Japan's WWII A-bomb Project in Hungnam, N Korea

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

Japan's WWII A-bomb Project in Hungnam, N Korea

Japan's own efforts to build a bomb are difficult for many here to accept because of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the widespread feeling that Japan would never have even considered such a brutal attack. Japan Times 7 March 2003.

Slowly but surely, the truth about the Japanese atomic bomb projects in WWII is coming to the surface. But just as surely, the Japanese continue to try and spin doctor their way out of owning up to reality and responsibility. The latest disingenuous Japanese attempt at "setting the record straight", is from the Japan Times English language online newspaper, dated 7 March 2003.

There are three features of this article that stand out. First is the admission that, far from being innocent nuclear victims, the Japanese themselves were trying to build a uranium fission bomb with a yield of at least 20,000 tons of TNT. This would have made it about 25 % larger than America's "Little Boy" uranium bomb that hit Hiroshima. (Best estimate of that device's explosive yield was 12-15 KT.)  

Having finally come clean about this fact, however, the Japanese immediately try to downplay the progress they made. This is the second point that stands out: In a very subtle move, the Japan Times article tries to suggest that the Japanese scientists were on the "slow neutron reaction" track, although they don't come right out and say it in so many words. While it is possible that they were in fact doing slow neutron reaction research, if they were, it was in parallel with their fast neutron reaction bomb research---the same thing the Americans were doing. (The US Navy had a small, almost forgotten WWII research program into the slow neutron reaction, which would later bear fruit, along with other work, in the production of reactors for powering ships and submarines.)

Remember that Yoshio Nishina, the lead scientist of the Imperial Japanese Army's Riken Institute atomic bomb project, did understand the fast neutron reaction very well. He had published scholarly papers on the subject prior to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, and he was also able to extrapolate a number of highly classified facts about Little Boy using nothing more than empirical observation and a slide rule. (For example, he was able to calculate to a high degree of accuracy both the actual number of neutrons that fissioned in Little Boy's core, and the force of the blast.) Given these truths, how likely is it that Japanese science in WWII was "nowhere close to a bomb"?

The BBC article on which this thread is based quotes "experts" who have studied the Riken Institute / Nishina warhead design and pronounced it "not very powerful". I'd like to know what that means---"only" 2 kilotons? 5? 10?---but rest assured, if the Japanese warhead really was relatively weak, it was not because Japanese science didn't understand how to produce a supercritical chain reaction detonation. No way. It was because the engineering of the compression of the two sub-critical masses was lacking. (Couldn't ram the two pieces of the warhead core together fast enough.) A technical mechanical engineering problem like this is a totally different problem than a lack of understanding of bomb physics, which is what they're trying to say now.

It also strikes me as unlikely that Nishina would make the calculation error that the article says the blueprints show he did make. Supposedly, Nishina thought that the warhead would go off if the two subcritical warhead components were compressed in 1/20th to 1/30th of a second, and not the 1/200th to 1/300th of a second that was truly necessary. I wonder how likely it is that the world class physicist Nishina would forget to carry the ten. But even if he did make such an error in 1943 (when the Kuroda documents apparently were written), the Japanese warhead design would still have worked even at the slower compression speed had it had sufficient highly enriched uranium. And this is leaving aside any later research under Nishina at Riken and Bunsaku Arakatsu at Hungnam, Korea, for which there is currently little or no existing Japanese documentary evidence.

(But we know it did happen. I would really like to see a bomb physicist do a calculation of the explosive force of a fission bomb with a slower compression speed, so we would know once and for all what kind of yield the Japanese weapon would actually have had---again, assuming they did not do any further refinement of their warhead design after 1943, an unlikely proposition, it seems to me. Unless the Nishina interview took place in 1943 and the warhead design was done later; the Japan Times article does not specify this.)

The third point is that the article implies---not so subtly---that anyone who thinks there might be more to the story of Japanese bomb making efforts at Hungnam is basically a right wing whacko and/or believes in little green men. Robert Wilcox's book Japan's Secret War does a great job of documenting the many suspicions of late WWII and Occupation US intelligence that something big was going on. Wilcox cites a number of original OSS and G-2 documents that he had to pry out of the Suitland, MD archives using the Freedom of Information Act. It is also a fact, contrary to the Japan Times article, that American intelligence was never able to penetrate Hungnam in any effective or comprehensive way. A B-29 that may or may not have been snooping around in the fall of 1945 was shot down by Russian Yak fighters when it came too close.

We also know that the Russians got a lot of heavy water from the gargantuan Hungnam military industrial complex after the War, and that they captured a number of high ranking Japanese atomic scientists working there who were later ruthlessly tortured for information. It is a fact that Soviet intelligence was the best in the world during WWII. It even managed to penetrate the Manhattan Project, and there were at least two moles working for the Soviets in the American atomic programs. Atomic espionage was one of Moscow's highest wartime priorities, and obviously the Russians thought there was a lot to be gained from the Japanese scientists whom they captured in Korea, but we are to believe nothing was going on there? Uncle Josef Stalin may have been many things, but he was nothing if not a ruthless pragmatist. I have long suspected that the biggest reason the Russians jumped into the Pacific War at the very end was to get their hands on Japanese atomic research at Hungnam.

The bottom line is that initially, the official Japanese and American mantra was, "Well, yeah, the Japanese had a few bright guys, but their overall science was poor and they were nowhere close to atomic weapons."

Then, after Deborah Shapley's 1978 Science magazine article started to expose them, it was "Well, yeah, they did a little preliminary work in the field, but they were nowhere close to a bomb."

Now, after Wilcox, the FAS assessment, and the BBC article, it's, "Yeah, they did some work and even produced a warhead design, but they were nowhere close to a bomb and certainly would never have done the unthinkable and actually used it, as those evil Americans did."   The Pellas Institute


 Japan's Secret War- Japan's Race Against Time. Wilcox's book explains not only how essential it was to finish WWII as soon as humanly possible, it ties up some loose ends. Why did Russia make a beeline to Hungnam when it entered the war, and why was it so antsy to start the invasion? Why was our country so sure that Orientals wouldn't ever develop the bomb? And for those who doubt that Japan would have used it, read the definitive, massive, but eminently readable Japan's Imperial Conspiracy by Bergamini.

Japanese Atomic Program (PhysicsToday) -- The Japanese atomic program was a program by the Empire of Japan to develop a genzai bakudan, an atomic bomb during World War II. The program started around the same time as the U.S. Manhattan Project. Most experts believe that the program was small, and managed neither to refine enough uranium-235 nor to breed enough plutonium needed to make a workable device, although there are indications that Japan had a more sizable program than is commonly understood. One isolated and disputed report even claims that an atomic bomb was tested and detonated on August 12, 1945 near Hungnam, North Korea, shortly after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In any case, the surrender of Japan three days later on August 15 halted all developments before Japan could finish developing the weapon.

Japan's Nuclear Weapons Program (FAS)  -- There are indications that Japan had a more sizable program than is commonly understood, and that there was close cooperation among the Axis powers, including a secretive exchange of war materiel. The German submarine U-234, which surrendered to US forces in May 1945, was found to be carrying 560 kilograms of Uranium oxide destined for Japan's own atomic program. The oxide contained about 3.5 kilograms of the isotope U-235, which would have been about a fifth of the total U-235 needed to make one bomb. After Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945, the occupying US Army found five Japanese cyclotrons, which could be used to separate fissionable material from ordinary uranium. The Americans smashed the cyclotrons and dumped them into Tokyo Harbor.

Bombardment of Tokyo's Nuclear Labs (AU AF) -- Japan's scientific community was aware of the explosive possibilities of an uranium bomb. During World War II, the Japanese Army funded one nuclear research project in Tokyo and the Japanese Navy started two other such projects.

http://www.kimsoft.com/KOREA/jp-hung.htm

[Jenny Lake]

Would be interesting to know the funding sources of Japan's nukes. I just read something about the International Education Board of the Rockefeller Foundation using it's start-up funds to directly pay for the training of international physicists. Abraham Flexner, who headed the U.S. General Education Board, wrote himself that the International division was "not an education board" but a "scientific research board", funding Niels Bohr, J. Robert Oppenheimer, and Enrico Fermi. Interesting that the German version of the Manhattan Project was precisely timed in 1943 to parallel the U.S. activities, beginning in February with securing a location and staffing it in March. Is the Japanese effort so timed?

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

I know the Germans tried to get Uranium to the Japanese at least according to this author:

http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/GENOCIDE/reviewsw54.htm

Joseph M. Scalia. Germany's Last Mission to Japan: The Failed
Voyage of U-234. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. xxiv + 296
pp.  Photographs, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. $29.95
(cloth), ISBN 1-55750-811-9.

Reviewed for H-War by Charles C. Kolb <CKolb@neh.gov>, National
Endowment for the Humanities

[Disclaimer:  The opinions expressed herein are those of the
reviewer and not of his employer or any other federal agency.]

Fortuitous Failure -- The Mission of U-234 from Germany to Japan

Untersee boot U-234 was built between 1 October 1941 and 2 March
1944 at Kiel by F. Krupp Germaniawerft AG.  Originally designed in
1938, it was intended to be one of a total of eight Type XB
ocean-going mine-layers.  It was instead refitted as a transport
submarine and assigned to the perilous Germany-to-Japan run. This
was the largest type of German U-boat ever constructed at 1763 tons
displacement, 2710 tons submerged and fully loaded, and 89.9 meters
in overall length.  Under the command of Kapitanleutnant (Kptlt.,
e.g. Lt. Cdr.) Johann-Heinrich Fahler, U-234 was originally designed
to carry 66 SMA mines. It had only two stern torpedo tubes and
carried a maximum of fifteen torpedoes.[1]

A newly-designed breathing and exhaust mast, the Schnorchel,
permitted the U-234 to travel submerged for extraordinary distances.
U-234 departed Kiel on its maiden voyage on 25 March 1945, bound for
Kristiansand, Norway.  There it loaded important cargo and personnel
and departed on 15 April for a submerged voyage which was to take
them around the Cape of Good Hope, eventually concluding in Japan.
That transit was never completed.

Among the three hundred ton cargo was three complete Messerschmitt
aircraft, a Henschel HS-293 glider-bomb, extra Junkers jet engines,
and ten canisters containing 560 kg (1,235 lbs.) of uranium oxide
(U235).  The uranium oxide was to be used by the Japanese as a
catalyst for the production of synthetic methanol used for aviation
fuel.  Other cargo consisted of one ton of diplomatic mail and 6,615
pounds of technical material including drawings of ME 163 and ME 262
aircraft, plans for the building of aircraft factories, V-1 and V-2
weapons, naval ships (destroyers of classes 36C and Z51, and M and S
boats), and submarines (Types II, VII, IX, X, XI, XXI, and XXIII).
German fire-control computers, Lorenz 7H2 bombsights, Lufte 7D
bombsight computers, FUG 200 Hohehtweil airborne radars and bomb
fuses were also included in the manifest along with other military
equipment and personal luggage.

Previous examinations of the voyage of U-234 have centered on the
cargo carried by the vessel. The presence of the uranium oxide, for
example, has generated much interest and conjecture. Scalia,
however, shifts this focus, and argues that the submarine's greatest
value lay not in her cargo, but in the individuals who were
accompanying the material to Japan.

The twelve passengers included a German general and his staff, four
German naval officers, civilian engineers and scientists, and two
Japanese naval officers.  The latter were Lt. Cdr. Tomanaga Hideo, a
naval aviator and submarine specialist who had come to Germany by
Japanese submarine I-29 in 1943, and Lt. Shoji Genzo, an aircraft
specialist and former naval attach in several European countries.

Luftwaffe General (General der Flieger) Ulrich Kessler, a
Prussian-born diplomat and military strategist, was originally a
naval officer, but resigned his commission in 1933 and became
commander of Luftwaffe Stuka squadrons operating in Poland, Norway,
and France.  He was disliked by Goering and rumored to have been
involved in anti-Hitler activities, including the infamous
assassination plot.  Kessler was being sent to assist the Japanese
in combat tactics using squadrons of ME 262 and ME 163 aircraft
against Allied bombers.  Oberleutnant (1st Lt.) Erich Menzel, a
Luftwaffe navigator and bombardier who was an aeronautical
communications and radar expert, also had combat experience against
the British, Americans, and Russians. Oberstleutnant (Lt. Col.)
Fritz von Sandrart, a FLAK antiaircraft defense strategist, was
assigned to enhance Japanese defense systems.

There were four naval officers, each with different
responsibilities.  Fregattenkapitan (Lt. Cdr.) Gerhard Falcke, a
naval architect and construction engineer who spoke fluent Japanese,
was to use German naval blueprints to initiate new shipbuilding.
Kptlt. (Lt. Cdr.) Richard Bulla, who had the unique distinction of
serving as an officer in both the Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine
simultaneously, was an expert on armaments, new weapons, and
carrier-based aviation. Oberleutnant Heinrich Hellendorn, a
shipboard FLAK artillery officer, served as a German observer, while
Kay Niescheling, an ardent National Socialist who was a naval
judicial and investigative officer, was being sent to rid the German
diplomatic corps in Japan of remnants of the Richard Sorge spy ring.

Among the civilian scientists was Dr. Heinz Schlicke, a radar,
infrared, and countermeasures specialist who was the director of the
Naval Test Fields in Kiel.  His task was to aid the Japanese in
developing and manufacturing electronic devices and instruments. Two
"men from Messerschmitt," August Bringewalde, Willi Messerschmitt's
"right-hand man"  who was in charge of ME 262 production, and Franz
Ruf, an industrial machinery specialist who designed machines and
appliances to manufacture aircraft components, were also among the
notable passengers.

The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 for military and technical
cooperation between Germany, Italy, and Japan required reciprocal
exchanges of raw materials, equipment, and personnel.  Germany and
Japan encountered difficulties in their attempts to carry out this
exchange, though.  Axis blockade running vessels were being sunk
with increasing frequency thanks to MAGIC intercepts and decrypts.
When Germany invaded Russia in June 1941, shipping war material and
personnel via the Trans-Siberian Railway ceased abruptly as Russia
became an Anglo-American ally.[2] The fragile Japanese-Russian
non-aggression pact forced a maritime exchange, although there was
an alternative plan to fly the precious cargo and personnel across
Russia to Japan in three Junkers aircraft.

Between December 1940 and June 1941, five German merchant vessels
departed Japan, with three arriving in Bordeaux.  By February 1942,
nine German and three Italian vessels had made the voyage, but three
were sunk en route.  Fifteen Axis blockade runners departed the Far
East in the winter of 1942-1943, but only seven reached Europe,
while in 1944 only one of five ships departing Japan reached
Nazi-occupied Europe.  In 1942, a Japanese submarine cruiser
completed a mission from Japan to France and back but fell victim to
a mine in Singapore harbor.[3]

Hence, by July 1943, Axis submarines were pressed into transport
service.  Allied antisubmarine countermeasures resulted in severe
losses, however.  Three of seven reconfigured Italian submarines
reached Japan from Bordeaux, but only one of four Japanese
submarines sent to Europe completed the round trip. Because it was
too late to build new transport submarines, other large U-boats were
refitted.  One reached Japan and was commissioned into the Japanese
Navy, five boats out of eleven arrived at Penang, Malaya, and only
six of eighteen Type IXD/2 boats that departed Penang from 1943 to
1945 ever reached Europe.  (Roskill and Niestl provide additional
documentation of these events [4, 5].)  U-boats made the trip from
the Nazi-held ports of Kiel, Bordeaux, and Kristiansand to Kobe,
Japan via the Cape of Good Hope.  On 9 February 1945, the U-864,
which carried similar cargo and personnel to that of the U-234, was
torpedoed and sunk with the loss of all hands off Bergen, Norway by
the British submarine HMS Venturer.  Raw rubber, molybdenum,
tungsten, tin, zinc, opium, and quinine were typical cargoes
destined for Germany.

On 8 May, during the final days of the Third Reich, U-234 was
ordered to either return to Bergen or continue to Japan, but when
the European war ended, the Japanese severed relations with defeated
Nazi Germany.  On 10 May the Allies ordered all U-boats to
surrender.  Because U-234 had two Japanese nationals aboard and
Japan had already bought and paid for the uranium oxide, Kptlt.
Fahler faced a dilemma.  He conferred with General Kessler and the
two Japanese officers.  The latter had the knowledge to scuttle
U-234, but had been deeply affected by German comradeship and
goodwill.  Fahler decided to bypass the Canadian Navy and Halifax
where he had been ordered, and chose instead to surrender to the
Americans.  The Japanese committed suicide by ingesting lethal
amounts of Luminal and were buried at sea with full military honors
along with their secret papers and Tomanaga's samurai sword.

Fahler jettisoned all of the new acoustic torpedoes and microfilms
of sensitive documents to prevent the Americans from obtaining them,
but failed to dispose of secret war documents or the U-234's war
diary (Kriegstagebuch), which was later recovered by the U.S. Navy.
The USS Sutton (DE-771) stationed at Argentia, Newfoundland, was
on antisubmarine warfare patrol and intercepted U-234 on 15 May.
Four days later the Sutton turned the U-234 over to the USCG
Cutter Argo which escorted her to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, which
also was the port of surrender for U-805, U-873, and U-1228.
Because of the intelligence potential of U-234's cargo and
passengers, the surrender of this boat was classified, but
information leaks caused press sensationalism and media frenzy.  The
Navy spent two years disassembling and recording in detail the
technical equipment aboard U-234.

The book has chapters devoted to most of the principal characters,
providing mini-biographies that emphasize the efforts of these men
during the war, their cooperation with the Office of Naval
Intelligence and Office of Naval Research, and subsequent
repatriation to Germany in 1946.  Project Paperclip also came into
play. Many of the repatriated had lived in what became
Soviet-occupied Germany and, therefore, chose to return to the
United States.  Schlicke, for example, had worked on sound and
electrical absorption materials (early stealth technology) for
submarines, and infrared detectors and homing devices.  After 1946
he continued these efforts at the U.S. Office of Naval Research and
later in the private sector. Bringewald and Ruf also returned from
Germany to America.  The former had assembled the ME 262, which flew
at Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio in May 1945, and became significant
to the American effort to develop jet-powered aircraft.  Bringewald
became the project manager for the American F-105 Thunderchief.
Likewise, the HS-293 glider bomb and V-weapons were indispensable to
the American effort to develop guided missiles.

The fate of the U-234 was less glorious.  After dismantling, the
hull was taken to a location forty miles east of Provincetown,
Massachusetts where, on 19 November 1947, she was struck by two
torpedoes from the USS Greenfish (SS-351), and sank to the ocean
floor six miles below.  The story of the fate of the uranium oxide
has never been clarified. Scalia notes that one rumor holds that it
was used in American atomic research at Oak Ridge, while another
contends that it was sent to a warehouse in Brooklyn or a storage
facility in Kansas (one has visions of the "Ark of the Covenant"
being stored at the climax of Spielberg's Raiders of the Lost
Ark).

Scalia provides some very new and exciting facts, observing that the
primary records themselves differ as to when the containers were
unloaded, where they were sent, and even if the supposedly
gold-lined containers held refined uranium oxide ore or fissile
material, or as Scalia conjectures, a radium compound or cadmium
alloy which would have required such lined containers.  We are still
uncertain, although transfer to Oak Ridge seems likely, though
likely too late to process into components for the atomic weapons
used against Japan in August 1945.

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

Here's some more discussion about Germany Enriching Uranium but the account is contested by other historians apparently:

The Belgian Congo was not Germany's wartime source of Uranium. During the 1944 Germany became a net exporter of uranium to Japan by U-boat following a series of requests by General Touransouke Kawashima seeking Czech Uranium in 1943, which are now made public from Magic decrypts.

Quote
Have we mentioned the German attempt at a reactor?

That would be the one where they suspended uranium blocks in heavy water.

Without a reflector so neutron density could'nt build and thus the thing would never start a proper fission cascade.

Zen, your line of logic is wrong because you are assuming incorrectly that the only path to a nuclear bomb is through a nuclear reactor (to make Plutonium). In fact Heisenberg's civilian Kaiser Wilhelm Gesselschaft (KWG) team was following that prospect. The destruction of heavy water from Norway hampered this project.

Incidentally the Voermark plant in Norway was not the only source of Heavy water for Nazi Germany as there was an equivalent plant in Germany known as the Beck plant (ref Virus House) whose location I have yet to establish.   Roll Eyes

Uranium Enrichment

The other path to a nuclear bomb was through Uranium enrichment. Germany was also pursuing that path in WW2 with Prof Kurt Diebner's Heeres Waffen Amt (HWA) team. In July 1944, the SS took over the HWA project and shifted it to an underground facility in Czechoslovakia. The SS virtually ruled over Czechoslovakia and used the nation as a giant SS factory. Czechoslovakia supplied Uranium from mines at Jac-y-mov (then called Jochimsthal). An ultra secret nuclear facility was housed in the Richard Mine in Czechoslovakia with it's abundance of Smectite deposits. Smectite is a clay material with high absorbency of toxic materials. One irony is that this former Nazi underground complex is now used as a modern nuclear waste dump.

Dr Erich Baage developed the gaseous Uranium centrifuge at Kiel Unavernin in 1942 which he called the Isotope Sluice. It is nowadays called the Harteck process after another Nazi scientist Dr Paul Harteck who developed the centrifuge to an industrial scale during WW2. In early 1944 a huge contract was let to HWA for the industrial scale development of Uranium centrifuges. The budget for this was ten times greater than the entire budget available to Heisenberg's KWA team (Virus House)

Which I think is the real point to be made. Before commenting on that however I slip back to answer the rest of Wingknut's point...  Undecided

Quote
The best defence of the claim that Heisenberg actively worked to derail the German A-bomb project is Thomas Powers's 'Heisenberg's War'.  But even Powers has had to admit that not a single historian has been convinced by his view.  Almost diametrically opposed to powers is historian Paul Lawrence Rose, who claims that Heisenberg worked to deliver an atomic bomb, failed and then thought up a false story of moral qualms to cover this failure.  However, the idea that an entire parallel bomb programme could have issued in a successful test without Heisenberg (or any of the other German physicists interned at Farm Hall) hearing about it, is very far-fetched indeed.

To the contrary Wingknut, there was a parallel bomb programme under far more able scientists, like Gerlach, Diebner and Harteck. Heisenberg's contribution to the Nazi bomb project was quite minimal, if not farcical.

Secret negotiations October 1944

The real answer to Wingknut's question is that in October 1944 either Himmler, or Kammler allowed Gen Walter Dornberger to take dr Werner von Braun to Lisbon for secret negotiations with two US representatives from General Electric. This is disclosed by Dornberger's post war comments at CSDIC internment camp 11 to General Bassenge, recorded by the British.  

Nazi Germany did not fail to build a nuclear weapon. they abandoned it. Immediately following the Lisbon meeting the Manhatten Project removed Germany as a target for the Allied A-bomb.

The fact was that the RAF had air superiority over the UK and thus delivery of a nuclear weapon over London was beyond the Luftwaffe. Although there were plans for a winged A4b which could reach London and perhaps even New York, it required homing on a pre-planted radio beacon, in addition to a self sacrifice pilot. Planting a radio beacon in London or New York had itself become near impossible by late 1944. A single stage winged piloted A6 missile was also proposed, but not developed.

From various inferences it appears Himmler was trying to cut a deal in October 1944 for Western Allies to allow German forces to be transferred to the eastern front to oppose the Soviets, however Hitler sabotaged Himmler's proposals with the Bulge offensive Operation "Watch on the Rhine."

Rugen / Ordruf bombs

One last point needs to be made about the unusually large bomb blasts at Rugen in October 1944 and Ohrdruf in March 1945 which Luigi Romosera raised with Rainer Karlsche.

A number of inferences suggest to me that the so called Nazi Bell device which Dr Kurt Debus (later of NASA fame) was involved with, was actually used to develop a highly ionised pinkish reagent for thermobaric bombs. The pinkish liquid appears to have involved some quantities of (possibly) enriched Uranium and coal dust, creating a Fuel Air Explosive.

I do not think Karlsche's sources are wrong. I just think Karlsche has tried to join the wrong dots and come to mistaken conclusions. Wink

There was a plausible Nazi A-bomb project to create Uranium gun type, A-bomb which appears abandoned for political reasons in October 1944. There appears to have also been a Fuel Air Explosive possibly involving enriched Uranium in a pinkish catalytic reagent, used at Rugen and Ordruf.  

Simon

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/i ... ic=3247.45