The meaning of the term intelligence and its major elements

[Travis]

The meaning of the term intelligence and its major elements

The 'war on terror' is reaching its eighth year, and the Iraq war is approaching its 5th anniversary, however, there is no indication either conflict is about to end. The 'war on terror' is a war that is as secret as it is publicised and exploited by governments and the media. At the heart of the struggle is the intelligence agencies, which we are told are at the frontline of the conflict. However, what intelligence is and to what degree does it shape foreign policy is as elusive to many as its actual clandestine operations. This essay will not focus on the internal structure and functions of intelligence. But rather will centre its discussion on the manifestation and impact that intelligence has on international relations. Also this essay will limit its scope of research to the US intelligence experience. The main hypothesis that will be presented is that intelligence does not have a cause and effect relationship with the formation of foreign policy. Meaning, foreign policy objectives are not dictated by intelligence findings, but rather by political directives such as 'survival' and 'security'. Furthermore, it will be suggested that intelligence's major elements, in the contemporary age, is the way it is used by the state to support preconceived policies and manipulate political and public opinion. The method this essay will support its core assumptions is by analysing modern examples, the Iraq war and the developing case against Iran.

Through out history examples of intelligence gathering about ones opponent can be found. Sun Tzu a military officer who lived between 544 BC-496 BC considered intelligence as the defining factor between victory and defeat. He states that 'know the enemy, know yourself and victory is never in doubt...' (2002 pg17).
Herman (2007) also suggests that intelligence is an ancient phenomena; however, he adds that 'intelligence as an institution was a Victorian innovation' (pg 15).

Intelligence is directly related to state security and survival, this is one of the main factors that make it unique, and separate it from law enforcement. Lowenthal (2006) suggests that '...intelligence largely refers to issues related to national security that is, defence and foreign policy and certain aspects of homeland security...' (pg 5) In the same manner Shulksy and Schmitt (2002) suggest that 'Intelligence refers to information relevant to a government's formulation and implementation of policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats from actual or potential adversaries' (pg 1). Gill and Phythian (2007) argue that:

'[Intelligence is] the umbrella term referring to the range of activities – from planning and information collection to analysis and dissemination – conducted in secret, and aimed at maintaining or enhancing relative security by providing forewarning of threats or potential threats in a manner that allows for the timely implementation of a preventive policy or strategy, including, where deemed desirable activities' (Pg 33)

Furthermore Goodman (1985) suggests that there are four components that are integral to the term intelligence and separate it from other state organisations. 1) 'Intelligence gathering', which consists of the processing of raw electronic, photography and communications data (ELINT and COMINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT. 2-3) The analyzing of raw information and its distribution to relevant parties. 4) Clandestine operations, which are only a minor part of the Intelligence structure. Goodman adds that '...despite controversy and mistakes it is [clandestine operations] generally better managed than either the collection or the analytic functions [of intelligence]' (pg 3).

The explanation so far has described what intelligence is as a mechanism; however, now the relevance intelligence has in international relations will be explored. Marrin (2007) suggests that the relationship between intelligence and the state is one where the intelligence agencies make professionals recommendations to the state, and the state makes policies based on them (see figure a).

This definition suggests that foreign policy is organised and structured on the findings of the intelligence agencies. Thus according to this rationale two crucial factors emerge; 1) if it is reported by intelligence agencies that a certain state is a threat the state will take proactive measures. 2) Like wise if it is reported that a certain state does not present a threat the state will not take any offence or defensive measures against it. However, contrary to this assumption the evidence suggests that foreign policy and intelligence do not have a 'cause and effect' relationship. For example states may invade other states solely to increase their power or undermine the power of their adversaries. In such cases intelligence findings have little or no relevance to the formation of foreign policy. Clausewitz (1997) argues that '...war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means (pg 357)'. Similarly Waltz argues (1979) that 'Internationally, the force of a state is employed for the sake of its own protection and advantage' (pg 112). According to Clausewitz and Waltz conflicts and wars are not solely based on threats but rather on political ambitions. The upshot is that states will follow the intelligence when it poses a threat to their existence because survival, according to realists, is the primary objective of the state. However, states will not necessary act in a 'cause and effect' fashion if the intelligence does not present a threat, rather their actions and responses will be based exclusively on their political ambitions. Wark (2004) argues that 'When intelligence clashes with policy preference, intelligence loses; when information runs up against power, information is the casualty' (pg 20).  In the same manner Lowenthal (2006) argues that a way to define the difference between policy decisions and intelligence is to imagine them as two entities divided by a semi permeable membrane. He adds that 'the membrane is semi permeable because policy makers can and do cross over into the intelligence sphere, but intelligence officials cannot cross over into the policy sphere' (pg 5) (See fig b).


A recent event that illustrates the role of intelligence is the Iraq war 2003. Many have termed it as an intelligence failure. However, the evidence suggests it was not an intelligence failure but rather a foreign policy triumph. In the sense policy makers were able to transform the intelligence to support policy objectives and thus create a legal and 'moral' pretext. The 'official' reasons that the US invaded Iraq were because of the threat posed by the Iraqi regimes WMD, and the connection the regime had with bin Laden. However, the initial intelligence refuted both of these claims. Pfiffner (2007) reports that as early as 2002 the C.I.A discredited information linking Saddam to Osama Bin Laden. He adds this provoked the US government to use the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group, created shortly after 9/11, 'to provide alternative analytic perspectives to those being produced by the CIA' (pg 229).
Paul Pillar who was the national intelligence officer for the Middle East, and was responsible for coordinating all of the intelligence community's assessments regarding Iraq supports Pfiffner's claim. Pillar (2006) argues that the US government ignored all the intelligence that indicated that the Iraqi regime did not have WMD and links to bin Laden. Rather they manipulated the intelligence to fit a preconceived objective, namely the invasion of Iraq. He further suggests that 'it has become clear that official intelligence analysis was not relied on in making even the most significant decisions to national security decisions...' (pg15). In the same manner Gill and Phythian argue that 'Intelligence certainly seems to have followed the policy agenda, rather than vice versa' (pg 135). Gill and Phythian support their claim by citing transcripts from both US and UK sources, which identify a desire to attack Iraq as early as September 2001. Chomsky (2004) also argues that the war was not about WMD but rather over oil and the expansion of US dominance in the regime. In a similar manner Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) suggest the war was not about WMD or global terrorism, but add that the war was inspired and carried out in response to the demands made by the Israel Lobby.

Another example where foreign policy has not followed a 'cause and effect' rationale with intelligence findings is the case against Iran. The US is currently taking an aggressive stance against the Iranian regime. The US claims that Tehran has an ongoing nuclear weapons programme. They have taken this stance even though Iran is a signatory to a draft UN resolution forbidding the proliferation of Nuclear weapons in the Middle East, which all in the region have signed to with the sole exception of Israel (UN 2002). Furthermore the continuation of this stance becomes even more confusing following National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report which is made up of 16 intelligence agencies. The report concluded that Iran did not have an ongoing nuclear weapons agenda (Abdel-Kerim 2008). Furthermore a document released by the Strategic comments (2007) suggests that despite the NIE report, the US, and many European states continue with a hostile foreign policy towards Iran based on the assumption they have a uranium enrichment program. The report also states that despite the lack of supportive intelligence 'EU and NATO foreign ministers agreed on the need for additional UNSC sanctions [against Iran]' (pg 3). The absence of intelligence supporting Washington's policy towards Iran further supports the notion that foreign policy does not exclusively follow intelligence findings. Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) suggest that the current campaign against Iran is not intelligence based but rather conspired by Israel who wants to become the sole hegemon in the region.
It has been argued that intelligence findings do not have a cause and effect relationship with foreign policy; therefore what are its major elements in the context of international relations, if any? The evidence suggests that states use intelligence to create a pretext or a moral justification for implementing prearranged policy objectives. Pfiffner (2007) suggests that during the lead up to the Iraq war the intelligence agencies were solely used to convince congress and the American public that an invasion of Iraq was justified. In the same manner Pillar (2006) adds that:
'The process did not involve intelligence work designed to find dangers not yet discovered or to inform decisions not yet made. Instead, it involved research to find evidence in support of a specific line of argument—that Saddam was cooperating with al Qaeda—which in turn was being used to justify a specific policy decision.'
The Iraq war is an example where intelligence agencies have been used to 'engineer' evidence to support a predetermined policy. However, there is another sphere that intelligence agencies operate in to create pretexts for policy objectives.  That is the sphere of clandestine operations. Chomsky (2004) argues that intelligence agencies were used in South America during the 60's, not just to alter and manipulate evidence but to create actual pretexts for invading Cuba. He reports that a plan (Operation Northwoods 1962) was suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to defence Secretary Robert McNamara, to stage 'false flag' terrorist attacks against the US and to blame them onto Castro. The document 'Operation Northwoods' (1962) has been declassified; it is a valuable insight into the secret operations of intelligence. For example:
'We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both' (pg 11).

This essay has argued that intelligence is a facet of international relations that is subservient to the state. Also it was suggested that intelligence findings do not have a cause and effect relationship with foreign policy. Examples were shown, the Iraq war and the case against Iran, which illustrated the strength of these assumptions. It was demonstrated that these conflicts were not driven by intelligence but rather by 'other political' interests.  This hypothesis was further supported by claims from a former intelligence operative, who stated that intelligence that contradicted the 'official line' was ignored, and intelligence was 'created' to support policy objectives. Furthermore it was suggested that a major element of intelligence in the contemporary age, is that it is used to manipulate political and public opinion in the direction of a pre-arranged policy. It was suggested that this is accomplished by 'creating' evidence to fit the policy or by means of clandestine operations.




References:

1) Abdel-Kerim I. (2008) The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research: US Israeli deliberations on Iranian nuclear issue [online] Available from:
http://www.ecssr.ac.ae/CDA/en/FeaturedTopics/DisplayTopic/0,1670,774-0-4,00.html#
(Date viewed 8 March 2008)

2) Chomsky N, (2004) Hegemony or survival. London: Penguin

3) Clausewitz, C (1997) On war. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth editions limited.

4) Herman M. (2007) Intelligence power in peace and war. New York: Cambridge University press

5) Gill P. and Phythian M. (2007) Intelligence in an insecure world. UK: Polity Press

6) Goodman A. E. (1985) 'Dateline Langley: Fixing the Intelligence Mess' Foreign Policy, [online] No. 57. pp. 160-179. Available from:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0015-7228%28198424%2F198524%290%3A57%3C160%3ADLFTIM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9
(Date viewed 9 March 2008)

7) Lowenthal M.M (2006) Intelligence from secrets to policy. Washington: cq press  

Marrin S. (2007) 'Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and Predicting
Analytic Responsibilities' Intelligence and National Security [online] 22:6,
821 – 846 Available from:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701770634
(Date viewed 9 March 2008)

9) Mearsheimer, J and Walt, S. (2007) The Israel lobby and US foreign policy. London: Penguin

10) Operation Northwoods. (1962) [online] Available from:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/doc1.pdf  
(Date viewed 06 December 2005)

11) Pfiffner P. (2007) 'Intelligence and decision making before the war with Iraq'. In: Edwards G. C. and D.S. King (eds.) The polarized presidency of George w. Bush London: Oxford university press. pp. 213-242
12) Pillar P. R. 2006 'Intelligence, policy and the war in Iraq' Foreign Affairs, vol 85 no.2 pp. 15-27.
13) Shulsky A. N. and G. J. Schmitt (2002) Silent warfare understanding the world of intelligence. Washington: Potomac books, inc.
Strategic comments. (2007) Iran's nuclear program assessing new intelligence. [online]Available from: http://www.swetswise.com/swetsfo/swproxy?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.informaworld.com%2Fsmpp%2Fftinterface%3Fcontent%3D10.1080%2F13567880701870019%26format%3Dpdf%26magic%3Dswets%7C%7CD0488B488368DEAB8E17849356766BC5%26wmdesc%3D192.87.50.16%26ft%3D.pdf&ts=1205075755882&cs=4000226884&userName=5316502.user&emCondId=532495&articleID=35241874&yevoID=2169912&titleID=193861&referer=0&remoteAddr=161.74.11.24
(Date viewed 9 March 2008)
14) Sun Tzu. (2005) The art of war. London: Penguin
15) UN (2002). Draft resolution to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Available from:
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2005/NPT_Press_Cfc_050510.doc.htm
(Date viewed 24 April 2006)

16) Waltz, K (1979) Theory of international politics. New York; London: McGraw-Hill

17) Wark W. K. (1994) Espionage: Past, Present, Future. Routledge Available from: http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=vmXGUkB4ZKQC&pg=PA20&lpg=PA20&dq=%22When+intelligence+clashes+with+policy+preference%22&source=web&ots=xpPHIGaBIV&sig=7ZmC2v0NaS8potRomcDzhPC82xA&hl=en
(Date viewed 9 March)



Bibliography:

1) Abdel-Kerim I. (2008) The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research: US Israeli deliberations on Iranian nuclear issue [online] Available from:
http://www.ecssr.ac.ae/CDA/en/FeaturedTopics/DisplayTopic/0,1670,774-0-4,00.html#
(Date viewed 8 March 2008)

2) Ahmed, N M (2005) The war on truth 9/11, disinformation and the anatomy of terrorism. Great Britain: Arris Books

3) Chomsky N, (2004) Hegemony or survival. London: Penguin

4) Clausewitz, C (1997) On war. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth editions limited.

5) Herman M. (2007) Intelligence power in peace and war. New York: Cambridge University press

6) Gill P. and Phythian M. (2007) Intelligence in an insecure world. UK: Polity Press

7) Goodman A. E. (1985) 'Dateline Langley: Fixing the Intelligence Mess' Foreign Policy, [online] No. 57. pp. 160-179. Available from:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0015-7228%28198424%2F198524%290%3A57%3C160%3ADLFTIM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9
(Date viewed 9 March 2008)

Lowenthal M.M (2006) Intelligence from secrets to policy. Washington: CQ press  

9) Marrin S. (2007) 'Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and Predicting
Analytic Responsibilities' Intelligence and National Security [online] 22:6,
821 – 846 Available from:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701770634
(Date viewed 9 March 2008)

10) Mearsheimer, J and Walt, S. (2007) The Israel lobby and US foreign policy. London: Penguin

11) Operation Northwoods. (1962) [online] Available from:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/doc1.pdf  
(Date viewed 28 February 2008)


12) Pfiffner P. (2007) 'Intelligence and decision making before the war with Iraq'. In: Edwards G. C. and D.S. King (eds.) The polarized presidency of George w. Bush London: Oxford university press. pp. 213-242
13) Pillar P. R. 2006 'Intelligence, policy and the war in Iraq' Foreign Affairs, vol 85 no.2 pp. 15-27.
14) Shulsky A. N. and G. J. Schmitt (2002) Silent warfare understanding the world of intelligence. Washington: Potomac books, inc.
Strategic comments. (2007) Iran's nuclear program assessing new intelligence. [online]Available from: http://www.swetswise.com/swetsfo/swproxy?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.informaworld.com%2Fsmpp%2Fftinterface%3Fcontent%3D10.1080%2F13567880701870019%26format%3Dpdf%26magic%3Dswets%7C%7CD0488B488368DEAB8E17849356766BC5%26wmdesc%3D192.87.50.16%26ft%3D.pdf&ts=1205075755882&cs=4000226884&userName=5316502.user&emCondId=532495&articleID=35241874&yevoID=2169912&titleID=193861&referer=0&remoteAddr=161.74.11.24
(Date viewed 9 March 2008)
15) Sun Tzu. (2005) The art of war. London: Penguin
16) UN (2002). Draft resolution to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Available from:
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2005/NPT_Press_Cfc_050510.doc.htm
(Date viewed 24 April 2006)

17) Waltz, K (1979) Theory of international politics. New York; London: McGraw-Hill

18) Wark W. K. (1994) Espionage: Past, Present, Future. Routledge Available from: http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=vmXGUkB4ZKQC&pg=PA20&lpg=PA20&dq=%22When+intelligence+clashes+with+policy+preference%22&source=web&ots=xpPHIGaBIV&sig=7ZmC2v0NaS8potRomcDzhPC82xA&hl=en
(Date viewed 9 March)