Prechter: Surviving Deflation: First, Understand It

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Surviving Deflation: First, Understand It
Deflation is more than just "falling prices."
Robert Prechter explains why.
by Editorial Staff, Elliott Wave International | February 26, 2010
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The following article is an excerpt from Elliott Wave International's free Club EWI resource, "The Guide to Understanding Deflation. Robert Prechter's Most Important Writings on Deflation."

The Primary Precondition of Deflation
Deflation requires a precondition: a major societal buildup in the extension of credit. Bank credit and Elliott wave expert Hamilton Bolton, in a 1957 letter, summarized his observations this way: "In reading a history of major depressions in the U.S. from 1830 on, I was impressed with the following: (a) All were set off by a deflation of excess credit. This was the one factor in common."

"The Fed Will Stop Deflation"
I am tired of hearing people insist that the Fed can expand credit all it wants. Sometimes an analogy clarifies a subject, so let's try one.

It may sound crazy, but suppose the government were to decide that the health of the nation depends upon producing Jaguar automobiles and providing them to as many people as possible. To facilitate that goal, it begins operating Jaguar plants all over the country, subsidizing production with tax money. To everyone's delight, it offers these luxury cars for sale at 50 percent off the old price. People flock to the showrooms and buy. Later, sales slow down, so the government cuts the price in half again. More people rush in and buy. Sales again slow, so it lowers the price to $900 each. People return to the stores to buy two or three, or half a dozen. Why not? Look how cheap they are! Buyers give Jaguars to their kids and park an extra one on the lawn. Finally, the country is awash in Jaguars. Alas, sales slow again, and the government panics. It must move more Jaguars, or, according to its theory -- ironically now made fact -- the economy will recede. People are working three days a week just to pay their taxes so the government can keep producing more Jaguars. If Jaguars stop moving, the economy will stop. So the government begins giving Jaguars away. A few more cars move out of the showrooms, but then it ends. Nobody wants any more Jaguars. They don't care if they're free. They can't find a use for them. Production of Jaguars ceases. It takes years to work through the overhanging supply of Jaguars. Tax collections collapse, the factories close, and unemployment soars. The economy is wrecked. People can't afford to buy gasoline, so many of the Jaguars rust away to worthlessness. The number of Jaguars -- at best -- returns to the level it was before the program began.

The same thing can happen with credit.

It may sound crazy, but suppose the government were to decide that the health of the nation depends upon producing credit and providing it to as many people as possible. To facilitate that goal, it begins operating credit-production plants all over the country, called Federal Reserve Banks. To everyone's delight, these banks offer the credit for sale at below market rates. People flock to the banks and buy. Later, sales slow down, so the banks cut the price again. More people rush in and buy. Sales again slow, so they lower the price to one percent. People return to the banks to buy even more credit. Why not? Look how cheap it is! Borrowers use credit to buy houses, boats and an extra Jaguar to park out on the lawn. Finally, the country is awash in credit. Alas, sales slow again, and the banks panic. They must move more credit, or, according to its theory -- ironically now made fact -- the economy will recede. People are working three days a week just to pay the interest on their debt to the banks so the banks can keep offering more credit. If credit stops moving, the economy will stop. So the banks begin giving credit away, at zero percent interest. A few more loans move through the tellers' windows, but then it ends. Nobody wants any more credit. They don't care if it's free. They can't find a use for it. Production of credit ceases. It takes years to work through the overhanging supply of credit. Interest payments collapse, banks close, and unemployment soars. The economy is wrecked. People can't afford to pay interest on their debts, so many bonds deteriorate to worthlessness. The value of credit -- at best -- returns to the level it was before the program began.

Jaguars, anyone?

Read the rest of this important 63-page deflation study now, free! Here's what you'll learn:

What Triggers the Change to Deflation
Why Deflationary Crashes and Depressions Go Together
Financial Values Can Disappear
Deflation is a Global Story
What Makes Deflation Likely Today?
How Big a Deflation?
More

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More Credit Default Swaps Means
Trouble for European Debt
by Editorial Staff, Elliott Wave International | February 25, 2010
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Government debt is no longer just a problem for emerging countries. Portugal, Spain, France and Greece (as we have seen in recent weeks) are living in fear of credit default. Consequently, the value of their credit default swaps is skyrocketing.

The following is an excerpt from the February issue of Global Market Perspective. For a limited time, you can visit Elliott Wave International to download the rest of the 100+ page issue free.

High levels of global debt are both financially debilitating and deflationary because they commit scarce cash to servicing interest payments. Up until now, most sovereign credit defaults occurred in emerging-market countries, such as Argentina and Russia. The deflationary tide, however, is starting to lap up against more developed Eurozone economies.

The chart shows the value of credit default swaps -- an instrument similar to an insurance contract that pays holders (if they are lucky) in the event of default -- for Greece, Portugal, Spain and France. In recent weeks these contracts have soared, with credit-default swaps on Greece's and Portugal's debt already surpassing the January-March 2009 extremes established in the latter part of Primary degree 1 down.



Obviously, the market is growing more skeptical that Greece can pay its debts, so the cost of protecting against default is rising fast. Greece's budget deficit is 12.7% of gross domestic product, and Portugal faces a budget shortfall that's more than twice the European Union's limit. Traders are now buying default protection on sovereign debt at a rate of more than five times that of specific company bonds. "Greece's neighbors would 'step in' to prevent a debt default to avoid 'a problem for the whole of Europe,'" a Tokyo-based bondsalesman says. Maybe so, but who will step in to bail out Portugal, Spain, the next sovereign default or the one thereafter?

The world is running out of money to service its mounting debts, and this chart simply depicts the front edge of the next great wave of credit contraction, which will sweep into more established countries throughout Europe and eventually to the United States.

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