington Post will comment later in the year, "[F]or days this past June, the prospect of what this pond might contain had captivated much of America." But the pond search is the end of the FBI's high profile activity targeting Hatfill. [Washington Post, 9/14/2003]

July 18, 2003: FBI Refuses to Release Letter Possibly Linked to Anthrax Attacks

The FBI refuses a third request to release a letter possibly connected to the anthrax attacks, suggesting they will never release it. The letter was sent to the FBI in late September 2001 and said a scientist named Ayaad Assaad was likely to launch a biological attack on the US. The letter was anonymous and there has been speculation that the author was connected to the anthrax attacks and was attempting to set up Assaad as a patsy. The government denies Assaad's request to release the letter on the ground that it has a regular policy not to "disclose the identities of confidential sources and information furnished by such sources." The government asserts that the letter is just a strange coincidence and has no link to the anthrax attacks. However, former FBI Assistant Director Oliver Revell says the discussion of possible confidential sources indicates the FBI has not ruled out a link between the letter and the attacks. "There has to be some rationale for wanting to keep it secret," he says. "If there is any possible nexis between the two, then the general rule is to keep it silent." [Hartford Courant, 7/18/2003] The letter has yet to be made public.

August 26, 2003: Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill Files Lawsuit against Justice Department and FBI

Scientist Steven Hatfill files a lawsuit against Attorney General John Ashcroft, the Justice Department, and FBI, saying his constitutional rights have been violated. Hatfill has been named by the FBI as a "person of interest" in the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001), but has not been charged or officially declared a suspect. His attorneys claim the FBI deliberately tipped off the media to searches of his house to hide the fact that the anthrax investigation was making little progress. They say 24-hour surveillance and wiretaps violated his privacy (see July 2002-Late 2003). [CNN, 8/26/2003] In 2008, Hatfill will settle out of court and receive nearly $6 million in compensation from the government (see June 27, 2008).

September 29, 2003: Some FBI Officials Do Not Like 'Person of Interest' Label for Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill, but Only One Speaks Out

Michael Mason.Michael Mason. [Source: Washington Post]Beginning August 1, 2002, the FBI started routinely calling Steven Hatfill a "person of interest," and even Attorney General John Ashcroft publicly used the term (see August 1, 2002). Some in the FBI were concerned about the use of the term. Van Harp, the head of the FBI's anthrax attacks investigation, will later claim that he viewed the label "improper," but he did not mention this to others at the time. [Los Angeles Times, 6/29/2008] But on September 29, 2003, FBI Executive Assistant Director Michael Mason tells reporters: "In my mind, there is absolutely zero value to coming forward with names or definitions of persons of interest.... It's very hard to take that back if you're wrong." He says people should only be publicly identified when they are formal suspects. He also regrets that the investigation had been "beset by leaks" about Hatfill. [Washington Post, 9/29/2003] Afterwards, FBI Deputy Director Bruce Gebhardt privately rebukes Mason and says his comments "did not go over well in the front office." [Los Angeles Times, 6/29/2008]

Early 2004: Conflict with Anthrax Samples Leads FBI Investigators to Bruce Ivins

Between 2003 and 2005, scientists working with the FBI's anthrax investigation have been developing a system to compare the anthrax used in the 2001 attacks with other anthrax samples they have completed (see Early 2003-2005). By early 2004, the system apparently still is not complete, but scientists have discovered enough to focus their attentions on USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory (see Early 2004). They also note a discrepancy. In 2002, USAMRIID scientist Bruce Ivins had submitted a sample of a variety of the Ames anthrax strain known as RMR-1029 (see April 2002). The FBI had also collected some other samples of RMR-1029 from other scientists. All the samples of RMR-1029 had genetic markers that match the anthrax used in the attacks except for Ivins's sample. As a result, in July 2004, the FBI will raid Ivins's lab and seize more of his RMR-1029. These samples will also have the genetic markers matching the anthrax used in the attacks, raising more questions as to why the sample Ivins submitted does not (see July 16, 2004). [Philadelphia Inquirer, 9/1/2008]

Early 2004: Early Scientific Results Suggest Anthrax Used in Attacks Came from USAMRIID
 
USAMRIID.USAMRIID. [Source: Skip Lawrence / Frederick News-Post]Scientists working with the FBI have been trying to identify unique genetic markers in the anthrax used in the 2001 anthrax attacks so that other anthrax samples can be compared to it (see Early 2003-2005). By early 2004, their work is not done, but they have been able to identify two unique genetic markers (eventually they will identify four). The investigators begin comparing anthrax samples based on these two markers. Preliminary results strongly suggest the anthrax came from USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory. [US Department of Justice, 8/18/2008] As a result, USAMRIID laboratories are raided to get more samples (see July 16, 2004). Some early results point suspicion at USAMRIID scientist Bruce Ivins (see Early 2004).

February 2, 2004: Real Ricin Poison Found in Sen. Frist's Mailroom, Case Remains Unresolved

On February 2, 2004, the deadly toxin ricin is detected on an automatic mail sorter in the Senate office building mailroom that serves the office of Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN). Subsequent tests confirm the substance is ricin. No one gets ill. Some buildings are closed, but Senate business continues as usual. It is presumed that the ricin arrived in a letter, but the letter is not found, leaving few clues. [CNN, 2/4/2004] About two months later, it is reported that laboratories are continuing to analyze the ricin in an attempt to determine where it came from, but no suspects or likely motives have been identified. In October 2004, two letters were intercepted in South Carolina and Tennessee containing real ricin. Letters were found with the ricin objecting to new rules for truckers. One letter was intended to go to the Department of Transportation and another to the White House. But it is unknown if there is any connection between those letters and the ricin in Frist's office, although Frist represents Tennessee. It is also unknown if there is any connection to the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). According to the Associated Press, "Unlike anthrax spores, ricin requires little scientific training to engineer and is not nearly as dangerous to handle." [Associated Press, 3/31/2005]

February 11-March 17, 2004: FBI Interviews Scientists, Asks If They Wrote Anonymous Letter Possibly Linked to Anthrax Attacks

On February 11, 2004, the FBI interviews at least one scientist from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in connection with the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). The name of the person interviewed is not known, but he is asked whether he wrote an anonymous letter to the FBI that possibly set up scientist Ayaad Assaad as a patsy for the attacks just before they occurred (see October 3, 2001). Assaad worked at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory, until 1997, and has worked at the EPA since then. The unnamed scientist says that he had nothing to do with the letter. It appears this person is possibly subjected to a polygraph test after this, but if so the results are not known. [Hartford Courant, 2/17/2004] On March 17, 14 additional EPA employees are interviewed about the letter. The interviews are said to focus on trying to find out who wrote it. [Washington Times, 3/30/2004]

May 11, 2004: FBI Re-interviews Possible Anthrax Attacks Patsy Assaad

The FBI re-interviews Ayaad Assaad, who was the target of a letter sent just before the 2001 anthrax attacks that seemed to point to him as being responsible for those attacks (see October 2, 2001). Assaad was interviewed about this shortly after the letter was sent (see October 3, 2001), and this is the second time the FBI has questioned him. The FBI tells him that he is not a suspect but they are interested in where he was when the anthrax letters were mailed. He gives documentation showing that he was in the Washington, DC, area at the time. He is also asked about his knowledge of producing anthrax. Assaad, who has been working at the Environmental Protection Agency since 1997 (see May 9, 1997), is an expert on the toxin ricin, and says he has never handled anthrax. He also says he has never been vaccinated against anthrax. He believes the FBI indeed is not interested in him as a suspect but as someone the anthrax attacker or attackers may have tried to frame. [Associated Press, 5/16/2004] Officially, the government has consistently claimed that the letter had nothing to do with the anthrax attacks and was just a strange coincidence. But CNN reports, "government sources said the interest in Assaad centers on the [anonymous] letter and the theory that whoever mailed it could have also been involved in sending the anthrax letters. 'It is one of several out there,' one source said when asked how accepted that theory is. 'No one has been ruled out.'" [CNN, 5/17/2004] Assaad claims that prior to this interview, he had contacted the FBI four times over the past two and a half years, offering to tell what he knows about his former colleagues who might have sent the letter. But he says he was rebuffed all four times. [Hartford Courant, 5/16/2004]

July 16, 2004: Anthrax Investigators Search USAMRIID and Seize Anthrax Samples from Bruce Ivins

The FBI closes some high-security laboratory suites at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland. The FBI apparently is searching for evidence related to the anthrax attacks investigation, although what the target of their search is remains unclear. For several days, investigators shut off access to bacteriology labs in two USAMRIID buildings where anthrax research is done or has been done. Numerous employees at USAMRIID were questioned by the FBI in the first months after the anthrax attacks, but then investigative activity targeting USAMRIID died down. In recent months, the FBI has seized medical records and computer hard drives there. Several days after the search, authorities say it failed to lead to any important breakthrough. The Baltimore Sun notes that USAMRIID's labs were used extensively after the attacks to study the letters, so if trace amounts of anthrax are found it would very hard to prove if they came from the attacks or the subsequent investigation of the attacks. [Baltimore Sun, 7/21/2004] It will later emerge that the raid takes place at least in part to seize anthrax samples from scientist Bruce Ivins. In April 2002, Ivins had given investigators a sample of anthrax known as RMR-1029 (see April 2002). In early 2004, investigators determined that the sample did not match the anthrax used in the attacks, but other samples of RMR-1029 did (see Early 2004). So Ivins's flasks of RMR-1029 are seized in the raid. These do show a match with the anthrax used in the attacks, raising questions why the sample Ivins had submitted in 2002 did not. [Philadelphia Inquirer, 9/1/2008] However, it appears the FBI will not begin to seriously focus on Ivins as a suspect until after the head of the FBI's investigation is replaced in late 2006 (see Autumn 2006).

August 5, 2004: FBI Anthrax Attacks Investigators Raid Medical Doctor's Residences, but Quickly Lose Interest in Him

Kenneth Berry.Kenneth Berry. [Source: Public domain]On August 5, 2004, FBI agents target Dr. Kenneth Berry for a role in the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). Agents raid his home and former apartment in Wellsville, New York, as well as his parents' apartment in New Jersey. Agents cordon off streets and search the residences wearing biochemical protective suits. This becomes a highly publicized media spectacle. But Berry is not charged or arrested. The raids are the culmination of an 18-month investigation. For instance, in July, dozens of his associates were interviewed. Berry apparently panics and gets in a fight with his wife and stepchildren. A restraining order prevents him from returning home and he is eventually divorced. He also loses his job. By October 2004, government officials say their investigation has uncovered nothing that would implicate him in the anthrax attacks, but he is not officially cleared of suspicion.
Unusual Background as WMD Expert - Berry is a licensed physician working in a hospital. But in 1997, he formed an organization named Preempt, which promoted training for first responders to protect against a WMD attack. By 1999, Berry had risen in prominence and was meeting with prominent experts and politicians about WMD threats, including some US senators and former CIA Director James Woolsey. He was also working on inventions for systems to detect the release of germ weapons, but none of his inventions are successfully developed. In late 2000, he attended a two-day course on using anthrax and other germs as weapons, taught by bioweapons expert William Patrick. His organization Preempt slowly fizzled in importance, but he continued to consider himself a freelance WMD expert. [New York Times, 10/3/2004]
Investigators Lose Interest, but Name is Never Cleared - The Associated Press will comment in 2008, "investigators seemed to lose interest in Berry quickly," but he lost his job and his wife in the process. He has never spoken about the experience, but a friend will say, "Since things quieted down, he's put his life back together again and he's in a stable environment right now.... As far as I know, he just wants his name cleared as publicly as it was smeared." [Associated Press, 8/7/2008]

October 7, 2004: Federal Judge Lambasts FBI for Leaving Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill's Status in Limbo

Anthrax attacks suspect Steven Hatfill has sued the FBI and Justice Department for violating his privacy and other charges (see August 26, 2003), but the government has been trying to stall the court case, saying it would interfere with the FBI's anthrax investigation. Responding to the latest request for a delay, US District Court Judge Reggie Walton says the government has stalled enough already. Walton says that Hatfill has "the right to vindicate himself, so he doesn't have this taint hanging over his head." He tells a federal prosecutor: "If you don't have enough information to indict this man, you can't keep dragging him through the mud. That's not the type of country I want to be part of. It's wrong!" Walton is a Republican appointed to the bench by the President Bush. [MSNBC, 10/7/2004] The FBI declared Hatfill a "person of interest" in August 2002 (see August 1, 2002) and will not officially clear him of any link to the attacks until August 2008 (see June 27, 2008 and August 8, 2008).

March 31, 2005: Anthrax Attacks Suspect Ivins Is Questioned about His After Hours Laboratory Work in 2001

The FBI questions scientist Bruce Ivins about a marked increase in his after hours laboratory work from mid-August through October 2001 (see Mid-August-October 2001). Ivins tells investigators that he was working late at the time to escape troubles at home. The FBI is unable to find evidence of legitimate work Ivins performed during those visits. He is also asked to explain the differences in anthrax samples he submitted to the FBI in 2002 (see April 2002) and those seized in 2004 (see July 16, 2004). [Washington Post, 8/7/2008; Associated Press, 8/7/2008]

April 2005-July 10, 2008: Anthax Attacks Suspects Keeps USAMRIID Lab Access despite FBI Suspicions

An aerial view of USAMRIID in 2005.An aerial view of USAMRIID in 2005. [Source: Sam Yu / Frederick News-Post]By the end of March 2005, the FBI clearly suspects Bruce Ivins for the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001). Ivins works at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory, and his lab was raided by the FBI to find Ivins' anthrax samples (see July 16, 2004). He has been questioned about suspicious behavior around the time of the attacks and since (see March 31, 2005). Yet Ivins is still allowed to work with anthrax and other deadly germs at USAMRIID. McClatchy Newspapers will report in August 2008, "[A] mystery is why Ivins wasn't escorted from [USAMRIID] until last month when the FBI had discovered by 2005 that he'd failed to turn over samples of all the anthrax in his lab, as agents had requested three years earlier." In 2003, USAMRIID implemented a biosurety program that required all scientists working there to undergo regular intrusive background checks, which includes disclosure of mental health issues. They also have to undergo periodic FBI background checks to retain their security clearances. Jeffrey Adamovicz, head of USAMRIID's bacteriology division in 2003 and 2004, will later say that USAMRIID officials knew at least by late 2006 that Ivins was a suspect, yet he maintained his lab access and security clearances until July 10, 2008, shortly before his suicide later that month (see July 10, 2008 and July 29, 2008). Adamovicz will say, "It's hard to understand if there was all this negative information out there on Bruce, why wasn't it picked up in the biosurety program or by law enforcement." [McClatchy Newspapers, 8/7/2008] By contrast, anthrax attacks suspect Steven Hatfill lost his security clearance in 2001 after it was discovered he had misrepresented some items on his resume (see August 23, 2001).

September 16, 2005: FBI's Anthrax Investigation Has Gone Cold

The Washington Post reports that four years after the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001), the FBI investigation is growing cold. [Washington Post, 9/16/2005] A New York Times article from the same day also concludes the investigation has stalled. The FBI has found itself on the defensive amid claims that they publicly smeared Steven Hatfill when lacking other viable suspects. [New York Times, 9/16/2005]

Late 2005-2006: Investigators Determine about 100 Scientists Used Anthrax Matching that in 2001 Attacks, Including Bruce Ivins

After years of work, by 2005, a scientific team working with the FBI has identified four genetic markers, known as indels, that make the anthrax used in the 2001 anthrax attacks unique (see Early 2003-2005). The anthrax is from the Ames strain, and the FBI has been slowly building a repository of 1,070 Ames anthrax samples from around the world. By late 2005 to 2006, it is discovered that only eight samples match the anthrax used in the attacks. Seven of these eight samples come from USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory, and the eighth sample comes from another unnamed laboratory in the US. One of these samples is the ancestor of all eight, and this is a flask known as RMR-1029 kept by USAMRIID scientist Bruce Ivins (see Early 2004). The FBI soon determines that about 100 scientists had access to this flask and its seven descendants. Investigators begin a new phase, using traditional criminology techniques to narrow down the possible suspects. [New York Times, 8/20/2008]

August 2006: FBI Scientist Claims Anthrax Used in 2001 Attacks Was Not Weaponized

Magnified anthrax cells.Magnified anthrax cells. [Source: T. W. Geisbert / USAMRIID]In August 2006, an article by Douglas Beecher is published in Applied and Environmental Microbiology, a well-respected peer-reviewed scientific journal. Beecher is a microbiologist in the FBI's hazardous materials response unit who has been working on the FBI's investigation of the 2001 anthrax attacks since the investigation began. His article represents the first official FBI explanation about the anthrax used in the attacks. Releasing the evidence in a peer-reviewed journal will give it more credence if cited in a later court trial. [Chemical and Engineering News, 12/4/2006] At first, the article is little-noticed by the media, but the Washington Post will highlight it in a front-page story a month later. The Post will also say that others in the FBI have come to the same conclusions Beecher has. [Washington Post, 9/25/2006]
Controversial Paragraph - Beecher focuses on the anthrax letter mailed to Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), since it had never been opened and thus remained the least contaminated. The anthrax in the Leahy letter and the letter to Sen. Tom Daschle (D-SD) has been considered deadlier than the other anthrax letters because victims were infected by inhalation and not just by touch. Most controversially, Beecher states that a "widely circulated misconception is that the spores were produced using additives and sophisticated engineering supposedly akin to military weapon production." Up until this time, it had been widely reported that these two letters had been "weaponized," meaning the anthrax in them had been coated with a substance (usually reported as silicia) to make it float in the air and thus deadlier to handle.
No Supporting Evidence - But while Beecher makes this surprising claim, he gives no evidence to back it up. The comment is made in passing in the discussion section of the article and there are no footnotes or explanation related to it. Several months later, L. Nicholas Ornston, editor-in-chief of the microbiology journal, says, "The statement should have had a reference. An unsupported sentence being cited as fact is uncomfortable to me. Any statement in a scientific article should be supported by a reference or by documentation." Beecher and the rest of the FBI make no further public comments to support his assertion, but the FBI begins describing the anthrax as non-weaponized from this point onwards.
Highly Pure Anthrax, but No Coating or Milling - Several months later, two scientists will claim they saw the anthrax from one of these letters not long after the attacks and did not see any signs of coating or milling. However, what they did see was an exceptionally high purity to the anthrax, in which the high level of debris in the earlier anthrax letters was removed, making it deadlier and possibly more able to float through air. [Chemical and Engineering News, 12/4/2006]

Autumn 2006: FBI Anthrax Investigation Finally Stops Suspecting Only Hatfill

According to a later report by the Los Angeles Times, the FBI's investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001) remains "fixated" on suspect Steven Hatfill into late 2006. Senior FBI agent

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

Likely killed by ->

Suicide riddle of weapons expert who worked with David Kelly: Scientist tells wife he is going for a walk, then takes his life in a field... just like his friend

Body of Dr Richard Holmes discovered in a field four miles from the Porton Down defence establishment
    Police said there were no suspicious circumstances in latest case but revealed scientist was 'under a great deal of stress'
    He resigned from Porton Down last month, but it is unclear why

By Nick Constable and Ian Gallagher

PUBLISHED: 16:58 EST, 21 April 2012 | UPDATED: 17:45 EST, 21 April 2012

A weapons expert who worked with Dr David Kelly at the Government's secret chemical warfare laboratory has been found dead in an apparent suicide.

In circumstances strongly reminiscent of Dr Kelly's own mysterious death nine years ago, the body of Dr Richard Holmes was discovered in a field four miles from the Porton Down defence establishment in Wiltshire. It is not yet known how he died.

Mr Holmes, 48, had gone missing two days earlier after telling his wife he was going out for a walk – just as Dr Kelly did before he was found dead at an Oxfordshire beauty spot in July 2003.
'Stressed': The cause of Richard Holmes's death is still unknown
Inquest demand: David Kelly, who was found dead nine years ago

'Stressed': The cause of Richard Holmes's (left) death is still unknown. David Kelly (right) was found dead nine years ago

Police said there were no suspicious circumstances in the latest case but revealed that Dr Holmes  had 'recently been under a great deal of stress'.

He resigned from Porton Down last month, although the centre yesterday refused to explain why.
Inevitably, the parallels between the two cases will arouse the suspicions of conspiracy theorists.

Despite Lord Hutton's ruling eight years ago that Dr Kelly committed suicide, many people – among them a group of doctors – believe his inquiry was insufficient and have demanded a full inquest.

Some believe Dr Kelly, who kept an office at Porton Down right up until his death, was murdered. He was outed as being the source of a BBC report that Downing Street 'sexed up' evidence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction to justify going to war.

 
More...

    British expat Neil Heywood left his family so broke a business associate had to pay for plane tickets for them to attend his funeral

Although it is not clear if the two scientists were close, one source told The Mail on Sunday that they were friendly when they worked at Porton Down in the Nineties.

At the time, Dr Holmes ran a project organising the installation of chemical protection equipment in RAF Sentinel spy planes, while Dr Kelly was head of microbiology and frequently toured the former Soviet Union as a weapons inspector.

After the first Gulf War, Dr Holmes is also thought to have worked on the production of chemical protection suits for troops. In 1991 he was the joint author of a scientific paper about an RAF chemical and biological protection system.

Yesterday, a Porton Down spokesman confirmed Dr Holmes had quit his job but declined to comment further. 'It is not our policy to speak openly about any individual who works for us,' she said.
Riddle: The Porton Down establishment, where Dr Holmes had recently resigned from his post

Riddle: The Porton Down establishment, where Dr Holmes had recently resigned from his post

Before finding his body, Wiltshire Police made a public appeal for information but warned people not to approach Dr Holmes for their own safety because they believed he had been 'looking at information on the internet regarding self-harm and the use of toxic substances'.

Friends of Dr Holmes say this disclosure irritated his family, who questioned why a scientist engaged in chemical warfare research would 'need to Google toxic substances'.

Dr Holmes's widow, Susan, is  a chemist who also works at  Porton Down as head of business administration.

One of the Government's most sensitive and secretive military facilities, the site has long been the focus of controversy.

Three years ago hundreds of ex-servicemen who were used as chemical warfare guinea pigs there between 1939 and 1989 were given compensation and an apology from the Ministry of Defence.
Grim discovery: The scene at Harrowdown Hill, where the body of Dr David Kelly was discovered in 2003

Grim discovery: The scene at Harrowdown Hill, where the body of Dr David Kelly was discovered in 2003

They were tested with the nerve agent sarin, but some of those involved claimed they had been  told they were taking part in cold-remedy trials.

Many suffered serious illnesses after exposure to the gas, which was developed by the Nazis during the Second World War.

An inquest into Dr Holmes's death was opened and adjourned by Wiltshire Coroner David Ridley last week. Coroner's officer Paul Tranter said Dr Holmes's family had grown concerned for his wellbeing after  he failed to return from a walk on April 11.

A search party involving police and members of the other emergency services began combing waste ground close to his home in the Bishopsdown area of Salisbury.

Police discovered his body half a mile away in a field used regularly by dog-walkers and joggers in the village of Laverstock.

Mr Tranter said the results of tests carried out to establish the cause of death would not be known for several weeks.

He added: 'Police do not consider this death to be suspicious in any way, nor do they believe there was any third-party involvement.'

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article ... Kelly.html

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

Scam Jews in the Puppet White House, still denying everything, as their fellow Israeli agents in the White House-Pentagon prepare for Iran... ---CSR

"The reason why I want to tell this story now is, we may be going down a path, helped along by the American Jewish community, and maybe even Israel, that is going to be worse even than the one we're on now - some sort of military confrontation with Iran. That worries me. Because they will be able to blame [it] on the Jews, to a great extent," says Weissman, who worked at AIPAC from 1993 until 2005, much of that time as the group's deputy director of foreign policy. Though Weissman disagrees sharply with those who say that AIPAC played a critical role in pushing for the 2003 U.S. decision to invade Iraq, he believes a war with Iran -- which he says "would be the stupidest thing I ever heard of" -- might well be blamed on AIPAC's leaders and their constituents. "What the Jews' war will be is Iran," he says. "Not Iraq."

AIPAC from the Inside | Part 1: Isolating Iran
by ROBERT DREYFUSS in Washington, D.C.
11 Jun 2011 23:13Comments

Keith Weissman on joining AIPAC, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, and the BTC pipeline.

weissman.jpg[ feature ] In August 2005, two lobbyists with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman, were indicted on charges of illegally conspiring to collect and disseminate classified secrets to journalists and to Israeli diplomats. The case, in which the two men were charged under a World War I-era espionage law along with Larry Franklin, a midlevel Iran analyst at the Department of Defense, was intimately linked to efforts by the AIPAC officials and others to improperly influence U.S. policy toward Iran, said prosecutors, and it caused a political firestorm in Washington. However, in 2009, the case fell apart, and the Justice Department withdrew all charges.

Now, for the first time, one of the two AIPAC officials, Keith Weissman, is speaking out. In a series of extended interviews with Tehran Bureau, Weissman tells his story. He's come forward, he says, because he's concerned that if a confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran leads to war, it will be a disaster -- one that Weissman fears will be blamed on the American Jews.

(Too late for that...)

"The reason why I want to tell this story now is, we may be going down a path, helped along by the American Jewish community, and maybe even Israel, that is going to be worse even than the one we're on now - some sort of military confrontation with Iran. That worries me. Because they will be able to blame [it] on the Jews, to a great extent," says Weissman, who worked at AIPAC from 1993 until 2005, much of that time as the group's deputy director of foreign policy. Though Weissman disagrees sharply with those who say that AIPAC played a critical role in pushing for the 2003 U.S. decision to invade Iraq, he believes a war with Iran -- which he says "would be the stupidest thing I ever heard of" -- might well be blamed on AIPAC's leaders and their constituents. "What the Jews' war will be is Iran," he says. "Not Iraq."

Although Weissman's comments might seem startling to those who don't know him, they're part and parcel of who he is, he says. From his days in college at the University of Chicago in the late 1970s, Weissman was in sympathy with a wide range of progressive causes, and, unusually for a man who'd end up working at AIPAC, he sported a "Free Palestine" bumper sticker on his car back then. (Last month, at a conference held by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think tank founded with support from AIPAC, I mentioned to Steve Rosen that I'd talked to Weissman. "Of course!" replied Rosen, who knows that I usually write for progressive publications. "He thinks just like you do!") During much of his tenure at AIPAC, Weissman served as a kind of unofficial liaison to various Palestinian officials, diplomats, and academics. Later, when he became AIPAC's chief Iran specialist, he insists that he quietly did what he could to steer the group away from direct calls for regime change in Iran, even though AIPAC was working hard to push the United States into ever stronger action against the Islamic Republic, including diplomatic isolation and tough sanctions to dissuade Iran from pursuing its nuclear program and supporting Hamas, Hezbollah, and other anti-Israel groups.

"What the Iranians feared most, and what the neoconservatives wanted most, was a policy of propaganda, of assisting groups against the government, to foster regime change," says Weissman. "I kept AIPAC away from that."

Back in 1978, as a history student at U.C., Weissman made his first and only visit to Iran, aided in parts by grants from the Department of Defense and from the Pahlavi Foundation, the then Shah's family fund. He flew to Kabul, traveled over land to Mashhad and then to Tehran, coincidentally arriving just as the first rumblings of the revolution that would topple the Shah were getting under way. "In Mashhad, they put us the floor of a dorm that was under construction at the edge of the city. Apparently, a week before we got there, we'd been scheduled to be in a dorm downtown, and before we got there the school had exploded in riots, and the school was shut down for final exams, and they put us in this dorm on the outskirts," he recalls.

Among Weissman's friends and acquaintances who were traveling back and forth to Iran at the same time were Zalmay Khalilzad, later a RAND Corporation analyst and, more recently, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq, and Harold Rhode, a polyglot Middle East specialist who worked at the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, an in-house think tank. That office was run by Andrew Marshall, a neoconservative strategist and acolyte of Bernard Lewis, a British academic and historian of the Ottoman Empire who is currently a professor at Princeton University. Though friends for a time, Weissman and Rhode had a falling-out. Says Weissman:

"[Lewis] was one of Harold Rhode's advisers. Harold was very close to him, and Lewis helped him get a job at the Pentagon, where he worked for Andy Marshall. We stopped speaking to each other in the early 1980s. I don't know what it was. I certainly wasn't an ardent Zionist, and I felt that Harold had adopted a very racist posture toward Middle Eastern people."

Later, Rhode would be a key player during the run-up to the war in Iraq, as an official working alongside Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith at DOD. When the espionage case built around Franklin, Rosen, and Weissman erupted in 2004, Rhode would be one of several U.S. officials who were forced to hire legal counsel in the face of the FBI investigation, according to Weissman. Rhode, along with Michael Ledeen, who was then a neoconservative strategist at the American Enterprise Institute, was part of a quixotic effort to enlist a discredited wheeler-dealer, Manucher Ghorbanifar, in an ill-starred regime change plan for Iran in the early 2000s.

After his visit to Tehran, Weissman traveled to Israel and Egypt, and then returned to the United States, teaching in colleges around Chicago, where he struck up a casual acquaintance with Rashid Khalidi, the Palestinian scholar. When his wife, who'd been an attorney with Sidley and Austin in Chicago, landed a job at the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Weissmans settled in the Washington area. Needing a job, Weissman started networking.

"Eventually somebody set me up with a guy at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the deputy there, Rob Satloff, just back from Oxford, and he was working for Martin [Indyk], and I gave my resume to him," recalls Weissman. "And a couple of weeks later I get a call from a guy named Jack Lew. Jack Lew had [been] the legislative director for the speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill." Indyk, the vice president for policy at the Brookings Institution, served as AIPAC's deputy director of research in the early 1980s and helped found the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) in 1985. Jacob (Jack) Lew is today President Obama's director of the Office of Management and Budget. Satloff is now the executive director of WINEP.

"And there were a couple of Jewish financial guys, philanthropists, who were really pissed off because they thought that the media were pro-Arab, pro-Palestinian, and they wanted to set up a small publication, a place that translated stuff, that provided journalists with mostly translated stories from the Middle East, Middle East Week. And they hired someone to do Hebrew, and they hired me to do Arabic," says Weissman. "It was really fun, and I got to know lots of people. Jack [Lew] was the overall editor."

"This is right when the [Oslo] peace talks started, people coming in and out of Washington, and I got to know all these Arabs, Arab journalists, Israelis, and I was this left-wing Jewish guy, who became friends with Akiva Eldar, Hisham Melham, Raghida Dergham, who wrote from the U.N. for Al-Hayat. I got to know all these people! I got to learn a lot. And because of Rashid Khalidi, who for the first year was an adviser to the Palestinian delegation, I got very friendly with a lot of the Palestinians, with Said Hammad, who was the number two there, and I got to know Saeb Erekat."

Middle East Week folded, and after a stint working for a small publication called Middle East Insight, Weissman found himself without a job. But soon afterward, despite, or perhaps because of, his connections with Arab and Palestinian figures, Weissman landed an opportunity to work at AIPAC.

"I was unemployed for six months. The last month of unemployment, I get a call from Rafi Danziger, [AIPAC's] director of research, who I knew, who says, 'How'd you like to come work at AIPAC?' He said, 'People are leaving, and we'd like to combine their salaries and give it to you.' And my title would be chief Middle East analyst," he recalls.

"And the week after I started at AIPAC, Oslo happens. And here I am, this left-wing guy, I find myself at AIPAC. It was unbelievable. Imagine the reaction from my friends, my family! And I didn't know anyone there, except for Rafi Danziger, I didn't know much about them, I mean, I knew they were the pro-Israel lobby, that's about it. I hadn't paid them much attention, and I didn't agree with their position. But I got hired by them the week that the Israeli-Palestinian talks break out! I said to Rashid [Khalidi], 'Would you rather have me there, or someone who doesn't know anything about the Palestinians?' No one else had the entrée that I had. I went to meetings and lunches where me and Jerry Siegel, this radical, left-wing professor, were the only non-Arab, non-Palestinians there. Bernard Lewis's son worked down the hall from me, Michael Lewis, actually a wonderful person. He used to joke that he kept a file on everyone in my Rolodex! But it was really an asset to have that entrée. I could call up Faisal Husseini, Saeb Erekat, and it was quite fun.

"I could get information that no one else could get about the Palestinians. I became very close to Steve Rosen, who was my boss. He liked me. And he liked that I was able to go places that no one else could go. He thought that was a great addition to the work."

Though the advent of Oslo raised hopes among Israelis and Palestinians alike that a peace accord might work, inside AIPAC there was strong discontent with Oslo and its implications, and a lot of sympathy for hardliners in Israel, including Benjamin Netanyahu, the bitterest opponent of Oslo and its backers, including Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister. As M. J. Rosenberg, a former AIPAC official, has documented, AIPAC moved steadily to the right from the 1980s onward. According to Weissman, that happened mostly because the group's biggest donors were right-wing American Jews who identified with Likud rather than the Labor Party and other liberal Israelis. Many of its donors and some its staff split from AIPAC during the Rabin-Oslo era to work with more right-wing groups such as the Zionist Organization of America, says Weissman. After Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli extremist opposed to giving up the occupied territories, an increasingly right-leaning Israel and AIPAC moved more and more into sync. As Weissman tells the story:

"So Rabin is shot. I mean, he won Oslo in the Knesset by one vote! You could imagine that in America there was similar opposition [to Oslo].... AIPAC had spent the last 15 years helping the Likud, so you've got people there that were sucking at the teat of Likud, that was how they viewed things. That's why so many people left AIPAC. A lot of them went to join ZOA and a lot of them also contributed to the work of Daniel Pipes. When Rabin came in, they had taken their money and left, and there was a lot of turmoil. At the time, I remember, they'd send me around the country, to fundraisers, with a lot of older people, and I would be yelled and screamed at, 'I can't believe you're doing this!' Donors were leaving, taking the money, and that's really their bread and butter, the lay leadership. AIPAC's donors were very active in the organization. Very. They were major elements in making policy, in determining the agenda, who the leadership was.

"AIPAC did not have a lot of people who you would call Labor, the Israeli Labor Party. The ideological war that went on, over the AIPAC agenda, was unbelievable. I was involved in creating the annual AIPAC agenda. I used to write it. And then it would be debated in a meeting, right before the policy conference. You wouldn't believe what went on, people getting up, denouncing this and that, they would put things in the policy agenda to make sure that no money went to the Palestinian Authority, to move the American embassy to Jerusalem.

"I tried my best to sell the peace process. But I tried to sell it in the context of what AIPAC was, that this was the way that Israel could become a permanent Middle East country. But the ideological war inside the Israel lobby, collectively, was extremely bitter -- and very close, you know, the tally of votes was very close. I would argue that while most American Jews are probably center-left, the rich ones, the ones who give to organizations, the ones who are involved in politics, tend to be more to the right. Those are the ones who were close to the Israeli government when it was run by the Likud."

Rabin, in his last years, was angry at AIPAC's obstructionism, says Weissman. (According to M. J. Rosenberg, in New York Rabin met with liberal Jewish donors and asked them to help finance what become the Israel Policy Forum as a very small but not ineffective counterweight to AIPAC.)

"Because of AIPAC, with the assistance of the right wing in Israel, who -- even though they weren't the majority in Israel then -- they'd come over and have very close contacts with AIPAC's leaders, prominent financiers, and donors, in order to influence policy.... It was all because of the money that would go from the American Jewish community to politicians in the United States. The pro-Israel bloc in Congress has nothing to do with parties. It had to do with friendship and loyalty. I learned this over time. This is the secret of AIPAC's power, its ability to fund campaigns. When people got together, they'd find ways, even if they'd given a ton of money to AIPAC, they'd still find ways to get money to candidates, Republican or Democrat."

In the mid-1990s, Weissman began to work on issues related to Iran. Before that, at AIPAC, Iran was "an afterthought," he said. But as German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Bill Clinton began to discuss ideas about isolating and reducing trade with Iran -- at the time, according to Weissman, the United States was Iran's biggest trading partner and Germany was second -- AIPAC saw an opening to start working on Iran, and from that the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) emerged. According to Weissman, it was originally designed by AIPAC to be focused solely on Iran, but Libya was added to the mix during the legislative process.

"I started to work on Iran in 1995. We had a new legislative director named Brad Gordon, who'd worked for [then Senator] Rudy Boschwitz [of Minnesota], and he'd been at the CIA for a while and worked on Iran, so he had a clue. We found a little-known, much-ridiculed law that [then Senator] Al D'Amato [of New York] had supported. D'Amato was Mr. Ass-Kissing of all the Orthodox in New York. Right before this, I'd been invited to lunch by the executive director of AIPAC, a guy named Neil Sher. He took us to lunch and he said, 'I'm thinking about what we can do about Iran. Maybe we could, like, model something on the Arab boycott.' Now, the Arab boycott is what is called a secondary boycott, and it's illegal under world trade rules. It's not allowed, and don't forget, one of the victories for Israel during Oslo was the ending of the Arab boycott by the Arab League. 'Why don't we try to find something, or invent some laws?' And there was this law that D'Amato had proposed a year earlier that would sanction anybody who bought Iranian oil.

"It opened up a whole world for me. Going from a guy working on, you know, talking to the Palestinians, I became a star! On Iran! And we began to work closely with D'Amato's staff, and we formulated the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act."

With Weissman's help, Rosen and a host of congressional staffers got the ball rolling on ILSA. AIPAC helped convince Clinton to cancel a deal that Conoco had struck with Iran, even though doing so angered Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then Iran's president, who backed the Conoco arrangement. "Rafsanjani still says, to this day, that canceling that deal ruined relations, and I believe him," says Weissman. "We [AIPAC] became the bitter enemies of the oil companies." ILSA passed overwhelmingly.

With the victory in 1997 of Mohammad Khatami's reformist candidacy, however, the Clinton administration backed away from AIPAC's hard line and sought to develop an opening to the new Iranian government. Weissman says that he never believed that talking to Iran's reformists would work, in the end, and that power instead remained in the hands of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the hardliners around him. AIPAC, meanwhile, was dismayed by the tentative opening to Iran that began in the late Clinton years. The organization concentrated a lot of its work then on trying to isolate Iran economically, in part by pushing Congress and the White House to support an oil pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan that bypassed Iran and ran through Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea. Ironically, despite the enmity between AIPAC and the oil industry, the group would manage to work closely with the oil companies, especially BP -- and, surprisingly, AIPAC would even pocket financial contributions from the oil companies for its work facilitating what became the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

Formally launched in 1998 and completed in 2005, the 1,100-mile long BTC pipeline was a $4 billion project that crossed Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, with BP, Chevron, and other U.S. companies as major shareholders. From the start, it was controversial politically, not least since the three transit countries viewed the pipeline as a geopolitical counterbalance to both Iran and Russia, and for that reason they each wanted U.S. backing. And the oil companies, still angry at AIPAC for its role in creating ILSA and blocking the Iran-Conoco deal, realized that they'd be better off cooperating with the group than confronting it.

Not only did AIPAC and the oil companies cooperate, but according to Weissman the oil companies actually funded the group's work and AIPAC officials gave John Browne, then BP's chief executive, a guided tour of Washington's Holocaust Museum. During these years, one of Weissman's main preoccupations was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan deal:

"So we get ILSA. It passes overwhelmingly. That same year I brought some Conoco guys to AIPAC's policy conference, where half the House and half the Senate usually attend, and they knew that night that they would never win anything against us. So they began to cooperate. A lot of the oil companies realized, 'We're not gonna beat these guys in Congress, so we might as well try to tailor their activities, where we at least have some room to work.' And I was the go-between. I was the guy. I mean, BP still credits me with being the guy who greased the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, because of my work with them. That was originally designed as an anti-Iran project.

"I also became the guy who was reaching out to the Iranian Jewish community here. AIPAC thought that the Iranian Jewish community thought our way, and that they'd be a great source of funds. So I began to go regularly to Los Angeles, to have meetings with Iranian Jews. The guy from Qualcomm was one of the guys we talked to, people in Bel Air and Beverly Hills. I got to know a whole cross section of them, I appeared on Persian radio, and you know what's funny? I got a call one day from [BP].

"During the Khatami period, when Clinton was reaching out to Iran, they had a lot of support from the Iranian business community, exporters, against sanctions. I can't remember how many oil conferences I spoke at, telling them that ILSA wasn't so bad for them, which went over like a lead balloon. But I got a free education in the oil business, from BP and so on. Every time somebody from BP would come to town, their chief economist, their chief geologist, I would always get an hour with them. They'd give us money, like $10,000 or whatever. What they did was very smart. They turned me into someone who saw the world through their eyes. They started, BP, and then Amoco, giving AIPAC money. You know what? One time Steve Rosen guided John Browne through the Holocaust Museum. John Browne, the head of BP. His mother was actually Jewish. He grew up with her, alone. So he was coming to the United States and he really wanted to go to the Holocaust Museum. So we cooked up this thing, we would have Steve Rosen and Browne and his mother tour the Holocaust Museum together. It was great!"

Even Prince Bandar ibn Sultan, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States, and Adel al-Jubeir -- then the Saudi embassy spokesman and currently the ambassador -- welcomed AIPAC's work in helping to support the BTC pipeline and isolating Iran, its Persian Gulf rival, economically. Remembers Weissman:

"Prince Bandar used to send us messages. I used to meet with Adel al-Jubeir a couple times a year. Adel used to joke that if we could force an American embargo on Iranian oil, he'd buy us all Mercedes! Because Saudi [Arabia] would have had the excess capacity to make up for Iran at that time."


Keith Weissman on resisting the regime change agenda, espionage charges, and making a living.

 With the election of George W. Bush, the events of 9/11, and the invasion of Iraq, Iran became front and center for Weissman at AIPAC. "Iran came back in a big way after the invasion of Iraq, because you had all these guys running around saying, 'Next stop Tehran!' and all that," says Weissman. Many within AIPAC, and some of Israel's top Iran-watchers, wanted to push hard for Iraq-style regime change in Iran, too, beginning with overt and covert support for dissidents, minority groups, and exile militia such as the Mojahedin-e Khalgh (MKO).

"You should see the people who crawled out of the woodwork to talk to me! I talked to monarchists, to socialists, to communists, everybody. And they all wanted AIPAC to support regime change," remembers Weissman. "Israel was also trying to unduly influence the United States, too. They were sending a lot of Iranian exiles to the United States from Europe to give talks, purporting to be Iranian leaders. A lot of times, I remember, when I went to Israel Uri Lubrani would take me to meet these people who were stashed in various hotels all over Tel Aviv and he would always make me switch cabs on the way, that kind of thing! This culture of regime change was very strong, very powerful, inside elements in Israel, and the Pentagon, the neoconservatives, a lot of pundits here."

But Weissman says that AIPAC and other organized Jewish groups in the United States avoided direct calls for regime change, and he takes credit for restraining AIPAC in that regard. "A Jewish organization would not so much get up and say, 'We want regime change.' They might say, 'We need to contain Iran,'" says Weissman.

"[Support for regime change] was the personal opinion of many people in AIPAC, but it never uttered the words 'regime change.' And I think my efforts were part of the reason why they never did," he says, adding: "How would it look anyway? This is what makes it so stupid! The American Jewish community choosing the next government of Iran? Helping to change the next government of Iran? How can that government have any legitimacy? It's completely ridiculous. And I think the arguments that I raised against it convinced AIPAC, no matter what they personally thought, they realized that what I was saying was right."

It was at this time that the AIPAC-Franklin espionage controversy erupted. What happened and why? Perhaps the full story of the Rosen-Weissman case, Franklin's involvement, and what role was played by AIPAC and by Israel will never be known. So far, it's never been proven that either of the two AIPAC officials either received or passed on any classified documents, either to Israeli intelligence or anyone else. According to Weissman, they merely engaged in what every Washington insider does, namely, meeting with and sharing gossip with U.S. officials, embassy officials, and journalists. Franklin, the Pentagon Iran analyst, never gave Rosen or Weissman any actual documents, Weissman says, though he did try to get the support of AIPAC and a handful of neoconservative outsiders for the Pentagon's battle with the State Department over policy toward Iran.

There's a clear difference between spying and trading information, of course. If the FBI and the Justice Department had evidence that Franklin, Rosen, or Weissman were engaged in classical espionage, they presumably would have said so, and charged them accordingly. Had Rosen and Weissman conspired with the Mossad, Israel's intelligence service, in a scheme to ferret out U.S. secrets, and had that scheme been uncovered by the FBI, then the two AIPAC officials would have been charged with spying. But there's no evidence that anything like that happened. Instead, if Rosen and Weissman simply met with Franklin -- and other U.S. officials -- and then shared what they learned with Israeli embassy officials and others, including think tank types, then it's hard to argue that any laws were broken. That's what Rosen and Weissman's lawyers argued, and in any event the case was eventually dropped.

So what does Weissman think was going on? He believes that U.S. law enforcement officials, including the FBI, and CIA officials were so angry over the role of neoconservatives in backing the war in Iraq that they launched an investigation that sought to link Wolfowitz, Feith, and other Jewish Pentagon officials to Israeli intelligence, AIPAC, and a panoply of neocons at the American Enterprise Institute, the Hudson Institute, and other think tanks in Washington.

"I don't think it had that much to do with Iran," says Weissman. "It had to do with Iraq." The FBI and the CIA believed, according to Weissman, that neoconservatives, AIPAC, and others were responsible for the Iraq debacle, and that they were out for payback. "This investigation was part of a much larger effort aimed at neoconservatives and AIPAC, not just Steve Rosen. Everybody in Doug Feith's office had to hire an attorney: [David] Schenker, Rhode, Michael Rubin, Mike Makovsky, all those people had to hire attorneys." They were being investigated, Weissman says, especially because many of them had ties to and contacts with Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi wheeler-dealer who led the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and who was a principal advocate for regime change in Iraq from the 1990s onward. "They were being investigated because of Chalabi," he says.

Chalabi and AIPAC did have relations before the invasion of Iraq, of course. But Weissman was highly skeptical of Chalabi. "Chalabi came to AIPAC in the late 1990s," he recalls. "I'll never forget sitting across the table from him, and he said, 'If I ever become president of Iraq, one of the first things I'll do is to recognize Israel.' And I think to myself, 'The second thing you'll do is, you'll get a bullet in the back of your head.' And I walked out of the room. I knew he was a complete idiot. Or a liar."

But he adds: "There were a lot of contacts between the Jewish community and the INC. In 2000, 2001, the INC spoke at the AIPAC policy conference. So there were links between the Jewish community groups and the Iraqi exiles, and also between the neocons and the Iraqi exiles." But Weissman insists that even so, the FBI and the Justice Department erred in believing that the contacts amounted to anything like espionage or a national security threat that required an FBI inquiry. Instead, he says, the FBI launched an investigation to go after what they saw as a conspiracy to support war in Iraq and, after that, regime change in Iran. Personally, Weissman believes that both the war in Iraq and regime change in Iran were wrongheaded. "I think that they were all bad policies, policies that a lot of people in the U.S. government badly wanted to discredit," he says.

The FBI's investigation of AIPAC, including Rosen and Weissman, apparently went back to at least 1999, half a decade before the inquiry became public and charges were filed against Franklin and the two AIPAC officials. And although the CIA wasn't overtly involved in the FBI investigation, Weissman says that there is clear evidence that the CIA was indirectly involved.

"Don't forget, the head of the office that was investigating us had just come back there from two years helping the CIA with counterintelligence," says Weissman. That was David Szady, the FBI's assistant director for counterintelligence from 2001 to 2006. During the period of the run-up to the war in Iraq, the CIA itself was virtually at war with the Pentagon, clashing over a wide range of intelligence issues. At the Defense Department, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, along with Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary, and Doug Feith, the head of the Pentagon's policy shop, argued forcefully that Saddam Hussein was in league with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups and that Iraq maintained an aggressive program to develop and stockpile weapons of mass destruction. At the CIA, however, there was a great deal of skepticism over Iraq's purported involvement with terrorism and WMD. And the fact that Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith -- along with a passel of other DOD officials, including Rhode, Schenker, Rubin, and Makovsky -- had allied with Richard Perle and other neoconservatives at the American Enterprise Institute alarmed the CIA.

Not only that, but since the early 1980s many CIA and FBI officials believed that Israel and AIPAC were engaged in gray-area espionage to acquire U.S. secrets and to obtain and pass around leaked information from classified files, says Weissman, citing a long list of past allegations. "I think the FBI counterintelligence people were just so frustrated that they could never bring a case against these people," he says.

And then the invasion of Iraq brought things to a head. "Now remember, at this time Iraq started to go really bad," says Weissman. "So by then a lot of these agencies were saying, 'We told you so. We gotta stop these guys. They're bringing us down. The Arab world is against us. They're destroying American interests everywhere.' They're seeing all this stuff, they remember that after 9/11 the United States had the sympathy of the world, and they focused the blame on the neocons."

Weissman doesn't dispute that the FBI, CIA, and others were correct in blaming the neocons for the debacle in Iraq. "I do," he says. "I agree with them."

To the extent that the Rosen-Weissman case was about Iran, not Iraq, it had to do with Franklin's efforts to win support from AIPAC and others for a tougher U.S. policy toward Iran.
feith_and_franklin.jpg"Larry Franklin was the Pentagon Iran analyst," says Weissman. He was a fellow traveler with the neoconservatives, often appearing in the front row of the audience at American Enterprise Institute events on Iraq, sitting alongside Harold Rhode and other DOD officials. According to Weissman, Franklin (pictured whispering to Feith) was one of a handful of U.S. officials who felt that after what they saw as the successful toppling of Saddam Hussein, Iran was next on the list, not least because Iran was interfering in Iraq in a way calculated to undermine the U.S. presence there. "At that time American triumphalism was ridin' high! And all those guys could see was Iranian interference with Iraq, backing of elements that were killing Americans. All they could see was an unpopular regime that was doing things that harmed American interests," says Weissman.

"One of the things that Larry came to realize, during the wars between the Pentagon and the CIA, was that they were the only ones who wanted to go after Iran. The Pentagon viewed the State Department [as] panty-waists who were gonna appease [Iran], always trying to undercut whatever the Pentagon did. Larry got the idea that he would bring AIPAC into that, trying to enlist AIPAC's help in support of a much tougher policy toward Iran than the administration was pursuing at that time."

So far, Weissman says, Secretary of State Colin Powell had been able to steer American policy away from a showdown with Iran. "The neocons were so frustrated about this," Weissman says. "They hated Powell more than they hated anybody."

By 2004, Weissman says, the Bush administration hadn't settled on a concrete policy toward Iran. "The White House never did anything about this because there was so much fighting about Iran. They were trying to write a policy document about Iran from the first day they started in power to, oh, the first day I met Larry Franklin in '03. And they never actually wrote one, because neither side could ever agree."

Continues Weissman: "Larry thought he needed more ammunition in his holster, in his belt, to move the administration away from Powell and closer to Rumsfeld-Cheney. And he must have thought that AIPAC could help because of our power in Congress. So he sought us out. He pushed for the meeting and he asked a mutual friend of ours to set it up."

That friend, Weissman says, was Michael Makovsky, who worked in the Department of Defense. Currently, Makovsky is the project director at the Bipartisan Policy Center, an organization that has taken a hawkish position on policy toward Iran. Makovsky's brother, David Makovsky, is a top official at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

For his part, Weissman was on Powell's side. "There's no question that I agreed with Powell's set of beliefs, that we should try to encourage dialogue, to see if we could build on cooperation over Iraq," he says. "I thought that Powell was right." In response to Franklin's entreaties, he says, neither he nor AIPAC provided any help.

"He wanted us to push for the creation of a document that would become U.S. policy," says Weissman. "The Pentagon was writing a draft of it, the State Department was writing a draft of it. The State Department finished its draft in the summer of '02. The Pentagon was still writing its draft in the spring of '03, right around the time of Iraq, and they were using Iran and Iraq as part of their ideological bombardment against what Powell wanted."

At the time, Weissman remembers, Iran was being especially cooperative with the United States. "There was a period of time, right after the war, when the Iranians though that they really were next," he says. "Remember, they asked if they could help pick up the downed pilots, there were whispers that there might be something to build on."

Ironically, Iran also sent to the United States the rough outline of a proposal for improved relations, often described as the Grand Bargain approach, in which Iran promised to suspend its nuclear program and modify its Middle East policies in exchange for recognition and security guarantees from the United States. The proposal, prepared by Sadegh Kharrazi, an Iranian diplomat, was forwarded to the United States through the offices of the Swiss ambassador. The arrival of the Kharrazi memo coincided exactly with Rosen's and Weissman's second meeting with Larry Franklin. "The second time we met Larry Franklin, Rosen and I had to cut the lunch a little short because we were meeting with the Swiss ambassador, who was bringing the Kharrazi initiative with him."

Weissman isn't sure if the Iranian proposal was legitimate or not, that is, whether it was written with the concordance of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, or whether it was more of a freelanced peace offering from an Iranian faction. Since then, there has been a lot of debate about the proposal, though most analysts believe that at the very least it was worth a formal U.S. response. Instead, it was ignored. Soon afterward, Weissman believes, the whole thing was overtaken by events. "In a matter of weeks, when the United States got more and more bogged down in the insurrection in Iraq, [Iran] started to realize that they could tweak us anytime they wanted, in Iraq," he says. "And probably did."

Weissman believes that at the time, and to this day, Iran is less concerned about a U.S. attack than it is about an aggressive American policy aimed at toppling the regime through support to dissident groups and ethnic minorities and propaganda beamed into Iran.

Weissman says that Iran was alarmed at the possibility that the United States might engage in overt and covert efforts to instigate opposition inside Iran. He says that many in AIPAC, especially among its lay leadership and biggest donors, strongly backed regime change in Iran. "That was what Larry [Franklin] and his friends wanted," he says. "It included lots of different parts, like broadcasts, giving money to groups that would conduct sabotage, it included bringing the Mojahedin[-e Khalgh], bringing them out of Iraq and letting them go back to Iran to carry out missions for the United States. Harold Rhode backed this.... There were all these guys, Michael Ledeen, 'Next stop Tehran, next stop Damascus.'"

But when Franklin asked Weissman for help, he turned him down. "We didn't do anything. We chose not to do anything. I told Rosen it was a terrible idea, and it wouldn't work, and all it would do would be to make more trouble."

Unbeknownst to Rosen and Weissman, of course, their contacts with Franklin were being monitored by the FBI.

At the end of our interview, I asked Weissman how he managed to operate at AIPAC for so long with so many contradictions in his head. He was sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, and he had Palestinian and other Arab friends, yet he worked for an organization that single-handedly undermined the possibility that Palestine might emerge as a nation. Ideologically, he was much closer to Israeli doves and to progressives within the Labor Party, yet he was employed by a group that was hand in glove with the Likud and other far-right elements in Israel. And he was opposed to the war in Iraq and to confrontation with Iran, yet his bosses at AIPAC hobnobbed with Ahmed Chalabi and joined with neoconservatives to push for a showdown with Iran.

"They were doing it out of patriotism," Weissman says, even as he disagrees with their choices. "They thought they were doing it for the right reasons."

And Weissman? Why didn't he just quit, and do something else? It turns out that sometimes the simplest explanation is the one that rings most true. It was a job. "Well," he says. "Two kids in college. I finally got up to over a hundred thousand dollars. I got to work on issues that I liked, and I was able to have some influence. I was listened to. I was able to keep AIPAC away from the Iraqi opposition in the 1990s, and to keep AIPAC away from regime change later on. Those were the things I liked, and those were the things I thought I did good on."

Finally, he says, "And I was looking for another job when all this happened."

Copyright © 2011 Tehran Bureau

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline ... hange.html


The Jew Murkovsky (his brother is Israeli ... so likely a traitor...all of them still wanting a war with Iran. --CSR)

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Brookings Institution senior fellow Justin Vaisse, author of Neoconservatism: A Biography of a Movement, argues that because neocons never had the degree of influence that opponents credited them with, and also because of a general unawareness of their history, observers don't fully understand the trajectory of the neoconservative movement that began long before the Iraq invasion and one continues today.

"Neoconservatism remains, to this day, a distinct and very significant voice of the Washington establishment," Vaisse insists. In May he published the report Why Neoconservativism Still Matters.

Stephen Walt, professor of international affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School and co-author of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, says that the most obvious place the neocons are still influential is in U.S. policy toward Iran, where the Obama administration is "continuing the Bush administration's basic approach, albeit with a 'kinder, gentler' face."

Walt's assessment squares with a number of recent op-eds in the pages of the Wall Street Journal by Richard Perle, Abram Shulsky, Douglas Feith and Danielle Pletka, the latter of whom also testified on Iran before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs earlier this month.

Walt calls attention to two major reports produced by the Bipartisan Policy Center on Iran, where neoconservative Michael Makovsky was staff director for the studies and Dennis Ross — whose role "in the administration remains something of a mystery," according to Walt — was directly involved. The studies, Walt says, "are quite hawkish" and promote the use of force against Iran if diplomacy doesn't work. Walt also points out that Ross has argued that diplomacy is necessary in part to win international support for military action later.

http://visibility911.com/ford/2010/06/0 ... der-obama/

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

A couple of Jew professors write on the Anthrax attacks.  Take all with a grain of salt.  They point to the fact that this was military grade and top secret work.  There are likely only Zio-Jews in the US Govt. labs like Spertzel or Israelis that can really do this at this level.  With a massive war to start, like the Iraq-war, nothing was left to "Goy" chance. --CSR

----------------------

Evidence for the Source of the 2001 Attack Anthrax

Martin E. Hugh-Jones1*,
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg2,  
and Stuart Jacobsen3    
1Professor Emeritus, Louisiana State University; Anthrax Moderator, ProMED-mail, USA
2Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research and State Univ. of NY-Purchase (retired), USA
3Technical Consultant Silicon Materials, Dallas, TX, USA

*Corresponding author:    Martin E. Hugh-Jones
Professor Emeritus
Environmental Sciences Department
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA
Tel: +1-225-578-5599
Fax: +1-225- 578-4286
E-mail: http://www.omicsonline.org/2157-2526/21 ... S3-001.pdf).
 
2Sets of FBI Documents identified by B (Batch) and M (Module) numbers were provided by the FBI to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on the Review of the Scientific Approaches Used During the FBI's Investigation of the 2001 Bacillus anthracis Mailings Investigation; the documents are listed in the NAS Report issued February 15, 2011, pp. 133ff, Index of Documents Provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the documents were released to the public in February 2011 and were available from the NAS at that time.
 
3FBI Document B1M7, Leahy sample p. 9, NY Post sample p. 12 (p. 1 identifies the samples).
 
4The only exception, a set of 10 "reverse engineered" samples made at Dugway, is discussed in a later section.
 
5Hugh-Jones et al., op. cit.
 
6See Hugh-Jones et al. (op. cit.) for details of the proposed siliconization procedure, which requires moisture from within the spores and results in deposition on the spore coat, not on the exterior surface of the spore (the exosporium).
 
7Michael J, Kotula P (2009) [Sandia National Laboratory]. Elemental Microanalysis of Bacillus anthracis Spores from the Amerithrax Case, presentation in September 2009 to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee studying the FBI's scientific approaches; also, FBI document B1M6 (Sandia National Laboratory Report), pp. 4ff. Tin and silicon were also found in extrasporular debris in the NY Post sample (see discussion in Hugh-Jones et al., op. cit.).
 
8Stewart M, Somlyo AP, Somlyo AV, Shuman H, Lindsay JA, et al. (1980) Distribution of calcium and other elements in cryosectioned Bacillus cereus T spores, determined by high-resolution scanning electron probe x-ray microanalysis. J Bacteriol 143: 481-491.
 
9Michael, J, Kotula P (2009), and FBI document B1M6, op. cit.
 
10Preparation of the "reverse engineered" samples is described in FBI Document B1M13 (DPG Production Methods).
 
11Ibid.
 
12Elemental analyses of the 10 samples are given in FBI Document B1M7 (FBI Laboratory Reports), Samples from Dugway, pp. 26-28; the data are repeated at B1M7, Elemental Analysis Summary, pp. 92-94. The ten Dugway samples studied by the FBI are labeled NDLB, NPLB,SDLB, SPLB, SDOB, NDOB, SPVB, NPVB, NDLM, NPLM, indicating their preparation methods (those ending with "B" were ball-milled; see FBI Document B1M13 (Dugway), p.72 or 27, for the significance of these labels).
 
13The milling methods used by Dugway for the 36 samples are described in FBI Document B1M13, p. 71.
 
14The mortar-and-pestle- milled samples, labeled NDLM (0.3 wt% silicon) and NPLM (0.2 wt%), can be compared to their ball-milled counterparts differing only in milling method: NDLB (5 wt% silicon) and NPLB (0.5 wt%). Note that NDLB was one of the two samples for which the analytical results were questionable, according to the FBI laboratory report (B1M7, p. 28); the other was SPVB (2 wt%). These two are the samples with the highest analytical results for silicon.
 
15FBI Document B1M7, FBI Elemental Analysis Summary, p. 93.
 
16FBI Document B1M13 (Dugway), pp. 23 and 84-85, where it can be seen that all 12 of the ball-milled Dugway samples, not just those analyzed by the FBI, exhibited clumping.
 
17FBI Document B1M7 (FBI Laboratories), p. 28.
 
18NAS Report "Review of the Scientific Approaches used during the FBI's Investigation of the 2001 Anthrax Letters," Feb. 15, 2011, p. 67 (analysis) and p. 70 (identity of the samples studied).
 
19Michael J, Kotula P (2009), op. cit.; also Sandia reports to the FBI in FBI documents B1M6 and B1M1 (in these reports, samples are coded and it is sometimes difficult or impossible to find their identities).
 
20FBI Document B1M13 (Dugway), p. 93.
 
21FBI Document B2M13 (Battelle), p. 151.
 
22FBI Document B1M13 (Dugway), Test Plan, p. 15.
 
23FBI Document B1M13 (Dugway), p. 79.
 
24Amerithrax Investigative Summary, February 19, 2010, p. 75.
 
25B1M13 (Dugway), pp. 70 and 74-5. The two fermentation products, grown in 2003 at the same time and from the same stock as the agar samples, were stored until 2005, when they were irradiated and processed (methods not disclosed) under the designations "Lot 05AUG05" for one grown with Antifoam 204 and "Lot 01SEP05" for one grown with Antifoam C.
 
26FBI document B1M1(Technical Review Panels), Sandia report on elemental mapping of Amerithrax Samples, pp. 109, 110, 100, 106. The data for this sample, coded 040255-1, in Sandia's Table on page 109 are the same as those for the "Dugway surrogate (fermentation using Leighton-Doi media)" in the NAS Report "Review of the Scientific Approaches Used During the FBI's Investigation of the 2001 Anthrax Letters," Feb. 15, 2011, pp 67 and 70, indicating that the FBI must have identified the coded material to the NAS Committee as a Dugway fermentation sample, but evidently did not specify which one.
 
27FBI Document B1M1, Sandia report on elemental mapping, pp. 109, 110, 100, 106.
 
28NAS Report (op. cit.), p. 67.
 
29FBI Science Briefing, August 18, 2009; Amerithrax Investigative Summary, Feb 19, 2010, page 14, footnote 5.
 
30FBI Document B2M13 (Chemical and Physical Characteristics, Battelle), Summary of Sample Analyses, pp. 146ff.
 
31FBI Document B2M13 (Chemical and Physical Characteristics, Battelle), The Analysis of Surrogate Dry Powder Bacillus Spore Product, pp. 92ff. The "unwashed" preparation had a titer of 9×1011 cfu/g, an indication of its high quality (compare to the titer of the pristine Daschle sample, 2.1×1012, which had been determined at USAMRIID just after the material was received from the Capitol Police (FBI Document B1M2 (USAMRIID), Anaytical Test Report, pp. 36ff; note pp. 37 and 42). The titer of spores in the Leahy letter has never been reported.
 
32FBI Document B2M13 (Chemical and Physical Characteristics, Battelle), Summary of Sample Analyses, pp. 146ff. Analysis of the Leahy sample was done in February 2002, after the Leahy letter had been stored in a mail bag for a number of months; it is therefore possible that the Leahy spores were no longer in their original condition.
 
33FBI Document B1M2 (USAMRIID), Report of Electron Microscopic Examination of Powder Obtained from the Daschle Letter, pp. 4-5.
 
34FBI Document B2M13 (Battelle), Summary of Sample Analyses, pp. 148ff.
 
35FBI Document B2M13 (Battelle), "Sample B," pp.11ff and 35ff.
 
36Names and origins of various Daschle samples are given in FBI document B1M2 (USAMRIID), pp. 36-38.
 
37FBI document B2M13 (Battelle), pp. 6, 31, 35; note that "Sample A" (p. 12) is sometimes incorrectly identified in the Battelle report as SPS.57.01, rather than SPS.57.03 (corrected on p. 105); "Sample B" is SPS.57.08 (p. 11).
 
38See, e.g., the Naval Surface Treatment Center, US Navy, Silicone Coatings. (http://www.nstcenter.biz/writeup.aspx?t ... ings&page= TechResourcesSiliconeCoatings.html).
 
39Gerhardt P, Black SH (1961) Permeability of Bacterial Spores. II. Molecular Variables Affecting Solute Permeation. J Bacteriol 82: 750-760; Nicholson WL, Munakata N, Horneck G, Melosh HJ, Setlow P (2000) Resistance of Bacillus endospores to extreme terrestrial and extraterrestrial environments. Microbiol Mol Biol Rev 64: 548-572.
 
40See, for example, Biological and Toxin Weapons Today, ed. Geissler E, p. 32 (Oxford University Press, NY, 1986); and Report of the Secretary General on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use, p. 64 (UN Document A/75/75/Rev.1, 1969).
 
41Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History, ed. Croddy EA and Wirtz JJ, Volume 1: Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Croddy EA, pp. 184-5 (ABC-CLIO, 2004).
 
42Ibid.
 
43Balkundi SS, Veerabadran NG, Eby DM, Johnson GR, Lvov YM (2009) Encapsulation of Bacterial Spores in Nanoorganized Polyelectrolyte Shells. Langmuir 25: 14011- 14016; Fakhrullin RF, Lvov YM (2012) "Face-lifting" and "make-up" for microorganisms: layer-by-layer polyelectrolyte nanocoating. ACS Nano 6: 4557-4564.
 
44Yang SH, Lee KB, Kong B, Kim JH, Kim HS, et al. (2009) Biomimetic encapsulation of individual cells with silica. Angew Chem Int Ed Engl 48: 9160-9163.
 
45Donlon M and Jackman J (1999) DARPA Integrated Chemical and Biological Detection System. Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 20: 320-325; Suter JJ (2005) Sensors and Sensor Systems Research and Development at APL with a View Toward the Future. Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 26: 350-355.
 
46Hathout Y, Demirev PA, Ho YP, Bundy JL, Ryzhov V, et al. (1999) Identification of Bacillus Spores by Matrix-Assisted Laser Desorption Ionization-Mass Spectrometry. Appl Environ Microbiol 65: 4313-4319. Note that dry B. anthracis Sterne spores from USAMRIID were used in developing this identification technique, which was employed in the DARPA project for analysis of aerosol samples collected on tapes.
 
47On August 28, 2000, forty ml were removed from flask RMR 1029 at USAMRIID "for DARPA mass spec project with JHU-APL" (inventory control sheet, www.vault.fbi.gov/ amerithrax, part 24, p. ; see also, FBI interview believed to be of Dr. Joany Jackman, a major participant in the DARPA project working at USAMRIID under John Ezzell from 1997-2000 and then at Johns Hopkins APL: B. anthracis, grown from an inoculum (about 1012 cfu/ml) provided by Bruce Ivins and purified on a gradient, was used at USAMRIID for the aerosol work (http://vault.fbi.gov/Amerithrax/ part 21, pp 19-22; Jackman's corroborating biographical details are at http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/ medicine/std/team/Jackman.html).
 
48Frederick News Post, Ivins' Lawyer, Colleague share details FBI left out, December 5, 2010.
 
49Personal communications from individuals present at the December 5, 2010 seminar.
 
50Ezzell also stated that he never prepared live virulent dry spores--the only dried spores he ever produced were sterilized first, before drying (ibid.).
 
51The plan is contained in DOD Budget Justifications issued in February 1999, February 2000 and June 2001: DOD RDT&E Budget Item Justification Sheet (R-2 Exhibit) for BA2 Applied Research, R-1 Item Nomenclature Biological Warfare Defense PE 0602383E, R-1 #14, dated February 1999; DOD RDT&E Budget Item Justification sheet (R-2 Exhibit) for BA2 Applied Research, R-1 Item Nomenclature: Biological Warfare Defense PE 0602383E, R-1 #15, dated February 2000; DOD Amended Budget Submission, RDT&E Budget Item Justification sheet (R-2 Exhibit) for BA2 Applied Research, R-1 Item Nomenclature: Biological Warfare Defense PE 0602383E, R-1 #16, p. 93, dated June 2001.
 
52DOD RDT&E Budget Item Justification Sheet (R-2 Exhibit) for BA2 Applied Research, R-1 Item Nomenclature: Biological Warfare Defense PE 0601383E, R-1 #16, dated February 2002.
 
53Chemical/Biological Defense Program projects cited here are found in the following documents: DOD CBDP Budget Item Justification Sheet (R-2A Exhibit) for BA2 - Applied Research, 0602384BP Chemical/Biological Defense, Project CB2, dated February 1999; and DOD CBDP Budget Item Justification Sheet (R-2A Exhibit) for BA2- Applied Research, 0602384BP Chemical/Biological Research, Project CB2, dated June 2001.
 
54Koblentz GD, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Cornell University Press, NY, 2009).
 
55DOD RDT&E Budget Item Justification Sheet for Biological Warfare Defense, dated February 2000 (op. cit.).
 
56Discussed in Hugh-Jones et al., op. cit.
 
57FBI document B2M1, p. 21, Report from Novozymes Biotech, Inc.
 
58Gibbons HS, Broomall SM, McNew LA, Daligault H, Chapman C, et al. (2011) Genomic signatures of strain selection and enhancement in Bacillus atrophaeus var. globigii, a historical biowarfare simulant. PLoS One 6: e17836.
 
59FBI documents B1M5, p. 83, p. 98 and B2M2, p. 138ff. The B. subtilis strain isolated from the NY Post powder was designated GB22.
 
60FBI document B2M4 (FBI Chemical Biological Sciences Unit), p. 13 and B1M5 p. 100.
 
61The genetic sequence of B. subtilis 168 became available in 1997: Kunst F, Ogasawara N, Moszer I, Albertini AM, Alloni G, et al. (1997) The complete genome sequence of the gram-positive bacterium Bacillus subtilis. Nature 390: 249-256.
 
62Nicholson WL, Galeano B (2003) UV resistance of Bacillus anthracis spores revisited: validation of Bacillus subtilis spores as UV surrogates for spores of B. anthracis Sterne. Appl Environ Microbiol 69: 1327-1330.; Greenberg DL, Busch JD, Keim P, Wagner DM (2010) Identifying experimental surrogates for Bacillus anthracis spores: a review. Investig Genet 1: 4.
 
63Nicholson WL, Munakata N, Horneck G, Melosh HJ, Setlow P (2000) Resistance of Bacillus endospores to extreme terrestrial and extraterrestrial environments. Microbiol Mol Biol Rev 64: 548-572.
 
64New York Times, US Recently Produced Anthrax in a Highly Lethal Powder Form, December 13, 2001.
 
65FBI Document B2M10 (Statistical Analysis), especially Appendix V of the Report on Statistical Analysis, where the names of some specific laboratories that submitted repository samples of interest are handwritten next to the sample data: DPG (Dugway Proving Ground); BMI (Battelle Memorial Institute); DRES (Defense Research Establishment, Suffield, Canada); NMRC (Naval Medical Research Center); USAMRIID. See also the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Report "Review of the Scientific Approaches used during the FBI's Investigation of the 2001 Anthrax Letters," February 15, 2011, pp. 110-112, and FBI Document B2M10, p. 25. From information in these documents it appears that seven repository samples from USAMRIID and one from Battelle tested positive in all four genetic assays; one sample each from USAMRIID and Northern Arizona University (an FBI contractor in the anthrax case) had three positives; a samples from DRES had two positives; and samples from six other laboratories, including Dugway and the Naval Medical Research Center plus four unnamed laboratories, tested positive in one or two assays, as did additional samples from some of the laboratories already mentioned.
 
66NAS Report (op. cit.), p. 108 gives reasons why all four markers probably originated at Dugway; the Report also discusses the probability of false negatives and presents a Table of assay results on 30 repeat samplings of flask RMR 1029 (the putative parental source of the attack anthrax) as an illustration (p. 117).
 
67Personal communication January 11, 2002 from David Lore, Columbus Dispatch Science Reporter, author of article "Labs deny use of letter anthrax: Powdered spores not part of stocks, Battelle official says" in Columbus Dispatch, January 9, 2002.
 
68FBI Document B3D16. One Ames repository sample from Battelle tested positive in all 4 assays; another from Battelle, known to have originated from an RMR 1029 sample, tested positive in 2 of 3 assays (FBI Document B2M10, p. 25).
 
69Maureen Stevens et al. vs United States of America: Notice of Errata, Document 162, entered on FLSD Docket 07/19/2011, submitted by the Defendant United States in US District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case Number: 03-81110-CIV-Hurley/Hopkins.
 
70Columbus Dispatch, Labs deny use of letter anthrax: Powdered spores not part of stocks, Battelle official says, January 9, 2002.
 
71See FBI/Dugway plan for the reverse engineering work in FBI Document B1M13.
 
72Elemental analyses of the 10 samples, measured by ICP-OES in an FBI laboratory, are given in FBI Document B1M7 (FBI Laboratory Reports), Samples from Dugway, pp. 26-28; the data are repeated at B1M7, Elemental Analysis Summary, p. 93.
 
73Problems in the FBI laboratory's analysis of the Dugway surrogates, particularly sample NDLB (5 wt% silicon, 0.0265 wt% tin), and sample SPVB (2 wt% silicon, 0.0132 wt% tin) are stated in FBI Document B1M7, p. 28 (see Table 1).
 
74FBI Document B1M7, p. 27.
 
75FBI Document B1M1 (Technical Review Panels), p. 83, gives the elemental analysis of the Standard, together with averages for the elements in the ten Dugway samples (presented at a Chemistry Review Panel in August 2005).
 
76FBI Document B1M7 (FBI laboratory), ICP-OES analyses, pp. 15-22, 29-37, also pp. 92-94.
 
77The preparation methods were reported by Dugway in fair detail: FBI Document B1M13 (Dugway Production Methods).
 
78See Table 1, note c.
 
79Brewer LN, Ohlhausen JA, Kotula PG, Michael JR (2008) Forensic analysis of bioagents by X-ray and TOF-SIMS hyperspectral imaging. Forensic Sci Int 179: 98-106.
 
80ScienceInsider, New Challenge to FBI's Anthrax Investigation Lends an Ear to Tin, 11 October 2011.
 
81For sensitivities of the analytical methods see Table 1.
 
82The finding, via stable isotope analysis (B1M9, p.44), that Dugway water is unlikely to have been used to grow the attack spores is probably not relevant; Dugway's report (B1M13) on preparation of the surrogate samples mentions the use of "sterile water for irrigation" and "sterile water for injection," which are generally purchased in small bottles from distant providers. The FBI laboratory, in analysing media components (B1M7), included "Baxter sterile water for irrigation".
 
83M. Wilson, chemist at a silicone products company, quoted in Miami Herald, "FBI lab reports on anthrax attacks suggest another miscue," May 19, 2011.
 
84DOD CBDP Budget Item Justification Sheet dated June 2001 (op. cit.).
 
85"Clear Vision" project (Miller J, Engelberg S, Broad, W, Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War (Simon and Schuster, NY, 2001) pp. 290ff, 295ff.
 
86USA Today, Army says labs not necessarily source of Hill spores, December 17, 2001; Washington Post, Capitol Hill Anthrax Matches Army's Stocks, December 16, 2001.
 
87NY Times, Terror anthrax resembles type made by US, December 3, 2001.
 
88BBC, March 14, 2002.
 
89Wall Street Journal, Anthrax Probe Was Complicated By Muddled Information, FBI Says, March 25, 2002.
 
90An appropriately targetted investigation would seek to determine whether Bacillus anthracis had been microencapsulated prior to the letter attacks, and, if so, by whom, where, when, and the amounts, strains and dispositions of the resulting materials. Parts of such an investigation might still need to be classified.

http://www.omicsonline.org/2157-2526/21 ... 0aid=10614