Jew Corrupter -- Cambridge author, Ronald Hyam of -- Empire and sexuality: the British experience

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Empire and sexuality: the British experience (Studies in Imperalism)
 By Ronald Hyam



Hyam Ronald: Understanding the British Empire

Hyam Ronald:
Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968

The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968
Cambridge University Press (United Kingdom), 2007
Quality paperback, 482 pages


Britain's Imperial Century 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion[/b]


http://www.eruditor.com/books/name/rona ... 87.html.en

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The Problem of Palestine

'Palestine: future policy': Cabinet conclusions on reference to the UN: CAB 128/9, CM 22(47)2 14 Feb 1947

The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Colonies (C.P. (47) 59) reporting the results of the further discussions with representatives of the Arabs and the Jews on the future of Palestine.

Both the Arabs and the Jews had declined to accept as a basis for further negotiation the [current British government] proposals ... . The Jews had rejected them as likely to lead to an independent unitary State in which the Jews would be a permanent minority. The Arabs had rejected them as leading inevitably to Partition and also because they provided for further Jewish immigration.

In these circumstances, it was recommended that His Majesty's Government should give immediate notice of their intention to refer the problem of Palestine to the judgement of the General Assembly of the United Nations. ... The Foreign Secretary ... explained how the problem had become progressively more intractable. American Jewry now had great influence in the counsels of the Jewish Agency. He had made every effort to secure the assistance of the United States Government, but in the event their interventions had only increased our difficulties. ...[T]he negotiations which had just taken place left no room for hope of a settlement acceptable to His Majesty's Government in which either side would acquiesce. In the final stage of the negotiations the Jewish representatives had been prepared to consider a scheme of Partition, but when asked to define what they meant by their claim to a "viable State in an adequate area of Palestine" they had made it clear that they claimed a far larger area than any which His Majesty's Government would be justified in proposing for the Jews under a Partition scheme. A map indicating the extent of the Jewish claim was shown to the Cabinet.

The Foreign Secretary said that he had the impression that the representatives of the Jews had not believed that we should in fact refer the matter to the United Nations. He thought that both Jews and Arabs were anxious to avoid discussion of the problem in that forum, and it might be that, if we now announced our firm intention to take the matter to the United Nations Assembly, this might bring them to a more reasonable frame of mind. ...

The Lord Chancellor said that ... Mr. Ben Gurion ... had made it clear that the Jewish Agency would prefer that we should not try to force a final solution of the Palestine question at the present time by submitting it to the judgement of the United Nations. ... [T]hey desired that meanwhile His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the Mandate on the basis on which it had been administered before the White Paper of 1939. If the Government were willing to do this, the Jews would be satisfied with two concessions. The first was that 100,000 Jews should be admitted to Palestine over the next two years, and that further immigration thereafter should be determined solely in accordance with the principle of economic absorptive capacity. If it were clearly laid down in advance that immigration was to be regulated solely in accordance with that principle, they would be content that the rate of immigration should be finally determined by the High Commissioner. The second concession was that Jews should have the right to settle and buy land in any part of Palestine. Mr. Ben Gurion had added that, if those two concessions were made, he would be able to secure the co-operation of the Jewish community in Palestine in combating terrorist activities, and he believed that terrorism could then be brought to an end. He could not give any assurance that illegal immigration would cease, but he thought that it would shrink to small proportions if legal immigration were allowed to the extent which he had suggested.

The Foreign Secretary said that it was clear that the object which Mr. Ben Gurion had in mind, in his conversation with the Lord Chancellor, was the same as that which the representatives of the Jewish Agency had advanced in their recent conversations with him and the Colonial Secretary, viz., that His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the Mandate in such a way as to enable the Jews to attain, by immigration, a numerical majority in Palestine. Such a policy was bound to excite the active hostility of the Arabs in Palestine.

The Minister of Food said that he ... would himself have preferred that we should support the Jewish claims. He believed them to be just; and he also considered that our strategic interests would be best served by securing in a friendly Jewish State the military facilities which we desired. As against this, it was pointed out that by adopting such a policy we should probably provoke an Arab rising in Palestine and should incur the hostility certainly of the Arab peoples and possibly of the whole Muslim world. Our main object in desiring military facilities in Palestine was to enable us to maintain our position and influence throughout the Middle East. It would be no advantage to us to secure a safe base in Palestine by means which estranged the surrounding Arab countries. Further, in view of the recent activities of Jewish terrorists in Palestine, it was not to be assumed that a policy of full support for the Jewish claim would be acceptable either to public opinion in this country or to the British troops in Palestine.

The Chief of the Air Staff said that, in the considered view of the Chiefs of Staff, it was vital to the security of the British Commonwealth and of the United Kingdom itself that we should retain bases adequate to maintain our military position in the Middle East; and in present circumstances we were relying on securing in Palestine some of our essential needs for such bases. If the future of Palestine were left to the decision of the United Nations, we could not be sure that we should be able to secure there the military facilities which we required. If in the event we were unable to secure adequate bases there or elsewhere in the Middle East, the foundations of Commonwealth defence would he undermined. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he still believed that Partition would afford the best means of securing both peace in Palestine and our own strategic interests in the Middle East... The Foreign Secretary confirmed that Partition was not excluded.

Source: British Documents on the End of Empire Series A Volume 2, The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-51 (editor Ronald Hyam): Part I (HMSO, 1992) pp. 66-9

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'Palestine': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Bevin on policy of withdrawal CAB 129/21, CP(47)259 18 Sept 1947

Extract

Withdrawal from Palestine

It appears from the preceding paragraphs that grave disadvantages would follow from a decision by His Majesty's Government to undertake the task of carrying out any of the three solutions which the [United Nations General] Assembly may be expected to consider. If these disadvantages are held to preclude acceptance of responsibility for any of the three solutions, His Majesty's Government must be prepared for an alternative course of action. This would be equally necessary in the somewhat similar situation which would be created by a failure of the Assembly to carry any resolution whatever by the necessary two-thirds majority.

The present situation in Palestine is intolerable and cannot be allowed to continue. His Majesty's Government have themselves failed to devise any settlement which would enable them to transfer their authority to a Government representing the inhabitants of the country. If the Assembly should fail, or if it were to propose a settlement for which His Majesty's Government could not accept responsibility, the only remaining course would be to withdraw from Palestine, in the last resort unconditionally.

The threat of British withdrawal within a specified time, coupled with an offer to assist in giving effect to any agreement reached between the Arabs and the Jews before our departure, might conceivably have the result of inducing them to co-operate in order to avoid the otherwise inevitable civil war. But a withdrawal, if decided upon, should not be made conditional on such an agreement.

Withdrawal in the absence of Arab-Jewish agreement has disadvantages which should not be underestimated. There would be an interval between the announcement of our intention to withdraw and the actual withdrawal, an interval in which the task of the Administration might be more difficult than in any previous period. In the absence of a Government to which power could be transferred, the consequences of our evacuation would be unpredictable. Some or all of the Arab States would probably become involved in the resulting disorders; they might even quarrel among themselves over the country's future. In any event it is likely that the situation would before long be brought to the attention of the Security Council.

On the other hand our withdrawal from Palestine, even if it had to be effected at the cost of a period of bloodshed and chaos in the country, would have two major advantages. British lives would not be lost, nor British resources expended, in suppressing one Palestinian community for the advantage of the other. And (at least as compared with enforcing the majority plan or a variant of it) we should not be pursuing a policy destructive of our own interests in the Middle East ....

Source: British Documents on the End of Empire Series A Volume 2, The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-51 (editor Ronald Hyam): Part I (HMSO, 1992) p. 75

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