Political contract required to enter IsraHell

[imsamhi1]

Saturday, April 14 2012|Dimi Reider
Exclusive: 'Political contract' required to enter Israel?
http://972mag.com/new-entry-requirement ... est/41703/
A Swedish tourist trying to enter Israel was made to sign a "contract" promising she won't get in touch with "pro-Palestinian" organisations, and acknowledging she'll get deported if she "gets caught doing even one of these things." Meanwhile, Prime Minister's Office released a letter that will be handed to deported Flytilla activists: Go to Syria.

Check this out. This is a "contract" that a Swedish citizen was required to sign upon entering Israel via the Eilat land crossing:




more:
http://972mag.com/new-entry-requirement ... est/41703/

[Michael K.]

The 'menorah' is getting too deep, need rubber boots.

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

Can they sue?

[imsamhi1]

Can they sue?

If you are familiar with the bolshevik machinations in israhell then you know there is no use. they will fu** it up from every aspect and Fu** you and your life and everyone even slightly involved in a move of that kind. The fear is very great and very tangible and always always maintained in the air. It's all a single evil machine working together, the courts, the military, the politicians, the supposed left fakes etc. all enslaved to the big honchos mammon worshipers and happy in the plundered gravy.  The feeling is that even for a victory in cracking the PR facade by starting such a move, one needs a whole lot of money and millions of supporters behind him/her. The cockroaches put an enormous amount of effort and resources to project a sinister unspoken, supposedly created effortlessly by itself, intimidation of "it's futile to resist. you'll be absorbed", while in reality when people understand that and get together and stand their ground and support each other during the attacks and record and share it in the open with the world, the paper monster cockroach is collapsing easily like the lies and deceit based house of cards it is. Just like every bully skunk who gets a good punch to the face. I think in fighting this devilish warm this saying is right: a little candle light can drive away much of the forces of darkness, better than a stick. But I also think there should be a stick, the arse to back you up. Their intimidation tactics and strategy thrives only when they can make one feels he/she is by itself and no one can protect from their satanism, but when people see that and are united their true colors are obvious and they rot, disintegrate and fade like all garbage.

[Christopher Marlowe]

Can they sue?

What is the Cause of Action?

Let's assume that they will sue under Swedish Law. I don't know Swedish law. I can't think of a common law tort that would cover what basically amounts to a travel restriction.  It is possible that the Swedish legislature has enacted statutes that enable them to sue international persons or bodies for the violation of international laws, such as human rights.  

In the US, there is the Alien Tort Statute:

The Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1350; ATS, also called the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)) is a section of the United States Code that reads: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." This statute is notable for allowing U.S. courts to hear human-rights cases brought by foreign citizens for conduct committed outside the U.S.

But we have already seen that the US is not willing to prosecute israelis for human rights violations under this statute:

http://www.internationallawupdate.com/10/second-circuit-holds-that-former-director-of-israeli-security-agency-is-immune-from-suit-brought-under-atca-and-tvpa-for-his-official-actions-related-to-aerial-bombing-of-gaza-city-apartment-complex/
Second Circuit holds that former director of Israeli Security Agency is immune from suit brought under ATCA and TVPA, for his official actions related to aerial bombing of Gaza City apartment complex, where U.S. Department of State recognized his entitlement to immunity, but declines to rule on categorical immunity for former officials under FSIA

On July 22, 2002, an Israeli Defense Force aircraft bombed an apartment complex in Gaza City in a successful attempt to kill alleged Hamas leader Saleh Mustafah Shehadeh. The attack killed fourteen additional people and injured numerous others. In December 2005 individuals injured in the attack and representatives of others killed or injured in the attack (Plaintiffs) sued Avraham Dichter (Defendant), the former director of the Israeli Security Agency, in New York federal court. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is liable pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 & note, for war crimes and other violations of international law.

Defendant moved to dismiss the suit arguing that he is immune from prosecution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602‑1611, that the Act of State doctrine barred suit and that it also presents a non‑justiciable Political Question. The U.S. State Department filed a Statement of Interest in November 2006 arguing that the FSIA applied only to countries and not to individuals. The statement, however, further argued that Defendant was immune under the common law as an official of a foreign state.

The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that Defendant was immune under the FSIA as an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" and, in the alternative, the suit raised a non‑justiciable political question. The district court did not rule on the State Action doctrine. Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The Second Circuit affirms on the grounds of common law immunity. It does not reach the issue, however, of whether the case presents a non‑justiciable Political Question.

The FSIA grants immunity from suit to foreign sovereigns, unless certain exceptions apply. In this case the Plaintiffs have not pointed to any exceptions to the statutory immunity. Thus the FSIA question rests solely on the issue of Defendant's status as an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." Plaintiffs had argued that the FSIA did not apply to individual foreign officials. After the briefs on appeal were filed, but before the oral argument, the Second Circuit ruled, in another case, that "an individual official of a foreign state acting in his official capacity is the 'agency or instrumentality' of the state, and is thereby protected by the FSIA." See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 81 (2d Cir. 2008).

Plaintiffs tried to distinguish the Terrorist Attacks holding by contending that the FSIA does not grant him immunity since Defendant was no longer an official of the Israeli government at the time Plaintiffs filed the suit. They maintain that the courts determine whether a foreign official is an instrumentality of a foreign state at the time that the suit is filed and not at the time that the actionable wrong took place. Plaintiffs rely on Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003), in which the Supreme Court had held that courts should determine a corporation's status as of the time that the plaintiff filed suit. The Court declined to rule on whether this rule applied to foreign officials because the common law endowed this Defendant with immunity.

The Circuit Court finds that the FSIA provides no guidance on the question of a former foreign government official's immunity. The Circuit Court therefore looks to the common law to determine the question. The common law of foreign sovereign immunity recognizes a right to immunity for former foreign officials for acts performed in their official capacity. At common law, courts left the decision of immunity for foreign sovereigns to the political branches of government, especially the Executive Branch. Because the State Department had recognized Defendant's immunity, the Circuit Court holds that the Defendant is immune from suit under the common law, although the Circuit Court does not go so far as to hold that all former foreign officials enjoy categorical immunity.

"Common law recognizes the immunity of former foreign officials. At the time the FSIA was enacted [in 1976], the common law of foreign sovereign immunity recognized an individual official's entitlement to immunity for 'acts performed in his official capacity.' Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 66(f) (1965) ... An immunity based on acts – rather than status – does not depend on tenure in office."

"Is Defendant entitled to common‑law immunity? Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, we 'deferred to the decisions of the political branches —in particular, those of the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.' [Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983)]. The United States – through the State Department and the Department of Justice – filed a Statement of Interest in the district court specifically recognizing Defendant's entitlement to immunity and urging that appellants' suit 'be dismissed on immunity grounds.' Accordingly, even if Defendant, as a former foreign official, is not categorically eligible for immunity under the FSIA (a question we need not decide here), he is nevertheless immune from suit under common‑law principles that pre‑date, and survive, the enactment of that statute." [Slip op. 12‑14]

Plaintiffs further argue that Defendant's actions violate jus cogens (imperative international law norms) and that there can be no immunity for such violations. The Circuit Court rejects this argument finding no exception to the FSIA or common law immunity in cases of jus cogens. The Circuit Court also rejects Plaintiffs' argument that the TVPA overrides Defendant's immunity. The TVPA only applies when one of the FSIA exceptions of 28 U.S.C. § 1605 exists. Further, under the common law, the TVPA will only apply when the Executive declines to immunize an official.

 "In summary, we need not decide whether the FSIA applies to a former official of a foreign government (a close and interesting question), because if the FSIA does not apply, a former official may still be immune under common‑law principles that pre‑date, and survive, the enactment of the FSIA."

 "Here, the Executive Branch has urged the courts to decline jurisdiction over appellants' suit, and under our traditional rule of deference to such Executive determinations, we do so. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' complaint for lack of jurisdiction; and because we decide the appeal on immunity grounds, we need not reach the district court's alternative holding that the case raises a non‑justiciable Political Question." [Slip op. 16]

Citation: Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009).