Good Overview Mind Control/MKUltra

[Amanda]

This seems like a relatively good overview of mind control techniques the CIA/DARPA have been working on (kind of goes over the early history of this kind of "work" and what they are most likely up to now).  I'm not so sure about some of the background info on Gottlieb (I thought he was jewish, but this article says he liked to raise Christmas trees?) The last two sections, "An Orwellian Nightmare" and "Novel Capabilities," are definitely worth the read IMO.


Mind Control and the Zio World Order

by Len Kasten

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php? ... &aid=31569


On 28 November 1953, at 2 am, a man crashed through a closed window and fell to his death from the 10th floor of the Statler Hotel in New York City. He was identified as Frank Olson, a bacteriologist with the US Army Research Center at Fort Detrick, Maryland. He had fallen from a room he shared with another scientist, Robert Lashbrook. It was ruled a suicide.

Twenty-two years later, in 1975, William Colby, then CIA director, declassified documents that changed the complexion of the case. It was revealed that Olson had actually been an undercover CIA operative at Fort Detrick, and that one week prior to his death, he had been drinking Cointreau at a high-level meeting with scientists at Deep Creek Lodge in rural Maryland. The Cointreau was laced with a large dose of LSD administered by his CIA boss, Sidney Gottlieb. He was then sent to New York with Lashbrook, also with the CIA, to see a psychiatrist because the LSD had induced a psychosis.

It was also revealed that Olson had been part of the top secret CIA program that was known as Project MK-ULTRA, exploring the use of chemicals and drugs for purposes of mind control, and bacteriological agents for covert assassination. Olson had been working on ways to deliver anthrax in aerosol form, for use as a weapon. New evidence that came to light, through the persistent efforts of Olson's son Eric, made the suicide ruling highly suspect.

It turned out that Olson had been labelled a security risk by British intelligence after getting upset witnessing human experimentation on a trip to Frankfurt, Germany the previous summer. Eric Olson now believes that his father was drugged and then murdered to make sure that he didn't reveal the secrets of the MK-ULTRA project. Following the 1975 revelations, the government must have felt more than a little guilt about the affair because Olson's family was given a 17 minute audience with US President Ford, who apologised to them, and they were awarded damages in the amount of $750,000.

Controlling Human Behaviour

The MK-ULTRA program was instituted on 13 April 1953 by CIA Director Allen Dulles, ostensibly to counter the brainwashing techniques of American prisoners being held by the North Koreans during the Korean War, and to duplicate those techniques on enemy prisoners, i.e. the creation of "Manchurian Candidates." This was the claim used to obtain funding for the project. However, the Prisoner of War brainwashing program was just the tip of the iceberg, and the CIA-sponsored experiments ventured far and wide into areas of Mind Control under the aegis of MK-ULTRA that had little or nothing to do with methods of interrogation.

The Colby revelations were part of a sweeping investigation of the CIA in January 1975 by the "Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States," chaired by Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller. The subsequent June 1975 Report to the President said: "The drug program was part of a much larger CIA program to study possible means for controlling human behaviour. Other studies explored the effects of radiation, electric-shock, psychology, psychiatry, sociology and harassment substances."

Even though the program got off to a rocky start with the Olson affair, it recovered quickly and became an umbrella project with 149 sub-projects. The overall guiding principal was succinctly stated in an internal CIA memo dated January 1952: "Can we get control of an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against fundamental laws of nature such as self-preservation?"

The drug program came under the aegis of the Chemical Division of the Technical Services Staff headed up by Sidney Gottlieb from 1951 to 1956. Gottlieb was a highly intelligent eccentric who drank goat's milk, enjoyed folk-dancing, and raised Christmas trees on his farm outside Washington.

The Agency funded LSD research programs at major medical centres and universities including Boston Psychopathic, Mt. Sinai Hospital at Columbia University, University of Illinois Medical School, University of Oklahoma and others. The funding was carried out secretly through the Josiah Macy Foundation, and the Geschickter Fund for Medical Research in Washington, D.C. The CIA claimed the secrecy was necessary to keep it from the Russians, but we have already seen that it was part of much larger project to learn how to control human behaviour in general, so this is not credible.

Gottlieb told Dr. Harold Abramson at Mt. Sinai (who just happened to be the psychiatrist that Olson was supposed to see!) that he wanted "operationally pertinent materials [about]: a. Disturbance of Memory; b. Discrediting by Aberrant Behaviour; c. Alteration of Sex Patterns; d. Eliciting of Information; e. Suggestibility; f. Creation of Dependence." That sounds like pretty deep stuff for the spy game. They were really afraid of public reaction and congressional condemnation, especially since the CIA charter did not allow domestic operations, and certainly prohibited experimentation on US citizens.

The callousness of the research is best exemplified by the CIA-funded work of Dr. Harris Isbell, the Director of the Addiction Research Center in Lexington, Kentucky. The drug addict hospital inmates, who were mostly black, were encouraged to volunteer for LSD research in return for hard drugs of their choice or time off their sentences. In most cases, they were given pure morphine or heroin. At one point Isbell kept seven men on LSD for 77 straight days. Many others were on it for up to 42 days.

Concerning extended LSD usage, John Marks in his landmark book The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The CIA and Mind Control says about writer Hunter S. Thompson (recently deceased) that he "frightened his readers with accounts of drug (LSD) binges lasting a few days, during which Thompson felt his brain boiling away in the sun, his nerves wrapping around enormous barbed wire forts, and his remaining faculties reduced to their reptilian antecedents." The recent movie The Rum Diary, starring Johnny Depp, based on the autobiographical book by Hunter S. Thompson, presents an imaginative re-enactment of his LSD adventures.

The CIA Turns On the Counter-Culture

Not satisfied with university research, Gottlieb recruited New York narcotics agent George White to distribute LSD surreptitiously to the "borderline underworld." Operating through safe houses in Greenwich Village, Haight-Ashbury and Marin County, White gave doses to prostitutes, pimps, drug addicts and other "marginal people" and then observed the results and reported to Gottlieb.

John Marks says they were people "who would be powerless to seek any sort of revenge if they ever found out what the CIA had done to them. In addition to their being unlikely whistle-blowers, such people lived in a world where an unwitting dose of some drug... was an occupational hazard anyway."

Eventually, White started using it randomly all over New York and San Francisco. Regarding the results, Marks says, "The MKULTRA scientists reaped little but disaster, mischief, and disappointment from their efforts to use LSD as a miracle weapon against the minds of their opponents." Yet, they continued this program for 10 years until 1963.

Ironically, since the CIA had pretty much cornered the market on LSD internationally, buying up all the product of Sandoz and Eli Lilly, the spread of the drug to the counter-culture was through the Agency. Timothy Leary, Ken Kesey, Allen Ginsburg and Tom Wolfe were first "turned on" thanks to the CIA, and that's how the "flower children" became psychedelic.

But, the LSD experiments may have been more successful than Marks realised. They were carefully noting the precise effects on brain chemistry, and in the six areas that Gottlieb was concerned with: memory disturbance, aberrant behaviour, altered sexual patterns, eliciting information, suggestibility and creation of dependence. This became evident when they started using LSD as an adjunct in hypnotic and electronic experiments.

Re-Patterning the Brain

Perhaps the most notorious and nefarious MK-ULTRA sub-project was carried out at the Allan Memorial Institute in Montreal, Canada under the directorship of Dr. Donald Ewen Cameron, an American from Albany, New York. Cameron had trained at the Royal Mental Hospital in Glasgow, Scotland, under eugenicist Sir David Henderson, and founded the Canadian branch of the World Federation for Mental Health. At various times, he was elected president of the Canadian, American, and World psychiatric associations. In other words, Cameron was no renegade but had the full faith and endorsement of the world psychiatric establishment.

The CIA wanted Cameron to "depattern" the contents of the brain to make it receptive to new patterning. David Remnick in a Washington Post article on 28 July 1985 said, "The.... heart of the laboratory was the Grid Room.... The subject was strapped into a chair involuntarily, by force, his head bristling with electrodes and transducers. Any resistance was met with a paralysing dose of curare. The subject's brainwaves were beamed to a nearby reception room crammed with voice analysers, a wire recorder and radio receivers cobbled together... The systematic annihilation or 'depatterning' of a subject's mind and memory was accomplished with overdoses of LSD, barbiturate sleep for 65 days at a stretch and ECT shocks at 75 times the recommended dosage. Psychic driving, the repetition of a recorded message for 16 hours a day, programmed the empty mind. Fragile patients referred to Allan Memorial for help were thus turned into carbuncular jellyfish."

Anton Chaitkin in his essay, 'British Psychiatry: From Eugenics to Assassination', says: "Patients lost all or part of their memories, and some lost the ability to control their bodily functions and to speak. At least one patient was reduced almost to a vegetable; then Cameron had the cognitive centres of her brain surgically cut apart, while keeping her alive. Some subjects were deposited permanently in institutions for the hopelessly insane."

The CIA funded these horrors through a front called "The Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology." Other supporters of the Allan Institute were the Rockefeller Foundation, the Geschickter Foundation, and the Canadian government.

About Cameron's work, Wikipedia says: "Naomi Klein states, in her book The Shock Doctrine, that Cameron's research and his contribution to the MKUltra project was actually not about mind control and brainwashing, but 'to design a scientifically based system for extracting information from "resistant sources." In other words, torture'. And citing a book from Alfred W. McCoy it further says that 'Stripped of its bizarre excesses, Cameron's experiments, building upon Donald O. Hebb's earlier breakthrough, laid the scientific foundation for the CIA's two-stage psychological torture method'." This method was codified in the infamous "KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual" published by the CIA in July 1963, and in the Human Resources Exploitation Training Manual – 1983 that was used in CIA training courses in Latin American countries up until 1987. These manuals describe methods of psychological torture, far more potent than physical torture, to elicit information from "resistant sources."

An Orwellian Nightmare

As one would expect, the technologies now available to the mind-controllers have zoomed off the chart to the point where George Orwell's world of omni-surveillance now seems almost quaint. Of course, it is true that 1984 was 28 years ago. But even as far back as 1970, US congressman James Scheur was able to say, "As a result of spinoffs from medical, military aerospace and industrial research, we are now in the process of developing devices and products capable of controlling violent mobs without injury. We can tranquillise, impede, immobilise, harass, shock, upset, stupefy, nauseate, chill, temporarily blind, deafen or just plain scare the wits out of anyone the police have a proper need to control and restrain."

A brief survey of some of the scariest products known to be in the arsenal of the secretive alphabet agencies arrayed against John Q. Public are such devices as the Neurophone, patented by Dr. Patrick Flanagan in 1968. It converts sound to electrical impulses which can be delivered from satellites. When aimed at individuals, the impulses travel directly to the brain where the sounds are re-assembled and appear to be voices inside the head, which can be perceived as coming from God, or telepathic aliens, or whatever. Or the sounds can come out of a turned-off TV or radio. Through software, the device can mimic anyone's voice and translate into any language.

It is believed that the CIA, DIA, NSA et al use the Neurophone to deliver threats and propaganda to selected targets, or just to torment someone they don't like. One can imagine the possibilities. Could this explain some of the killings by "psychopaths" who say they were instructed by God, such as Mark David Chapman, David Berkowitz, or Sirhan Sirhan? If they had been previously evaluated through sophisticated personality assessments and groomed by LSD or hypnosis, such voices could easily tip the balance and convince them to kill.

We've all heard about the "Thought Police" and laughed because it seemed so implausible. Well, the joke is on us. Brain scanning technology is now well-advanced. In 1974, Lawrence Pinneo, a neurophysiologist and electronic engineer with the Stanford Research Institute succeeded in correlating brain wave patterns from EEGs with specific words. In 1994, the brain wave patterns of 40 subjects were officially correlated with both spoken words and silent thought at the University of Missouri. It is believed that US intelligence agencies now have a brain wave vocabulary of over 60,000 words in most common languages.

Brain waves constitute a magnetic field around the head (the aura), each person having a unique, identifiable electromagnetic signature which becomes visible through Kirlian photography, and these fields can be monitored by satellites. The translated results are then fed back to ground-side super computers at speeds of up to 20 gigabytes/second. Neurophone messages can then be beamed to selected individuals based on their thoughts. It is believed that about one million people around the globe are now monitored on a regular basis. As these numbers increase, as they certainly will, to include most educated and important people in the world, the New World Order will definitely have arrived.

As Australian writer Paul Baird has observed, "no-one will ever be able to even think about expressing an opinion contrary to those forced on us by the New World Order. There will literally be no intellectual property that cannot be stolen, no writing that cannot be censored, no thought that cannot be suppressed (by the most oppressive/invasive means)." Baird also claims that ex-military/intelligence whistle-blowers have reported that experiments in controlling voters with these techniques have been tried in several foreign countries. So much for democracy.

Other technologies, such as microwave bombardment to confuse and disorient field personnel, microchip implantation, silently delivered acoustical subliminal messages, widespread population control through psychiatric drugs, and extreme close-up satellite-based viewing able to read documents indoors, are all well-developed and in use by military and intelligence agencies. This doesn't even address the monitoring of overt spoken and written material. Under Project ECHELON, the NSA monitors every call, fax, e-mail and computer data message in and out of the US, Canada and several other countries. Their computers then search for key words and phrases. Anything or anyone of interest draws the attention of agency operatives, who can then commence surveillance operations by the NSA or other intelligence agencies.

Novel Capabilities

We conclude with a chilling vision of the future from the US Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. It is from New World Vistas of Air and Space Power for the 21st Century.

"Prior to the mid-21st century, there will be a virtual explosion of knowledge in the field of neuroscience. We will have achieved a clear understanding of how the human brain works, how it really controls the various functions of the body, and how it can be manipulated (both positively and negatively). One can envision the development of electromagnetic energy sources, the output of which can be pulsed, shaped, and focused, that can couple with the human body in a fashion that will allow one to prevent voluntary muscular movements, control emotions (and thus actions), produce sleep, transmit suggestions, interfere with both short-term and long-term memory, produce an experience set, and delete an experience set. This will open the door for the development of some novel capabilities that can be used in armed conflict, in terrorist/hostage situations, and in training..."

And based on the past clandestine abuses of MK-ULTRA reviewed above, one can predict with relative certainty that these capabilities will be used on civilians, with or without their knowledge or acquiescence.

[Amanda]

Okay, this is sort of a tangent, but since the above article mentions Sirhan Sirhan, I thought I would post this. I listened to this about six months ago, so I don't recall all the details, but I'm pretty sure the lawyer guy got into the whole issue of how Sirhan was hypnotized. I actually immediately thought of SIrhan when the whole Holmes/Batman shooting occurred b/c it seems pretty easy for TPTB to just get their mind-controlled/hypnotized dupe in place to take the blame after the real shooter leaves the scene (this may not be the case for Holmes, but certainly was for Sirhan). And Holmes claims amnesia, just like Sirhan did.

http://www.kpfa.org/archive/id/75811

Guns and Butter

"Sirhan Sirhan and the Assassination of RFK" with Lawrence Teeter. Presentation to the press by Sirhan Sirhan's attorney, Lawrence Teeter, (now deceased) at the Coalition on Political Assassinations conference on the 35th anniversary of that assassination, June 2003. William Pepper is currently representing Sirhan.

[mgt23]

We conclude with a chilling vision of the future from the US Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. It is from New World Vistas of Air and Space Power for the 21st Century.

"Prior to the mid-21st century, there will be a virtual explosion of knowledge in the field of neuroscience. We will have achieved a clear understanding of how the human brain works, how it really controls the various functions of the body, and how it can be manipulated (both positively and negatively). One can envision the development of electromagnetic energy sources, the output of which can be pulsed, shaped, and focused, that can couple with the human body in a fashion that will allow one to prevent voluntary muscular movements, control emotions (and thus actions), produce sleep, transmit suggestions, interfere with both short-term and long-term memory, produce an experience set, and delete an experience set. This will open the door for the development of some novel capabilities that can be used in armed conflict, in terrorist/hostage situations, and in training..."

link for this?........

[Amanda]

That was in the original article and there wasn't a separate link for it.

I did a quick search and found this: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/vistas/vistas.htm

It's about 70 pages and I don't have the time to go through it now, but it looks like there might be some good info

[mgt23]

Go to New World Vistas main menu

New World Vistas Air ans Space Power for the 21st Century Summary Volume

New World Vistas
Air and Space Power
for the 21st Century

Summary Volume

This report is a forecast of a potential future for the Air Force.
This forecast does not necessarily imply future officially sanctioned programs, planning or policy.
Foreword
In the fiftieth year of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, both the Air Force and the Nation are at the brink of a new era. Our Cold War adversary no longer exists, and we now face threats which are not precisely defined. The situation is further complicated by changing alliances as much as by the absence of well known adversaries. Armed conflict around the world shows us that the world is still a hostile place, but responses which may have been appropriate during the Cold War are no longer appropriate. There appears, however, to be even more widespread pressure for the United States to remain a stabilizing force throughout the globe. Our military forces are involved in dangerous humanitarian and peacekeeping operations at an increasing rate, and anti-terrorist operations can be expected to increase as well. Although participation in these operations may require military action, we are expected to respond effectively with minimum injury and loss of life on both sides. Further, the domain of conflict is moving from earth into space and even into cyberspace. The balance of influence in the information domain has shifted from defense organizations to commercial organizations, and a similar shift will occur in space during the next decade. The crucial importance of detailed and timely knowledge and rapid communications to the successful pursuit of our new missions will demand creative use of commercial systems and technologies. This will produce an intimate intertwining of commercial and military applications to an extent not yet encountered. The intertwining will blur the distinction between threat and asset, offense and defense, and, even, friend and foe. Our future enemies, whoever they may be, will obtain knowledge and weapons better than those we have at present by making rather small investments. New sensor fusion and distributed processing capabilities will make operational distinctions such as onboard and offboard or space and ground obsolete. The rapid operational tempo enabled by complete and current knowledge, the operational demands generated by new missions, and the geographical constraints produced by a decreasing number of worldwide bases will require weapon system performance beyond that of existing systems. New technologies will permit improvement of existing systems, but new systems and new concepts will be needed to cope with the world of the 21st century.

There are strong analogies and contrasts between the world situation today and that at the time of the first Scientific Advisory Board study, Toward New Horizons, fifty years ago. We had won a devastating world war in 1945. In 1995, we have won the Cold War -- a war less bloody, but one which always had the possibility of destroying most of civilization. In both cases, we eliminated the threat from a powerful enemy, but then and now we have understood that preparedness and technological superiority are the keys to national security. After 1945, the United States moved to establish bases and influence abroad, but in 1995 we are reducing our physical presence abroad while we attempt to maintain a moral presence. It was clear in 1945 that the technology gains of the first half of the twentieth century should be consolidated to create a superior, technology- and capability-based Air Force which could respond to threats not yet imagined. The world which emerged from the destruction of World War II could not have been predicted in 1945, but the emphasis on technology and capability rather than on assumptions about future geopolitical scenarios served us well as we entered the Cold War. In the intervening 50 years, we have treated increasingly specific problems related to the Soviet threat. Now, that threat has disappeared. It is appropriate to return to the idea that development of broad superior capabilities through application of new technology will maintain the United States Air Force as the most powerful and effective aerospace force in the world and will enable the Air Force to discharge its responsibilities as an equal partner with the other Services in the defense of the Nation.

These considerations and the broad applications of new, largely commercial, technologies which are now, or soon to be, possible have led us to present the conclusions of the participants of New World Vistas as an integrated, capability-based, report. Realization of these capabilities will permit future members of the Air Force of all ranks to know, to plan, to act, and to evaluate in the detail appropriate to their responsibilities. One should not doubt that the 21st century Air Force which will be enabled and, indeed, demanded by its new capabilities and responsibilities will hardly be similar to the Air Force of today. The changes will be as profound as those experienced by the Army in moving from horse to tank or by the Navy in converting from sail to steam.

The Board wishes to thank the numerous Air Force people and organizations for their tremendous help in the preparation on New World Vistas. Special recognition goes to the United States Air Force Academy and the Air University for their assistance and counsel.

Finally, we have endeavored to define the capabilities which will result from emerging technologies during the next three decades, and we have attempted to point the way toward achieving those capabilities as the Air Force enters the Information Age. We hope that our work will succeed in helping to prepare the Air Force for the approaching revolution in the use of military power.

Dr. Gene H. McCall
Chair, USAF Scientific Advisory Board
Study Director, New World Vistas

John A. Corder
Major General, USAF (Ret)
Deputy Study Director

15 December 1995

Contents

Foreword.................................................................. iii

Chapter I
   Technologies for Arming the Air Force of the 21st Century ...............1
   1.0 Introduction.........................................................3
   2.0 Fundamental Considerations ..........................................4
   3.0 The Future Force.....................................................8
   4.0 Revolutionary Concepts in Context ..................................13
   5.0 The Report .........................................................14

Chapter II
   Capabilities and Technologies...........................................15
   1.0 Introduction........................................................17
   2.0 Global Awareness ...................................................19
   3.0 Dynamic Planning and Execution Control .............................26
   4.0 Global Mobility in War and Peace ...................................29
   5.0 Projection of Lethal and Sublethal Power ...........................33
   6.0 Space Operations ...................................................42
   7.0 People .............................................................48
   8.0 Primary Technologies ...............................................51
   9.0 Conclusion..........................................................53

Chapter III
   Recommended Actions for the Air Force
   What to Do and What to Stop Doing
   Resources to Get There and How to Make It Happen .......................55
   1.0 Introduction........................................................57
   2.0 What the Air Force Should Do........................................57
   3.0 What the Air Force Should Not Do or Stop Doing .....................63
   4.0 Resources to Get There .............................................64
   5.0 How to Make "New World Vistas" Happen ..............................64

Chapter IV
   Organizational Considerations and Recommendations.......................65
   1.0 Introduction........................................................67
   2.0 Procurement and System Development..................................67
   3.0 Air Force Laboratory Organization ..................................68
   4.0 Personnel Practices and Opportunities ..............................68
   5.0 SAB Focus ..........................................................69

Appendix A
   General Fogleman's, CSAF, and Dr. Widnall's, SecAF,
   memo to Dr. McCall, SAB Chair, subject: New World
   Vistas Challenge for Scientific Advisory Board (SAB),
   dated 24 Nov 94 ........................................................A-1

Appendix B Abstracts ......................................................B-1

Illustrations

Figure I-1(a) Effect of Weapons Capability on Battle ......................6

Figure I-1(b) Effect of Apparent Force Size on Battle .....................7

Attack by Low Observable UCAVs Deployed by Airlifter ......................9

Figure II-1................................................................18

Figure II-2................................................................21

Figure II-3................................................................28

UCAV Control Center .......................................................35

Space Based Global Precision Optical Weapon Attack on
   Boosting Ballistic Missile .............................................39

UCAV Fotofighter Attacking Air and Land Targets with High
   Power Laser Beams ......................................................41

Distributed Satellites Cooperatively Scanning a Target Area ...............44

Chapter I
Technologies for Arming the Air Force of the 21st Century
1.0 Introduction
New World Vistas is a study about the Air Force. It is about technology. It is about ideas. Most of all it is about the defense of the United States. The Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Sheila E. Widnall, and the Chief of Staff, General Ronald R. Fogleman, directed the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board to identify those technologies that will guarantee the air and space superiority of the United States in the 21st century.[1] We have taken the charge as an obligation to find and to create new ideas. We believe those ideas will make the Air Force of the future effective, affordable, and capable in seamless joint and multinational operations in which it achieves its purpose "to fight and to win the Nation's wars."[2]

New World Vistas is documented in detail in over 2000 pages of monographs collected in 15 volumes. The study participants are listed, and abstracts of their work are contained in Appendix B. There are many good ideas and careful descriptions of them in the 15 volumes. In addition, there is a Classified Volume[3] and a volume of important ancillary information obtained during the conduct of the study. And finally, this Summary Volume distills the major ideas from the monographs and integrates them into concepts that will produce a discontinuous or quantum enhancement of the effectiveness of the Air Force. We attempt in this volume to provide compelling reasons for pursuing these ideas, and we establish a path that stretches from today into the future. The definition of the path includes suggestions for significant incorporation of commercial technologies and practices into Air Force operations, and it includes suggestions for both change and reinforcement of the ways that the Air Force pursues science and technology goals. Our suggestions are based on the principles embodied in the concept of Global Reach-Global Power, which directs the Air Force to be capable of projecting power and influence worldwide.

We understand the uncertainties that accompany any attempt to predict the future. We may generate ideas that will be notable as humorous objects for future generations rather than notable as accurate visions of the future. We can only base our suggestions on our experience and on our estimates of the needs of the future. Most predictions become increasingly inaccurate with time after a decade or so has passed. Experience has shown, however, that carefully considered predictions are useful in defining new areas of endeavor that lead to new discoveries even if the discoveries are not those predicted. Thus, armed with caveats, confidence, and, perhaps, a small amount of vision we plunge into the task of defining technologies that will arm the Air Force of the 21st century.

We assert that the emphasis of Air Force technology must change. The Cold War presented a single adversary who had well known tactics, systems, and capabilities. Cold War military technology responded to the threat by developing weapon systems designed to respond to particular scenarios. In the process of development, we produced generic capabilities, but they mainly derived from the process of responding to the Soviet threat. System cost was always an important parameter, but it was never the predominant consideration.

Now, however, no well defined enemy exists. There are scenarios that suffice for some planning purposes, but they are of questionable reality. Rather than responding to a few particular scenarios, military technology now must respond to diverse situations. Cost has become a major factor in the development of all systems. We must also recognize that commercial technologies, which are developing at a rapid pace, have significant military applications. The Air Force must take advantage of new commercial technologies and must counter their use in adversary systems. It is essential that future systems be based on capabilities and cost, perhaps on an equal footing, rather than on solutions to specific problems.

There are two subjects about which the report is silent. The first is National Missile Defense. We do not believe the topic to be unimportant, and it will be apparent that several of the technologies we discuss are applicable. We found, however, that National Missile Defense is embroiled in politics too complex to permit detailed concept definitions to be of use at present. The second subject omitted is Nuclear Weapon Technology. That subject, too, is important, but nuclear weapon technologies are developed outside the Air Force, and the nuclear forces are, at present, prohibited from pursuing new ideas of design or delivery. We do, however, address problems associated with defense against weapons of mass destruction.

Chapter II will address the capabilities which are enabled by the new technologies. We will emphasize the interaction of technologies and capabilities, and we will show how new information sciences connect and enhance capabilities. Next, we will delineate the technologies. A striking feature of the list of technologies is that it is short. From a short list of new technologies and their supporting technologies the Air Force will derive amazingly superior capabilities. Chapter III will suggest what the Air Force should do, what they should stop doing, how to pay for it and how to make it happen. Chapter IV will conclude with organizational considerations and recommendations.

2.0 Fundamental Considerations
We have attempted to define capabilities and technologies that transcend particular missions and apply to all scenarios. We have not divided our recommendations into neat, well-defined categories. We tried, but we found that the power of the technologies and concepts that we recommend is that each cuts across several fundamental capabilities. The Attack Panel Volume presents a detailed method for inverting the matrix and discussing capabilities in terms of tasks to be performed.[4] We believe that the applications will be readily apparent when explained in detail. For example, knowledge and control of information is necessary for all missions, whether in peace or war, logistics or combat. All missions depend on communications and reconnaissance and, therefore, increasingly on space assets. As space assets become increasingly important, space control becomes a necessary part of all missions. Throughout the Force, the necessity of accurate, absolute positioning and timing is apparent. The most efficient way to supply this service is through space assets such as an enhanced, countermeasure-immune Global Positioning System (GPS). A technological thread which runs through many future applications is materials development. Strong, lightweight materials and structures will enable many capabilities in space, aircraft, and weapons.[5]

We know that reduced cycle time is a true force multiplier. It is characteristic of reduced cycle time that all components of the Force must operate at a higher tempo. If an airlifter is late with supplies, an attack mission will be delayed, and the choreography of an entire operation can be disrupted. The sensor systems that enable precision delivery of munitions can also be used in aircraft self protection. Technologies and functions will influence all capabilities. The Force will become so tightly integrated in function, and will be so tightly coupled to allies and the other services that boundaries between capabilities will become blurred if they exist at all.

For the purposes of New World Vistas, we have assumed that:

    The Air Force will have to fight at large distances from the United States. Some operations may be staged directly from the Continental United States (CONUS). Operations may persist for weeks or months, and they must be executed day and night in all weather.

    The site of the next conflict is unknown. The Air Force must be prepared to fight or to conduct mobility or special operations anywhere in the world on short notice.

    Weapons must be highly accurate, must minimize collateral damage, must minimize delivery and acquisition costs, and must enhance, and be enhanced by, air-craft capabilities.

    Platforms that deliver weapons must be lethal and survivable. They must establish air superiority in areas that are heavily populated with surface to air missiles (SAM's), and they must carry the attack to all enemy targets, fixed and mobile.

    Adversaries may be organized national forces or terrorist groups.

    Targets may be fixed or mobile and may be well concealed. Target classes will span the range from personnel to armored vehicles and protected command centers and information systems. Operational geography will range from classical battlefields to cities and jungles.

    Adversary capabilities will steadily improve and will be difficult to anticipate. For example, the Air Force must be prepared to defend against improved SAM's, low observable aircraft, cruise missiles, directed energy weapons, and information attack.

    The Air Force must detect and destroy chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and their production facilities.

    There will be peacetime missions in areas of local conflict. Aircraft must be protected against SAM's and ground fire by means other than offensive attack.

    Increasing the pace of operations increases the effectiveness of all operations.

    Cost will be equal in importance to capability.

    The number of people in the Air Force will decrease. Individual performance must be optimized.

2.1 Increased Tempo
All missions establish a cycle of knowing, planning, acting, and assessing. The cycle repeats, and if we are to minimize losses and maximize effect the cycle must repeat as rapidly as possible.

Increased tempo of operations makes the Force appear larger.[6] If an attacker can strike an enemy twice in the time necessary for the defender to respond once, the attacking force appears to the defender to be twice as large as it actually is. Given fixed funding to improve capability, though, one can ask whether it is more effective to spend the allocation on improving the performance of existing weapons or to spend it on increasing delivery, or sortie rate. Improvements in performance are produced by improved accuracy of weapons, for example. The two categories are not completely independent, of course. An accuracy improvement in weapons can reduce the number of sorties required per target. Thus, more targets can be struck in a given time, and the force appears to be larger. A simple mathematical theory to analyze the situation described was devised by F. W. Lanchester,[7] a British aeronautical scientist, in 1907. Although modern warfare is more complex than envisioned by Lanchester, his theory has survived remarkably well, and we use it here to motivate the reader to accept our concentration on increasing

Effect of Weapons Capability on Battle

Figure I-1(a)

the tempo of operations. We refer the reader to the reference for a complete description of the Lanchester theory, but we display the results of the theory in figures I-1(a) and I-1(b). Figure I-1(a) shows the fraction of an attacking force lost as a function of weapon effectiveness, M. One can think of effectiveness as accuracy, for example, figure I-1(b) shows the fraction of an attacking force lost as a function of the ratio of the size of the forces. For the purposes of this discussion it will suffice to observe that increasing the force size reduces losses faster than does increasing weapon effectiveness. Because of budget limitations, it is unlikely that we can justify large increases in numbers of aircraft, weapons, or people. Therefore, we will concentrate on technologies which increase the apparent force size through increased tempo of operations.

Effect of Apparent Force Size on Battle

Figure I-1(b)

It is certain that most of the weapon systems that will exist in a decade exist now. The F-22 will be the only new aircraft available in a decade. An aircraft based on the Joint Advanced Strike Technologies (JAST) may appear a decade after that to replace the F-16. By the time that the F-22 and JAST appear, new technologies will be available to enhance their performance, but both aircraft are being designed using extant technologies. Thus, in addition to long range projections, we propose technologies and concepts to enhance the current force during the next ten years. These ideas will also lead to better capabilities for the F-22 and JAST. The technologies that will enhance the early 21st century Force are related to improved weapons, improved communications, and improved generation and exploitation of information. Improvement in the reliability of components such as avionics will be necessary to reduce logistics costs and to maintain extended high tempo operations.

The aircraft now planned for the 21st century, such as the F-22, are superior to existing aircraft in the United States and abroad. They will not, however, produce a discontinuous change[8] in the nature of aerospace warfare. Discontinuous change can occur in several ways. It usually occurs as a result of the introduction of new weapons that rapidly transcend the capabilities of older weapons. Firearms were a discontinuous change over weapons propelled by humans. The machine gun and the tank made the horse obsolete. The airplane destroyed the idea that distance provides protection. To a lesser extent new delivery systems or new tactics can produce a discontinuous change in warfare. The precision guided munition and the stealth aircraft are examples of delivery systems. For certain targets, the precision guided munition increased the destructive power of munitions by as much as a factor of 1000, and the stealthy aircraft reduced the effective range of surface-to-air missiles by a substantial amount. The introduction of naval tactics by Rodney at the Battle of Saints in 1780 and the introduction of the concept we now call reduced cycle time by Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 are examples of the force of a new philosophy of warfare.

3.0 The Future Force
What then are the discontinuous changes of the future, and how are they enabled by technology? Both concepts and technologies are described in detail in subsequent volumes. In this volume we delineate the major features. We will set the stage for the discussions that follow by describing the Air Force that will be built from the concepts and technologies proposed.

There will be a mix of inhabited and uninhabited aircraft. We use the term "uninhabited" rather than "unpiloted" or "unmanned" to distinguish the aircraft enabled by the new technologies from those now in operation or planned. The "unmanned" aircraft of the present have particular advantages such as cost or endurance, but they are either cruise missiles or reconnaissance vehicles. The "uninhabited" combat aircraft (UCAV) are new, high performance aircraft that are more effective for particular missions than are their inhabited counterparts. The UCAV is enabled by information technologies, but it enables the use of aircraft and weapon technologies that cannot be used in an aircraft that contains a human. There will be missions during the next three decades that will benefit from having a human present, but for many missions the uninhabited aircraft will provide capabilities far superior to those of its inhabited cousins. For example, shape and function will not be constrained by a cockpit, a human body, or an ejection seat. We believe that the design freedom generated will allow a reduction in radar cross section by at least 12 dB in the frequency bands currently addressed, compared to existing aircraft. A 12 dB reduction in aircraft cross section will reduce the effective range of enemy radar by a factor of two and area coverage by a factor of four. At this point we reach the limit of passive radar cross section reduction, and active methods must be developed. Also, reduction of infrared emissions is an important area where substantial improvements can be made. Other advantages of the UCAV will be described later. There is the possibility of extending UCAV performance into the hypersonic range to enable strikes from the CONUS on high value targets in minutes.

Large and small aircraft will project weapons. At present we think of large aircraft as bombers, tankers, surveillance aircraft, or air launched cruise missile (ALCM) launch platforms. In the future large aircraft will be the first to carry directed energy weapons, and their entry into combat as formidable tactical weapons will cause a discontinuous change in aerospace warfare. Eventually, after establishing their value aboard aircraft, directed energy weapons will move into space. Small UCAVs can be carried aboard and launched from large aircraft to provide intercontinental standoff capability.


Attack by Low Observable UCAVs Deployed by Airlifter

Explosive weapons will be substantially more accurate than those of today, and explosive effectiveness per unit mass will be higher by at least a factor of ten than those of today. As a result, a sortie of the future can be ten times more effective than one of today. Weapon types will range from inexpensive enhanced accuracy weapons without sensors to GPS directed weapons with better than one foot accuracy to microsensor directed microexplosive systems that kill moving targets with grams of explosive.

We must extend airlift capabilities. The current generation of military airlifters and commercial transport aircraft will be useful for the next three decades, but replicating these aircraft with evolutionary upgrades will not provide the necessary capabilities. Even the addition of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) cannot provide enough airlift capacity for the future, and while commercial airlifters will form an important component of the future airlift fleet, their capabilities are limited, and they cannot be exchanged one for one with military airlifters. The future airlifter should be large (10 6 pounds gross takeoff weight), efficient (1.3-1.5 times current aircraft), and long range (12,000 nm). It should have point-of-use delivery capability through precision airdrop as a routine delivery process. Full airdrop capability will reduce theater infrastructure requirements for both the Air Force and the Army at forward locations. Rapid tempo of operations will require rapid resupply. As we take advantage of the operational possibilities enabled by technology, the Air Force of the future will be limited by logistics considerations just as surely as were the forces of Hannibal and Napoleon. We must pay close attention.

The future force will become efficient and effective through the use of information systems to enhance US operations and to confound the enemy. The infancy of this capability is represented today in the F–22. Information and Space will become inextricably entwined. The Information/ Space milieu will interact strongly with the air and ground components, and it is here that commercial technologies and systems will have the largest presence. Defense will not be a driver of important technologies in this area. Surveillance and reconnaissance will be done worldwide from commercial platforms, and international conglomerates may own some of those platforms. High resolution mapping services from space will be purchased. Worldwide weather monitoring will be possible, although current systems are not capable of adequate precision. Precise timing and positioning services will be provided by a new ultra precise, jam resistant Global Positioning System (GPS). Communication of information and instructions throughout the Force will be instantaneous over fiber and satellite networks. Computers and displays will be common, commercial units. Even avionics processors and data busses will be purchased off the shelf. As we improve the capabilities of information equipment, we should remember that the human is an integral part of the system. We must improve the capabilities of the human-machine interface as we improve the machine.

There is an area where development of defense information systems may diverge from development of commercial systems. Those are systems used in Information Warfare (IW). The use of "information munitions" in offensive operations will become an essential component of warfare. The use of "information munitions" will, however, make unusual demands on software and equipment. At present, it appears as though Information Warfare is more of a "bag of tricks" than a system of warfare. As the technologies are better defined, this will change. We must constantly make IW more robust and more effective. Information Warfare has three components. One is the method, or core, of IW which uses computers and software to deceive and destroy enemy information systems. The second component is deployment. Deployment may be as simple as connecting to the Internet, or it may require special communication systems, high power microwave systems, special forces action, or surreptitious individual action. The final component is Defense. Defensive IW will be pursued by the commercial community because of the obvious effects that malicious mischief can have on commerce. The military problem is, however, likely to be different enough that some effort will be required. The commercial solutions should be monitored closely. It is the union of method, deployment, and defense which creates the Information Munition. These components must not become separated if maximum effectiveness is to be achieved. Space and space systems will become synonymous with effective operations. In addition to government investment in military systems, US companies will have large investments in space and information systems. The protection of our assets and the denial of capabilities to an enemy will be essential. The future Force will, eventually, contain space, ground, and airborne weapons that can project photon energy, kinetic energy, and information against space and ground assets. Many space and information weapons will destroy. Others will confuse the enemy and weave the "bodyguard of lies"[9] that will protect our forces.[10] Sensors and information sources will be widely distributed. Sensors onboard fighter aircraft will continue to be important, but they will form a progressively smaller part of the total information source for combat operations. Fighter-mounted sensors, too, will supply information to companion craft as often as they provide information to their bearer. There will be sensors functioning cooperatively aboard small, distributed satellite constellations, sensors aboard uninhabited reconnaissance aerial vehicles (URAVs), sensors aboard weapons, and sensors on the ground delivered by URAVs. We often speak glibly about enhancing capability through information, but we as often forget that information originates as data from active and passive sensors.[11] The power of the new information systems will lie in their ability to correlate data automatically and rapidly from many sources to form a complete picture of the operational area, whether it be a battlefield or the site of a mobility operation. In particular, the accuracy of a single sensor and processor in identifying targets or threats is severely limited. Detection and identification probabilities increase rapidly with sensor diversity and the false alarm probability and error rates decrease correspondingly.

Affordability restrictions demand caution at this point. For the technologist, the intellectual lure of ultra precise sensors and control systems aboard munitions flying at hypersonic speeds is seductive. But, sensors and control systems constitute a large fraction of the cost of a munition, and we see no substantial change to this situation in the future. We properly laud the improvement in capability generated by precision guided weapons. We sometimes forget, however, that Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) do not always produce an increased operational advantage proportional to their increased cost. This situation can change as a result of reduced sensor costs in the future or as the result of reduced performance requirements. It will always be cheaper to carry reusable precision sensors aboard a reusable delivery platform and either to eliminate guidance and control on board the munitions entirely or to use rather inaccurate onboard systems. The trade between munition precision and platform precision will, of course, depend on the survivability of the platform at appropriate release distances and the dependence of cost on munition accuracy. It may be possible to reduce the cost of precision delivery by building reusable, close approach delivery platforms that have precision positioning and sensing systems, reproducible weapon release, and wind measuring equipment onboard. Munitions can be built with low drag coefficients. Significant cost reduction will result from the reuse of sensors and processors. The munition can either have no guidance or can have simple inertial or GPS guidance and low precision controls. This option favors the low observable UCAV for attack of mobile and protected targets.

Finally, the loop must be closed. The operational components of the Air Force must plan together, function together, command and be commanded, exchange information, and assess results collegially with each other, other services, and allies. Planning and directing must be done in parallel rather than in series to sustain high rate operations. Plans must be analyzed continuously at all levels by simulation. We refer to the construct that makes this possible as a complete "internetting of nodes" and as a seamless "operation across networks."12 A node can be an airplane, a general, an Army private, a tank, or a UCAV. A collaborating network may be operated by the US Army or by an allied command. Internetting provides for the nearly direct connection of one of the nodes to any other node. Communication channel, processor, and terminal considerations determine the fundamental physical limitations, but with the exception of radio frequency (RF) channels, these limitations are vanishing as practical limitations to the internetting process. Even RF data channel capacities are increasing as the result of new compression algorithms and error correction schemes. Major difficulties remain, however, in establishing priorities for information transfer and in maintaining adequate security. Capture of nodes must not compromise system integrity. Elimination of these difficulties will be neither easy nor inexpensive. We must solve the important security problems before the full impact of information sciences can be realized.

This low resolution snapshot of the Force was intended to give the reader an idea of the extensive enhancement and integration of capabilities that will be possible in future decades. We hope that the applications of the new technologies are so profound that they are obvious and compelling, and we hope that they stimulate the reader to create personally pleasing combinations of capabilities. For example, improved stealth provides higher effectiveness against both aircraft and SAMs in establishing air superiority. Improved aircraft performance, say through UCAVs will increase survivability in high threat areas. Together, stealth and performance will reduce the reliance on electronic countermeasures with an accompanying reduction in cost and system volatility, and when directed by offboard information and passive sensors, they have the surprise value of a silent force. Large airlifters with point of use delivery capability can provide the military equivalent of "just in time" supply from CONUS, if necessary, with cost reductions and efficiency increases that are as large as those realized by commercial industries. Accompanied by airlifters carrying UCAVs and directed energy weapons for self defense, the airlifter fleet will become a survivable offensive weapon system in high threat areas. Distributed space systems can revisit areas of interest at rates not now possible. Distributed space sensors can operate cooperatively with staring sensors aboard Uninhabited Reconnaissance Air Vehicles (URAVs), which continuously monitor important targets, to optimize the collection and use of intelligence information.

A word about the application of commercial technologies is appropriate. No one doubts that many commercial technologies are applicable to military problems and that their use can reduce system costs and improve utility. There are, however, obligations concomitant with their use. Commercial technologies accompany commercial practices. We must be prepared to change requirements and operating procedures to agree with commercial practice if we are to make efficient use of commercial technology. In the fields of space, communications, and information, the time from concept to deployment must be no longer than two years. Information systems should be replaced in five years. Many processes can be improved by an injection of commercial practice, but the price paid for the improvement will be uncertainty in ultimate performance and survivability. Replacement of damaged units will become more acceptable than hardening to reduce cost. A program development culture that generates continuous improvement from humble beginnings rather than ultimate initial performance will be demanded. The new development culture will require an operational culture that can accept less than optimum performance today in exchange for rapid improvement tomorrow. We must demand reduced cycle time in procurement just as we will demand it in execution.

In the following chapters we will provide much more detail about technologies and concepts. Ultimately, however, the Panel Volumes and the Panel Members provide the depth necessary for implementation.

4.0 Revolutionary Concepts in Context
The word "revolutionary" is in common use, and overuse, today. New World Vistas proposes concepts that we believe to be revolutionary. The word has been used to mean many things, and it is useful to put the term into a context within which we can discuss new technologies and their use. The word is frequently used to identify a "silver bullet" -- a single concept or device that will immediately produce the ascendancy of the user's forces over those of the user's adversaries. The world is not like that. Science, technology, and military inventions are not like that. Nearly always, it is the evolutionary follow-on of a new concept that produces a revolution in capability. For example, the nuclear weapon was the most revolutionary weapon ever invented. It not only changed the nature of warfare but also it changed the nature of all interactions among nations, and it changed the way all science was viewed by the public. The first two nuclear weapons, however useful as a demonstration of the principle, would not, had they been duplicated many times, have had that affect. It was the evolutionary development of the thermonuclear weapon from the fission weapon coupled with the evolution of the ICBM from the V-2 that produced the profound effects on society. Frequently, too, it is the association of well-known principles in an innovative way that produces the revolutionary result. The geometric arrangement of junction voltages between semiconductors in an unusual way produced a transistor. The evolutionary development of Complimentary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) and integrated circuits has led to the information revolution.

Thus, we can seldom expect to produce truly revolutionary effects with the first manifestation of a new technology. In recognition of this fact, demonstrations should not include all aspects of a new technology. Smaller steps should be taken to minimize the total cost and to permit more flexibility. The first attempt to apply new concepts is a necessary, but not sufficient step. In military systems, the second step in the development of a radically new concept must be determined after operational deployment. The warfighters will use the system in innovative ways not described in the manuals, and it is this experience that will define the path to revolution.

We should keep some general guidelines in mind:

    The relationship between revolutionary and evolutionary concepts is complex and complementary.

    Revolutionary ideas often point the way to later applications which are far more useful than the original idea.

    Early applications of revolutionary concepts should not be required to be complete and final weapon systems.

    Identification and development of revolutionary concepts require intuition, innovation, and acceptance of substantial risk.

    We must be prepared for a failure rate greater than 50 percent.

    Most revolutionary ideas will be opposed by a majority of decision makers.

    We must remember that science and science fiction are related only superficially.

    Examples of all these points abound. We invite readers to substitute their favorites.

5.0 The Report
The Air Force must become a force that is tightly integrated within itself, with the other Services, and with allies. It is difficult to write a report on New World Vistas that reflects the integration and, at the same time, displays the component parts in a way that makes their development clear. We will try to expose the nature of the problems and their solutions by writing the report from two aspects. In Chapter II, we will remove technologies from their applications and describe them separately, and we will describe concepts that collect the technologies into integrated units. The reader should constantly imagine each technology and each concept feeding and deriving support from the others.

In Chapter III, we will suggest the immediate tasks that will spawn the new technologies. We will even suggest a few fields now pursued which should be abandoned, although our knowledge of Air Force Science and Technology programs is not deep enough to make the list complete. In Chapter IV, we will suggest changing some of the management concepts for the Air Force Laboratories, and we will identify some characteristics of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) that can be used to make it more effective. It is well known, however, that self analysis is unlikely to be accurate.

Finally, we observe that the relationship of the Air Force to technology is a living, changing one. It is the character of the relationship and the dedication of the people in the Air Force to the application of the newest principles of science and technology that has made it the envy of the world. To the extent that New World Vistas is a part of this process, it should stimulate discussion and analysis as much as it defines new concepts, and its proposals are debatable. If our work causes the Air Force to examine and embrace the notion of discontinuous enhancement through technology, we have succeeded. If a few of our ideas find their way into the Force of the future, our efforts will have been well repaid.

___________________________________________________
1. Memorandum to Dr. McCall from General Fogleman, CSAF and Dr. Widnall, SecAF - Appendix A.
2. General Ronald R. Fogleman, Address to Air Force 2025, Maxwell AFB, AL, 6 September 1995.
3. Classified Volume - on file in SAB office
4. Attack Volume
5. Materials Volume
6. Attack Volume
7. James R. Newman, The World of Mathematics , Simon and Schuster, New York, 1956, vol. 4, pp 2136-2157 Figure I-1(a)
8. We will use the terms "discontinuous change" and "revolutionary" interchangeably
9. Winston Churchill, said to Josef Stalin; Teheran; November, 1943
10. General Ronald R. Fogleman, Speech to NDU/NSIA Global Information Explosion Conference, National Defense University, 16 May 1995
11. Sensors Volume
12. Information Applications Volume

Chapter II
Capabilities and Technologies
1.0 Introduction
We define a set of capabilities which, we believe, are synonymous with an effective Air Force, and we believe that others will agree to their importance. They do not match accepted Mission Areas for two reasons. We experimented with Mission Areas at the Spring Workshop[1] of New World Vistas. We found that Mission Areas were closely related to existing capabilities, and we naturally began to think of new technologies as producing evolutionary enhancements to existing capabilities. Many participants thought that the categories were too narrow and restrictive. Second, when we collected the new ideas they formed categories which mapped into the Mission Areas, but the ideas each applied to several areas, and we began to generate a complex set of charts. Constructing the map is straightforward and instructive, but we leave it as an exercise for the interested reader. We decided to form a set of categories which were natural ones for the technologists and, simultaneously, meaningful for the operators. These primary capabilities, as viewed by the technologist, are entirely consistent with the capabilities of Global Reach-Global Power and the Air Force Core Capabilities. These categories form a bridge for discussion between scientist and warfighter, and we felt that to be a dominant factor in an activity such as New World Vistas.

We reduced the list of essential capabilities to a basic few. We intentionally made the categories broad to encourage broad thinking about important problems. The list is short and is meant to be viewed in the context of the Air Force concept of Global Reach-Global Power. The primary capabilities are:

    Global Awareness

    Dynamic Planning and Execution Control

    Global Mobility in War and Peace

    Projection of Lethal and Sublethal Power

    Space Operations

    People

One can argue that the categories mix support, or infrastructure, and operational capabilities, and that is, indeed, true. However, the 21st century will be characterized by an increasing reliance on devices which operate at the edge of technology and by an increasing worldwide infrastructure in space. Therefore, the education and training of Air Force people will enable all operational capabilities. We must remember, too, that space will contain major threats to the security of the Nation and its Forces as well as containing important operational assets. We believe that Space Operations and People deserve equal footing with the other capabilities.

Each of the capabilities expand to include many subcategories, and each depends on many technologies. In this chapter, we will describe the capabilities and relate the technologies to them. The major technologies will be listed in Chapter III. Do not expect completely logical one-to-one correlations or extremely detailed expositions in this volume. Those features are characteristic of the Panel volumes. We will direct the reader to the appropriate volume through footnotes.

It is our intent to emphasize the close integration of the technologies and the capabilities with one other. Therefore, we will refer to some systems or technologies several times in the chapter. This is not an unintentional redundancy. It is to impress on the reader that capability is based on dependency. We can not afford -- financially or operationally -- to have all systems self contained to the extent that they are now. Offboard sensors and weapon control provide enhancement of capability far beyond their cost. Replicating information functions on all weapon platforms is not only extravagant, it is also less operationally effective than central information processing.

The list of essential capabilities reflects the effect of uniting the Air Force with technologies that will produce a discontinuous enhancement of Air Force capabilities. Those technologies are variously named "high leverage", "revolutionary", or "explosive growth" technologies. A more useful and accurate description is that certain technologies are "coming of age". Information technologies are now an essential part of all Air Force activities, and they will be even more important a decade from now. We should remember, though, that computer programming was an undergraduate course at many universities in the 1950's. The transistor, which makes it all possible, was invented in the 1948. We illustrate this concept intuitively in Figure II-1, which is a graph of a parameter, which we call "importance", that started with a value of 1 and doubled every four years. Importance could be computer speed, PGM performance, or another important measure of the value of a technology.

Figure II-1

If one looks back from a period when the importance has grown by a factor of 1000 from its initial value, the growth seems to be explosive for the past most recent decade, but it seems that nothing much happened for the first 20 years. In fact, the relative growth was constant. This is not a new observation, but it makes the graphical point that in New World Vistas, we are trying to define capabilities that make immediate and efficient use of technologies which have passed the "700" point. Next, we will show uses and effects of the technologies which have passed the "400" point. Finally, we will suggest new capabilities which will demonstrate the use of technologies at the "100" point. One could, for example, identify these states with information technologies, space technologies, and directed energy technologies, respectively.

2.0 Global Awareness
Global awareness means that the Air Force can use affordable means to derive appropriate information about one or more places of interest after a delay which is short enough to satisfy operational needs. This is the goal of the capability we call Global Awareness, but the definition is far too vague to be of practical use. We will explore the idea by describing the strengths and weaknesses of the systems which can make it possible. There is a strong commercial component here, and we will show the connection between military and commercial applications. The systems which enable Global Awareness form a truly joint capability. Although we describe Global Awareness in an air and space context, the application to sea and land should be clear.

Technology has for years made it possible to build relatively inexpensive observation platforms in space which will deliver images from optical or radar sensors at resolutions better than one meter. Images from a few systems are commercially available now, and there will soon be competition among companies to deliver the best product. The Air Force, or the Defense Mapping Agency, should purchase these products for mapping the world at a resolution of one meter. This provides Global Awareness of a sort, but the latency time for a world map is expected to be 90-180 days with local updates of, say, 100 mile square areas in 24-48 hours. A dedicated system could provide high resolution images of several small areas daily. This is an essential capability, but it is not completely adequate.

Mapping at present consists of a huge number of products both digital and analog constructed on an array of coordinate systems with varying precision and accuracy. First a common grid based on WGS-84 should be defined. It may be useful to supply maps which are expressed in unique coordinates, but the source for all these maps should be a common database. The database can be supplied by the commercial imaging system described above. It is not likely, however, that absolute accuracy will be one meter, but it is possible to devise a GPS-based method of calibrating the images. Collaboration with the commercial supplier in satellite design could make the calibration task easier. The goal of precision mapping should be to equip each aircraft and planning system with a map of the entire world to one meter accuracy. The map will require 10-20 terabytes with suitable compression. After the creation of the initial map, only updates need be supplied routinely. Onboard storage will minimize data transmission needs. Storage density will be adequate in a decade. We refer to the high resolution onboard digital map as the "onboard world."

The "onboard world" will enable the ultimate in moving map navigation and self contained, undetectable terrain avoidance. The information can be coupled with navigation aid and airport information supplied by commercial vendors. All Air Force aircraft will have the navigation database to fly anywhere, anytime, on any route independent of external data.

2.1 Distributed Satellites
The manifestation of the concept of Global Awareness is one of distributed constellations of small satellites[2] which cooperate with airborne and ground sensors. We must divest ourselves of the mindset that spatial resolution is the only criterion for evaluating surveillance systems. There are indications that one can derive target information from spectral data coupled with low resolution position information. A system of satellites each having a spatial resolution of 10 meters and, say, 100 spectral bands in the visible and infrared could provide worldwide coverage instantly on demand. Communication limitations will restrict the number of areas which can be covered simultaneously, but even this restriction will disappear as laser cross- and down-links become commonplace. Laser links will approach the capacity of fiber, where 40 Gb/s is becoming routine. Onboard processing and compression can increase information transfer rates. Because of higher cost and the 1/R[4] dependence of signal on satellite altitude, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) systems will be fewer than optical systems, and SAR images will have a latency time of an hour or two.[3] Active systems could also include Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) for chemical and biological agent detection in clear weather and for precision weather observations. These systems will provide missile warning and will enable the tracking of mobile rocket launchers and SAM systems. They can also provide weather information at a level of detail appropriate for combat and mobility operations. High resolution active and passive systems can augment the lower resolution data at revisit rates of one per day. The cooperative, distributed satellites will establish long baselines for precise location of radio frequency emitters on the surface and in space. It will be possible to locate an emitter to an accuracy that will permit the launch of a precision guided munition using GPS coordinates even if transmissions cease.

Onboard processors will make it possible to identify and track moving targets to the extent that tracking and identification can be done by infrared hyperspectral systems. Complete Air-borne Warning and Control System (AWACS)-like performance will be enabled at the second stage of deployment 4 with a combined air and space based system. High resolution radar from space can be enabled by the capability to deploy large, lightweight space structures. Given power available in space, continuous operation of high resolution radar will necessitate antennas having diameters of kilometers. Development of appropriate structures and materials coupled with technologies for correcting RF wavefronts to compensate for antenna imperfections will make space based radar possible. If one requires only limited coverage, say 500 km (the limited diameter), the peak power of a space based radar system can be increased by operating at a duty cycle of only 1/250. It is then necessary, however, to launch enough satellites to provide continuous coverage. Such a system is not likely to be affordable. A bistatic spacebased arrangement with transmitter and receiver separated may provide some relief. The receiver can be composed of a distributed constellation to construct an instantaneous synthetic aperture.

A detailed design of a bistatic system may point the way to cost savings, but the prospects are not encouraging for the next decade. The Uninhabited Reconnaissance Aerial Vehicle (URAV) appears to be the most cost effective vehicle.

Observe that 10 meter resolution does not restrict location to 10 meters. Centroid location is a question of signal-to-noise, and there is no reason that centroid location cannot be done to 2- 3 meters. Thus, lower spatial image resolution can be coupled with precision targeting. If the target can be identified with a low resolution hyperspectral imaging system, the aimpoint can be located to approximately 2 meters. It appears that, if preliminary experiments are verified, the 10 meter hyperspectral system will provide a global observation system which is affordable and effective. We have defined the following space based system to provide maximum affordable coverage world-wide:

    1. Continuous multi-spectral observation at 10 meter resolution with 2-3 meter targeting

    2. Continuous location and targeting of RF emitters to 10 meters

    3. SAR with 1 meter resolution once per hour

    4. Submeter resolution once per day, multispectral and SAR

2.2 Standoff Systems
The systems described in Sec. 2.1 are non-intrusive. At the next level of involvement other possibilities arise. If it is possible to position vehicles within 200-300 nm of a region of interest,

Figure II-2

high resolution staring sensors and SAR's can be carried on URAVs that loiter at 50,000-100,000 feet. Figure II-2 shows range to the horizon from a given altitude.

Continuous monitoring at a resolution of one meter or less is possible. URAVs can work cooperatively with satellite constellations by projecting high power RF beams over the area of interest. The satellites receive reflected signals from targets near the earth to form a distributed bistatic synthetic aperture radar system. Clutter rejection is improved because of the varying reflection angles to different satellites. Moving and fixed targets can be detected with high resolution as the result of the long baseline between satellites. This arrangement limits the number of expensive spaceborne transmitters by restricting coverage to a region of interest. We have added:

5. Continuous Multispectral and SAR observation at 1 meter resolution
6. Continuous bistatic detection and tracking of fixed and moving targets over a limited area

2.3 Overhead URAV Systems
Further improvement in resolution can be obtained in situations where overflight of enemy territory is authorized. Low observable URAVs can carry staring and scanning sensors which produce multispectral and SAR images and LIDAR returns at few centimeter resolution. The URAVs can deploy low altitude or ground based chemical sensors for accurate discrimination of Chemical & Biological (CB) agents and the effluents from Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear (CBN) manufacturing plants. These sensors can be interrogated by driving readout with an RF or optical signal from a satellite or a URAV. The remotely read sensor will have reduced size, weight, power, and vulnerability. Now, the system consists of:

7. Continuous multispectral and SAR observation at 1 centimeter resolution
8. Contact sensors for CBN detection.

2.4 Unattended Ground Sensors
We mentioned the integration of ground sensors into the Global Awareness network as CBN detectors, but a few specific observations should be made. Unattended ground sensors are at present difficult to deploy and to monitor. Deployment by manned intrusion, air or ground, is the norm.[5] It is not clear that deployment and operation are Air Force missions. Technologies now under development and the need for detailed awareness in specific areas of the world can change the situation completely. In addition to CBN detectors, ground sensors are natural candidates to monitor the local weather. Weather monitoring from space is possible, but ground monitoring can be more accurate, more continuous, and far less expensive.

Ground sensors can be deployed by miniature UAV's carried aboard larger UAV's. Microsensor development is proceeding, and, as noted, novel readout methods which have a low probability of intercept (LPI) have been proposed. The Air Force should investigate the advantages of ground sensors for local monitoring before committing to more expensive space and airborne sensors.

2.5 Practical Considerations
It is in the region where friendly and enemy airspace meet that the AWACS and Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) systems will begin to participate. These systems will continue to be very valuable for the next decade, but it is now time to consider the next generation. Some of the functions of these systems can be implemented in space, but for continuous coverage aircraft, deployment appears to be more practical. The 1/R[4] factor in the radar equation exacts great concessions from a space based system. The geometric factor and the limited power from the satellite power bus will limit coverage area severely. The deployment of airborne transmitters and satellite receivers in a bistatic geometry as described above is possible, and this may be the ultimate system. After a decade from now, URAV deployment is likely to be the method of choice, although there is a long term possibility for shifting the balance of continuous surveillance completely back to space. It has been proposed that very large, lightweight structures can be deployed in space to create optics and antennas having dimensions of kilometers.[6] It is the product of power and aperture that determines signal-to-noise, all other factors being equal. The URAV and space options are attractive as replacements for AWACS and Joint STARS. Both the AWACS and the Joint STARS use much of their volume for crew and displays, and loiter time is restricted by fuel consumption and crew limits. The systems of the early 21st century should use high speed processors which will exceed current performance by a factor of 10,000 for AWACS and 1000 for Joint STARS. Processor volume should be no more than 1m 3 . Communication rates of 100 MHz to satellites will be practical almost immediately, and lasercom will appear in a decade. Multiple URAVs can detect and process signals coherently to provide large increases in resolution, and loiter times of tens of hours without refueling are possible.

It is unlikely, of course, that the entire collection of sensors would be deployed simultaneously in a single area of interest. The arrival of higher resolution systems can free the lower resolution systems for use at the periphery of the area of interest.

These systems offer the possibility of monitoring the entire world continuously at reasonably high resolution. By now, the reader has realized that the data rate may be impossibly high. Consider that the actual information content from a 10 m system is one bit per pixel spatial and 100 bits spectral. Both SAR and visible images assume that the total information content is 100 bits/pixel over the entire world once per hour. The data rate is approximately 40 GBits/s continuously. If we observe one percent of the world, 1.3X10 6 km 2 , at a rate of once per second the data rate is 1.3X10 12 /s (1.3 TB/s). State of the art for a single optical fiber is 40 GB/s, and 1.3 TB/s necessitates only 40 fibers. In 10-20 years laser cross- and down-links will be capable of these rates, too. The important issues, however, are: Why would one want so much information? Who would look a