Jew Aussie General Sir John Monash - "Father of the Blitzkreig" in WWI

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

This may be another reason the Germans were really pissed off at Jew Communists, Strike leaders, etc. at the end of WWI.

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The Father of the Blitzkrieg
....

On the 4th July 1918, Australian and American troops under Monash's command took less than 92 minutes to kill 2,000 Germans, and capture 1,600 others. Australian casualties were fewer than 1,300 and the Americans were fewer than 176.

Not only had a stalemate been broken, the allied forces had been given a massive moral boost. Americans had been initiated into the war with a victory and it had been shown that the days of trench warfare were coming to an end.

The French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, cancelled his planned visit to French front line troops and instead visited the Australians to say:

"When the Australians came to France, the French people expected a great deal of you... We knew you would fight a real fight, but we did not know that from the beginning you would astonish the whole continent..." (2)

After the success at Hamel, Mawson submitted plans to use a similar approach to break the stalemate at Amiens. On August 8, an allied force put Monash's plans into actions. In the previous four years, the only major breakthrough on the Western Front had been by the Germans on March 21, 1918, when they attacked and defeated the British Third and Fifth armies.  With Monash's plan, it took less than 150 minutes for the allies to do what hadn't been done in the previous four years.

To maintain an element of surprise, there was no pre-battle bombardment. Instead, the Germans only learnt of an attack once a line of tanks and infantry was upon them. It was then that the creeping artillery kept up a continuous bombardment by advancing behind. In the thick of the action, the tanks offered cover for the infantry, and in turn the infantry was able to protect the tanks against fire. Re-supply from the air allowed the allies to keep moving forward. The German army lost strategic territory, suffered 27,000 casualties, and lost 450 guns. Not only was its defensive positions smashed, but the awe of the attack broke German morale. German General Ludendorff later said:

"Our fighting machine was no longer of real value. Our capacity for year had suffered harm even if the far greater majority of our divisions fought bravely. August 8 marked the decline of our military power and took from me the hope that...we could restore the situation in our favour... The war had to be ended."

With the Germans in retreat, Monash chased them with more victories at Mont St Quentin and Peronne. From 8th August to 11th November 1918 the Australian Army Corps destroyed no less than 39 German divisions.
In total, Monash's troops comprised just 9.5 per cent of British forces in France, yet they captured 18.5 per cent of the German prisoners, 21.5 per cent of the territory and 14 per cent of the guns. On average, one Australian soldier was worth around twice that of other British soldiers.  On the battlefield, Monash was knighted by King George V. It was the first time in 200 years that a British monarch had honoured a commander in such a way. More praise came from British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery who said of  Monash:

"I would name Sir John Monash as the best general on the western front in Europe".

Ironically, after experiencing first hand the fear that a coordinated attack can have on an enemy, the likes of Major General Heinz Guderian, a German soldier who fought against the Australians at Amien, studied the approach and incorporated it into German battle strategies. In World War II, Guderian became a crucial leader in the Monash-style blitzkrieg strategy that led to German dominance in the first half of the war.

1)http://www.awm.gov.au/1918/people/genmonash.asp2)Georges Clemenceau, quoted by Charles Bean, The Australian Imperial Force in France during the Allied Offensive, 1918, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Vol VI, 1942, Sydney,

3)General Ludendorff, quoted by John Toland, No Man 's Land - The Story of 1918, London, 1980

http://www.convictcreations.com/history/monash.html


General Sir John Monash

On the outbreak of war Monash acted as chief censor for four weeks before he was appointed to command the 4th Infantry Brigade, Australian Imperial Force. It was an Australia-wide brigade which had to be organized and gathered at Broadmeadows, Victoria, and given elementary training before sailing with the second contingent on 22 December 1914. Monash chose as his brigade major Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. McGlinn; they were soon intimate friends. Monash commanded the convoy of seventeen ships which reached Egypt at the end of January 1915. The 4th Brigade went into camp near Heliopolis as part of Major General Sir Alexander Godley's New Zealand and Australian Division. Godley and the corps commander Lieutenant-General Sir William Birdwood were well satisfied with Monash's training of the brigade. At the Gallipoli landing it was in reserve: Monash did not land until the morning of 26 April, and was given the left-centre sector including Pope's Hill and Quinn's Post to organize while the Turks counter-attacked. His brigade was still not fully gathered by the 30th but Monash had an orderly conference of his battalion commanders that day. The night offensive on Baby 700 of 2 May, which Monash had opposed, was disastrous; according to Charles Bean it left him 'unstrung, as well it might'. The brigade played its part in withstanding the Turkish offensive of 19 May and the break-in to Quinn's on the 29th, and was relieved from the line at the end of the month.

In July Monash learned of his tardy promotion to brigadier general at a time when wild rumours were circulating in Cairo, London and Melbourne that he had been shot as a German spy and traitor; there had been a similar vicious whispering campaign in Melbourne the previous October. The brigade now prepared for the battle of Sari Bair and its part in the left hook on Hill 971. Their night-march of 6 August was delayed and a vital wrong turning made. Monash forced himself to the front, punched his battalions into position and made good progress against moderate resistance. But the maps were faulty, the men were lost and exhausted, and next morning could only dig in. On the 8th, after attacking, they had to withdraw. Most of the men were sick, many had paratyphoid. The remnants then took part in the unsuccessful attacks on Hill 60, before being withdrawn to Lemnos. Monash had three weeks leave in Egypt where he learned of his appointment as C.B. The brigade returned to a quiet sector on Gallipoli. On the final night of the evacuation Monash was not one of the last to leave, but rashly sent home an illegal diary-letter implying that he had been. Gallipoli had given him a devastating education. Bean, Birdwood and others left an impression that his performance had been mediocre; but his brigade had performed at least as well as any of the other three and he had little or no part in the battle-plans he had to attempt to carry out. His performance on 7-8 August is open to criticism, but it came to be recognized that the attack on Hill 971 was totally impossible of achievement. Bean reported the saying that Monash 'would command a division better than a brigade and a corps better than a division'.

In Egypt in January 1916 he wearily began retraining his reconstituted brigade, distressed by the news of his wife's operation for cancer. The brigade, after dismemberment to form daughter units, joined 4th Division and spent two months in the local defences east of Suez Canal. In June they moved to France, to the Armentières sector, and were immediately tagged for a substantial diversionary and unsuccessful night-raid on 2 July. That month Monash was promoted major general in command of the new 3rd Division arriving on Salisbury Plain, England. He was given two first-rate British professionals to watch over him, Lieutenant-Colonels G. H. N. Jackson and H. M. Farmar, who soon became his admiring devotees. Training proceeded vigorously. Monash had a flattering triumph when King George V himself inspected the division. In November they moved into the Armentières sector as part of Godley's II Anzac Corps and General Sir Herbert Plumer's Second British Army. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig inspected on 22 December. Monash had established and retained a remarkably low crime-rate in the division. By an extraordinary feat of will-power he had reduced his weight drastically to 12½ stone (79 kg), which considerably added to his authority. His good fortune was, unlike the other Australian divisions, to serve under Plumer and Major General Harington, and that his first major battle, Messines in June 1917, was Plumer's masterpiece. According to Bean, Monash 'concentrated upon the plans an amount of thought and care far beyond that ever devoted to any other [A.I.F. operation]'. 'Wonderful detail but not his job', Harington commented. In the autumn, during 3rd Ypres, at Broodseinde Monash brought off the greatest A.I.F. victory yet. But the weather had broken and in the following week Monash and his 3rd Division suffered the misery of Passchendaele.

3rd Division, which Monash was sure was 'one of the Crack Divisions of the British Army', spent most of the winter quietly in the Ploegsteert sector. In November it had at last joined the other divisions in I Anzac Corps. Monash dined privately with Haig who let it be known that he wanted him as a corps commander; at the New Year he was appointed K.C.B., not a mere knighthood. In March 1918, in the face of the great German offensive, he brilliantly deployed his division to plug the gap in front of Amiens. They were, however, in the eye of the storm, and saw little serious action. But in late April and May they were heavily involved in aggressive 'peaceful penetration'. Then, to the general satisfaction of the A.I.F., Monash was appointed corps commander from 1 June and promoted lieutenant-general; Birdwood remained general officer commanding the A.I.F. Bean and the journalist (Sir) Keith Murdoch, however, carried on a relentless campaign for more than two months to replace Monash with Major General (Sir) Brudenell White and Birdwood with Monash. He stood to win both ways, but was determined to test himself in the field at corps level.

The battle of Hamel of 4 July—'all over in ninety-three minutes...the perfection of teamwork', Monash wrote—proved his point. The Americans participated, and Monash had to withstand, by extraordinary force of personality, a last-minute attempt by General Pershing to withdraw them. Military historians have acclaimed it as 'the first modern battle', 'the perfect battle'. 'A war-winning combination had been found: a corps commander of genius, the Australian infantry, the Tank Corps, the Royal Artillery and the RAF'.

Returned soldiers including many senior officers, and Australian patriots in general, broadly assumed that Monash inspired the great offensive of 8 August and thus 'won the war'. He himself was never quite sure. He and his army commander, General Rawlinson, were thinking along similar lines, but it is almost certain that Rawlinson anticipated Monash and allowed him to believe he was the instigator. At all events, in conjunction with the Canadians, the break-out on 8 August, 'the black day of the German army', was a classic set-piece. On 11 August an extraordinary chance gathering at Villers-Bretonneux of senior allied generals and politicians made Monash and Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, the Canadian, the centre of congratulations. Next day the king invested Monash with his knighthood.

The sixty days from 8 August, with the A.I.F. as virtual spearhead of the British army, were glorious. There was a minor botch on 10 August near Proyart, but thereafter, until about the end of September, a series of conclusive victories followed—at Chuignes, Mont St Quentin and Péronne especially (where Monash's ability in a fluid battle was finally proved), and Hargicourt. The breaking of the Hindenburg line, during which Monash commanded some 200,000 including Americans, was a much more uncertain matter; and the very last A.I.F. infantry action at Montbrehain, with heavy casualties, was probably unnecessary. But it was a series of victories unsurpassed in the annals of the British army and, according to military historians, the 5000 A.I.F. dead were a remarkably light cost. During the battles Monash had had to deal with Prime Minister Hughes's decision to send 6000 veterans home on leave, the British army's enforcement of disbandment of some battalions, and the tragic 'fatigue mutiny' of some of the 1st Battalion. Exhausted, Monash sought seclusion in England. Blessedly, the A.I.F. was moving back into action only on the day of the Armistice.

Monash perhaps won more than his fair share of fame, as against other Australian generals, for he had the great luck to take command of a magnificent fighting body just when the tide was about to turn conclusively in the allies' favour. But the task could hardly have been better done. None of the A.I.F. generals compare with him in intellect, articulateness or personal magnetism, though White does in administrative capacity. He won the undying respect of nearly all his peers, including the greatest fighting generals. Remarkably, no serious charge was ever held against Monash of 'butchery'. His reputation remains undiminished. Bean, as historian, remained rather ambivalent, combining effusive praise with trivial criticism and some personal distaste. Monash's international reputation, largely British, derives from Sir Basil Liddell Hart's admiration, which has uncritically been accepted by a succession of historians. Monash was sometimes admired as 'the best man in France' but, although he might have been offered an army if the war had continued into 1919, the conjecture that a Jewish colonial militiaman of German origin could ever have become British commander-in-chief is absurd. He never had the opportunity to succeed, or fail, at the level of high strategy.

As a general, Monash had the first essential qualities, the capacity to bear great strain and to make quick and clear decisions. His sheer intellect, breadth of grasp, his articulateness especially, together with his forceful personality, induced respect and confidence among his juniors. He worked closely with his staff, extracting the best from them: the partnership with his devoted admirer at corps, Brigadier General (Field Marshal Sir Thomas) Blamey was famous. He developed the practice of conferences of senior officers, not merely to cover a mass of detail, but to facilitate knowledge of what was expected right down the line. He held the view that warfare was essentially a problem in engineering, of mobilizing resources, like the conduct of a large industrial undertaking; in 1918 the men in the line knew that all was right behind them. He eagerly made use of the most recent innovations. He took the view that an energetic offensive policy, 'feeding the troops on victory', was the short way to end the slaughter and misery. He was of the new scientific breed of generals, did not attempt to hob-nob with the troops and seek their popularity, and so was often criticized by the traditional 'inspirational' school of thought. His chief weaknesses were his status-hunger, craving for publicity and honours, and his habit of exaggerating his men's and his own achievements.

The efficient and harmonious repatriation of 160,000 Australian soldiers, almost entirely within eight months, is among the most remarkable of Monash's achievements. He compelled the government to alter its initial policy of slow repatriation for fear of employment difficulties, and aggressively fought for and found ships, despite the shortage. He delighted in presiding over the superb A.I.F. Education Scheme. Commonwealth governments, in 1919 and later, entirely neglected to honour him or treat him with any generosity or ordinary courtesy, until the Scullin government eventually promoted him general. Meanwhile in London Monash enjoyed his considerable fame. From early August in about a month—another amazing feat—he wrote The Australian Victories in France in 1918; it was propaganda, but not far off the truth. Monash left for home on 15 November and had a tumultuous welcome in Melbourne on Boxing Day. But his happy homecoming was ruined by his wife Vic's illness; she died on 27 February 1920.

Monash had been uncertain about his future. He seriously considered standing for the Senate in 1919, but the Nationalist politicians blocked his path. He was looking for a national job, but negotiations for him to head the Institute of Science and Industry fell through. The salaries attached to the most senior military posts were meagre. He picked up the threads of his enterprises which Gibson had carried on, but could not resist a takeover offer for the Concrete Constructions Co. by W. R. Hume; Monash became a director of the Hume Pipe Co. (Aust) Ltd and picked up other directorships. Then in late June 1920 came the offer of the general managership of the State Electricity Commission of Victoria, which he was happy to accept, withdrawing from the Reinforced Concrete Co.

His new task was of great public importance, difficulty and attractiveness to an engineer. Making abundant cheap power available by harnessing the huge deposits of Gippsland brown coal would remove a crippling handicap to development of industry. He had strong fellow commissioners—Sir Robert Gibson, (Sir) Thomas Lyle and George Swinburne—and Hyman Herman as chief technical expert; Monash himself was soon appointed chairman. Unexpected high moisture content of the coal produced a grave early crisis, but power from Yallourn, the model garden-town, was turned on in 1924. German technology was used to solve many problems. Monash faced great political difficulties and distrust of the project which required all his forceful pugnacity to overcome; he could not tolerate (Sir) Frederic Eggleston, his minister in 1924-27, who distrusted Monash's 'ruthless egotism'. He survived a major inquiry in 1926, and next year the commission showed a profit. By 1930 the initial task was completed, the S.E.C. grid covered the State and the commission was established as a highly successful state enterprise. Monash himself had inspired a degree of creativity, loyalty and affection, probably unparalleled in any other large Australian corporation then or since. As in the A.I.F. he displayed his gift both of exciting their best from his colleagues and making them his personal friends. 'He was a great leader', Herman wrote, 'and a genius in getting to the heart of any problem and finding its solution ... the ablest, biggest-minded and biggest-hearted man I have ever known'.

Innumerable demands were made on him. His advice on military matters was occasionally sought and he sometimes publicly condemned starvation of the forces. He was the natural spokesman for returned soldiers. He took command of the Special Constabulary Force during the police strike of November 1923 and chaired the subsequent royal commission. From 1925 he led Melbourne's Anzac Day march and from 1927 was its chief organizer. The cause closest to his heart in his last years was the Shrine of Remembrance of which he was in practice chairman of the constructing body. Premiers constantly pestered him for advice. From 1923 he was vice-chancellor of the university (acting chancellor for a year in 1925-26), which involved heavy burdens. He was president of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science in 1924-26. He advised and lobbied governments on engineering appointments and other matters relating to the profession. The clubs he most enjoyed, other than the Naval and Military, were the Wallaby and Beefsteak, and he was president of Melbourne Rotary in 1922. His haven was the family home, Iona, where he lived with his daughter and delighted in his grandchildren; he had a great gift with children. His constant companion was Lizette Bentwitch, a miniature-painter; he also remained in touch with Annie Gabriel.

The great Anglo-Jewish families had rushed Monash in London in 1919. His quiescent communal feeling revived. He had habitually ignored anti-Semitism and denied that he had ever been subject to discrimination. But he was well aware of his own unusual position as a Jew leading the army of one of the world's most democratic peoples. On return home, he could not have escaped, even if he wished to, the degree of leadership of the Jewish people thrust upon him. He accepted some formal duties, including inactive membership of the board of management of the St Kilda congregation, sympathized with the liberal Jewish position, sometimes acted as communal spokesman, and eventually occasionally attended services. He also adopted moderate Zionism—an unusual stance among prominent contemporary Jews—and in 1927 became national president of the Australian Zionist Federation on the understanding that he could be little more than a figure-head. In the 1920s he never had to speak in protest about any major local incident of anti-Semitism. His own presence and prestige, Colin McInnes claimed, 'made anti-Semitism, as a "respectable" attitude, impossible in Australia'.

In the 1920s Monash was broadly accepted, not just in Victoria, as the greatest living Australian. The soldiers had to have a representative hero who was a volunteer; he was acceptable to the community as a seemingly unpretentious outsider, not really part of the Establishment. His commanding intellect was sensed as well as his basic honesty and decency. He was one tall poppy who was never cut down. His knowledge ranged extraordinarily widely, but was neither very profound nor original. He achieved greatness essentially as an administrator, by cultivating to a super-pitch of excellence the ordinary qualities such as memory, concentration, stability and common sense, allied with temperamental capacity to work harmoniously with colleagues. He had the gift of being able instantaneously to turn from one task to the next. He was a great teacher, supremely articulate, 'the greatest advocate I ever listened to' said Sir Robert Menzies. No one in Australia's history, perhaps, crammed more effective work into a life; but, he said, work was the best thing in life. In later years at least, his charm, courtesy and impression of simplicity were striking, though traces of deviousness, sensitivity to slights and constant need for approval remained.

From 1927 Monash was troubled with high blood-pressure. With his eyes open he continued to work. Early in 1930 the Scullin government briefly considered him as a possible governor-general. In 1930-31 he rebuffed sporadic attempts to persuade him to lead a right-wing political movement. Early in 1931 he enjoyed representing the Australian government at the durbar for the opening of New Delhi. By August his health had markedly deteriorated and he died of coronary vascular disease at Iona on 8 October. His state funeral, with crowds of at least 250,000, was probably the largest in Australia to that time; he was buried in Brighton cemetery with Jewish rites. Numerous memorials were raised, including an equestrian statue near the Shrine of Remembrance. The Australian War Memorial holds portraits by John Longstaff and James Quinn and shares with the National Library of Australia his huge collection of private papers and memorabilia.

http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/biogs/A100533b.htm

[Anonymous]

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

The more I read about this, it was actually a True Australian (non-Jewish) that devised the tactics that won at Hamel and later Amiens--CSR

Rawlinson had already finalised his plans in discussion with his Corps commanders (Butler, Monash, Sir Arthur Currie of the Canadian Corps and Lieutenant General Charles Kavanagh of the Cavalry Corps) on 21 July. For the first time, the Australians would attack side by side with the Canadian Corps. Both had a reputation for aggressive and innovative tactics and a strong record of success over the past two years.

The tactical methods had been tested by the Australians in a local counter-attack at the Battle of Hamel on 4 July. The German defenders of Hamel were deeply dug in, and their position commanded a very wide field of fire. Similar positions had resisted capture for two months in the Battle of the Somme. The Australians had used surprise rather than weight at Hamel. The artillery had opened fire only at the moment the infantry and tanks advanced, and the Germans were rapidly overrun.[8]

A key factor in the final plan was secrecy. There was to be no pre-battle bombardment, only artillery fire immediately prior to the advance of Australian, Canadian, and British forces.[6] The final plan for Fourth Army involved 1,386 guns and howitzers, making up 27 medium artillery brigades and 13 heavy batteries, in addition to the infantry divisions' artillery. The fire plan for Fourth Army's artillery was devised by Monash's senior artillery officer, Major General C.E.D. Budworth. British sound ranging advances in artillery techniques and aerial photographic reconnaissance made it possible to dispense with "ranging shots" to ensure accurate fire. Budworth had produced a timetable which allowed every single German position to be hit at "zero hour", while a creeping barrage preceded the infantry. This method was similar to the Feuerwalze which the Germans themselves had used in their Spring Offensive, but its effectiveness was increased by the surprise achieved.[9]

There were also to be 580 tanks. The Canadian and Australian Corps were each allocated a brigade of four battalions, with 108 Mark V fighting tanks, 36 Mark V "Star" tanks capable of carrying a squad of infantry armed with a Lewis gun and 24 unarmed tanks intended to carry supplies and ammunition forward. A single battalion of Mark V tanks was allocated to III Corps. The Cavalry Corps were allocated two battalions each of 48 Medium Mark A Whippet tanks.[10]

The Allies had successfully moved the Canadian Corps of four infantry divisions to Amiens without them being detected by the Germans. This was a noteworthy achievement and reflected well on the increasingly efficient staffwork of the British Armies. A detachment from the Corps of two infantry battalions, a wireless unit and a casualty clearing station had been sent to the front near Ypres to bluff the Germans that the entire Corps was moving north to Flanders.[11] The Canadian Corps was not fully in position until 7 August. To maintain secrecy, the Allies commanders pasted the notice "Keep Your Mouth Shut" into orders issued to the men, and never used the actual word "offensive".[12]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_ ... %281918%29