The White Paper of 1939 - when Britain tried to restrain the jews

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Warning:  Although this video is probably factual, it is pro-jew.   

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrzlgOPlnZ4

THE WHITE PAPER OF '39   
– The British White Paper on Palestine, May 1939 – information aggregate
https://ioncoja.ro/cartea-alba-din-39/

Britain's presence in Palestine coincided with a promise to the Zionists to support the establishment of a Jewish national home. For two decades, Britain continued to support Zionist aims in Palestine, including immigration and colonization, even after the first phase of an Arab revolt in 1936 that shook the foundations of British colonial rule and could not be suppressed without the intervention of neighboring Arab states . .

With the Arab Revolt again in force from 1937 to 1939, in the midst of preparations for war in Europe, British statesmen questioned and reinterpreted the promises the British government had made to the Zionists two decades earlier. The resulting new policy was published in the May 1939 White Paper.

The 1939 White Paper was a policy document issued by the British government, led by Neville Chamberlain, in response to the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine. After its formal approval in the House of Commons on 23 May 1939, it acted as the governing policy of Mandatory Palestine from 1939 until the British departure in 1948. After the war, the Mandate was transferred to the United Nations.

The 1939 White Paper introduced three measures:
– immigration quotas for Jews arriving in Palestine,
– restrictions on settlement and land sales to Jews, and
– constitutional measures that would lead to a single state under Arab majority rule, with provisions to protect the rights of the Jews. minority.

The single state of the White Paper was really a binational state, where it would be recognized by law that two peoples, two nations, inhabited Palestine. But the provisions of the White Paper were self-contradictory. Constitutional measures and immigration restrictions advanced the idea of ​​a binational state with a permanent Jewish minority, while land restrictions aimed to keep Jews where they had already settled, legislation more in line with the idea of ​​partition.

The debate between partition and a binational state continued throughout these years. This paper examines the motivations of the White Paper, primarily to keep the world Jewish question separate from the question of Palestine and to ensure stability in the Middle East. An investigation based on the White Paper introduces a series of important debates that took place between 1936 and 1948 and resonate today.

The policy, first drafted in March 1939, was prepared by the British government unilaterally following the failure of the London Arab-Zionist Conference. The paper called for the establishment of a Jewish national home in an independent Palestinian state within 10 years, rejecting the Peel Commission's idea of ​​partitioning Palestine.

It also limited Jewish immigration to 75,000 for five years and decided that further immigration would then be determined by the Arab majority (section II). Jews were prohibited from buying Arab land throughout the mandate, except for 5% (section III).

The proposal did not meet the political demands put forward by the Arab representatives during the London Conference and was officially rejected by the representatives of the Arab parties in Palestine, who were acting under the influence of Haj Amin Effendi al-Husseini, but the more moderate Arab opinion which was represented by the Party National Defense was prepared to accept the White Paper.

Zionist groups in Palestine immediately rejected the White Paper and led a months-long campaign of attacks on government property. On May 18, a Jewish general strike was called.

Land transfer regulations and immigration restriction clauses were implemented, but at the end of five years in 1944, only 51,000 of the intended 75,000 immigration certificates had been used. In light of this, the British offered to allow continued immigration beyond the 1944 deadline at the rate of 1,500 per month until the remaining quota was filled.

From December 1945 until the end of the 1948 mandate, 1,500 additional certificates for Jewish immigrants were allocated each month. Ultimately, key provisions were never implemented, initially due to cabinet opposition after the change of government and later due to preoccupation with World War II.

During the First World War, the British had made two promises regarding territory in the Middle East. Britain had promised the Hashemite governors of Arabia, through Lawrence of Arabia and the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, the independence of a united Arab country in Syria in exchange for British support against the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman Caliphate had declared a military jihad against the Germans, and the British hoped that an alliance with the Arabs would quell the chances of a general Muslim uprising in British-held territories in Africa, India, and the Far East.
Britain also negotiated the Sykes-Picot Agreement to divide the Middle East between Britain and France.

A variety of strategic factors, such as securing Jewish support in Eastern Europe while the Russian front collapsed and luring the US into the war alongside Britain, culminated in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which Britain promised to create and to promote a Jewish national home in Palestine. Broad territorial boundaries and goals for both the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine and Arab self-determination were approved at the San Remo Conference.

In June 1922, the League of Nations approved the Palestine Mandate, effective from September 1923, an explicit document regarding Britain's administrative responsibilities and powers in Palestine, including "provision of the establishment of the Jewish national home" and "defense of civilians". and the religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine".

In September 1922, the British government presented the Transjordan memorandum to the League of Nations stating that the Emirate of Transjordan would be excluded from all provisions relating to Jewish settlement under Article 25 of the Mandate. The memorandum was approved on September 23.

Strong Arab opposition and pressure against Jewish immigration led Britain to redefine Jewish immigration by restricting its flow according to the country's economic capacity to absorb immigrants. In fact, annual quotas were set on how many Jews could immigrate, but Jews who possessed a large amount of money (£500) were allowed to enter the country freely.

After Adolf Hitler's rise to power, European Jews were increasingly willing to spend the money necessary to enter Palestine. The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 stripped the 500,000 German Jews of their citizenship. Jewish migration was hindered by Nazi restrictions on the transfer of funds abroad (departing Jews had to abandon their property), but the Jewish Agency managed to negotiate an agreement that allowed Jews resident in Germany to buy German goods for export to Palestine, thereby circumventing the restrictions.

The large number of Jews entering Palestine was a cause of the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine. Britain responded to the revolt by appointing a royal commission, the Peel Commission, which went to Palestine and undertook a thorough study of the problems. The Peel Commission recommended in 1937 that Palestine be divided into two states: one Arab, the other Jewish.

The proposal was rejected by the Arabs, while the Zionist response was "neither positive nor negative", and the Peel Commission failed to stop the violence. In January 1938, the Woodhead Commission explored the practicalities of partition and considered three different plans, one of which was based on the Peel Plan.

Reporting in 1938, the Woodhead Commission rejected the plan, primarily on the grounds that it could not be implemented without a massive forcible transfer of Arabs, an option the British government had already ruled out. With dissent from some of its members, the Commission instead recommended a plan that would leave the Galilee under a British mandate, but pointed out serious problems with it, such as the proposed Arab state's lack of financial self-sufficiency.

The British government accompanied the publication of the Woodhead Report with a statement rejecting the policy of partition as impossible due to "political, administrative and financial difficulties". He proposed a substantially smaller Jewish state, including the coastal plain.

The Évian Conference, convened by the United States in July 1938, failed to find any agreement to deal with the rapidly increasing number of Jewish refugees, increasing the pressure on the British to find a solution to the problem of Jewish immigration to Palestine.

In February 1939, the British convened the London Conference to negotiate an agreement between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine. Arab delegates attended on the condition that they not meet directly with Jewish representatives, which would constitute an acknowledgment of Jewish claims to Palestine. The British government therefore held separate meetings with the two sides. The conference ended in failure on March 17.

In the aftermath of World War II, the British believed that Jewish support was either guaranteed or unimportant. However, the government feared hostility from the Arab world. This geopolitical consideration was, in the words of Raul Hilberg, "decisive" for British policies, as Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were independent and allied with Britain.

Main points of the White Paper: from 1939
– Section I. The Constitution: It was stated that with over 450,000 Jews now settled in the Mandate, the Balfour Declaration of "a national home for the Jewish people" had been fulfilled and also called for an independent Palestine to be established within 10 years and to be governed jointly by Arabs and Jews:

Her Majesty's Government consider that the authors of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab population of the country. [ ... ]
Her Majesty's Government now unequivocally declare that it is no part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the mandate, as well as to the assurances which had been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should become the subjects of a Jewish state. against their will.

Her Majesty's Government's objective is to establish within 10 years an independent Palestinian state in treaty relations with the United Kingdom which will satisfactorily meet the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. [..] The independent state should be one in which Arabs and Jews share governance in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are protected.

– Section II. Immigration: Jewish immigration to Palestine under the British Mandate was to be limited to 75,000 for the next five years and would then depend on the consent of the Arabs:
His Majesty's Government [..] find nothing in the Mandate or subsequent Policy Statements to support the view that to which the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely.

If immigration has a negative effect on the economic position in the country, it should clearly be restricted; and, equally, if it has a seriously injurious effect on the political position in the country, it is a factor which must not be ignored.
Although it is not difficult to argue that the large number of Jewish immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absorbed economically, the fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the Jewish population is able to dominate them has produced consequences. which are extremely serious to Jews and Arabs alike and to the peace and prosperity of Palestine.

The lamentable disturbances of the past three years are only the latest and most sustained manifestation of this intense Arab apprehension [...] it cannot be denied that the fear of indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread among the Arab population and that this fear has made disturbances possible . which have seriously set back economic progress, exhausted the budget of Palestine, created insecurity of life and property, and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable between citizens of the same country.

If under these circumstances immigration continues up to the country's economic absorptive capacity, regardless of all other considerations, a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction between all the peoples of the Near East and Middle.

Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, economic absorptive capacity permitting, will bring the Jewish population up to about one-third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural growth of the Arab and Jewish populations and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants currently in the country, this would allow for the admission, as of the beginning of April of this year, of approximately 75,000 immigrants over the next four years.

These immigrants will be admitted, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, as follows: For each of the next five years, a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be admitted, provided that a one-year shortage may be added to the quotas for the next 5 years. years, in the five-year period, if the economic absorption capacity allows.

– Section III. Land: No restrictions were initially imposed on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews, but the White Paper now said:
"The reports of several expert commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural increase of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of of Arab land to the Jews, in some areas there is now no room for further transfers of Arab land, while in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if the Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of living and not a considerable landless Arab population is soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land."

On 22 May 1939, the House of Commons debated a motion that the White Paper was inconsistent with the terms of the mandate, but was defeated by 268 votes to 179. The following day, the House of Lords accepted the new policy without a vote.
During the debate Lloyd George called the White Paper an "act of perfidy" and Winston Churchill voted against his party even though he was in government. Liberal MP James Rothschild said during the parliamentary debate that "for most Jews going to Palestine it is a matter of migration or physical disappearance".

Some supporters of the government opposed this policy on the grounds that, in their view, it appeared to contradict the Balfour Declaration. Several government MPs voted against the proposals or abstained, including cabinet ministers such as the distinguished Jewish Secretary of State for War Leslie Hore-Belisha.

The Permanent Commission on Mandates of the League of the United Nations held, unanimously, that the White Paper was in conflict with the interpretation that the Mandatory Government, with the agreement of the League bodies, gave to the mandate in the past. Four of the members felt that the policy was not in harmony with the terms of the Mandate, and the other three held that the existing circumstances would justify the policy if the Council of the League of Nations did not object. The outbreak of World War II suspended any further deliberations.

The Arab Higher Committee initially argued that the independence of a future government of Palestine would prove illusory, as Jews could prevent it from functioning by withholding participation, and in any case real authority would still be in the hands of British officials. Limitations on Jewish immigration were also considered to be insufficient, as there was no guarantee that immigration would not resume after five years.

Instead of the policy outlined in the White Paper, the Arab High Committee called for "a complete and final ban" on Jewish immigration and a repudiation of Jewish national policy altogether.

In July 1940, after two weeks of meetings with the British representative, SF Newcombe, the leader of the Palestinian Arab delegates to the London Conference, Jamal al-Husseini, and fellow delegate Musa al-Alami, agreed to the terms of the White Paper, and both signed a copy of it in the presence of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri as-Said.

Zionist groups in Palestine immediately rejected the White Paper and began a months-long campaign of attacks on government property and Arab civilians.
In response to the White Paper, the right-wing Zionist militant group Irgun began formulating plans for a rebellion to evict the British and establish an independent Jewish state.

Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the founder of the Irgun, who had been exiled from Palestine by the British, proposed a plan for an uprising to take place in October 1939, which he sent to the Irgun High Command in six coded letters.
The Irgun seriously considered implementing the plan, but was concerned about the heavy losses that would be inevitable. Irgun leader Avraham Stern, who would later break from the Irgun to form Lehi, formed a plan for 40,000 armed Jewish fighters recruited in Europe to sail to Palestine and join the rebellion.

The Polish government supported his plan and began training Jews and setting aside weapons for them. However, the outbreak of World War II in September 1939 quickly put an end to these plans.
After the outbreak of war in September 1939, the head of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, David Ben-Gurion, declared: "We will fight the White Paper as if there were no war, and we will fight the war as if there were no White Paper. "

On July 13, the authorities announced the suspension of all Jewish immigration to Palestine until March 1940. The reason given was the increase in the number of illegal immigrants.

In March 1940, the British High Commissioner for Palestine issued an edict dividing Palestine into three zones:
– In Zone A, consisting of about 63% of the country, including the rocky hills, transfers of land except to a Palestinian Arab were generally prohibited .
– In Area B, consisting of approximately 32 percent of the country, transfers from one Palestinian Arab except to another Palestinian Arab were severely restricted at the discretion of the High Commissioner.

In Area C, the rest of Palestine, comprising about five percent of the country—which, however, includes the most fertile areas—land sales remained unrestricted.
In December 1942, when the extermination of the Jews became public knowledge, there were still 34,000 immigration certificates. In February 1943, the British government announced that the remaining certificates could be used as soon as possible to rescue Jewish children in southeastern Europe, especially Bulgaria.

This plan was partially successful, but many of those who received certificates were unable to emigrate, although those from Bulgaria survived. In July, it was announced that any Jewish refugee arriving in a neutral country in transit would receive clearance for Palestine. During 1943, about half of the remaining certificates were distributed, and by the end of the war, 3,000 certificates remained.

At the end of World War II, the British Labor Party Conference voted to cancel the White Paper and establish a Jewish state in Palestine, but the party's foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, continued with the policy, which remained in place until in May 1948, until the departure of the British from Palestine.

After the war, the determination of Holocaust survivors to reach Palestine led to a large illegal migration of Jews to Palestine. British efforts to block migration led to violent resistance from the underground Zionist organization.

On January 31, 1946, the High Commissioner announced:
"It will be remembered that, in the Declaration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of November 13, 1945, it was made clear that Her Majesty's Government cannot detach itself from the duties and responsibilities arising from the Mandate as long as The mandate continued."

They therefore proposed to consult with the Arabs with a view to an arrangement which would ensure that until the provisional recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry were received there would be no interruption of Jewish immigration at the present monthly rate. These consultations with the Arabs took place over a long period and did not reach any conclusive results.

In these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government have now decided, on cogent grounds, that they must allow immigration to continue provisionally at the proposed rate of 1,500 per month. Preference will be given to those European Jews who have a special claim, such as those to whom the Palestinian Government has already assumed obligations and relatives in Europe of Jews already settled in Palestine. Of course, illegal immigrants will continue to be deducted from quotas.
The quota of 1,500 certificates for Jewish immigrants per month continued until the end of the mandate.

The first constitutional bill of the Provisional Council of Israel was a Proclamation that "All legislation resulting from the White Paper of the British Government of May, 1939, at midnight shall become null and void. This includes the immigration provisions as well as the land transfer regulations of February, 1940."

In reality, both the Permanent Commission for Mandates of the League of the United Nations, as well as the British Mandate Commissions or the UN Commissions, did not have a clear and determined intention to accommodate the two nations in Plestina within demographic limits acceptable to both sides, but always tilted the balance towards the advantage Jewish migration and then to the advantage of the apartheid state of Israel.

It follows from everything that the Israeli state does that it wants to forcibly evacuate, for any reason, the Palestinian population from the Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank and take over that territory under its government, using the machinations of subversive groups such as Hamas, as they have done since 1919 henceforth.

If nuvo Jews want a peaceful coexistence and want everything, then they must also accept the reversal of NOTHING - All or nothing. How this will be decided will be seen when the already declining power of the hegemon will diminish rapidly and the state of Israel will remain at the mercy of the Arabs. Existential despair pushes these absolutists on the verge of disappearing as a state and they will end up as tenants again and only where they will be tolerated but under not exactly kosher conditions.

Sources: Internet, etc.