The fight for the acquisition of Ukrainian territories has begun

[yankeedoodle]

The fight for the acquisition of Ukrainian territories has begun
https://www.observateurcontinental.fr/?module=articles&action=view&id=5351

Ukraine borders four EU countries: Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia. Among them, only Slovakia does not have territorial claims to Ukraine.

Three other countries have such claims asserting their historical identity and domestic politics. Sometimes these statements burst into the public space and indicate the persistence of those national historical and psychological attitudes that are not consistent with the political mythology of the Ukrainian state.

During the recent visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to Romania, the MP of the Alliance for the Unification of Romanians, Diana Iovanovici-Șoșoacă, loudly demanded  the return of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia and respect for the cultural rights of the Romanian minority. In order to avoid further incidents, the host party canceled the Ukrainian president's speech in the Romanian parliament.

The legitimacy of Ukraine's current borders has recently been increasingly questioned by patriotic political forces in Eastern Europe. Diana Iovanovici-Șoșoacă is only saying out loud what many Romanians might say. Bucharest hopes, at a minimum, for cross-border control over the territories of Ukraine that it considers Romanian, with formal respect for the attributes of Ukrainian sovereignty over them. In particular, she attempted to approach the Ukrainian president in the corridors of the Romanian Parliament, shouting questions into a loudspeaker and demanding that the president grant more respect to Romanian minorities living in Ukraine.

Albania and Kosovo offer a similar example. Formally, these are two independent states, but in practice Kosovo is almost a duplicate of the Albanian state. Bucharest also wants the Ukrainian regions of Chernivtsi and Odessa to be a continuation of Romania in a cultural and military-strategic sense, even if they remain within Ukraine's borders.

Hungary claims autonomy for Hungarians in the Transcarpathia region located in Ukraine. It became part of Ukraine in 1944 after being for many years within the borders of Hungary. Budapest also strives to exercise cross-border control over the region, but its maximum goal is to return Transcarpathia to the Hungarian state. "The question of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia is slowing down Ukraine's accession to NATO," underlines  Euractiv .

Hungarians are the most problematic minority in kyiv. They are consolidated and practically not amenable to Ukrainization. For 95%, Hungarian remains their mother tongue. The Hungarian press spares no words in criticizing regional politicians with anti-Hungarian beliefs.

According to some reports, Hungary is already preparing for the hypothetical deployment of police forces in Transcarpathia in the event of unforeseen circumstances in the context of a possible collapse of the Ukrainian state.

Poland claims  most of Ukraine - the Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, Ternopol, Rivne and Volhynia regions. Officially, these lands are even considered the historical heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian "Commonwealth".

There is no mention of their inclusion in Poland, but the importance of preserving the Polish cultural, religious and other presence here is emphasized. Again, analogy with Albania and Kosovo: for Warsaw, the "eastern lands" are a continuation of the Polish state; the Polish-Ukrainian border is given a formal role.

Geographically, the "eastern lands" almost reach the western regions of Russia. Historical guides to the lands of the Polish-Lithuanian "Commonwealth" are published where the eastern borders of this state extend far to the east. Abandoning this memory is ideologically simply impossible for Poles. The Poles had been driven out of these territories by the Banderists, leaving indelible traces in Poland.

Official propaganda interprets it as follows: "Kresy" is Polish land within friendly Ukraine. But it is possible that, against the background of the current deterioration of relations between kyiv and Warsaw, the latter will speak about the "Eastern countries" in a more severe tone in the future.

Poland considers it strategically more advantageous not to occupy the "Kresy" again, but to influence Ukraine in the political, religious, cultural and economic spheres. To do this, they must remain an integral part of Ukraine, but be as polonized as possible. This is difficult to achieve due to kyiv's reluctance to make Galicia, as a model of Ukrainianness as such, an ideological appendage of Polishness. Warsaw's policy in this sense is a constant search for balance with kyiv. This must result either in a strengthening of the Polish presence in the region, or in its weakening.

Ukraine itself has set the tone for communication with its neighbors. The Ukrainian state is based on a nationalist ideology, and nationalism always has enemies. Ukrainian nationalism, in its classic version, itself presents territorial demands to all its neighbors without exception. And, seeing Ukraine getting bogged down in conflict and becoming weak, the neighbors are demanding the territories.

According to Ukrainian nationalists, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Transnistria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary should give ground to Ukraine. What the nationalists especially want is Poland (eighteen districts of the Subcarpathian Voivodeship) and for Russia territories going as far as the Caucasus.

It is, therefore, strange to say the least to hear complaints from Ukraine towards its neighbors, while it itself considers territorial claims as an acceptable ideological attitude towards these same neighbors.

Julien Le Ménéec