CFR's Richard Haass: Putin is exploiting a vacuum left by the west

[MikeWB]

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8d37ec00-661f-11e5-97d0-1456a776a4f5.html

Somewhere, Yevgeny Primakov must be smiling. Primakov, for those readers who do not recognise or recall the name, was the former Soviet and Russian official who cultivated close ties with authoritarian rulers in the Middle East (particularly Saddam Hussein) and who rarely missed an opportunity to work against western interests.

The details have changed, but the pattern is familiar. Vladimir Putin, interested in turning world attention away from Ukraine and his public's attention away from a shrinking economy, has launched an eleventh hour effort to shore up the embattled regime of Bashar al-Assad. He is putting soldiers and military equipment into Syria and launching a new diplomatic offensive. He is being joined in this effort by Iran and by the divided and dysfunctional Iraqi government, whose foreign policy is increasingly made in Tehran.

Mr Putin, anxious as ever to demonstrate that Russia is a great power that cannot be ignored, is exploiting the vacuum left in large part by the US and European governments. For more than four years, western voices have called for regime change in Syria and done little to bring it about. The decision by President Barack Obama not to take military action after the Assad government used chemical weapons in defiance of US-articulated red lines emboldened the government and demoralised the opposition. Adding to the problem was the strategy of looking to Iraq as a base from which to attack Isis in Syria. This plan never came to fruition as Iraqi government forces disappointed whenever called upon. The result is that western Iraq has, like much of Syria, become fertile ground for Isis.

The subsequent US-led effort to identify, train and arm a moderate opposition to Mr Assad proved to be a fiasco. The problem is not, as the Russians and Iranians have charged, that it is an illegal action taken against the legitimate Syrian government. This government long ago forfeited its legitimacy, and neither Russia nor Iran is in a position to lecture others about the legality of support for the armed opposition given what Russia has been doing in Ukraine and what Iran has done over the years in Lebanon, Iraq and elsewhere. The problem is simply that the effort to build an opposition the west could associate with and that could hold its own on the ground has come up empty.

Mr Putin and Iran's President Hassan Rouhani are arguing that Isis is a terrorist threat that must be defeated and that the Assad regime is a necessary partner in the struggle. Mr Putin said exactly this at the UN on Monday: "It is an enormous mistake to refuse to co-operate with the Syrian government and its armed forces who are valiantly fighting terrorism face to face." He is right in his assessment of Isis, but wrong in overlooking the reality that it is Mr Assad (who controls no more than a quarter of his country) who is fuelling support for Isis in Syria and around the Muslim world by his attacks on his own people.
"For the foreseeable future the most realistic policy for Syria is one not based on a national government in effective control of the country"

But this is not to say the Russians and Iranians are entirely misguided in their thinking. Getting rid of Mr Assad is in and of itself not a strategy. Both Russia and Iran are rightly concerned that if not done in a careful way, regime change could lead to regime collapse, paving the way to the disappearance of order in Damascus and to the establishment of a caliphate under Isis. If this were to happen, the entire region would be placed at risk. In addition, the collapse of the Syrian government could also lead to a genocide, a new wave of refugees, or both.

Ideally, Mr Assad would be persuaded or pressured to step down or cede real power. For its part, the US should set out its conditions for a successor government and make clear what it was prepared to provide in the way of military, economic and diplomatic support if the conditions were met.

The possibility of working with Russia and Iran here should not be ruled out. Russia has a stake in seeing the civil war in Syria end as it is a training ground for another generation of terrorists who will one day return home to Russia and cause real damage. Iran, too, has an interest in see Isis cut down to size.

The US could make clear that it is prepared to join in a political process with them towards that end.

For any number of reasons, though, engineering an acceptable political transition in Damascus may well prove impossible, and even with one, the fact remains most of the country will be under the control of hostile groups. For the foreseeable future then the most realistic policy for Syria is one not based on a national government in effective control of the country. What is required instead is working with the Kurds and select Sunni tribes in their respective regions. US and European support of such enclaves will necessarily be an element of such a policy, as would be attacks on Isis. Such a strategy will not deliver a solution, but it may stop the haemorrhaging and lead more Syrians to opt to stay until a partner emerges in Damascus.

The writer is president of the Council on Foreign Relations