Mission to America: Ludwig Martens in the United States, 1919-1921

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

I'm distantly related to this guy by blood.  --CSR

Ellis took the offensive, shutting up Martens whenever he tried to explain Bolshevik land, woman, and education reforms.  Ellis only wanted Martens to admit that he was a radical bent on overturning American capitalism:

Ellis: I would to ask you whether or not you believe in bringing about a new world order by the employment of force and violence to establish a proletariat dictatorship?

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Mission to America: Ludwig Martens in the United States, 1919-1921

Posted on July 17, 2011

Between November 1917 and August 1918 the Wilson Administration assumed a strong oppositional posture against the Bolshevik Revolution.  Motivated by Soviet propaganda campaigns, radical social changes, the repudiation of debts, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the publishing of secret treaties, and the overall perceived Soviet threat to the corporate and profit system, the United States withdrew its recognition, erected a blockade against Russian commerce, and sent elements of the American Expeditionary Force into the country to bolster the forces of restoration and reaction in Russian state and society.  The United States wanted nothing to do with Soviet Russia, as David Russell Francis, the American Ambassador to Petrograd pointed out:  "It is reported that the Petrograd Consul of Workmen and Soldiers has named Lenin as Premier, Trotsky as Minister of Foreign Affairs.  Disgusting!"1

            At the same time, and for nearly two years after the November armistice, there was the Red Scare on the domestic front as America's hysteria shifted from German Militarists to Russian Bolsheviks.  Unions such as the Industrial Workers of the World were obliterated, the strikes of 1919 were put down with force, and radicals were either thrown in jail without any charges, or were deported.   Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, who was leading the raids and the Red Scare, referred to radicals as having "unclean morals" who "have stirred discontent in our midst." 2

The perceived threat to America's conservative and upper classes by Soviets and radicalism was so strong that the United States Senate formed a committee to investigate radicalism in early 1919.  Lee Slater Overman, a Democrat from North Carolina, led the Committee.  At one point he sponsored a bill to limit immigration only to Anglo-Saxons.  From the beginning the Committee was an anti-Bolshevik sounding board.  Of the twenty-four people who testified, sixteen were rabid anti-Bolsheviks. The other eight, including John Reed, were silenced when trying to give answers.  Ambassador Francis told the Committee "if this Bolshevik government remains in control of Russia peace in Europeis, in my opinion, impossible."3  Indeed, after each day of hearings Overman would announce to the press and public that the Soviets "looted beyond all calculation," and "we must bring home to the people the truth that a compromise with Bolshevism is to barter away our inheritance."4

Then on August 10 of 1920 Wilson's new Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby, issued the Colby Note, which was for thirteen years the final say on American policy regarding Russia.  It was a sharp criticism of the Bolsheviks, pointing out that they had ruthlessly usurped power from a democratic government; they used terror and atrocity to sustain themselves, and were determined to overthrow all capitalist governments.  The United States, in short, could in no way recognize Soviet Russia.  "There cannot be any common ground" upon which America "can stand with a power whose conceptions of international relations are so entirely alien to our own, so utterly repugnant to a moral sense," he wrote.5  It was a "counter blast  to radicals everywhere," and "sounds the death knell of zig zag diplomacy," wrote Robert J. Kerner of the New York Times.6

After the White Armies were defeated and the Bolsheviks consolidated their power, their top priority was not only to rebuild what had been destroyed since 1914, but also to build Russiain to an industrialized power.  "We must restore industries which were ruined by the world war and afterward by civil war and raids.  It is necessary to consider the work of restoring economic welfare to the country," announced one Soviet official.7  Industrialization meant that Soviet Russia would be buying machinery, mining equipment, railroad cars, and importing skilled labor.

Lenin and Trotsky had little desire to deal with British or French capitalists.  To Bolshevik leaders, the British and French were "imperialist robbers" who started the war and then invaded Soviet Russia in order to loot it.  Lenin and Trotsky believed the same for the American leadership, for Lenin told an American journalist "your Government is instituting more violently oppressive measures not only against the socialists, but against the working class in general than any other Government, even the reactionary French."8  Nonetheless, Soviet leaders understood that America was the only solvent country after the war.  Besides, Lenin was optimistic about dealing with the United States, for he admired American culture and society.  The approximately eight thousand books in his library included works from Edgar Allen Poe, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Walt Whitman, and Upton Sinclair.  And his favorite story was Jack London's "Love of Life."9

Lenin made it clear that he wanted cooperation from the United States.  "I told Colonel [Raymond] Robins that it is in the interest of the United Statesto have friendly ties with Soviet Russia," and "I expressed our desire to enter into trade relations with America. . ." he told Louise Bryant, the widow of John Reed.  "Political problems excluded, the very simple fact remains that America needs our raw materials and we need American manufactured goods."10  

On March 21 of 1919, in the midst of American hysteria against the Bolsheviks and the Soviets desire to re-build and industrialize Russia, Soviet Foreign Minister Georgii Chicherin appointed Ludwig Christian Alexander Karlovitch Martens as Ambassador to the United States, primarily to foster good commercial relations, or more specifically, "for the defense of the interests of the Soviet Republic and above all the struggle against intervention and for commercial goals."11

Background on Martens

On March 21, 1919, Martens sent his credentials to Secretary of State Robert Lansing.  The credentials included a personal biography and a long memorandum detailing Bolshevik progress in rebuilding Russia.  It also included his objectives as Ambassador.

Martens was born in 1874 in Bachmut, a town in the Ekaterinoslav province in south Russia to German parents who never naturalized as Russian citizens.  In fact, Martens did not become a citizen of Russia until 1917, when Kerensky granted it to him.  In 1899 he was deported from Russia for revolutionary activities and went to Germany where he served two years in the Kaiser's army. In fact, it was sometime in the 1890s that he met up with Lenin and the two were arrested together in 1896 by the Czar's secret police.  In 1902 he left for England for fourteen years and there he met exiled Bolsheviks and had traveled to a number of countries, including Switzerland where he met up with Lenin.  Then in 1916, with his arrival in America, Martens wrote for Novy Mir, a radical Russian paper edited by Trotsky.12

            All the while, Martens was working as an engineer.  When growing up in Russia he attended the Kurst Technical Academy for high school and then the Technological Institute in Petrograd.  He was the American representative of the Demidoff Iron and Steel Works.  Also, while inEnglandin 1914, he was Vice President of Weinberg and Posner, Inc., an engineering firm where he made improvements on the Diesel Engine.

            Physically, Martens was described by the American press at the "Teutonic Engineer."  Standing over six feet tall with broad shoulders, he was "a blond hair, blue-eyes Russian," and a Lutheran, though he renounced his faith.13  "Martens was the picture of innocence.  His presence, build, and general characteristics were those of a placid individual far from popular Bolshevik characterization," wrote the New York Post.14

            Martens was also very outspoken, for he had an opinion on just about every political issue of the day.  He was critical of President Wilson, Secretary of State Lansing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and publicly embraced his Bolshevik superiors.  Indeed, a major factor that led to Martens' deportation was that American officials grew impatient with him.  When he was subpoenaed to testify in front of the Lusk Committee, for example, he said "your committee was created for a definite and limited purpose which cannot under any circumstances be held to include matters of international character."15  And he denounced the Colby Note, pointing out that "the domestic affairs of the Russian people are no concern of the Government of the United States," and American officials were "lamentably ill informed" regarding Soviet Russia.16
Setting up the Bureau

            With a budget of fifteen thousand dollars a month from the Soviet Government, Martens set up his mission, known as the Soviet Bureau, at the World Tower Building on 110 West 40th Street in New York City.  His Bureau took up one and a half floors and had thirty-five employees.  About half of his workers were born in Russia and the other half in America, and almost all belonged to the Socialist or Communist party's.

            Martens divided up his staff into departments.  The general office featured the file clerks, secretaries, and office manager.  Abraham A. Heller, a longtime member of the Socialist Party and close friend of Eugene V. Debs, headed the Commercial Department, which was the one to negotiate business deals and contracts.  Then there was the Information and Publicity Department, which was the one that wrote and edited Soviet Russia, the Bureau's weekly periodical.17

            Martens' spokesman and closest friend was Santeri Nuorteva, a Finn who came from a Swedish-speaking family.  Over the years he had been a schoolteacher, a journalist, a chicken farmer in New Jersey, and a member of the Finnish Parliament.  He was also an "international socialist," joining the Bolshevik Party while in Russia, and the Socialist Party's in Britain and the United States.  Whenever Martens was arrested, Nuorteva was arrested with him. And whenever Martens had to testify, Nuorteva was at his side.18
 
Establishing Soviet Russia

            Convinced that with a little education, the American people would become more sympathetic to his Government, Martens started a pro-Bolshevik weekly from Bureau headquarters titled Soviet Russia.  In just about every issue there were articles about sweeping reforms carried out by the Bolsheviks in education, land distribution, working conditions in mines and factories, and how the Bolsheviks only wanted peace and commercial intercourse with the United States.  "Soviet Russia is published," read the opening manifesto, "in order to acquaint the people of the United States with the real conditions in Russia and to combat the campaign of deliberate misrepresentation which is being waged by the enemies of the Russian workers. . ."19

            Soviet Russia was also used to further Martens' agenda of establishing commercial relations with the United States.  Indeed, the opening issue pointed out that Soviet Russia was not only in need of mining and textile machinery and railroad cars, but also "adopted a page from the American experience.  It is adopted the American science of efficiency-as expressed in the Taylor systems-to the newly created social and economic conditions."  The same editorial also pointed out that American politicians should stay out of the way of the American people and businessmen and let them decide what American policy should be.  "Should intelligent and unselfish sympathy on the part of the American people be overshadowed by bias and prejudice?  Should not their common sense prevail?"20

            Soviet Russia did not go unnoticed by the authorities.  Indeed, the periodical advertised in many radical magazines.  "Its issues contain the best available official and unofficial material on Soviet Russia" and "protests from all over the world against intervention in Russia, etc." said its quarter page advertisement in Good Morning.21  The Lusk Committee referred to the periodical as one that tried to "picture the proletarian government in Russia in its most favorable light."  The Lusk Committee also called for the banning of the periodical in the mails.22

            The federal government, however, did nothing to curtail the distribution of Soviet Russia, for it was published unhampered until 1923.  This issue was brought out during the Senate Hearings when Martens claimed that the magazine had a weekly circulation of thirty thousand:

Borah: Is it circulated in the mails?

Martens: Yes, sir.

Borah: Has Mr. Burleson [Post Master General Albert] objected to it?

Martens: No, sir.

Borah: Has it been held up in any way?

Martens: No, sir.

Borah: Then I take it that it must be all right? [Loud laughter by spectators].23
Martens Versus Bakhmetev

            Kerensky's Ambassador to the United States was Boris Bakhmetev, and even though the Kerensky regime was overthrown, the United States Government still recognized him as the legitimate ambassador, and did so until 1922.

Bakhmetev, also an engineer by trade, was just as popular in the United Statesas the Provisional Government was.  When he arrived in this country, in New York Cityon July 5, 1917, Mayor Mitchel greeted him with an elaborate ceremony.  Bakhmetev and his assistants arrived at City Hall to discover "a semicircle in front of the building" with twenty flag posts flying the Russian flag.24

Bakhmetev got along well with members of the Wilson Administration.  "Bachmeteiff [sic] and I speak the same language. . .He is a thorough-going liberal," wrote Colonel House.  Bakhmetev also developed a good working relationship with Secretary Lansing and Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long.25  

While Bakhmetev supported the Kerensky regime during the Provisional months, he shifted his loyalties to Admiral Kolchak and other White Forces.  He referred to Bolshevism as a "social disease" and a "barbarism comparable with that in the fourth century when Rome fell."  Then he demanded that the Wilson Administration try to oust the radical regime.

Furthermore, the American Government floated about $187 million in loans and credits to the Provisional Government, most of it being channeled through Bakhmetev.  He used the money to help sustain his embassy and to purchase arms for the White Armies.26

Chicherin then ordered Martens to take action: "The people's Commissariat authorizes you to take charge and administration of all movable and real estate of the Former Embassy and Consulates and all the property in the United States of America belonging to the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic."27  Indeed, Martens first major act was to confront Bakhmetev.  On April 11, 1919, Martens sent a letter to Bakhmetev ordering him to give up his post, the Embassy, and all of the assets in it.  "You are hereby ordered to surrender the Embassy building, with its furniture, archives, records, & c., and all moneys in this country belonging to the former Government of Russia."28  Bakhmetev, with the Wilson Administration behind him, would not budge.  Despite the fact that Martens wrote in his letter "the Government whom you are alleged to represent has absolutely gone out of existence,"29 Bakhmetev did not even bother to read it.  Secretary Lansing stepped in, asserting again that the United States did not recognize Soviet Russia, and that Bakhmetev was the true Russian Ambassador.  Able to read the writing on the wall, Martens dropped his case against Bakhmetev and never brought up the issue again.
Martens and American Radicals

Martens' relationship with American radicals was in flux.  First, he never joined any radical organization.  Indeed, when socialists and communists filed into the Soviet Bureau hoping to land jobs for the cause, he turned most of them away.  "I have nothing to do with any political party in the United States and cannot be expected to take sides," he announced.30

But Martens was a radical and a Bolshevik, so he did much more than just sit as his desk when it came to American radicalism.  He spoke to radical groups on an almost weekly basis in New York, Boston, Chicago, and other cities.  He also wrote articles in the New YorkCall, and, of course, in Soviet Russia.  "The historian of the future will marvel at the superhuman achievements of the workers in Russia during the last two years of a life-and-death struggle against the combined forces of world imperialism," he wrote in the Call.31

Martens was also a frequent speaker at radical meetings.  On September 2, 1920, the Socialist Party held a "monster mass meeting" at Madison Square Garden.  Eight thousand people jammed inside, including members of the Lusk Committee, the Justice Department, and officers in the New York City Police Department.  The New York Times described the meeting as "several persons attired in red costumes unfurled a red banner across the stage, upon which inscription 'Long Live the Third International.'"  When Martens tried to speak, the crowd cheered him on for fifteen minutes.  "There is much talk about Bolshevist propaganda against America, but there is no such thing," the envoy told the crowd.  "But there is propaganda against Soviet Russia.  We are not afraid of it."32

Martens was also close to Morris Hillquit, the head of the Socialist Party while Debs was behind bars.  An experienced attorney, Hillquit served as an advisor to Martens when the latter testified in front of the Lusk Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee, and officials at the Labor Department.  Martens thanked him for his service and comradeship, pointing out to Hillquit that your "cause to Soviet Russia is so dear to us all," and "I hope to we shall have you soon among us fraternally."33

Martens did tie himself to domestic radicalism, but not too tight.  He spoke at some mass meetings, and was close to some Socialist Party officials.  But, he never took part in any of the numerous strikes of 1919, or in any organization such as the I.W.W., and he dropped his affiliation with Novy Mir.  Martens was more concerned with his mission, which was to purchase durable goods which would help industrialize Soviet Russia.
The Attempt to Open Commercial Relations

Despite being sidetracked by putting together a staff and dealing with Bakhmetev, Martens and his associates proceeded to court American businessmen.  The American business community was divided on how to approach Martens, for he represented a government that was totally antithetical to their economic ideology.  Further, the State Department opposed any negotiations between the two sides, pointing out that America"has never recognized the Bolshevik regime at Moscow," and "deemed it proper to warn American business men that any concessions from the Bolshevik authorities probably would not be recognized as binding on future Russian Government's."34

Although Charles S. Clark, the head of Kohler Motors, wrote to the War Department that that doing business with the Bolsheviks was like doing business with a copperhead snake, it was likely that he was in the minority.  In fact, representatives from 853 firms approached Heller and Nuorteva, hoping, if not to secure a contract, then at least learn about the terms.  American businessmen knew that Soviet Russia would not be able to make payments for goods and services rendered, but they hoped that American bankers would be allowed to float out loans.  Indeed, J. F. Fulton, the General Executive Manager of the National City Bank, wrote a letter to Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk asking the State Department to recognize Russia so loans could be made.35  Also, the four-thousand member National Association of Manufacturers announced in the spring of 1919 that "many thousands of manufacturers in this country would be in a position to do business in Russia."36

Indeed, some businessmen, always looking for ways to increase profits, were eager to conduct business with Martens.  This point was first demonstrated in April of 1919 at the Sixth National Foreign Trade Convention in Chicago.  More than a thousand exporters, bankers, and small manufacturers showed up.  Heller and Nuorteva set up their own booth, handed out fliers, and conversed with attendees.  Enthusiastic, Heller wrote to Martens that "the dominant tone of the convention were complaints about the lack of export markets and the difficulty of getting payment from Europe."37

Also at the Convention was Samuel N. Harper, a staunch anti-Bolshevik, a sometimes advisor to the Wilson Administration, and a Russia watcher at the Universityof Chicago.  He took a special interest in the Heller-Nuorteva booth and was compelled to write to James Huntington, the head of the Russia Desk at the Commerce Department.  "A great many businessmen in Chicago went around to see Heller," Harper wrote, and "one told me that he had the most interesting talk with him and had promised to send all of his price lists and other pamphlets."38  

Indeed, one unidentified New York businessman and a close friend of Huntington, wrote to him, demanding that the Commerce Department push to open up trade relations with Soviet Russia.  "Do you see any harm. . .if I should get rich with these people who have so much money at their disposal. . ."  Frustrated, Huntington wrote back to Harper: "You should be surprised to know how seriously a lot of our people have taken the preposterous proposal of this man."39

Despite the warning from the State Department, a few of those 853 firms signed a total of thirty million dollars in contracts with Martens.  One deal was for three million dollars in heavy machinery and hand tools with Weinberg and Posner, the engineering firm that Martens had worked for.  Martens also signed a deal for fifty million pounds of foodstuffs from the Morris & Company meat-packing firm.  Also, a 4.3 million dollar deal in boots and shoes was signed with the B. L. Bobroff Foreign Trading Company of Milwaukee.  Another deal cut was for 4.5 million dollars for one thousand automatic presses supplied by the Lehigh Machinery Company.  And to finish the deal Lehigh's President, E. P. Jennings, wrote to President Wilson asking him to grant an export license: "The security of this order means not only a great deal to the business of Lehigh Machine Co., but it also means a great deal to our community and the best interests of our country. . ."  President Wilson never responded.40

Convinced that the Government would do nothing to help him, Jennings formed the American Commercial Association for the Promotion of Trade with Russia.  About a hundred firms joined the ACA, all of them small to mid-size ones that represented "several hundred million dollars' worth of capital," pointed out Iron Age.41  The ACA also demanded, by way of writing scores of letters to the State Department, that shipping rights be extended to and from Soviet Russia, along with the opening of mail, wire, and telegraph operations.42

After the Italians and Danes opened up commercial relations with Soviet Russia, plus pressure from the ACA, the State Department followed suite on July 7, 1920.  State announced "the restrictions which have heretofore stood in the way of trade with Soviet Russia are hereby removed."43

The demands made by the ACA, and the business arrangements made by Martens and his subordinates meant little, as Frederick Louis Schuman pointed out.  Within a month came the Colby Note, which finalized American hostility towards Soviet Russia.  Furthermore, completing business deals was just not practical, considering the sad state of the Russian transportation and communications system.  The U. S. Senate was aware of this problem, and put out a report on it: "The burden of securing shipment to Soviet Russia was placed entirely on the producer. . ."44

And the Martens Mission was further hampered when Martens and his subordinates got caught up in America's struggle with radicals at home and with the Soviets abroad.  The New York State Legislature set up the Lusk Committee to investigate radicalism, and Martens was at the center of the investigation.  He was badgered, arrested, and forced to testify in secret without a lawyer.  And at the top of the American political structure, the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee set up a Sub-Committee to further question, or badger, the luckless Soviet envoy.
Lusk Versus Martens
            On March 20, 1919, Henry Walters, the President Pro-Tem of the New York State Senate, introduced a resolution to investigate domestic radicalism in the state of New York.  "It is the duty of the Legislature of the State of New York to learn the whole truth regarding these seditious activities."45  The Walters Resolution was quickly pushed over the top.  In fact, the New York Times wrote "the resolution was adopted unanimously, practically without debate."46

            The Walters Resolution created the Lusk Committee, which was chaired by Assemblyman Clayton R. Lusk.  The Committee was given a budget of fifty thousand dollars only to investigate radicalism.  Instead, along with the Justice Department, the Lusk Committee became one of the leading red-hunting agencies.  The Committee raided the Rand Socialist School, the headquarters of the Socialist Party, the New York office of the I.W.W., and Martens' Soviet Bureau.47

            Lusk targeted Martens from the beginning, pointing out that it was a facility "for the purpose of directing propaganda looking toward the recognition of Soviet Russia, the re-establishment of commercial intercourse, and for the purpose of guiding the propaganda of the International Revolution."48

On June 12, 1919, at three in the afternoon, twenty officers raided the Bureau.  The raiders included agents from the Justice Department, the Military Intelligence Division of the Department of War, the New York City Police Department, and private detectives led by Wade H. Ellis, who was assigned to the Lusk Committee.  "They raided us in a very rough manner," Nuorteva told the New York Herald, and "they cut our telephone wires and would not let us permit us to talk to our counsel.  Then they locked the doors and began to jumble our papers."49

            The agents quickly took control of the Bureau.  They gathered every piece of paper and carted it away, arrested Martens and his aides, and a few agents stayed behind, waiting around ready to arrest anyone who showed up.  The agents also confiscated a giant red flag, "the banner of the Soviet Government," and a large supply of fine Cuban cigars.  "Only in the brain of the Lusk Committee could a box of perfectly good cigars have been considered Bolshevik propaganda," wrote the New York Call.50

            Reporters from the New York City newspapers, the Post, the Herald, the World, and the Sun, followed Martens and his subordinates on the way down to City Hall.  Martens was asked about the raid, saying that "two can play at this game as well as one.  As bad as the conditions in Russia have been, the Soviet Government there has never raided the headquarters of other Governments, seized papers and letters and cut telephone wire, as was done to-day."51

            Martens and his aides were questioned in the Board of Estimate Chamber for two hours.  Though Lusk said they were not arrested, when Martens tried to leave for supper, he was ordered back to the chamber.  But after the initial interrogations, Martens and his subordinates were let go, but they had to stay in the city.

            The raid and arrest caused an international incident.  Chicherin wrote to the American ambassador to Stockholm, pointing out that "the arrest of Mr. Martens is most surprising and unjustified, as he acted openly as the representative of Soviet Russia."  Chicherin demanded his immediate release.

            Acting Secretary of State William Phillips wrote back to Chicherin, denying that any arrest ever took place.  Furthermore, Phillips pointed out that the American Government did not forget about the arrest of Counsel Treadwell "and the illegal and unjustifiable imprisonment of vice-counsels Burns and Leonard, contrary to the fundamental practice of civilized nations."52  The two sides were at a stalemate, and the issue was never brought up again.

            Meanwhile, Lusk's agents and the Committee counsel, Charles B. Newton, who was also the New York State Attorney General, went though the literature seized.  Most of it was made up of resolutions from various local Socialist Party's, copies of Soviet Russia, and Lenin's Letter to American Workingmen.  But no correspondence between Martens and his superiors back home were found.

            During the initial interrogation, Lusk ordered Martens to turn over his financial and banking transactions and "all documents, letters and other papers sent by you and your Bureau to Soviet Russia."53

            Martens was willing to meet Lusk halfway.  He agreed to turn over all financial transactions, but none of his diplomatic correspondence with his Government.  Martins told him that this was a diplomatic issue and only the State Department "would be the sole authority vested with jurisdiction in the matter," and "your Committee was created for a definitive and limited purpose which cannot under any circumstances be held to include matters of an international character."54

            The Lusk Committee refused to go along with the diplomacy argument.  Archibald Stevenson, a member of the Military Intelligence Division and a lawyer for both the Overman and Lusk Committees, said that since the United States did not recognize the Soviet Government, and that Martens had no diplomatic standing.  "He is not clothed with any of the privileges of immunity of a foreign representative."55

            The hearings occurred about twice a month and dragged on until the end of 1919, or when the United States Senate demanded to question Martens.  Lusk, as well as those around him, did little more than badger the Soviet envoy.  The Committee wanted to know about his ties to the Communist and Socialist Party's, his relationship with Lenin and Trotsky, what was he doing in America, if he was a German or Russian citizen, how the Soviet Bureau was funded, and to announce that his mission was not economic, but to spread Bolshevik propaganda and revolution.

            Martens refused to corporate, so his answers were vague, often irrelevant, or just "I decline to answer." Newton asked Martens about his correspondence with Chicherin:

Newton: When you send report by mail, where do you send them?

Martens: I decline to answer.

Newton: Do you send them to your country?

Martens: No.

Newton: Though some friendly agency outside of theUnited States?

Martens: Yes.

Newton: You decline to tell the committee what the agency is?

Martens: I regard my communications with my Government as privileged.56

            Then Lusk tried to get Martens to admit that he was in America not for commercial purposes, but to spread revolution:

Lusk: What's your purpose in the country?

Martens: To purchase materials desired by theSovietState.

Lusk: Is that all?

Martens: Positively.

            Lusk also tried to get Martens to explain his relationship with Lenin, Trotsky, and Chicherin.  Martens, however, told Lusk and Newton that this was "not within the scope of the Lusk Committee Investigation."  "You mean, then, that it is none of our business?" Newton asked.  Martens laughed and the question was asked again.57

            The Committee also wanted to know why Martens was speaking in front of so many radical groups.  Martens said he just wanted to explain the position of the Bolsheviks to the American people.  Besides, it should not be of any surprise, Martens argued, that socialists want to hear from a representative of a socialist country.  And further, Martens said he spoke in front of many non-radical groups, including the League of Nations Association, the American Academy of Political and Social Science, the Knit Goods Manufacturers Association, and the editorial board of The Dial.58

            While the Lusk Committee did not discover any hard evidence that Martens advocated a Soviet style revolution for the United States, he was obligated on the witness stand to defend the policies of his superiors.  He insisted that the killings committed by the Bolsheviks were done out of self-defense.  Stevenson asked Martens  "isn't it a fact that in stating its wish to overthrow the capitalist system, the Soviet Government wishes to overthrow all capitalist governments?"  Put into a corner, Martens did concede that world revolution was a goal of his Bolshevik superiors.  When Stevenson asked him how this change would happen, Martens said it would come "by purely practical means, or it may come through a bitter struggle.  They do not care how it is done."  Martens also stressed that revolution was up to the working class.59
Moses Versus Martens

            The Lusk Committee never got the chance to wrap up its hearings with Martens.  Tired and frustrated, Martens began to show signs of strain after almost six months of hearings.  "An hour's grilling by counsel for the committee had a demoralizing effect on Martens.  Time and again he hedged, made evasive answers, only to be met by more searching questions," wrote the New YorkEvening Post on December 11.  No longer interested in the Committee, Martens left New York without telling anybody.60

            On December 20 of 1919 the Committee summoned Martens for yet another hearing, but he was nowhere to be found.  Lusk Committee agents raided his apartment on Ocean Avenue in Brooklyn, searched his usual hangouts, and railroad terminals throughout the New York City area.  When the Committee came up empty, it, in conjunction with the Justice Department, issued a warrant for his arrest and deportation.61

            But in early January Nuorteva told the press that Martens was in Washington D. C. to get ready for the Senate hearings.  "I am authorized to assure you on his behalf that when called in before the Senate Committee he will be at the service of whoever has business with him."62

            The United States Senate became aware, and alarmed, of Martens' presence from the very beginning.  On May 23, 1919, Senator William H. King, a Utah Democrat, sponsored Senate Resolution 33, calling for the deportation of the envoy.  The Resolution stated that Martens' was maintaining his Bureau "to spread the poison of Bolshevism."63  But with the Senators ready to do battle over the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty, the Senate did not vote on the King Resolution.

            No action regarding Martens was taken in the Senate until December 16 when Senator William H. Kenyon, an Iowa Republican, introduced Resolution 263.  It called for the Foreign Relations Committee to investigate the Soviet envoy.  Kenyon wanted Martens to answer what country was he a citizen of, and why is he in America.  "According to newspaper reports he refuses to answer certain questions before the Lusk Committee," so "I felt that he ought to be investigated by the Senate."  But Kenyon had already pre-judged Martens, pointing that he was a German who served in the German Army "and is carrying on. . .a great propaganda campaign" against American institutions.64

            The Senate took up the Kenyon Resolution right away, and the votes on it were divided.  Forty Senators did not vote and twenty-one voted against it.  But the thirty-four who voted to confirm were able to push it over the top.  The Resolution ordered that five members from the Foreign Relations Committee get together and form a sub-committee.  George Higgins Moses, a New Hampshire Republican, was named chairman.  Also on the sub-committee was William E. Borah, an Idaho Republican, Key Pittman, a Nevada Democrat, John K. Shields, a Tennessee Democrat, and Frank B. Brandegee, a Connecticut Republican.  The sub-committee also provided Thomas W. Hardwick, a former U. S.Senator from Georgia(and future Governor) as Martens' legal advisor.

            Martens was glad to testify in front of the Senate, believing that he could tell such an esteemed body about his mission and the agenda of the Soviet Government.  His optimism was re-enforced when Moses said Martens would get "fair play" and "every opportunity to tell his side of the story."65

            The hearings took place between January 12 and March 29 of 1920 and were divided into fifteen sessions.  At the beginning, Moses let Borah take the helm.  Though Borah was a Progressive, he was surprisingly hostile to Martens.  Borah wanted Martens to admit that trading with American business was just a pretext for his real agenda, which was to spread propaganda and revolution.  Borah also emphasized Martens' 1899 deportation, and considering radicals were getting deported, it had a stigma attached to it:

Borah: Did you follow your profession in Russia?

Martens: No; I did not follow it because I was deported in 1899.

Borah: You were what?

Martens: I was deported from Russia in 1899.

Borah: I didn't catch that word.

Martens: Deported from Russia.

Borah: In consequence of what?

Martens: Of political work.  I spent three years in Russian prisons.66

            Hearings were held again on January 26, and Borah continued his line on questioning.  Rather than ask about Bolshevik land or education reforms, as a Progressive might ask, Borah grilled Martens about his association with American radicals, where the money to fund the Bureau came from, and if he ever "sought to conduct propaganda to extend your form of government."  Martens said no down the line, denying everything.67

            After the second session, however, the hearings took on a new direction.  Borah stopped showing up, having taken over as chairman of Hiram Johnson's presidential campaign.  Shields and Pittman, whose lack of interest was demonstrated by not voting on the Kenyon Resolution, just stopped showing up.  And then Senator Brandegee appeared only on February 4.

            Over the next dozen sessions Moses directed the hearings, but he allowed the situation to fall into "a pale imitation of the Lusk Committee proceedings" as Wade H. Ellis took over the line of questioning.  Ellis was not only on the Lusk Committee, but he was also a member of the American Legion and the Union League of New York.  And not surprisingly, he questioned Martens in a similar manner as the Lusk Committee members did.

            Paul Wallace Hanna of The Nation speculated why Moses allowed Ellis to question Martens, and he concluded that Moses was politically motivated.  Moses was the campaign chairman in the South for presidential candidate General Leonard Wood.  But more important for Moses, he was up for re-election in 1920, and his prospects were shaky.  He was elected in 1918 only to fill a vacancy, and the Union League of New York, which also had a large voting block in his home state, pushed him in a direction more its liking.68

            Indeed, the Union League was well aware of Martens and "resented" him for "establishing a mission in the United States" to foster propaganda and revolution "directed against the integrity and safety of this country."69

            Ellis took the offensive, shutting up Martens whenever he tried to explain Bolshevik land, woman, and education reforms.  Ellis only wanted Martens to admit that he was a radical bent on overturning American capitalism:

Ellis: I would to ask you whether or not you believe in bringing about a new world order by the employment of force and violence to establish a proletariat dictatorship?

Martens: I do not believe force as such.

Ellis: Well, do you believe it necessary?

Martens: If necessary, you mean?

Ellis: Yes.

Martens: If you believe it necessary, I believe it too.

Ellis: Oh, no. I'm asking you if it is necessary.

Martens: I cannot answer that question because it is really no question at all.  It is something you want me to state to me which is-

Ellis: (interposing) I though you said you have nothing to conceal?

Martens: I have not.

Ellis: Tell us frankly.70

            The hearings dragged on until the end of March, and the pattern remained the same.  Moses sat quietly, as did Senator Hardwick.  Occasionally he would interpose on behalf of his client.  Ellis asked Martens hypothetical questions, aimed throw him off guard.  On one occasion, Ellis asked Martens if David Lloyd George sent a letter to American workingmen (in reference to Lenin's 1918 letter to American workers) urging them to overthrow their Government "do you think this county would receive or keep an ambassador from England?"  Martens said that Lloyd George "would be a stupid fellow if he did such a thing."71

            The hearings went nowhere.  The Sub-Committee never got Martens to admit that he was an agitator.  Even The New York Times wrote that "one can hardly follow Senator Moses in his conviction that the investigation had proved that Martens. . .has engaged in plots to overthrow the government."72

            On March 29 Moses, Ellis, and a giant crowd filed into the Senate Office Building.  Then Moses announced: "we will now call the hearings closed."  The sudden end came out of Moses' frustration plus pressure to deliver Martens over to the Labor Department for deportation.  "Why is this enemy permitted to be at large?" asked the Washington Post.  "It is high time that he should be either interned or deported."73

            After the hearings the Sub-Committee came out with two reports.  The majority, authored by Moses, argued that Martens was an agitator, was German in origin, was not a diplomat of any standing, and urged that he be deported.  And Borah took the lone road, writing that he did not believe Martens was planning to form a Soviet form of government in the United States, "either vicariously or otherwise."  Apparently, Borah believed that Martens was being honest with him.74
Deportation
            The Soviet envoy was whisked over to officials in the Labor Department, where Secretary William B. Wilson had the final say in deportation matters.  There he was locked up in a series of secret hearings, none of which went well for Martens.

The hearings dragged on until January of 1921, draining Martens of energy and patience.  Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis B. Post kept asking Martens about murders the Bolsheviks committed in Moscow and Petrograd.  Martens brushed those questions aside, claiming that he already answered those questions.

Then Post asked him about Bolshevik mistreatment of American citizens in Russia.  Martens fervently denied any such mistreatment, pointing out that Americans in Russia were "treated with every consideration" and "diplomatic courtesy."75

Then the hearings degenerated into an "I decline to answer" muddle:

What is your age?

I decline to answer

Where were you born?

I decline to answer.

Are you married?

I decline to answer.

Have you any children?

I decline to answer.76

Secretary Wilson was hesitant to deport Martens, for he broke no known law.  But the pressure from his colleagues got to him.  Colby, Polk, and Attorney General Palmer all pushed Wilson to give the deportation order.  Indeed, Assistant Attorney General Garvin had been pushing Wilson from the beginning, for Martens was a "perfect case for deportation."77  And Wilson gave the order that the Commissioner General of Immigration "is hereby directed to take the said Ludwig C. A. K. Martens into custody and deport him to Russia at the expense of the Government of the United States."78

            Martens and his superiors saw deportation coming, so Chicherin ordered him to leave the country and shut down the Bureau.  That happened and all orders and contracts were cancelled.

            Martens did not leave quietly, however.  Hundreds of sympathizers stood in the rain for three hours waiting for the ship to sail off "with three cheers and a song that was described as a revolutionary hymn," wrote the New York Times.79  In his farewell address Martens told the crowd that "it has been a source of constant encouragement to me to find everywhere men and women who have not allowed hysterical fears of prejudice to move them from their sympathy with the cause which I have represent."80

 

The Ghost of Francis Dana

            The Martens Mission, if defined as to open up trade and commercial relations, was a failure in the United States.  The Red Scare at home and the attempts to counter the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia overwhelmed Martens.  Just by the fact that he represented a feared and loathed regime was enough to brand him as an agitator who was worthy only of deportation.

            That failure, however, was only for the time being.  Ten years later, when the Five Year Plans were under way, a great transfer of technology had occurred.  American manufacturers, be it Henry Ford or Armand Hammer, were in Soviet Russia doing business.  Martens had nothing to do with any of that, but one can argue that helped paved the way.  At the very least, he made it aware to American businessmen that Soviet Russia, despite a very different mode of production, was willing to open itself up to American technology and ingenuity.

            Martens went back to Soviet Russia and met with Lenin.  He told the Soviet leader about his experience, and expressed an interest in going back.  Martens recalled: "Lenin asked a great deal of questions during our talk.  He had a wonderful way of asking questions and was just as skilled as a listener."81  But Lenin, and later Stalin, had other plans for Martens.

            Though Martens failed in the United States, his career in the Soviet Union, as one who was never purged under Stalin, was a success.  His first job after returning was to find housing and employment for Russians returning home.  Indeed, more than twenty thousand migrating Russians were re-settled by Martens.  After that, he became the chairman of the chief metallurgical trust known as Glavmetall.  Later, he would be a professor of engineering at Moscow University, and then later promoted to be the dean of the Lomonoffsky Institute also in Moscow.  Even though he had no legal experience, he was made a judge in 1932.  He presided over the Metro-Vickers treason trial, which received a great deal of media publicity in Britain.  And during the 1930s he was the chief editor of two major Soviet encyclopedias on science and engineering.  Martens was active until he became ill in 1942.  He died in 1948 from natural causes.82

            The failure of the Martens Mission could have been avoided if Lenin, Trotsky, and Chicherin had read about Francis Dana.  In early 1920, William Hard, a correspondent for the New Republic, made a comparison between Martens and Francis Dana in order to justify recognition of Soviet Russia.  Like Martens, Dana hung around St. Petersburg, trying to get an interview with Catherine the Great.  She refused to see him and also refused to recognize the young republic.  Also like Martens, Dana went home empty handed.  "Now the Russians have sent us a neatly written sequel entitled, 'A Martens for a Dana,'" Hard wrote.  And ironically, John W. Foster, Robert Lansing's father-in-law, wrote the biography of Dana that Hard had cited.83


Endnotes

    Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy Towards Russia Since 1917, (New York: International, 1928), 56-57.
    Alexander Mitchell Palmer, "The Case Against the Reds," Forum, January, 1920, 185.
    "Bolshevism's Heaven on Earth," The Literary Digest, 22 March 1920, 16; Subcommittee to the Judiciary of the United States Senate, Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), pt. 3, 957.
    Robert K. Murray, The Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), 16.
    New York Times,11 August 1920.
    Robert J. Kerner, New York Times,15 August 1920.
    "Soviet RussiaSees Need of Industries," Christian Science Monitor,10 March 1920, 9.
    LincolnEyre, Russia Analyzed, 10.  A 1920 interview pamphlet of Lenin.
    Daniel Mason and Jessica Smith, Lenin's Impact on the United States, (New York: NWR Publishers: 1970), 22.
    Mason and Smith, Lenin's, 76-77.
    Chicherin to Martens in David S. Foglesong, America's Secret War Against Bolshevism, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 281.
    There are a number of sources on Martens' life, each making the same points. The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, (Makaril: Academic International Press, 1981), 111-114; more detailed is 550 pages of U. S. Senate Hearings, Russian Propaganda: Hearings Before a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Foreign Relations, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), 7-10; "Martens Always a Revolutionary," Christian Science Monitor 20 January 1920, 6-7.
    New York Call,26 March, 1919.
    New York Evening Post,19 January, 1920.
    Soviet Russia,22 November 1919, 14.
    Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World History, 1929, 2:310.
    A complete list of Martens' staff in U. S. Senate, Russian Propaganda, 41-43.
    Auva Kostiainen, Santeri Nuorteva, Kansainvalinen Soulwalaines, (Helsinki: Finska Historica, 1983), 215-216.  The summary is written in English.
    "To the Reader," Soviet Russia,7 June 1919, 10.
    SovietRussia,7 June 1919, 10.
    Good Morning,1 May, 1920, no pages listed.
    New YorkStateLegislature, Joint Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Revolutionary Radicalism: Its History, Purpose, and Tactics, (Albany: New York State, 1920), 1:644.
    U. S. Senate, Russian Propaganda, 54.
    New York Post,6 July, 1919.
    Linda Killen, "The Search for a Democratic Russia: Bakhmetev and the United States," Diplomatic History 2 (September 1978), 237.
    Schuman, America's, 224-226.
    Chicherin to Martens, in Lusk Committee, Revolutionary Radicalism, 1:654.
    New York Times,11 April 1919.
    New York Times,11 April 1919
    Foglesong, America's Secret, 282.
    New York Call,7 November, 1919.
    New York Times,3 September, 1920.
    New York Times, 3 January, 1921; Martens to Hillquit, 31 July, 1919, in Morris Hillquit Papers.
    Polk to Poole, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States-Russia, 21 May, 1919, 144. From now on FRUS.
    J. F. Fulton to Poole, FRUS-Russia,20 April, 1919, 143.
    Katherine A. Siegal, Loans and Legitimacy, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 13.
    Siegal, Loans and Legitimacy, 13.
    David W. McFadden, Alternative Paths: Soviets and Americans 1917-1920, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 277.
    McFadden, Alternative Paths, 277.
    U. S. Senate, Russian Propaganda, 454-455.
    Iron Age,5 February, 1920, 417.
    Iron Age,18 March, 1920, 847.
    Schuman, American Policy, 194-195.
    U. S. Senate, Russian Propaganda, 4.
    New York Times,1 March, 1919.
    New York Times, 1 March 1919.
    Lusk Committee, Revolutionary Radicalism, pt. 1:368.
    Lusk Committee, Revolutionary Radicalism, pt.1:368.
    New York Herald,13 June, 1919.
    New York Call,27 June, 1919.
    New York World,13 June, 1919.
    Christian Science Monitor,2 July, 1919.
    Soviet Russia,22 November, 1919, 14
    Soviet Russia, 22 November, 1919, 14.
    New York Call,16 November, 1919.
    "Martens Refuses to Give Up Papers," New York Times,26 November, 1919.
    New York Post,25 November, 1919.
    Soviet Russia,28 June, 1919.
    New York Tribune,18 November, 1919.
    New York Evening Post,11 December, 1919.
    "Hunt for Martens in Progress Here," New York Times,8 January, 1920.
    "Envoy of Soviets Sought in Vain," Christian Science Monitor,8 January, 1920.
    Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 2nd Session,24 May, 1919, 954.
    Congressional Record, 20 December, 1919, 66th Congress, 3rd Session, 953-954.  Here, Senator King said that Martens "is not an ambassador, but an enemy."
    New York Call,20 January, 1920.
    U. S. Senate, Russian Propaganda, 7-8.
    U. S. Senate, Russian Propaganda, 52.
    Paul Wallace Hanna, "The Failure of the Moses Inquiry," The Nation,27 March, 1920, 396-397.
    McFadden, Alternative Paths, 277; New York Times,11 April, 1919.
    U. S. Senate, Russian Propaganda, 208.
    U. S. Senate, Russian Propaganda, 175.
    New York Times,16 April, 1920.
    Washington Post,1 March, 1920.
    "The Verdict on the Soviet Envoy," New York Post,25 April, 1920.
    "Martens Hearing Held in Secret," Christian Science Monitor,1 April, 1920.
    New York Evening Post,22 July, 1920.
    New York Times,30 March, 1920.
    William B. Wilson, Monthly Labor Review, January, 1921, 191-193.
    "Martens Deported, Expects to Return," New York Times,23 January, 1921.
    Soviet Russia,29 January, 1921.
    McFadden, Alternative Paths, 287.
    Martens' obituary in New York Times, 22 October, 1948.

William Hard, "The Tide Turns So

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[CrackSmokeRepublican]

Weinstein, Gregory Isaakovich (1880-1940)
Biographies, References

A Russian Revolutionary who took part in the American revolutionary movement from 1915 to 1918 and later became a Soviet diplomat.

Gregory Weinstein was born in Vilna, in the Russian Empire (now Vilnius, Lithuania), on July 1, 1880. He joined the Socialist revolutionary movement while he was a student at the Vilnius Teachers Institute and, after his graduation in 1900, became a professional revolutionary and a member of the Jewish Socialist Federation, commonly known as The Bund. In 1905, Weinstein was arrested by the Russian authorities at Brest-Litovsk, incarcerated and later exiled to Siberia for four years. But in 1906 he managed to escape to Paris and subsequently moved to Switzerland. He studied at the University of Geneva, earning masters' degrees in law and social science in 1911.

In 1912 or 1913, Weinstein immigrated to the United States, where he worked in New York for two years as a statistician at a labor union statistics office. In 1913, he joined the American Socialist Party and became active in its left wing. 1 In 1914, Weinstein became an associate editor of the Socialist newspaper, Novyi Mir (New World), which was published in New York and predated the organized Russian Socialist movement. 2 In March 1918, Weinstein was one of five signatories to a resolution sent to President Woodrow Wilson by the Executive Committee of the First United Russian Convention, which brought together liberal, socialist and anarchist members of the "Russian colony" in America. The resolution expressed deep indignation about a prospective attack on revolutionary Russia with the consent of the Allies. 3

In January 1919, the Government of Soviet Russia (RSFSR) opened a mission in New York to work towards the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations with the United States. (The mission was commonly known in the States as the "Martens Bureau.") Weinstein was appointed its chief clerk, with the official title of Director of the General Office Department. He was listed simultaneously as a staff member of the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (NKID). In September 1919, Weinstein joined the newly founded Communist Labor Party of America, and in 1920 he became a member of the United Communist Party of America. 4 The Martens Mission was not recognized by the U.S. government, however, and its head, Ludwig Martens, was eventually deported to Soviet Russia. 5 Weinstein was remembered by Benjamin Gitlow, his friend and fellow party member, as "an able writer, well versed in the movement, a good lecturer and speaker and in addition a fairly capable politician." 6

In early 1921, Weinstein went to Moscow and became head of the Department of Anglo-Roman countries of the NKID. From 1926 to 1928, he served at the Soviet Consulate General in Istanbul, Turkey, and in 1929 he was appointed as the NKID diplomatic agent in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). Weinstein remained in Leningrad until the late 1930s, when he was summoned back to the NKID Moscow Central apparatus to serve briefly as the head of its Second Western Department. He was soon arrested and was executed in 1940 – to be rehabilitated in the 1950s. 7

    Rethinking the Red Scare. The Lusk Committee and New York's Crusade Against Radicalism, 1919-1923, by Todd J. Pfannestiel, New York: Routledge, 2003, p. 41; Gregory Weisntein's CV in Potemkin to Andreev, May 19, 1938, in Fund 05 (M. Litvinov Secretariat Records), description 18 (1938), P. 138, folder 3 ("Letters of Potemkin, the First Deputy of the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs to the CC VCP (b), 4 January – 31 Dec., 1938." ), p. 123, AVP RF. ↩
    Early American Marxism website, http://www.marxists.org/history/usa/eam ... ssian.html. ↩
    Ibidem. ↩
    Gregory Weisntein's brief biography in Potemkin to Andreev, Op. Cit. ↩
    Instructions to Ludwig Martens, in Fund 129 (Information on the USA), description 4, P. 3, folder 6, p. 10, AVP RF. ↩
    Rethinking the Red Scare, Op. cit., p. 41. ↩
    G.I. Weinstein brief profile in Soviet-American Rel

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