The other Cold War: Moscow vs Jerusalem (1953-1967: From Confrontation to Disruption)

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The other Cold War: Moscow vs Jerusalem

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 ISRAELI-SOVIET RELATIONS 1953-1967: From Confrontation to Disruption

YOSEF GOVIN

(FRANK CASS, LONDON, 1998; translated from the Hebrew edition of 1990)

{p. x} Abbreviations

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union ECOSOC Economic and Social Council of the United Nations GA General Assembly of the United Nations Maki Miflagah Komunistit Israelit, Israeli Communist Party

Mapai Mifleget Po'alei Erez Israsel, Israeli Labor Party Mapam Mifleget ha-Po'alim ha-Me'uhedet, United Workers Party

MFA Arch. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive MK Member of Knesset (Israel Parliament)

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

{p. xi} Letter to the Reader

Dear Reader,

I was First Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in Moscow when the Soviet government informed the government of Israel, on Saturday 10 June 1967, of its decision to sever diplomatic and consular relations with Israel following the results of the Six Day War. This announcement was the culmination of Soviet political support - in addition to massive military support - for the Arab countries in their fight against Israel.

That day at noontime I was walking from our residence at the Sadovo-Samotechnaya to the Embassy of Israel on Bolshaya Ordinka Street. It was a lovely sunny day. My heart was torn in two. On the one hand, I felt extremely happy to know that my country - Israel - had been able to defeat the Arab countries who had threatened, in so many declarations, to destroy us. On the other, I could only assume - at that stage - that the victory of Israel's Defense Forces had been achieved at the very heavy price of many dear lives of young soldiers and of ficers, who were dreaming of living in their Homeland in peace and security, like any other normal people on this earth, their futures awaiting them, and now they had left behind deep pain and profound grief in the hearts of family and friends.

Walking through the central streets of Moscow I encountered many cars with loudspeakers informing the public of the Soviet breach of relations with Israel. For a moment it seemed as if the Soviet Union was declaring war against Israel. Indeed, from that moment on the Soviet Union stood completely at the side of Israel's enemies, on bilateral and international levels. In fact until then,

{p. xii} between Israel and the USSR, there had never been a conflict, either territorial or military. On the contrary, historic social and cultural ties connected both nations. True, there w ere ideological differences - the Soviet Union fought against Zionism, with no reason, and rejected, categorically, Israel's pleas to let Jews living in the USSR emigrate to Israel. Yet, from that to the breach of diplomatic relations was a long distance. Moreover, the breach constituted an act which weakened the international system of relations rather than strengthening it.

Upon reaching the street where the Embassy stood, I could hardly make my way through. Hundreds, if not thousands, of workers, brought in from all the different enterprises in Moscow, blocked the entrance to the E;mbassv. They were carrying anti- Israeli slogans, shouting every few minutes 'Doloy [Down] with Israel'; the most humiliating slogan was the one comparing Israel to Nazi Germany.

I went up to the second floor of the building and, together with the rest of our staff, looked through the wide windows at the outrageous mob outside the gate. It was a frightful scene, as if they were going at any moment to penetrate into the courtyard and then into the building itself. It was hours before they left, but not before we were instructed several times by the Protocol of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to pull down our flag. And we did so, at sun set, singing our national anthem, 'Hatikvah' ('The Hope').

On 18 June 1967 we locked the building (handing over the keys to the Dutch Embassy which represented our interests in the Soviet Union during the entire period of the breach in relations, 1967- 1989) and left Moscow for home.

From then until now, nearly 30 years have passed. I served at various posts in the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem and in our Foreign Service abroad. The last positions I held abroad were as Israel's Ambassador to Bucharest, during the Ceausescu era (Romania was the single country in the Communist bloc not to have severed its relations wiTh Israel following the Six DayWar), and lately as Israel's Ambassador to Austria and to the UN organizations in Vienna as well as non-resident Ambassador to Slovakia and Slovenia.

After my return from Bucharest, I was appointed Deputy Director Genelal of the Ministry for East Europe. We were thell ellgaged in the process of renewing our diplomatic relations with

{p. xiii} the east European countries. It was in this capacity that I returned for the first time to Moscow, in September 1990, as head of the Ministry's delegation, for talks held with officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministly in preparation for the renewal of Israeli-Soviet relations .

It was only natural that I returned to the premises of our Embassy building, where an Israeli consular delegation had been operating from 1989. Excitedly, I went up to the second floor to the same window looking out over Bolshaya Ordinka, where I had stood watching the mob outside who shouted humiliating slogans against Israel when the Six Day War ended. Now I saw through the window hundreds of men and women all along the street - just as then - but lining up quietly, waiting to get an entry visa to Israel, mostly for permanent residence.

A year later, I revisited Moscow along with my colleague and friend (we had served together as First Secretarie,s in Moscow until 1967) Judge David Bartov to participate at a reception given by A. Levin, Consul General (later Ambassador) of Israel in the USSR on the occasion of the renewal of Israeli-Soviet relations. The invited Soviet guests, hundreds of them, were joyful over the resumption of contacts, as if 23 years had not separated us.

On 13 December 1991, the Soviet Ambassador to Israel, A. Bovin, presented his credentials to the President of Israel, H. Herzog, at a very solemn and exciting ceremony, since it was the first time after more than 24 years that a Soviet Ambassador had done so in Jerusalem. A fortnight later, the Soviet Union dismembered itself into 15 independent republics, the red flag was taken off the Kremlin and the Ambassador automatically became the Representative of Russia. It so happened that he was the last Soviet Ambassador to have presented his credentials and that this was the last.time the Soviet anthem was played at such an occasion anywhere in the world. And so, it seems that the last ceremonial requiem to the USSR was held in Jerusalem, between the hoisted flags of Israel and the USSR.

Fortunately, Israel's relations with Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union are speedily developing both in volume and content. We are building together relations of friendship and co-operation between our nations toward a common future of peace and security free of interbloc confrontations.

This process began during the Gorbachev era and continues to

{p. xiv} this day.

Israeli-Soviet relations constitute a most dramatic chapter in the history of Israel's foreign policy. I also dare to think that they constitute no less a turbulent chapter in Soviet policy in the Middle East, directly and indirectly related to British policy as well, particularly from 1948, starting with Israel's independence up to the 'Suez Campaign' and later.

This study fills a gap, which had not thus far been extensively or academically treated in the historiography of Israeli-Soviet relations. It was first published in Hebrew by the Magnes Press of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1990, and in 1994 it appeared in Russian translation in Moscow through 'Progress' Press. Thanks to the publishers Frank Cass & Co. English readers the world over will be able to become acquainted with the subject until additional studies will appear.

I do hope that readers and researchers will find this book interesting, not only because it constitutes a source of abundant information and references related to Israeli-Soviet relations but also as a basis for political conclusions to be drawn from this chapter of history which left a very strong imprint on the mutual relations between the two countries for over 40 years.

One day, when the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will open the Soviet Archives of Foreign Policy to the period dealt with in this book, the reader no doubt will have access to additional material retlecting this dramatic chapter (though I believe that the basic picture will remain basically unchanged) . Until then, and well after- wards, this book will fulfill its mission in eliminating the 'blank spots' in the history of Israeli-Soviet relations.

Respectfully,

Yosef Govrin, Ph.D.

{p. xv} Preface

THIS BOOK deals with the period ranging from the first severance of Israeli-Soviet relations in the last stage of Stalin's rule through their renewal, shortly after his death in 1953,totheirbeingseveredagainunderBrezhnev'srule,in 1967. This period - the longest in the annals of Isra Soviet relations - is extensively examined with regard to two parallel processes:

1. Development of trade and cultural relations accompanied by a harsh political dialogue and limitation of the number of Jewish emigrants permitted to leave the USSR for Israel.

2. Confrontation areas that led gradually to the severance of diplo- matic relations following the Six DayWar in 1967: on the one hand, Soviet policy in the Middle East aimed at forming a united Arab anti-Western front against Israel's wish to entrench its security and independence with Western assistance, in face of Arab threats to Israel's existence and, on the other hand, Israel's struggle for Soviet Jews to have the right to emigrate to Israel and the right to preserve their cultural and national heritage - thus clashing with Soviet ideological interests.

The subject of Israeli-Soviet relations has always been in the forefront of public interest in Israel: first, owing to the significant USSR support extended to Israel during the early stages of its independent existence and the drastic shift in this stance, from the beginning of the 1950s, to siding with Israel's enemies - a change then fateful for Israel's survival; secondly, because of Israel's growing concern for the fate ot Soviet Jews; thirdly, because of the hope that Israeli-Soviet relations would be restored to their former splendor.

{p. xvi} Introduction

WHEN THE Palestine Question was brought up before the UN General Assembly in May 1947, the USSR made a surprising move by departing from its hostile attitude towards Zionism, a stance well known from the 1920s in the USSR itself as well as in the communist world. Andrei Gromyko, head of the USSR mission to the UN, in his address delivered in the plenary meeting of the Assembly, on 14 May 1947, proposed to establish an independent, democratic Jewish-Arab state in Palestine. Should that prove impossible to implement, owing to deteriorating relations and irreconcilable differences between theJ ews and the Arabs, he then suggested that the territory of Palestine be partitioned into two independent states: one Jewish, the other Arab.1

The position of the USSR regarding the right of the Jews to their own state in Palestine - as expressed by its representatives in the UN debates during 1947 - was based on the following arguments:

1. The aspirations of a considerable part of the Jewish people are linked with Palestine and its future, as well as to the administration which will govern it. The Jewish people, like the Arab people, have historical roots in Palestine - the Homeland of these two peoples.

2. The suffering and sorrow which were the lot of the Jewish people in the Nazi-occupied areas, having been subjected to almost complete physical annihilation, cannot possibly be described. The fate of the Jewish people continues to be tragic since hundreds of thousands of Jews are wandering about in various countries of Europe, searching for a means of existence and for shelter.

3. The fact that the countries of Western Europe were unable to ensure the defense of the basic rights of the Jewish people and to

{p. xvii} safeguard it against the violence of the fascist executioners explains the aspirations of the Jews to establish their own state. It would be unjust to deny them this right.

4. The partition of Palestine into two separate states will be of deep historical significance, since this decision will satisfy the legal claims of the Jewish people, hundreds of thousands of whom remain without a land and without a home.

5. The decision to partition Palestine is not aimed against either of the two peoples living in Palestine. On the contrary, the decision is congruent with the national interest of both peoples - the Jews and the Arabs.

This forcefully expressed position of the USSR had a decisive influence on the crystallization of the UN General Assembly resolutionon 29 November 1947 regarding the Partition of Palestine - a decision which brought about the end of the British Mandate in Palestine and the declaration of the establisment of the State of Israel on 15 May 1948.

The Soviet position revealed no identification with the Zionist vision. Two new principles, however, could be discerned in the USSR's position at that time:

(a) the recognition of the Jewish people's historic connection with Palestine - the Land of Israel, as called by Jews the world over throughout the centuries;

(b) the right of the Jewish people to establish their own independent state, which would absorb tens of thousands of Jewish refugees, survivors of the Holocaust.

Thus, two national interests coincided here: the Soviet interest in pushing the British out of the region - one of its main ceasons for supporting the partition of Palestine - and the Jewish interest in establishing an independent Jewish state in the Land of Israel.

MAIN LANDMARKS IN ISRAELI-SOVIET RELATIONS FROM THEIR ESTABLISHMENT IN 1948 TO THEIR BREAK IN 1953

The USSR recognized the State of Israel, dejure, on 18 May 1948, and was the first to accord full recognition to the newly born state. Recognition was accorded following a note addressed by Israel's

{p. xviii} Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moshe Shertok (later Sharett) to V. Molotov, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 16 May, in which he requested the Soviet government's official recognition of the State of Israel and its provisional government. Shertok expressed his hope that this recognition would 'strengthen the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and its peoples' and 'the State of Israel and the Jewish people of Palestine'. On this occasion, Shertok also expressed the 'deep gratitude of the Jewish people of Palestine shared by the Jews throughout the world, for the firm position adopted by the Soviet delegation to the UN which advocated the establishment of a sovereign and independent Jewish State in Palestine, and for its unfailing support of this position, in the face of all the difficulties, for the expression of sincere sympathy to the Jewish people who suffered in Europe at the hands of the fascist butchers and for the support of the principle which stipulates that the Jews of Palestine are a nation which has the right to sovereignty and independence'.2

In according official recognition by the USSR government of the State of Israel and its provisional government on 18 May 1948, Molotov expressed the hope that the 'creation of their own sovereign State by the Jewish people will promote the strengthening of peace and security in Palestine and in the Middle East' and the Soviet government's 'confidence in the successful development of friendly relations between the USSR and the State of Israel.'

18 May 1948

Kol Haam ('Voice of the People'), the Israeli Communist Party organ, notes in its editorial that in view of the USSR's recognition of Israel, relations between the USSR and Israel should rest 'on the basis of friendly relations, cooperation and mutual assistance'. The paper also called upon Israel to create an alliance with the USSR which should secure Israel's independence against the imperialists' attempts at subjugation of Israel and the opening of possibilities to receive practical support in our war (meaning the war imposed then on Israel following its Independence Declaration, when seven Arab armies invaded its territory aiming to conquer it and negate the existence of Israel). Kol Haam concluded the article by saying that in order to consolidate peace in the world 'Israel should not

{p. xix} demonstrate the same attitude toward warmongers as to peace lovers'.3

In those fateful days the USSR stood by Israel's side both in the UN - where it sharply condemned the Arab armies' invasion into Israel's territory and called for their immediate withdrawal (27-28 May, during the Security Council's debates) - and in the granting of military assistance, through Czechoslovakia, that was of utmost importance in rebuffing the invading armies. In exchange for its political and military assistance, the USSR expected that Israel would side with the USSR in its confrontation with the west.

30 May 1948

The greetings sent by the MoscowJ ewish Anti-Fascist Committee to the President of Israel, Dr Chaim Weizmann, stated:

The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR is sending you, and through you to the Jews of the State of Israel, ardent congratulations on the occasion of the Jewish State's establishment. Reactionary forces that serve imperialism continue their dark activities, trying to suppress the people's aspiration for freedom and independence. But we believe in the victory of progress and democracy. We hope that only this way the young Jewish State will succeed to overcome all the disturbances and will thus occupy its worthy place among nations who fight for real democracy and peace throughout the world ... The Jewish people acquired for the first time in its entire history of suffering, a truthful defender for its rights, its interests, the USSR, a friend and defender of all nations.4

27June 1948

Tel Aviv and Moscow officially announced the exchange of official Envoys between their respective states. Mr P. Yershov was appointed the USSR's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Israel (the USSR Legation opened in Tel Aviv on 10 August 1948) and Mrs Golda Meyerson (later Meir) was nominated Israel's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the USSR (the Israeli Legation in Moscow was opened on 6 September 1948).

{p. xx} July 1948

The Ukrainian Representative at the UN Security Council sharply condemned Count Folke Bernadotte's program (which recommended transferring territories in the Negev and Galilee to the Kingdom of Jordan), defining it as a program aimed at the liquidation of Israel.

26August 1948

At a farewell reception held in Tel Aviv by the Friendship League with the USSR, in honor of Mrs Golda Meyerson on the eve of her departure to Moscow as Israel's plenipotentiary Minister, Mrs Meyerson declared:

We have to develop understanding and mutual friendship with the USSR. I wish to set up a direct and close relationship with Soviet Jewry. I would like to work with them in a friendly manner and receive in turn friendship from them. I would have liked that out of this direct connection, we should get also to a good relationship with the USSR Jews.5

15 September 1948

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Zorin told Mrs Meir:

A Jewish question exists and will exist only in those States which do not advance towards Socialism. From there Jews will emigrate to Israel and it is Israel's role to absorb them ... Even after a large immigration, many Jews will still remain in the capitalist countries and for their well being it is essential to fight not only for the State but also for democratization all over. In each state there are active progressive forces and the very creation of Israel is none other than an expression of these forces' innuence. It is not by chance that the democratic states were the first to recognize Israel. It is our hope that Israel will follow the road of progress.6

21 Setember 1948

An article in Pravda, the organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), signed by the Jewish-Soviet writer Ilya Ehrenburg - member of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee directorate in

{p. xxi} Moscow and one of the most important spokesmen of the Soviet press during World War II against the Nazi invaders - sums it up as: Israel, yes! To Jews' emigration from the USSR to Israel, no!

Here are its main points:

The Soviet Union stood by Israel's side in its war against the Arab invaders. Now, however, Israel is facing another invasion, less alarming, less dangerous - that is the invasion of American capital. US programs of military bases and installations are the danger threatening Israel. Israel is a capitalist state. Its leaders are not representatives of the working class. 'The Jewish Question' will be resolved in each place as a result of social and spiritual progress. The solution of the Jewish question doesn't depend upon Israel's military successes but upon the victory of socialism over capitalism. The interconnection among Jews is anti-Semitism. 'This is solidarity of the offenders and embittered.' It isn't to the credit of Zionism that more Jews are flowing to Israel, but as a result of anti-Semitic persecution ... These Jews didn't come to Israel to find wealth but a right to human dignity. The Soviet Jews are proud of their country and regard it as their homeland. Neither do they want the Jews of eastern European countries to emigrate to Israel. They sympathize with the struggle of Israeli workers, but every Soviet citizen realizes that the problem isn't related only to the national character of the State but also to its social regime.7

This article marked the beginning of the USSR's turn in its attitude towards Israel. (In days to come Ehrenburg will argue in his memoirs that this article was dictated to him.) Its publication was intended to warn Israe lthat it should not allow itself to be influenced by American capital, which could lead to the loss of its independence, and that it should not encourage Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel, which would result in political confrontation between Israel and the Soviet authorities and among Soviet Jews themselves.

5 October 1948

The military attache of the Israeli Legation in Moscow discussed with Soviet military authorities the subject of military co-operation

{p. xxii} with Israel with regard to: (a) short- and long-training of commanders; (b) supply of arms from German loot; and (c) air and sea delivery bases.

After a month, Mrs G. Meir (Meyerson) and Mr M. Namir, Counselor of the Legation, submitted a detailed list of military equipment - required by Israel - to the Head of the Middle East Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His reaction was somehow reserved. He was said to be afraid that the matter would become publicly known, 'whilst the UN prohibits the supply of arms to the conflicting sides.' He added, 'This matter will not only be inconvenient for us, but will also make your situation more difficult. My Arab friends have an advantage, geographically speaking: they have depots in their vicinity and they would be able to act publicly and extensively, whilst they are compelled now to act clandestinely and in a limited manner.'8

24 November 1948

The Soviet Union presented a draft resolution, in the third (political) committee of the UN General Assembly, demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Arab armies which had invaded Palestine .9 The USSR representative, Kisselev, declared that Israel was born as a result of an armed fight for freedom and independence.10

29 November 1948

Comment made by I. Ehrenburg to M. Namir in Moscow:

Soviet Jews fought against Hitler, not only because of his anti-Semitism, they shed their blood in defense of this country and this regime to which they are wholeheartedly devoted and will never give up their Soviet citizenship.

The State of Israel should understand that in the USSR there is no Jewish problem and that the Soviet Jews should not be bothered and that all attempts at attract them to Zionism and emigration should cease. Otherwise, it will encounter sharp resentment, both on the part of the Soviet authorities and amidst Jews themselves. The State of Israel will then be the loser - this he said 'is my friendly advice'. You

{p. xxiii} are stuck in a region of pure Anglo-Saxon influence. Your situation will never permit you to be in complete solidarity with the Soviet Union! Who knows? The notion should not be discounted that in a time of crisis we shall find ourselves on both sides of the front as enemy camps.

16 December 1948

The Soviet weekly Novoye Vremya complained that Israel was ungrateful to the Soviet Union, that it had adopted an anti-Soviet attitude in her policies, 'in spite of the constant support extended by the USSR to the Jewish State'.

19 December 1948

The Soviet Union voted in favor of Israel's admission to UN membership. The proposal was rejected in the absence of a sufficient majority.

7 February 1949

The first Soviet protest note to Israel's Legation in Moscow on account of two allegations.'2

1. The Legation is engaging itself in sending letters to Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality, encouraging them to leave the Soviet Union, abandon their Soviet citizenship, and emigrate to Israel. Since this act is illegal and does not correspond to the status of a diplomatic Legation, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs is proposing that the Israeli Legation cease this activity.

2. The Legation is distributing an informative bulletin contrary to the existing regulations in the Soviet Union. The Legation is being requested to stop doing so.

13 February 1949

The Soviet Ambassador to the USA, Panyushkin, commented to Israel's Ambassador in Washington, Elath, that Israel might join the Marshall Plan:

{p. xxiv} The Soviet Union has no intention of asking Israel to join the bloc of countries that it is heading, but it does ask Israel to remain independent in its foreign policy and free from foreign influence and rule.

20 March 1949

TASS, the Soviet news agency, quoted the General Secretary of the Israeli Communist Party, Mr Shmuel Mikunis, as having said that the American loan given to Israel would fortify imperialist positions and would permit the Anglo-Saxon superpowers to control Israel's economic sovereignty.14

20 March 1949

The Knesset's Declaration of Basic Principles stated that Israel would be loyal to the UN Charter and to friendship with all peace-loving nations, in particular the USA and the USSR.

14 April 1949

Mrs G. Meir commented to Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vishinsky in Moscow upon her visit to bid farewell at the conclusion of her mission as Israeli Minister to the USSR:

We are determined to lead a neutral foreign policy, to not be driven by any bloc nor to join any group of countries aimed against this or any other world factor, nor against the Soviet Union, especially ... We decided to maintain neutrality, this is the will and aim of all responsible factors who are leading our State ... We have taken a firm decision to safeguard our independence and not to allow any military bases on our territory to England or any other party ... We shall not deviate from our Foreign Policy principles, which are: the non-adherence to any organisation oriented against the Soviet Union whose friendship with us is in our basic interest ... We have a coalitionary government, and although there are workers' parties outside this coalition, the majority of workers are represented in the government whose aim is to build Israel as a Socialist State.

{p. xxv} In this conversation, Mrs G. Meir requested (a) trade credit from the USSR; (b) expeditious treatment of Israel's application for arms from the Soviet Union; and (c) the exertion of Soviet influence upon Romania and Hungary to permit Jews from those countries to emigrate to Israel.

Vishinsky reacted very positively to these assurances of Israel's neutrality; responded encouragingly to the idea of increased trade with Israel; refrained from supplying Soviet arms to Israel; and argued that permission for emigration from neither the Soviet Union nor the eastern European countries would be granted because Jews were an element faithful to the communist regime and were therefore important to the process of its consolidation.15

5 May 1949

The Soviet representative to the UN demanded Israel's admission as a member of the UNO without any further delay and condemned the foot-dragging demonstrated by certain countries in this regard.

11 May 1949

Israel was admitted as a member of the UNO thanks to vigorous Soviet support. After the vote the Ambassador of Poland noted,

The period of sentimental interest in the fate of Israel has come to an end. An era of cooperation based on mutual interest is beginning. The Jewish people advancing along peaceful and progressive lines can rely on the assistance of Poland, the Soviet Republics and the People's Democracies of Europe. Israel will doubtless remember that those countries have been its true friends at the troubled time of its emergence ... neither should [it] be forgotten that Israel is deeply indebted to the working classes. Poland will watch the future of Israel with sympathetic interest.

7 July 1949

M. Namir presented his credentials as Minister Plenipotentiary of the State of Israel to the President of Supreme Soviet.

{p. xxvi} 9 August 1949

The USSR representative to the UN, Tsarapkin, demanded the liquidation of the UN staff control over Palestine, the dissolution of the Conciliation Commission, and facilitation of direct negotiations between the conflicting parties - Jews and Arabs - without UN interference, or outside pressure.17

5 December 1949

Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Shertok (later Sharett), declared, 'Israel's foreign policy is "a non-aligned" policy in distinction to "neutral". Permanent ties with Soviet Jewry are impossible at present, because of the Russian authorities' rejection for reasons which I don't want to judge.' He stressed the fact 'that Israel will refrain from identifying itself with any of the sides involved in the cold war between the blocs'. He also added that Israel would not participate in any imperialistic program.18

19 April 1950

The Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN, J. Malik, presented to the General Secretary of the UN, a Note, stating:

It has become clear now that the General Assembly's resolution of December 1948, determining an international regime in Jerusalem satisfies neither the Jewish nor the Arab population in Jerusalem itself and in Palestine as a whole. In such circumstances the USSR government sees no possibility for continuing to support the said resolution. The USSR government is confident that the UNO will succeed in finding a solution to the problem of Jerusalem that will be acceptable to the Arab and Jewish residents.19

23 May 1950

Prime Minister David Ben Gurion made the following statement at a Mapai (Labor party) convention in kibbutz Aflkim:

The Soviet Union has promised national equality to all nations inhabiting its territory and has kept her promise. But

{p. xxvii} the Jewish people in the Soviet Union do not have a school of their own, nor a newspaper, neither in Hebrew nor in Yiddish. There is no anti-Jewish discrimination in the Soviet Union, and anti-Semitism is prohibited, but the Soviet regime has not succeeded in understanding the uniqueness of the Jewish problem. The Jewish people who have succeeded to build their independence will not give up the right of any Jew to immigrate to Israel and join the builders of the Homeland. We demand from the Soviet Union that the right be given to Jews who inhabit the USSR to join with us and participate in the building of our independence. Let us send from here our greetings to the Jews of Russia and let us tell them: Our/Your hope has not been lost, and to the Soviet Union we shall appeal with the call that the opportunity be given to every Jew in the USSR - who so desires - to take part with us in our creativity. Let us not despair and let us live with the knowledge that there are still many Jews in the world who are with us in spite of all the misfortunes. Let us hope that the day will come when they will, with total freedom, be able to join us in our enterprise.20

25 May 1950

Israel welcomed the 'Tripartite Declaration' (American-British- French) concerning the supply of arms and security guarantees to Israel and the Arab states (in the face of very sharp Soviet criticism) .

3 July 1950

Israel condemned the North Korean aggression towards South Korea (for which it was sharply criticized by the USSR).

20 August 1950

Prime Minister D. Ben Gurion made the following statement at the Labor Party (Mapai) convention:

The [Israeli] government always objected to having its foreign policy defined as neutral. We are not neutral regarding the

{p. xxviii} supreme question of mankind in our days. Peace and war. No people is so eager to safeguard peace as the Jewish people, and we therefore cannot be neutral towards those deeds that determine peace or war.21

4 October 1950

Korean War. Foreign Minister M. Shertok opposed the Soviet draft resolution at the UN calling for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. Israel announced that it was dispatching medicines to South Korea.22

30 October 1950

Israel's representative at the UN joined those opposing a Soviet draft resolution concerning a peace treaty and the prohibition against the use of atomic weapons.

9 January 1951

At the UN the Soviet Union rejected the proposal of Israel's mission on the question of Korea (a seven point program presented by Israel's head of Mission at the UN, Mr A. Eban) demanding the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.

20 May 1951

The USSR abstained on a draft resolution presented by the Western bloc at the UN calling for condemnation of Israel for having bombed El-Hama and for an order demanding the cessation of the draining of the Hula Sea.

21 November 1951

In a note addressed by the Soviet Union to all the Middle East countries, including Israel, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Gromyko, denounced the US plan to set up an Allied Middle East Command. He wallled that any country which would join the Command would bring about a deterioration in its relations with the USSR.23

{p. xxix} 8 December 1951

In its reply to the government of the USSR, concerning the Middle East Command, the government of Israel noted that Israel was not invited to join the Command. It was informed, however, about the plan to set it up, but was at the time assured that there was no aggressive intention behind its establishment. It also mentioned that there were no foreign military bases on its territory (as the Soviet press claimed at that time) and that Israel aspired for peace to prevail with its neighbors.

On this occasion Israel called upon the USSR to permit Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel.24

9 December 1951

Israeli-Soviet trade negotiations were concluded concerning the exportation of 5,000 tons of citrus fruit from Israel to the USSR.

1 March 1952

An agreement was signed regarding the exportation of 50 tons of bananas and 30,000 boxes of oranges from Israel to the USSR.

6-12April 1952

Israel participated at the International Economic Conference held in Moscow and negotiated on the exportation of citrus fruit from Israel to the USSR in exchange for importing agricultural machinery from the USSR.

19 May 1952

An Israeli-Soviet agreement was signed on the exportation of 50,000 boxes of citrus fruit from Israel to the USSR, in exchange for which Israel would import oil products from the USSR. Negotiations were also held regarding the purchase of crude oil and grain from the USSR.

8 December 1952

Pravda denounced the 'incitement campaign of the Zionist leaders' against the Slansky Trials in Prague, whereupon the Secretary of

{p. xxx} the Czechoslovak Communist Party was accused of weaving a plot with Israel as well as Zionist and Jewish organizations to overthrow the communist regimes in Czechoslovakia and its neighboring countries. (Slansky, of Jewish origin, was executed. With the passage of time, the Czechoslovak post-communist government rehabilitated him and exonerated him from the charge of treason.)

13 January 1953

The 'Doctors' Plot' was announced in the Soviet media. A large group of Jewish doctors were accused of attempting to poison Stalin, according to instructions they had, allegedly, received from Jewish and Zionist organizations. (The group w s expected to be sentenced to death; after Stalin's death, the charges were dropped.)

19 January 1953

In his Knesset speech, Israeli Foreign Minister M. Sharett made the following statement concerning the 'Doctors' Plot' and the Soviet media's claim that they were Jews:

The State of Israel will not remain silent in the face of an attempt made by any power to defame the name of the Jewish people and of a danger threatening masses of the Jews wherever they may be.

The government of Israel has alwas regarded friendship with the USSR as one of the pillars of its international position and as a precious asset for the entire Jewish people. It views with deep sorrow and grave anxiety the malignant course of hatred against Jews officially adopted in the USSR, which must arouse most vehement indignation and condemnation on the part of Israel and the Jewish masses throughout the world ...

The government of Israel will denounce in the UN and on every other platform the campaign of incitement conducted in the communist countries against the Jewish people, and the abomination directed at its authoritative oranizations and will warll of the dangers threatening the well being of millions of Jews in these countries. The government of Israel

{p. xxxi} will continue to demand even more vigorously, the right of all Jews who aspire to Zion to be permitted to emigrate to Israel. 25

9 February 1953

A small bomb was hurled at the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv. Three Legation employees were slightly injured by the explosion.

The President and the Prime Minister of Israel, in fact the whole government and Knesset, expressed their deep regret at the incident, condemned it and promised to catch the criminals and bring them to court.

13 February 1953

The government of the USSR informed the govelnment of Israel of its decision to break off diplomatic relations with Israel.

17 February 1953

Prime Minister D. Ben Gurion expressed in the Knesset his amazement and deep concern in view of the Soviet decision to sunder diplomatic relations with Israel.

NOTES

Speech by Andrei Gromyko, 14 May 1947, in the United Nations General Assembly, First Special Session 77 Plenary Meeting, Vol. 1, pp. 127-35.

2 Kol Haam, 18 May 1948 .

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 30 May 1948.

5 Ibid., 27 Aug. 1948.

6 M. Namil; Mission lo Moscow (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1971) p. 52. 7 Pravda, 28 Sept. 1948

8 M. Namir, op. cit., pp. 63-73.

9 General Assembly, Official Rec. 3rd Year, I Community. Doc. A/c 1/401, 25 Nov. 1948.

10 General Assembly, Official Rec. 3rcl Session, Gen. Comlll. 211 Meeting, 24 Nov. 1948, p. 741.

11 M. Namir, op. cit., pp. 90—91.

12 Ibid., p. 109. 13 A. Dagan, Moscow andJerusalem (Londoll: Abelard and Schuman, 1970) p. 40.

{p. xxxii} 14 Ibid., p. 41. 15 M. Namir, op. cit., p. 116-18. 16 A. Dagan, op. cit., p. 44 17 Sec. Council, Official Rec. 4th Year, No. 37, p. 5, 9 Aug. 1949. 18 Davar (Heb. daily), 5 Dec. 1949. 19 Gen. Assembly Official Rec. 5th Session Suppl. No. 1, 8, 6, 19 April 1950. 20 Davar, 23 May 1950. 21 Ibid., 20 Aug. 1950. 22 Ibid., 4 Oct. 1950. 23 A. Dagan, op. cit., p. 59-60. 24 Ibid., p. 59-60. 25 Divrei HaKnesset (Knesset Verbatim), Vol. 13, p. 493.

{p. 1} Part 1

From severance of diplomatic relations in February 1953 to their renewal in July 1953

{p. 3} {Chapter 1}1

Ideological and psychological aspects of the USSR's decision to sever its relations wth Israel

THE CAUSE AND BACKGROUND OF THE BREACH

ON 9 February 1953 a small bomb was thrown on the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv. The ensuing explosion damaged the building and wounded three Legation employees. This event was used by the Soviet government as a pretext for informing the Israeli government of its decision to sever Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations.1 The USSR regarded the blow to its Legation in Israel as a by-product of the angry manifestations against it at that time in Israel, both among the public and in the government, in consequence of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist accusations which were manifested at the Prague Trials and in the case of the 'Doctors' Plot' in Moscow.

In the notification transmitted to Israel's Legation in Moscow on 11 February 1953, the Soviet government placed the responsibility for the criminal act on the government of Israel basing its argument 'on the well known and indisputable facts concerning the engagement of Israel's government representatives in hostile acts of systematic incitement against the USSR'.

The USSR also stated in its notification2 that

the apologies expressed by the President of Israel and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the condemnation of the act and the promise they made to find the criminals and punish them, 'are in contradiction to the acts of incitement' against the

{p. 4} USSR. All is simply 'a fraudulent show' aimed at evading the assumption of responsibility for the attack.

The 'provocative'3 policy of the government in Israel towards the USSR, was characteristic not only in the press siding with the ruling parties in Israel, but also of the statements made by their representatives in the Knesset as well as those of government ministers, in particular those of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sharett, on 19 January 1953, 'who openly incited hostile acts against the USSR'.

Elementary conditions are lacking in Israel for carrying out normal diplomatic activity by Soviet representatives. Therefore, and in view of what was stated above, the USSR government has decided to call back its Minister and the diplomatic staff of the Legation and to sever its relations with Israel.

No warning was given to Israel prior to the notification of the breach of relations, either on the diplomatic plane or in the Soviet media. The actual notice did not include any reference to the defamation of Israel in the Soviet press following the Prague Trials and the 'Doctors' Plot' in Moscow. In Israel itself the announcement of the break in relations was received as a grave and unexpected political development, with serious implications of concern for the situation of the Jews in the USSR and for Israel's position in the international arena.

THE REACTION IN ISRAEL

In the Knesset debate on the Soviet announcement on the severance of relations with Israel, Prime Minister D. Ben Gurion said that the government of Israel had received it 'with astonishment and concern'.4

Zalman Aran, Member of the Knesset (MK) for the Labor Party, when speaking of this said, 'Since the day Israel was established the sky has never been so clouded as at this time,' and that for him the breach was a 'Soviet political bomb' thrown at Israel 'which was struck by a mighty political blow'.5

MK Y. Ben Aharon of Mapam (the United Workers Party), then in the opposition, described the event as 'one of the gravest incidents

{p. 5} to occur to our young country during its short existence' and as 'a bitter day for our country and a terrible notice to the masses of our people all over the world'.

The 'astonishment' with which the government received the announcement probably derived from the fact that Israel, as a Jewish state with Zionist objectives, was hurt by the defamation aimed - directly and indirectly - at Israel itself and at the Jewish and Zionist organizations, at the Prague Trials and through the 'Doctors' Plot' in Moscow. Bearing in mind the anti-Soviet spirit that then prevailed in Israel in face of these defamations, people were asking whether Israel would have intended to sever its diplomatic relations with the USSR. To this Foreign Minister M. Sharett replied that the government of Israel had had no such intention, since 'breach of diplomatic relations is not a way that leads to peace'.6 The leadership of the country had probably not realized that a break in relations could ever have been initiated by the USSR. Perhaps the government of Israel was impressed by the fact that the USSR never broke its relations with Yugoslavia in spite of the bitter and persistent ideological confrontation between them. Moreover, the USSR was engaged, at the time, in a sharp political clash with the USA and a number of European countries, without any break in diplomatic relations between them; there was not even any Soviet threat of potential severance. Breaking off diplomatic relations was considered a very unusual phenomenon in the system of international relations. Thus it was apparently felt after the breach that the USSR regarded Israel differently from the way it regarded the rest of the world.

The 'grave concern' stemmed, apparently firstly from fear for the fate of Soviet Jews - who in many cases faced oppression and persecution - whose situation would possibly worsen in view of the breaking up of diplomatic relations with Israel. Secondly, there was concern for the wide gap then created between the Soviet Union's former position of extending unlimited support to the establishment of Israel, strengthening it politically and militarily, and its new position, aimed at humiliating Israel and weakening it in the international arena. And last, but not least, it was the first breach of diplomatic relations Israel had ever experienced - and with a superpower.

In the Knesset debate, following announcement of the severance of relations, Foreign Minister Sharett somehow avoided making any

{p. 6} comment on the political significance to Israel of this act.7 A fortnight after the debate, he belittled the value of its importance by saying that 'from the practical point of view, we have lost nothing from the break in relations, while we have never enjoyed anything from them'.8 He adopted the same attitude in his instructions to Israeli diplomatic representations abroad. In this he differed from his fellow party members, including Prime Minister D. Ben Gurion.

A statement issued by the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem on 12 February 1953 synthesized, on the governmental plane, the various reactions expressed by government spokesmen, representatives of the coalition parties in the Knesset, in shifting the weight of all explanations to the traditional hatred of the USSR for Zionism, Judaism and Israel. Here is the full text:

The official reason given for this act is nothing but a pretext. The decision taken (regarding the breach of relations) is the climax of open hostility and a poisonous defamation campaign against the State of Israel, the Zionist movement, Jewish organizations, and Jews as such - a campaign conducted for a long time in the USSR, one which in recent months has increased to a threatening state. The true aim of this campaign is to completely isolate and intimidate Soviet Jewry, whose fate arouses profound fear.9

In the guidelines M. Sharett addressed to Israel's Diplomatic Mission abroad on 9 March 1953 he stressed that in explaining the break in Israeli-Soviet diplomatic relations, 'we ought to contradict their assumptions: firstly, that the breach constitutes a catastrophe for Israel; secondly, that it brings us to an impotent dependence on the good graces of the USA, without any countersupport; thirdly, that it raises the status of Arabs over us'.10 Clarification of these three assumptions constitutes a kind of summary of Israeli-Soviet relations, as follows:

The USSR always regarded Zionism as an adversary. Its turnabout in 1947 was more for the purpose of expelling the British from Palestine than for the love of Zionism. The retreat from a position of advocacy for the establishment of the Jewish State began shortly afterwards when the USSR became aware of:

{p. 7} (a) the necessary link of Israel with the West, and (b) the connection between the Soviet Jews and Israel.

Things came full circle and the USSR returned to its position prior to Israel's independence. The historic balance sheet shows that we have not lost anything by the rupture of relations, but we have gained our independence. The USSR never served us as a countersupport against the US and the West, it never extended us any aid and never opened any door for us to allow us to become closer to it.

Our dependence on the West, prior to the breach, was not weaker than it is at present, nor did it become stronger because of the rupture . If the breach caused any change in the situation, it is rather in the direction of increased sympathy in the world towards Israel. The breach and the hostility preceding it plugged a hole in the wall of isolation in the world separating the Soviet Jews and Israel. Gaining sympathy towards the Soviet bloc among the Arab countries was not the aim, but at most an attempt to gain secondary benefit. But the Arab leaders hostile to Israel knew full well that they would not gain from Communist aid, but that they must be wary of it, and the Western leaders know that the Arabs know this and the Arabs know that the West knows that they know that it is an imaginary benefit.

In neither the official reaction nor the information guidelines is there mention of Israel's policy of estrangement from the USSR or of its drawing closer to it - except for the Jewish aspect - as a factor in the Soviet-Israeli relationship.

According to this concept, the nature of Soviet policy towards Israel was deterministic. Namely, it was not Israeli policy towards the USSR- in the internal, bilateral, regional, or international arenas - that set the tone. No matter what Israel's policy would be, it would not have any influence on Soviet policy towards Israel, owing to the traditional Soviet hostility to Zionism, Judaism and Israel. Israeli government spokesmen unhesitatingly rejected the assumption that their angry reaction - no matter how justified from the Jewish national point of view - contributed to the deterioration of relations with the USSR, to the point of severance. Moreover, there was an increasing tendency to obscure this opinion as much as possible and to adopt in its stead the idea that the breach in relations was merely a continuation of the series of events that had

{p. 8} begun with I. Ehrenburg's article in Pravda on 21 September 1948 and culminated in the 'Doctors' Plot'.11

The left-wing opposition parties held an opinion completely opposed to the official line. It ignored the significance of the anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic elements in Soviet policy towards Israel while linking the reasons for the breach with Israel's policy towards the USSR in the internal and international arena. MK M. Sneh was the spokesman for this approach. When he referred to the Soviet reasons for taking such a step against Israel, he said,12 'The true chain of events as it has become clear to us is: the break in diplomatic relations was preceded by an attack on the Soviet Legation; the anti-Soviet attack was preceded by anti-Soviet incitement; the anti-Soviet incitement was preceded by an anti-Soviet policy ...'

After enumerating the various aspects of Soviet support for Israel in 1947-49, he continued with:

This was advance payment for Soviet friendship towards Israel. And in this same UN arena, how did the Israeli delegation stand vis 2 vis the USSR? How did the delegation act when the USSR presented basic proposals at the UN for securing world peace? What stand did you take in the Korean conflict? What was the matter with you when you identified yourself with McArthur and Syngman Rhee? Why did the Israeli Foreign Minister give his blessing to the American invader to cross the 38th parallel north? ... And when the idea of a Middle East Alliance came up - an idea which has not yet been realized - you were the first in the region to express in a thousand ways your readiness to join it. And when the Prime Minister was in America, didn't he promise that Israel - side by side with Turkey - would fight alongside the West? Didn't Abba Eban [head of Israel's Delegation to the UN] state at the UN forum that granting military bases to foreign powers did not contradict the concept of state sovereignty? And when A. Eban visited Israel didn't he state that the Israeli Defense Forces had an international duty 'to defend the whole region'? Defend against whom? Against the USSR? ... In view of these facts, which occurred a long time before the Prague Trials, can one accept the theory of 'an anti-Jewish attack' as the reason for your anti-Soviet stance?

{p. 9} In putting these questions, MK Sneh took Israeli policy makers to serious task for switching from supporting neutrality between the two blocs to siding gradually with the USA in its confrontation with the USSR.

The Mapam party spokesman, as distinguished from the leftist party headed by Sneh, declared that his group would never accept the putative connection between Zionism and the world Jewish organizations with Soviet civil crimes. As to the remaining accusations, the Mapam approach differed only slightly from the statements by MKSneh.

A draft resolution presented by Mapam at the end of Knesset debate on this subject stated:13

The Knesset regards the rupture of diplomatic relations on the part of the USSR with Israel as a grave political blow to the Jewish people, to Zionism, and to the State of Israel. Without ignoring the background of the USSR's anti-Zionist attitude towards us, as was expressed in the Prague Trials and in the Moscow publications, the Knesset cannot acquit the government from its responsibility for the development of events that led to the breach of diplomatic relations. After having abandoned the policy of non-alignment and neutrality, the government undertook a policy of increasing subjection to the West, encouraged incitement against the USSR by official bodies, turned the justified defense against the constantly increasing attacks on Zionism and Israel into an anti-Soviet defamation campaign in contradiction to Zionist and Jewish responsibility and did not know how to prevent the malicious assault on the Soviet Legation, perpetrated by fascist elements ...'

The draft resolution was rejected by a majority of votes. The proposals submitted by Maki (the Israel Communist Party) and MK M. Sneh were not even brought to a vote. The Knesset accepted the draft resolution presented by the coalition parties, saying that the Knesset aligned itself with the Prime Minister's statement in which he appealed to the Soviet authorities: (a) to permit Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel, and (b) to behave towards Israel according to the principle which the USSR professes of 'fraternity and peace between nations'.

To sum up, opinions differed in Isracl as to the Soviet motivation for breaking off its relations with Israel. The coalition and rightist

{p. 10} parties regarded the ideological aspect (namely, Soviet hostility to Zionism) as the decisive factor leading to the breach. The leftist parties ascribed the reason for the break to political motives (such as, Israel's siding with the USA in its confrontation with the USSR, while at the same time carrying on public and official incitement against the very basis of the Soviet regime). Factions of the leftist oppositions, however, differed among themselves over the question of whether they should react at all, and if so, how they should respond to the USSR for having connected Zionism and Jewish organizations with Soviet internal affairs. The majority of the opposition parties believed that the Israeli government's response to the 'Doctors' Plot' should have been more controlled and restrained, in such a way as to not endanger the fate of mutual relations between the two countries. The minority, including Maki and the leftist faction of MK M. Sneh, ignored this issue altogether.'4

THE USSR'S CONSIDERATIONS IN DECIDING ON THE SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS

We do not know whether the USSR's decision to break off relations with Israel was the result of a planned anti-Israel and anti-Zionist campaign, as MKs of the coalition parties assumed in the Knesset debate held following the announcement on the severance of relations,13 or was, perhaps, a reaction to the turn taken in Israel's foreign policy moving from declared neutrality to increasing alignment with the USA in its confrontation with the USSR.

The Soviet government in its note informing Israel of the decision to break off relations explained its decision as deriving from the assault on the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv as well as from the statements made by spokesmen of the Israeli government, headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself- following the 'Doctors' Plot' - which openly incited, as stated above, hostility to the USSR.

On what was the Soviet reasoning based? Were the reasons given what actually prompted its decision?

The political aspect

It might be assumed that the response by the coalition parties' Knesset representatives, and particularly the reaction of the Foreign

{p. 13} Minister, considering its scope, 'sharpness, and main objective'16- the mobilization of world public opinion and that of Western countries and the UN in the struggle for the annulment of the charges in the 'Doctors' Plot' and for the improvement of the lot of the Soviet Jews - was probably regarded by the Soviets as the decisive factor behind the rupture. All other factors referred to by the Soviet commentators after the break in relations - although the Soviet note did not mention them - displayed no new argument. The accusation that Zionism was serving American imperialism and was acting on behalf of its intelligence, or that Israel was leading an anti-Soviet policy according to the directives of the USA, aimed at inflaming a new war17 - all these accusations had been repeatedly made in the past without causing the rupture of relations between the USSR and Israel. They never disappeared from the Soviet media frame and were never brought up on official Soviet Notes. On the contrary, the majority of the MK reactions created a new dimension in the history of Israeli-Soviet relations. Representatives of the ruling party (Mapai) and its official spokesmen criticized the USSR in a systematic and broad manner which they had previously avoided during any Knesset debate or similar platform. This fresh criticism comprised:

1. Condemning the Soviet regime as 'a regime of spiritual annihilation and national oppression', condemning its anti-Semitic policy and accusing it of making mass preparations to strike the Jews (pogroms).

2. Exposing the tragic situation of the Soviet Jews, facing spiritual and physical annihilation; challenging the Soviet authorities to account for it; energetically demanding the restoration of the rights of Soviet Jews and permission for them to leave for Israel.

3. Condemning the legal and judiciary system in the USSR, 'based on threats and forgery'.

4. Appealing to public opinion in the free world with the aim of shattering its indifference, urging the free world to take immediate steps to avoid a holocaust.


5. Determination to urgently bring their problem onto the UN agenda.

6. Warning that appropriate steps would be taken in Israel against the supporters of the USSR incitements and libel policy against the Jews.

{p. 12} The condemnations, criticism, appeals, demands, and all these warnings were expressed for the first time publicly, not only within the framework of a Knesset debate but as a demonstration of Jewish solidarity and as a government operational program for the fight against the USSR's anti-Jewish policy. For the first time, Israel's leaders referred in very critical terms to the USSR's policy in internal affairs and regarding the Jews who live within its borders. The State of Israel, in fact, appeared to the USSR as the spokesman of Soviet Jews and of world Jewry and as one who would openly station itself in the camp of the 'instigators'. This dimension might have been decisive in the USSR's determination to break its relations with the Israeli government, against the background of ideological and psychological enmity that the USSR projected towards Israel.18

The ideological aspect

The Prague Trial - and immediately afterwards the 'Doctors' Plot'19 - provoked Israel's leaders, for the first time, to take a route leading to an open ideological conflict with the USSR.

Anti-Semitic expressions and the proof, as it were, of a conspiracy between Zionist Organizations, Israel with the Prague defendants and the accused doctors (the majority of whom were Jewish) in Moscow (against whom it was alleged that it had been their mission to poison the Soviet leadership on behalf of Zionist and world Jewish organizations) increased the level of 'negation' to that of dangerous hostility. The Prague Trials and the 'Doctors' Plot' constituted to a great extent the background to Israel's change of attitude, influenced by the enmity these two events fomented against Soviet Jews, world Jewry, and Israel.

Israel's leaders not only rejected the putative accusations against Zionism and Israel, but also revealed the evils of the Communist regime in the USSR and the 'satellite' countries in eastern Europe, exposing them as a danger to mankind as well as to Jewish existence. Prime Minister Ben Gurion addressed this in particular in his public speeches and in the polemical articles he signed with the pseudonym 'Saa shel Yariv' ('Yariv's grandfather'), an allusion undoubtedly understood by the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv.20

During the Knesset debate on the Prague Trials, on 22 November

{p. 13} 1952, Foreign Minister Sharett defined the trials as a 'deceiving show' and as a 'vision of moral suicide and self-degradation shattering the heart of anyone who believes in the holiness and spiritual strength of a human being's personality'.21 As for the nature of the trials, the Foreign Minister's evaluation was that it was permeated with a malignant anti-Semitic spirit and replete with 'bombastic propaganda and anti-Semitic incitement in line with pure Nazi tradition'.22

In that debate Prime Minster Ben Gurion enumerated four aspects characterizing the trials:

(a) the human essence of the Prague tragedy;

(b) its terrible international significance (without commenting on it);

(c) the expected fate of the Jews under the Communist regime (spiritual and physical annihilation); -

(d) the implications for Israel itself: the need to draw proper conclusions while coming to terms with Mapam through moral self-examination.23

'Communism', he noted, 'is based on two dicta: (1) loyalty to the policy-line, whatever it may be, "even if today is the opposite of tomorrow, and tomorrow the opposite of today"; (2) the end justifies the means - all means, without exception, including alleging of libels, falsifications of history and truth, deceiving slogans, and the murder of innocent people when necessary to increase the rulers' power or to cover up their failures.'24

The debate in the Knesset, in which cabinet ministers participated actively, spilled over into criticizing the judicial system and the terror methods of the Communist regime, but the contents of the draft resolution submitted for Knesset approval by the Committee for Foreign and Security Affairs - and which was accepted by a majority vote - attested to the delicate care being taken to not deviate from the defensive nature of the debate, while intentionally overlooking its offensive character.25 The aim was probably to not overtly aggravate the ideological conflict with the USSR. The debate was not subject to clarification at the diplomatic level, so one may perhaps conclude that the Soviets were ready to accept it as it was, at that stage.

{p. 14} The 'Doctors' Plot', which aroused great fury in Israel and in the Knesset, broke the bonds of restraint that had characterized Israel's leaders since the establishment of Israeli-Soviet diplomatic relations and gave them a free hand in revealing the nature of the the Communist regime and its leader, Stalin. The criticism leveled was sharp, penetrating, and daring. We may assume that its forcefulness must have shocked the Soviet personalities who read it.

In January and the beginning of February 1953 articles appeared in the daiiy Davar written by Prime Minister Ben Gurion signing himself as S. Sh. Yariv. Presumably, they significantly influenced the USSR's decision to break off relations with Israel. Though
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