Bashar Assad assesses the Syria situation

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'We were close to direct conflict between Russia & US inside Syria' – Bashar Assad

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=YB-McdKnFtQ

'We were close to direct conflict between Russia & US inside Syria' – Bashar Assad
https://www.rt.com/news/428299-assad-syria-russia-interview/

Syrian President Bashar Assad says Moscow deterred the West from launching a devastating country-wide air strike last month, and believes that Damascus has nearly won the seven-year war, despite continued US "interference."

"With every move forward for the Syrian Army, and for the political process, and for the whole situation, our enemies and our opponents, mainly the West led by the United States and their puppets in Europe and in our region, they try to make it farther – either by supporting more terrorism, bringing more terrorists to Syria, or by hindering the political process," Assad told RT correspondent Murad Gazdiev, during a sit-down interview in Damascus, noting that without outside funding his opponents inside the country could be subdued "within a year."

After having to switch its support between the various anti-Assad factions, and the recapture of the key cities of Aleppo and Deir ez-Zor by government forces over the past two years, Washington, the Syrian leader believes, is "losing its cards" and can be brought to the negotiating table.

"Our challenge is how can we close this gap between their plans and our plans," Assad said.

'World didn't buy US chemical weapons story'
The Syrian leader believes, however, that the closer the deadly conflict comes to an end, the more desperate his opponents' measures become. He cited the alleged Douma chemical weapon attack ("Is it in our interest? Why, and why now?" he asks) as a last-ditch Western attempt to sway international opinion – one that failed.

"They told a story, they told a lie, and the public opinion around the world and in the West didn't buy their story, but they couldn't withdraw. So, they had to do something, even on a smaller scale," Assad said, referring to the joint airstrikes against purported Syrian chemical weapons facilities, carried out on April 14 by the US, UK, and France.

Assad says Moscow also played a role in restraining Washington's influence and meddling in the region, both generally since its invitation to aid Damascus in September 2015, and in this particular incident.

'Russia deterred larger-scale attack on Syria'
"The Russians announced publicly that they are going to destroy the bases that are going to be used to launch missiles, and our information – we don't have evidence, we only have information, and that information is credible information – that they were thinking about a comprehensive attack all over Syria, and that's why the threat pushed the West to make it on a much smaller scale," the Syrian president said.

With Western 'advisers' deployed alongside their proxy forces in Syria, Assad also thanked Russia for not triggering face-to-face confrontation with the US, which is operating in close proximity both in the air and on the ground.

"We were close to have direct conflict between the Russian forces and the American forces, and fortunately, it has been avoided, not by the wisdom of the American leadership, but by the wisdom of the Russian leadership," Assad told Gazdiev. "We need the Russian support, but we need at the same time to avoid the American foolishness in order to be able to stabilize our country."

'Either you have a country or you don't have a country'
Despite praising the diplomatic efforts of the Astana peace process, and emphasizing the government's own drive to win the hearts and minds by restoring order in liberated areas, and initiating a process of reconciliation, Assad says there are still some victories that will have to be won on the battlefield.

"Factions like Al-Qaeda, like ISIS, like Al-Nusra, and the like-minded groups, they're not ready for any dialogue, they don't have any political plan; they only have this dark ideological plan, which is to be like any Al-Qaeda-controlled area anywhere in this world. So, the only option to deal with those factions is force," Assad said, emphasizing that there is no stepping back now.

"The more escalation we have, the more determined we'll be to solve the problem, because you don't have any other choice; either you have a country or you don't have a country," the Syrian president told RT.

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© 2018 Emrah Gurel/AP
TURKEY-ISRAEL TENSION: WHAT DOES PRESIDENT ERDOGAN WANT TO ACHIEVE?
Guney Yildiz                                                                                                                   30.05.2018
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/turkey-israel-tension-what-does-president-erdogan-/

  "Turkey's relations with Israel are determined, in no small part, by
   Ankara's relations with other power blocs, its domestic and broader
   foreign policy. The roots of Ankara's May 14th decision to recall its
   ambassadors to Washington and Tel Aviv shouldn't therefore solely be
   sought in US President Donald Trump's decision to relocate the US
   Embassy to Jerusalem or alternatively the killing of dozens of
   Palestinian protesters by Israeli Defence Forces at the Gaza border.

   The Turkish government's response to Israel this time has been muted
   when compared with previous reactions, such as President Recep Tayyip
   Erdogan's clash with former Israeli President Shimon Peres in Davos
   2009 or over the Israeli raid on a Turkish-led Gaza-bound flotilla,
   which saw nine Turkish citizens killed. This time, Erdogan and his
   Justice and Development Party (AK Party) reaction's have been
   restrained despite fiery rhetoric. AK Party MP's voted down a
   Parliamentary motion - tabled by opposition parties - seeking to cancel
   military and political agreements with Israel.

   By leading the anti-Israeli rhetoric, Erdogan wants to provide
   ammunition for several objectives. First, Ankara seeks to fill the
   perceived vacuum for the leadership of Sunnis in the Middle East and to
   strengthen its position as a non-Arab country by scoring points against
   potential rivals, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which are both restrained
   vis-a-vis Israel. A strong Sunni leadership role is also crucial for
   President Erdogan's plans to dominate the Sunni Arab political spectrum
   in Syria and Iraq, mobilising them against the Kurdish leadership and
   the Assad government.

   However, President Erdogan's track record and image as the protector of
   Sunni Muslim's internationally is patchy. After supporting the Syrian
   Sunni Arab rebels against the Assad government for years, Turkey
   changed its track and facilitated the strategic capture of Aleppo by
   the regime forces. He also distanced himself last year from the
   Turkish-led Gaza flotilla campaign.

   Second, while seeking to lead Sunni Arabs, Erdogan has also sought to
   avoid antagonising Iran and the Shia bloc. But, a bid for Sunni
   leadership on an anti-Israeli ticket cements Turkey, as the preferable
   choice to be Iran's main rival. Yet, Turkish-Iranian cooperation is
   strategically vital for Ankara against the PKK in the Qandil mountain
   of Iraqi Kurdistan and to keep broader Kurdish ambitions in check.

   Since Turkey started to follow a more independent foreign policy in the
   mid-2000s,  the Turkish foreign policy has meandered from being a
   reluctant regional actor into a multi-directional and non-sectarian
   policy approach, and later became an Islamist and increasingly
   sectarian one. Since the rise of the Kurds in Syria and the collapse of
   the peace process with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Turkish
   government's foreign (and domestic) policy became firmly nationalist.
   In this equation, Israel's outlook, which is pro-Iraqi Kurds, and
   increasingly pro-Kurds more broadly, doesn't make the country a
   priority partner for Ankara.

   Third, Erdogan and the AK Party do not symapthise to the US-led
   anti-Iranian bloc, which includes Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel as
   members in the region. Joining these countries will not only pit Turkey
   against Iran, but it will also require AKP to take a hostile position
   against the Muslim Brotherhood, which, as a political movement, is one
   of AKP's close political allies. By focusing political attention and
   public debate in the Arab world on Israel, Ankara could potentially
   weaken the Saudi Arabia -Egypt bloc and enlist support among Muslim
   nations for its leadership. Calling an extraordinary summit of the
   Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Istanbul on May 19th was a
   step in that direction.

   Finally, calling for mass rallies against Israel, Erdogan seeks to
   translate the anti-Israeli sentiment into political points for Turkey;s
   upcoming Presidential and Parliamentary elections on June 24th. Since
   anti-Israeli attitudes are not limited to conservative Turks but also
   widespread among secularists and nationalists, Erdogan can garner
   further support by leading the rhetoric on the issue.

   Israel has responded to Turkey with similarly fiery rhetoric signalling
   that the Knesset may recognise the massacres of Armenians under Ottoman
   Turkey in 1915 as genocide. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also
   voiced criticism for Turkey's offensive into the Syrian Kurdish town of
   Afrin and Ankara's treatment of the Kurds. This tension works to
   Netanyahu's advantage regarding Israeli domestic policies.

   But are further tensions between Turkey and Israel worth risking
   potentially unclear gains by Turkey? The AKP has for years been taking
   steps to mitigate the backlash of a tension with Israel. The Turkish
   government has more than doubled its intelligence capabilities and
   modernised its defence industry to reduce its dependence on the West as
   well as Israel. Initially buying the majority of its unarmed UAV drones
   from Israel, Turkey now has the capabilities to build its armed drones
   itself. Increasingly confident of its new intelligence capabilities,
   economic links and influence beyond its borders the Turkish government
   believes that it has much less need for Israeli support.

   However, the costs for Ankara of hostilities between Israel and Turkey
   can reverberate beyond the region. Turkey's already stretched relations
   with the US could further be damaged if pro-Israeli figures in the US
   establishment become firmly anti-Turkish. Some former Turkish diplomats
   argue that although the pro-Israeli lobby in the US is no longer a
   supporter of Turkey, it hasn't yet taken an openly hostile position
   against Ankara.

   Tension between Israel and Turkey is also not necessarily good news for
   Palestinians. A Turkish government, which can talk to Israel and yield
   some influence, would probably benefit Palestinians more than the just
   a show of public support at rallies inside Turkey.

   A few weeks before pulling its ambassador from the US, Turkey extended
   diplomatic support for a US, UK and French attack on Syria. These
   seemingly inconsistent attitude makes sense in the new Turkish foreign
   policy orientation, which has been put in place since the forced
   departure of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Turkey's foreign
   policy is based on exploiting the geopolitical rivalries, not only
   between Washington and Moscow, but also between Iran and Israel, Qatar
   and Saudi Arabia, and between European countries. Ankara's thinking is
   that increased tension between Moscow, Tehran and Washington over Syria
   would propel Turkey into a more important geopolitical position,
   securing its desire to play a leadership role in the Middle East.
   
   Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than
   the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

   # Turkey   # Israel # Middle East "