SIGNIFICANCE OF RUSSIAN VICTORY AT BATTLE OF BAKHMUT

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SIGNIFICANCE OF RUSSIAN VICTORY AT BATTLE OF BAKHMUT, ACCORDING TO INDIAN NEWSPAPER
https://brunobertez.com/2023/05/23/limportance-de-la-victoire-russe-a-la-bataille-de-bakhmut-selon-un-journal-indien/

Most wars are characterized by information overload. The war in Ukraine is different because of the opposite: a glaring lack of credible and verified information.

As a result, it has taken Russia, Ukraine and the world all month to finally recognize what was obvious to anyone following this conflict – that the city of Bakhmut (called Artemovsk by the Russians) in the eastern Ukraine had finally fallen. to the Russians after a ten-month battle.

Much of the battle was characterized by intense, urban, positional warfare in which the Russians fought their way from trench to trench and building to building.

Although exact casualty figures are not available, Russia and Ukraine admit the numbers number in the thousands.

Map of Ukraine (Note: green lines mark the approximate front line)

Video footage of cemeteries and combat operations, geotagged by several Telegram channels, qualitatively indicates that the Ukrainian forces suffered much more than the Russians by orders of magnitude. But this is categorically denied by kyiv.

Whatever the numbers, Bakhmut is the biggest and bloodiest battle of the 21st century and has earned an unsavory nickname – "the meat grinder" – in reference to the many Ukrainian soldiers killed.

kyiv stubbornly shoveled numerous military formations into the area, armed with advanced weapon systems provided by the West, and continued to be so until the very end.

By most estimates, the Ukrainian forces involved in the Battle of Bakhmut totaled the equivalent of 3–4 Indian divisions, roughly equivalent to one corps. This is a third of the entire Ukrainian army.

In the end, most of these formations were either destroyed or rendered incapable of conducting military operations.

A calculation based on shoulder patches and vehicle markings indicates that more than a dozen Ukrainian mechanized infantry brigades took part in the battle at one time or another.

In contrast, the Russian attacks were carried out mainly by a group of mercenaries called the Wagner Group, supported by regular Russian artillery, armor and airstrikes.

Although the fall of Bakhmut alone may not determine the outcome of the war, it is an important victory for many reasons and offers a number of lessons for India.

First  , it was the first conventional battle between peer groups using modern weapon systems and platforms in a network-centric manner.

The complete defeat of the Ukrainian army, which was armed with the best the West has to offer, and strongly supported by Western intelligence agencies (including their considerable satellite and electronic means), shows that advanced technologies are insufficient to win a battle when the other side is just as well equipped.

Second  , the massive and continuous artillery barrages the Russians have waged to devastating effect, interspersed with thermobaric weapons that can destroy entire units in a flash, show that numbers matter.

This is both in terms of artillery pieces and shells fired. The Ukrainians were unable to match the Russians' rates of fire, even to a moderate degree, and thus were severely under-armed.

Third  , Russia's use of mercenaries as a spearhead was a novel move, as it protected its regular army, minimized its losses, and allowed it to keep large forces in reserve.

Fourth  , the Russians have shown that the successful pursuit of infantry operations in urban environments for long periods in a sustained manner, while tactically questionable, is possible without a breakdown in discipline or morale, as long as troops are effectively supplied. , units are periodically rotated and well led.

Fifth  , the futility of the West's continued support for their proxy war in Ukraine has been revealed for what it was all along – a horrible mistake.

There was no way for the Ukrainians to win in Bakhmut, just like there is no way for them to win this war. Worse, they cannot even recover what they have lost.

And yet, the war rhetoric emanating from Kiev, and echoed in Western capitals, is that the Ukrainian military (essentially what's left of its military, since it has no air force or navy) will soon recover the four Russian-majority provinces of the Donbass region and Crimea as well.

This is a dangerously delusional posture that, if not mitigated or stopped, will have only one result: the further and unnecessary death of more young Ukrainians.

Worse, and perhaps more importantly, the Russians now have first-hand knowledge of how advanced Western weapons work in wartime. This information is worth its weight in gold.

Sixth  , it is now clear from the Ukrainian perspective that clinging to Bakhmut was more symbolic than strategic in nature.

They seem to have treated Bakhmut in true Stalingradian terms: a grand and glorious siege that breaks the enemy's back, uplifts the nation's spirit and propels its forces to victory.

On the other hand, this inexplicable Ukrainian decision to wrap Bakhmut in symbolism and funnel so many formations into the sector, was strategically very useful for the Russians. It prevented the Ukrainians from deploying these troops in other areas, along a disputed front line that stretches for a thousand kilometres, and gave Russia an excellent opportunity to destroy a third of the opposing forces, a training at a time.

Seventh, with Bakhmut on their list, the Russians can now plan the next phase of the war with far less pressure and far more options, not least because the city is a transportation hub.

As shown on a map of the Bakhmut sector below, they could attack the towns of Sloviansk or Kramatorsk (highlighted in red), to free up more territory in Donetsk Province. Or, they could open a new sector further south. Or both.

Map of Bakhmut with assault options available to the Russians in Slovansk and Kramatorsk

Either way, the Battle of Bakhmut broke the back of the Ukrainian forces. They will take time to regroup.

But, given the recent barrage of Russian missiles that have both depleted Ukrainian air defense capabilities and destroyed ammunition magazines, it is doubtful that Kiev will be able to quickly stage another Custer-ian last stand in a another city. If they try, it will probably be the battle that breaks them.

The Indian government would do well to keep these points in mind the next time it sends potential howitzer vendors for another round of endless trials, instead of just ordering the field guns.

If we can't learn from what happened in Bahkmut, we are going to be prepared for some bad surprises.


Venu Gopal Narayanan