Sudan normalized with Israhell, and then all hell breaks loose

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URkJGni9q0M

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'Israel' eager to mediate ceasefire in Sudan: What are the reasons?
By Ahmad Karakira     
Source: Al Mayadeen
The Israeli occupation has several reasons to rush to mediate a ceasefire between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support forces, the most important of which is establishing its presence in yet another African country bordering the strategic Red Sea.
https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/israel-eager-to-mediate-ceasefire-in-sudan:-what-are-the-rea

A few days ago, three Israeli occupation Foreign Ministry officials told Axios that "Israel" has offered to host both parties involved in the conflict in Sudan in an effort to reach a ceasefire agreement.

The proposal was handed to Army Chief General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) head General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, as Israeli occupation Foreign Minister Eli Cohen and director general of the Israeli occupation's Foreign Ministry Ronen Levy remained in direct contact with both Sudanese generals.

https://twitter.com/MayadeenEnglish/status/1649155989520908288?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1649155989520908288%7Ctwgr%5Edd0b9ff18d90ac98b606ea4bb768a55c8beeb7d8%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fenglish.almayadeen.net%2Fnews%2Fpolitics%2Fisrael-eager-to-mediate-ceasefire-in-sudan%3A-what-are-the-rea

According to Cohen and Levy, both Sudanese generals gave the impression that they were considering the proposal in a positive light, adding that US President Joe Biden's administration was consulted and informed.

"Since the fighting started in Sudan, Israel has been working in different channels in order to reach a ceasefire. The progress we have made with the two parties is very encouraging. If there will be a way that Israel could help in stopping the war and the violence in Sudan we will be very happy to do it," Cohen told Axios in a statement.

https://twitter.com/MayadeenEnglish/status/1647601293987577856?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1647601293987577856%7Ctwgr%5Edd0b9ff18d90ac98b606ea4bb768a55c8beeb7d8%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fenglish.almayadeen.net%2Fnews%2Fpolitics%2Fisrael-eager-to-mediate-ceasefire-in-sudan%3A-what-are-the-rea

Normalization with 'Israel' jeopardized by Sudan fighting: Axios
Another report by Axios revealed that the Israeli occupation fears that the ongoing clashes will hinder the formation of a prospected Israeli-allied civilian government, which would jeopardize the normalization agreement between Sudan and the Israeli occupation.

According to the report, "Israel" has built strong relationships with both Al-Burhan and Dagalo. Before clashes ensued, Israeli officials said they were actively following up on the process of appointing a civilian-led government in Sudan.

During his visit to Khartoum in February, Cohen urged Al-Burhan to proceed with restoring civilian rule, emphasizing that it will be challenging to secure a peace agreement without it, Axios mentioned.

The news website cited Israeli sources as saying that the Israeli occupation Foreign Ministry has been in contact with Al-Burhan over the normalization process, while Dagalo and Mossad have met and discussed "security" and "counterterrorism issues".

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3jxRJP2RBAc

Israeli officials were certain of an agreement to appoint a civilian government in the upcoming days, Axios indicated. However, what transpired was fierce fighting that spread over multiple cities in the country.

The White House has also pushed Israelis to mediate a ceasefire deal between the fighting generals, the report revealed.

But why is "Israel" in a rush to complete the normalization process with Sudan?

A flashback
It all started in 2016 when the Israeli occupation urged the US to allow it to infiltrate into Sudan after the North African country severed diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following Saudi Arabia's lead, Sudan cut diplomatic ties with Iran after the storming of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Tehran and the consulate building in the city of Mashhad.

In August 2017, then-Sudanese Minister for Investment, Mubarak Fadel Al-Mahdi, spoke for the first time about normalization with the Israeli occupation during an interview for the Sudania24 TV station.

And when General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan came to power after the resignation of Omar Al-Bashir, he met in February 2020 with Israeli occupation Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Uganda.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AmzHIPmX_SE

Consequently, Khartoum was removed from the US blacklist in December 2020 after 27 years of imposed sanctions.

In January 2021, Sudan formally agreed to normalize relations with "Israel" in a quid pro quo for the United States to remove it from its list of so-called "state sponsors of terrorism," but ties were never formalized. In April of that year, the North African nation approved a bill abolishing a 1958 boycott of the Israeli occupation.

Finally, Sudan and "Israel" said in February they agreed to move toward normalizing relations during the first official visit of Israeli occupation Foreign Minister Eli Cohen to Khartoum.

Sudan; a route to transfer arms to Palestinian Resistance
One of the several reasons why the Israeli occupation is racing against time to complete the normalization process with Sudan is to make sure that the North African country does not again become a route to transfer arms to the Palestinian Resistance in the Gaza Strip.

Before severing ties with Iran, Al-Bashir's administration reportedly supported the Hamas movement politically and allowed it to open an office in Sudan. The Israeli occupation had previously accused Sudan of allowing the passage of arms from several countries to Gaza via its territory.

However, with the regime change in Egypt and the rise of General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi as President, the latter ordered the destruction of tunnels between his country and Gaza, through which the Palestinian Resistance reportedly used to receive arms.

In March 2009, the Israeli occupation even targeted a 17-truck convoy in eastern Sudan that reportedly carried weapons to Gaza and also targeted an arms factory in Khartoum in October 2012.

In March 2014, the Israeli occupation's navy said it seized a ship loaded with weapons in the Red Sea between Sudan and Eritrea that was allegedly en route from Iran to Gaza.

To further dive into the reasons for "Israel's" eagerness to mediate a ceasefire in Sudan and consequently complete a peace agreement with the North African nation, one should tackle the history of relations between the two.

History of Sudanese-Israeli relations
In his book "Israel" And Relations With The Islamic World, Jihad Odeh said "Israel's" ties with Sudan began before the latter gained its independence from British occupation in 1956, when an Israeli trade mission comprising 50 people settled in Khartoum in 1951 to buy Sudanese products and goods and send them to "Israel" via Cape Town, South Africa, to avoid anti-smuggling measures taken by the Egyptian authorities in the Suez Port and Port Said.

The book mentioned that Israeli planes often landed at Khartoum airport to refuel and continue their flights, which prompted the Secretary-General of the Arab League at the time to send a memorandum to the British government in February 1951 to inquire about the matter.

Britain, which was ruling Sudan in partnership with Egypt, replied that Israeli planes had the right to use Khartoum Airport under the pretext that Britain and Sudan are not at war with "Israel".

It was during the era of Abdullah Khalil's government that the first Israeli intelligence envoy arrived in Sudan, with the consent of the Sudanese government, Odeh revealed in his book.

And as a result of contacts that began in 1954 between Sudanese politicians and "Israel", a Sudanese figure accompanied by a Sudanese journalist met in a London hotel with a young diplomat working in the Israeli occupation's embassy in Britain named Mordechai Gazit.

The author said Sadiq Al-Mahdi, the head of the Umma Party, was in contact with Mossad in 1954 and met, along with Mohammad Ahmad Omar, editor-in-Chief of the Nile Newspaper and spokesperson for the Umma Party, with Gazit.

According to Odeh, the goal of Sudan at the time was to seek the help of "Israel" to win Jewish public opinion in the West to obtain independence, while Gazit wanted to establish commercial relations between Sudan and "Israel" to reduce the intensity of Arab isolation.

Contacts and meetings between Israeli and Sudanese politicians continued after the latter's independence in 1956 when then-Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir met with then-head of the Sudanese government Abdullah Khalil in the summer of 1957.

In those discussions between Meir and Khalil, it was agreed to send Israeli agricultural experts and civilian and military advisors to Sudan. It was also agreed that Sudan would allow EL AL planes to land and refuel on their way to South Africa and that Mossad would be allowed to build a station in the North African country.

Al Haya newspaper noted that Mossad was able to establish its station again in Khartoum in 1983 during the era of then-Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiry after the latter met with Menachem Begin's Security Minister, Ariel Sharon.

Nimeiry revealed that he began his contacts with "Israel" in 1965 when he was an officer participating in a course on cooperation between Sudan and the US, where he established contacts with Israeli personalities who later visited Sudan in unannounced secret visits, Odeh mentioned in his book. However, when he took power in May 1969, Nimeiry followed in Egypt's footsteps against the Israeli occupation.

Nevertheless, Israeli ties with Nimeiry's regime re-resurfaced after the Camp David Accords, which he supported, leading Mossad to rebuild its mission in Sudan.

Why Africa and Sudan?
In his book, The Israeli Foreign Policy Toward Africa: The Sudan Case, Amer Khalil Ahmed Amer pointed out that "Israel" has adopted an approach that relies on closer relations with countries surrounding Arab states, and this is evident in the strong relations with these countries at all levels, especially in the field of military and security cooperation, hidden under the cover of trade and economic relations.

In parallel with the expertise that the Israeli occupation provides to these countries, Amer continued, it has gained a foothold in military bases that oversee Arab countries, which represents a clear threat to Arab national security in general.

The occupation can threaten Arab water security and navigation in the Red Sea, due to the advanced position that it gained from establishing strong relations with Eritrea, the author pointed out.

Amer noted that the attempt to control the Red Sea is one of the most important strategic goals of "Israel" in the African continent, adding that the occupation began to establish a presence on the Red Sea in order to use it to achieve its military, economic, and political interests.

To achieve this goal, "Israel" strengthened its relations with Ethiopia in the late sixties and Eritrea after its independence from Ethiopia in 1991; it also built bases in Ethiopia after Moshe Dayan's visit in 1965.

In addition to its military bases on the Eritrean islands, especially near Bab Al-Mandab, "Israel" built two military bases in Ethiopia near the border between Eritrea and Sudan.

According to Amer, this expansion in the Red Sea region gave "Israel" a strategic depth in Bab Al-Mandab to monitor any Arab military activity in the region.

It is noteworthy that "Israel" has military and intelligence bases for espionage and monitoring on a number of Eritrean islands, including Dahlak, Haleb, and Marsa Fatma, which are located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, in addition to Zubair Island, which is only 22 km from Yemen, and houses a communications network and radar equipment.

The Israeli presence on these islands also includes special forces, paratrooper units, and airborne forces equipped with modern helicopters and Dolphin-class submarines. Through these bases, "Israel" threatens Yemen's national security, where it can monitor it and spy on it smoothly, Amer argued.

During his visit to "Israel" in 1996, then-Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki signed an agreement to enhance security and military cooperation that included, in one of its clauses, an Israeli pledge to support Eritrea to confront any attempts by any force to control its strategic islands located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea and to allow a limited military presence in these islands.

Sudan; a power to the Arab world
According to Amer, Israeli estimates since the beginning of Sudan's independence indicated that this country should not be allowed to become a force added to the power of the Arab world, because if invested in stable conditions, its resources will make it a threatening force.

During the 1967 War, Sudan became a base for training and sheltering the Egyptian Air Force and ground forces. It also sent its forces to the Canal region during the War of Attrition between 1968 and 1970, as well as during the 1973 October War.

It is noteworthy that following the 1967 Six Day War, Khartoum hosted the Arab League summit held from August 29 to September 1, 1967. There, Arab leaders declared the three no's: "no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel."

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Netanyahu bolsters Sudan's military leaders in attempt to save normalization
Israel is attempting to exploit the conflict in Sudan to push through Sudan-Israel normalization, a symbolic milestone for Israel. It is also against the will of the people of Sudan.
https://mondoweiss.net/2023/04/a-democratic-sudan-will-not-want-to-normalize-with-israel/?

the attitude toward Sudan in recent years. After the 2019 coup—led by the young women and men of Sudan—finally ousted long-time autocrat Omar al-Bashir, the leaders of that civilian uprising entered an ill-fated partnership with the military which had arrested al-Bashir and ended the process of removing him from office. The plan was to transition to a fully civilian government.

That always shaky plan was fully derailed in 2021 when al-Burhan led a military coup. One coup failed, but the second succeeded in establishing al-Burhan as the head of the Sudanese government. Protests swelled again and, as turmoil threatened to engulf the country, a highly unpopular deal was struck where al-Burhan would allow the ousted prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok to return to office. That lasted six weeks, as the Sudanese people protested that deal, forcing Hamdok to resign again.

As all this was unfolding, the U.S., under both the Donald Trump and Joe Biden administrations, did little to help the struggling Sudanese people attain their goal of democracy. As has so often been the case, the Biden administration chose to distinguish itself from Trump in rhetoric, but not in policy or action.

Trump pressured Sudan to pay over $335 million to the U.S. as compensation for al-Qaeda attacks on U.S. sites in the 1990s, when al-Bashir was providing shelter for Osama Bin Laden, although there is no evidence linking Sudan to the attacks. When we consider that Sudan's entire budget for 2021 was just $3.7 billion, meaning the payment to the U.S. was nearly 10% of the national budget, it becomes clear how onerous that was.

Trump also pressed Sudan to move forward as one of the three initial signatories of the Abraham Accords, normalizing relations with Israel and abandoning the Palestinians. This was problematic for Sudan, as the agreement was highly unpopular. While the repressive Sudanese military was eager to join forces with the like-minded Israelis, Sudanese civil society felt great solidarity with the Palestinians, even though, economically, they desperately needed to reap the benefits of trade with the U.S. that would come with normalization with Israel.

Sudan agreed to sign the Accords but the process of full normalization would have to be approved by whatever civilian government was eventually formed. This has left relations in limbo ever since. Israel states that it is waiting for a civilian government to complete the Accords, but in reality, they are simply waiting for any Sudanese government to be stable enough to move forward, civilian or military. As is demonstrated by Israel's long-term peace treaty with Egypt—a relationship that was only threatened briefly when a revolution ousted the military dictator Hosni Mubarak and replaced him with a civilian government led by Mohammed Morsi, whom Israel despised—a civilian government is not a prerequisite for Israel to establish relations.

In fact, the Abraham Accords, absurdly called "peace agreements" by craven politicians and a credulous media, are uniformly normalization agreements between brutal dictatorships in the Arab world and an apartheid state, brokered with all the hypocrisy the United States can muster. A newly restored military dictatorship in Sudan concluding an agreement with Israel would be par for the course.

Why is Sudan important to Israel?
Sudan is a poor country, although a civilian government that leads it out of the international isolation established during al-Bashir's reign could grow the economy quickly. But for Israel, the value of normalization with Sudan is largely symbolic.

It was in the Sudanese capital Khartoum in 1968 that the Arab League issued the famous "Three No's" declaration, in the wake of Israel's decisive victory in the 1967 war. "No peace with Israel, no negotiation with Israel, no recognition of Israel," went the declaration. Also, unlike the other three Arab states that have entered the Abraham Accords—the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco—Sudan did actually participate in hostilities against Israel in both 1948 and 1967, albeit peripherally. Also, where the UAE and Bahrain stifled opposition to the Abraham Accords and are not making any effort toward ending their authoritarian rule, Sudan would present an argument, however disingenuous, that the "voices of peace" in the country overcame populist anti-Zionism. That would mean a deadly blow to the already crippled Palestinian hopes for help from the Arab world. And it would be the first actual "peace" deal among the Abraham Accord agreements.

This is one reason that Israel's effort with Sudan was underway long before the Abraham Accords were birthed, dating back to at least 2016, when Sudan cut ties with Iran and Israel began advocating for the U.S. to drop it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Different parts of the Israeli security establishment have been working with different wannabe dictators in Sudan as well. The current fighting between al-Burhan and Hemedti splits the Israeli Foreign Ministry, which is more sympathetic to al-Burhan and the Mossad, which has developed close ties with Hemedti. The UAE is also close to Hemedti, while Egypt is warmer toward al-Burhan. All of this plays out regionally as well, in places such as Libya and Yemen. The complicated alliances of the two Sudanese rivals makes Israel reluctant to act in support of either, and this is why they prefer the role of mediator.

Cutting out the civilians
The fighting in Sudan, however, is very much a local affair, and is a simple one. Al-Burhan, as leader of both the military and the government, wants to move toward a unified Sudanese military. He entered talks with Hemedti's RSF to merge the two military forces over the next two years. Hemedti could not come out and say that he did not want to submit to al-Burhan's command, so he argued that the merger should happen over the course of ten years, which is tantamount to a refusal.

Because each side has significant interests not just in wealth as well as power, the fighting began. The Sudanese civilian population has been caught in the middle. Meanwhile, in terms of Israel's and the U.S.' ongoing push for Sudan to fully sign on to the Abraham Accords, the Sudanese people are simply out of the loop.

When Sudan first signed the Accords  it was the beginning of the normalization process, not the end. The process moved forward in April 2021 with the repeal of a 1958 law requiring a boycott of Israel.

Yet even before the Accords were signed, the normalization process was controversial. In January 2020, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secretly met with al-Burhan in Uganda. Netanyahu announced the next day that Sudan would soon agree to normalize relations with Israel, and howls of protest were the response. Prime Minister Hamdok pushed back, saying that only after a permanent government was in place could such an agreement be decided upon.

As much as Israel, and especially Netanyahu, wanted to reap the political benefits of normalization with Sudan, an agreement that was seen as illegitimately struck with a transitory government would be too fragile. So they waited.

Yet it has been clear from numerous examples, including Netanyahu's secret meeting and Foreign Minister Eli Cohen's visit in February of this year, that Israel was treating al-Burhan as the head of the Sudanese state and pushing him to come to an agreement. Yet Cohen's visit was also greeted with protests.

In fact, the Arab Opinion Index released in January 2023 showed that, although Sudan showed the second highest percentage of citizens in the Arab world who would support normalization with Israel, that was still only 18% of the population, with 72% opposed. And this is all the more remarkable since Sudan's particular situation—its dire economic distress that makes it desperate for help from the West and the international financial system—might otherwise lead more Sudanese to support a relationship with Israel that might bring American and European favor, support, and, crucially, investment. Yet the Sudanese popular movement that has continued to struggle for democracy also presses the population to remember the Palestinians.

But this is par for the course for Israel and the Abraham Accords. Israel has no means to convince most of the Arab world that they should simply forget the Palestinians and work with Israel regardless of its apartheid nature. But since the countries they are normalizing with are dictatorships of various types, they need only convince the leadership. Where those leaders are firmly ensconced, they can use authoritarian methods to address the people's objections. But in Sudan, the struggle with democratic forces make the situation much less comfortable for al-Burhan. It would be no better if Hemedti took power.

Despite its rhetoric about waiting for a civilian government, Israel knows very well that any sort of democracy in Sudan would put an impenetrable barrier in front of the Abraham Accords. A democratic Sudan would certainly insist on granting the Palestinians their rights before any sort of normalization. And, even before the latest fighting in Sudan, the military government was not stable enough to simply forge ahead with normalization.

The United States has already demonstrated, through its callous extortion of money from an impoverished country, that it is prepared to put enormous pressure on Sudan to normalize with Israel. It will be important to support the Sudanese struggle for democracy and to prevent our government from derailing that struggle in Sudan for the sake of Israel's petty political gains. Sudanese democracy demands it, as does justice for Palestinians, who will suffer yet another major setback if Sudanese-Israeli normalization is completed.