ISSER HAREL

[blueocean]

read:
http://www.bollyn.com/index/?id=10769

+
http://www.bollyn.info/    together with page search for the name: "Isser Harel"

gets you:

ISRAELI "SECURITY" AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER
Mossad Chief Isser Harel Predicted 9-11 in 1979


His Crack Team Got the Port Authority Security Contract in 1987

What Exactly Was Their Role in 9-11 ?

(The next chapter of Solving 9-11 will reveal the Israeli network behind 9-11.)

There is a very important but little-known history of senior Israeli intelligence officers being involved in security at the World Trade Center.  Being in charge of security at the twin towers was obviously crucial to the 9-11 operation.  The explosive charges and Thermite that evidently demolished the three towers could not have possibly been placed in the buildings without the perpetrators having complete control of the security of the complex.  Control of security at the WTC was something crack veterans of Mossad had sought since 1987.  

A team of the most senior Israeli intelligence veterans named Malkin and Ben Dor first obtained the security contract for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PA) in 1987, according to a Washington Post article from April 12, 1987.  The Port Authority operates the airports and was the owner and operator of the World Trade Center complex.

What needs to be pointed out about Peter Zvi Malkin and Avraham Shalom Ben Dor is that these men were the crack Israeli intelligence agents who worked with Isser Harel, the director of Mossad, since 1949.  They were sent by Harel to Argentina in 1960 to kidnap Adolf Eichmann.  Eitan and Ben Dor were involved in the theft of 500 lbs. of plutonium from Pennsylvania in 1986.


Isser Harel is the former head of Israeli intelligence who predicted the 9-11 attacks in 1979.  Why were Harel's senior agents trying to get control of security at the World Trade Center in 1987?  Were they trying to stop Arab terrorism or were they trying to stage it?  

See Chapter 2 of Solving 9-11 for the details about Harel's 9-11 prediction from 1979.   Solving 9-11 is what this effort is all about.  The next chapter is the culmination of years of research into the Israeli network behind 9-11.  

The following article is part of the background reading for the forthcoming chapter of Solving 9-11, which will be sent to supporters and donors this week.  Click on "Read more" (just below this posting) and then on the print button in the upper right-hand corner to print out the entire article from the Washington Post.

The Post article concludes:

Malkin gave an interview to The New York Times last year recounting his role while an Israeli intelligence agent in the kidnaping of Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann in Buenos Aires in 1960. It has been reported in Israel that other members of that team included Shalom / Bendor and Rafi Eitan, who gained notoriety last year because he ran the Jonathan Jay Pollard espionage operation against the United States.

The Washington Post reported last year [1986] that Eitan, posing as a chemist, had traveled in 1968 to a Pennsylvania nuclear processing plant that was suspected of secretly diverting several hundred pounds of weapons-grade uranium to Israel. A declassified Federal Bureau of Investigation document shows that another Israeli accompanying Eitan on that trip was "Abraham Bendor, department of electronics.


One year later these are the Israeli criminals (Mossadniks) who got the contract to provide security for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.  Am I making sense yet?

Zionism does not have to be a criminal enterprise but it sure turned out that way!  I feel sorry for those Israelis whose ideals and nation have been so completely corrupted by a criminal gang at the top.  Destroying 395 Palestinian villages and towns in 1948 marked the birth of a criminal state in 1948.  It's been all downhill from there.

The forthcoming chapter of Solving 9-11 is entitled "The Architects of Terror:  Mapping the Israeli Intelligence Network Behind 9-11."  Dirty Rafi, Ben Dor, and Malkin were all in on the 9-11 set-up.  This was an operation that was prepared over two decades prior to September 11, 2001.  


This article explains the Israeli intelligence connections behind three key aspects of 9-11:  the infiltration of the U.S. military and aviation computer networks, the security of the World Trade Center, and the Kroll-Greenberg connection to Israeli intelligence.

[Anonymous]

yea, i was just reminding mike about this... also with dov zakheim in the PNAC and netanyahu a separate section can be made with all these "jewish prophecies" about 9/11 or a foreknowledge section that could include the odigo instant messages and the "we were there to document the event" stuff..

[LatinAmericanview]

where is the the url for the article? Thanks in advance

[blueocean]

http://www.bollyn.info/ together with  ( ctr + f) page search for the name: "Isser Harel"

gets you the article

the other link goes deeper in to it :  http://www.bollyn.com/index/?id=10769

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

Harel - he likely had a hand in Killing Kennedy:

"HE WOULDN'T EVEN HAVE CAUGHT YOUR EYE"

Moshe Tabor, the Mossad operative who captured Eichmann, said Harel played an instrumental role in the operation: "If you were in a room with Isser and a hundred other people, he wouldn't even have caught your eye. He was small and quiet. He had a sharp ability to analyze situations and reach the right conclusions. Isser was the one who coordinated the whole Eichmann operation."

In a television interview aired long after Eichmann's capture in 1960, Harel said he told (then Israeli) Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion: "I have brought you a present. Eichmann is here." Harel's book recounting the abduction – "The House on Garibaldi Street" – became a best-seller and was turned into a Hollywood movie.

OBTAINING KRUSHCHEV'S FAMOUS 1956 "SECRET SPEECH"

Among his other triumphs was when he handed James Jesus Angleton, the head of the CIA's counterintelligence division, the full text of Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev's famous 1956 "secret speech" denouncing Stalin, a copy of which the Mossad had obtained.

Born Isser Halperin in Vitebsk, Russia (the region in which the famed painter Marc Chagall grew up and depicted in many of his paintings), Harel moved with his family to Latvia in 1922 and to Palestine in 1929. He fought for the British against the Nazis in the 1940s, while at the same time gathering intelligence for the Haganah against the British who then controlled Palestine. He became head of Haganah intelligence in 1944, and was appointed deputy head of the Mossad in 1952.

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

Founding father of the Mossad, Isser Harel, passes away
Jeruselem Post ^ | Feb 18 | internet staff

Posted on Tuesday, February 18, 2003 6:49:17 PM by ganeshpuri89

Founding father of the Mossad, Isser Harel, the man who conducted the capture of Adolf Eichmann, has passed away.

Harel passed away at Beilinson hospital in Petah Tikva Monday night. He was 91.

Harel was the first head of the Mossad, and was responsible for the capture of Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires's Garibaldi Street in May 1960.

Harel quit the Mossad in 1963 after disagreeing with military intelligence over the work of a German scientist in Egypt.

By capturing Eichmann made the Mossad into a household word.

In his account of the operation, The House on Garibaldi Street, Mossad chief Isser Harel explained the reason behind his determination to bring Eichmann to justice: 'In everything pertaining to the Jews, he was the paramount authority and his were the hands that pulled the strings controlling manhunt and massacreֹ this man was pointed to as the head butcher.'

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/846333/posts

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The Journalist's Connections: How Israel Got Russia's Biggest Pre-glasnost Secret
Authors: Yossi Melman a;Dan Raviv b
Affiliations:      a Nieman Fellow, Harvard University,
   b CBS News,
DOI: 10.1080/08850609008435140

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/conten ... 926&db=all

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ISRAEL
Other Operations Included here:

    1. Khrushchev's Speech

    2. Attack on Iraq's Nuclear Facilty (1981)

    3. Miscellaneous

1. Khrushchev's Speech

Melman, Yossi, and Dan Raviv. "The Journalist's Connections: How Israel Got Russia's Biggest Pre-Glasnost Secret." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 4, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 219-225.

      Shin Bet -- not Mossad -- got Khrushchev's speech. Question: How definitive?

2. Attack on Iraq's Nuclear Facilty (1981)

Claire, Rodger W. Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel's Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the Bomb. New York: Random House, 2004.

    Rosales, Air & Space Power Journal 19.2 (Summer 2005), finds that the author describes Israel's attack on Saddam Hussein's Osirak nuclear facility in 1981 "with remarkable clarity and accuracy. Granted access by the Israeli government to formerly classified documents and voluntary contact with all eight pilots, the mission coordinator, and cockpit film of the attack[,] Rodger Claire captures details previously unknown to the rest of the world. His style combines historical fact with clandestine thrill and the suspense of cloak and dagger, making the reader privy to every perilous decision made by the Israeli leadership."

    For Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), the author "fills in the details of Operation Babylon in an easy-reading style, though his grasp of administrative and technical detail sometimes falters." The book is strongest when "Claire describes the pilot selection process, the technical problems involved in the attack ... and the step-by-step execution of the mission itself."

3. Miscellaneous

Alexander, Yonah, Yuval Ne'Eman, and Ely Tavin, eds. Future Terrorism Trends. Washington, DC: Global Affairs, 1991.

      Surveillant 2.1 notes that this work includes a chapter on, "'The Role of Intelligence in Combating Terrorism: The Israeli Experience,' by General Yehoshua Saguy, former chief of intelligence, Israeli Defense Forces, currently a member of the Knesset."

Bar-Zohar, Michael, and Haber Eitan. The Quest for the Red Prince. New York: Morrow, 1983.

      Wilcox: "Mossad assassination of Palestinian guer[r]illa and murder of Algerian by mistake."

Dan, Uri, and Yeshayahu Ben-Porat. The Secret War: The Spy Game in the Middle East. New York: Sabra, 1970.

      Constantinides identifies this as an account of a number of Israeli, Egyptian, and Soviet espionage cases involving Israel. The Israel Beer and Wolfgang Lotz cases receive the greatest attention. Dan and Ben-Porat present their material "without indicating sources, except infrequently in the text.... There are a number of errors in their treatment of other intelligence services and their roles."

      See Wolfgang Lotz, The Champagne Spy: Israel's Master Spy Tells His Story (New York: St. Martin's, 1972).

Jones, Clive. "'A Reach Greater than the Grasp': Israeli Intelligence and the Conflict in South Lebanon, 1990-2000." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 1-26.

    Israel's overall intelligence effort in South Lebanon was "conceptually flawed. The inability to regard Hizb'allah as anything more than terrorists, or to look beyond the more extreme rhetoric at their emergence into the mainstream of Lebanese politics produced erroneous intelligence assessments."

Lotz, Wolfgang.

    1. The Champagne Spy: Israel's Master Spy Tells His Story. New York: St. Martin's, 1972. New York: Manor, 1973. [pb]

          Surveillant 3.2/3 identifies Lotz as an "Israeli soldier who spied in Egypt from 1960 to 1965 while posing as a ... German." Constantinides notes that disagreement exists over aspects of Lodz' account, but concludes that this is "nevertheless a rare work -- the story of a post-World War II non-Soviet illegal operation written by the illegal himself." Lotz' Handbook for Spies offers further insight into Lodz the man and Lodz the spy.

    2. A Handbook for Spies. New York: Harper & Row, 1980.

          Surveillant 3.2/3 describes A Handbook for Spies as "something of a do-it-youself manual for testing your suitability to be a spy." To Constantinides, the book "not only reflects [the author's] experiences and his outlook stemming from his work in Egypt but reveals much about Lodz himself.... Some of his observations on the agent and espionage are universally pertinent, while others seem to fit his particular experiences and circumstances."

Schack, Howard H., with H. Paul Jeffers. A Spy in Canaan: My Life as a Jewish-American Businessman Spying for Israel in Arab Lands. New York: Birch Lane Press, 1993.

      Surveillant 3.2/3 says that the author worked for Mossad from mid-1970s to late 1980s.

Schleiffer, Ron. "Psychological Operations: A New Variation of an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006): 1-19.

Schleiffer, Ron. Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Media Politics and Military Strategies. Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2006.

    For Gordon, DIJ 16.2 (2007), this work "provides valuable insights into the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians." It "is especially strong in its discussion of media policy in the furtherance of strategy.... Israeli fear and distrust of propaganda resulted in an information mechanism [that] was inadequate to deal with the challenge presented by the Intifada. Palestinians on the other hand ... understood the power of propaganda and did not hesitate to employ it in their struggle."

    Perry, NWCR 61.2 (Spring 2008), believes that this work "offers a unique, though logically flawed, perspective of the first intifada, which he describes as 'political warfare.'" The author "analyzes the successful Palestinian tactics and compares them to the unsuccessful Israeli response through the components of 'psychological operations' (PSYOP) as presented in the U.S. Army Manual of Psychological Warfare.... [T]his work is ultimately unsatisfying, because its organization and thesis have logical flaws."

Silman-Cheong, Helen. Wellesley Aron: A Rebel With a Cause -- A Memoir. London: Frank Cass, 1991.

      Surveillant 2.2 identifies this as the biography of a "Jewish Palestinian who worked clandestinely for the Hagannah in the US during Israel's War of Independence."

Sumaida, Hussein Ali, with Carole Jerome. Circle of Fear: From the Mossad to Iraq's Secret Service. Toronto: Stoddart, 1991. London: Robert Hale, 1992. Circle of Fear: My Life as an Israeli and Iraqi Spy. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1994.

      According to RJB, Surveillant 1.6/2.6, the author, whose father was a high-ranking official and an intimate of Saddam Hussein, claims to have worked with Mossad in Europe and later with the Iraqis. "Despite an occasional tendency toward glib generalization, this would seem to be a powerful and informative book; its many plausible, but unsupported, assertions should be carefully evaluated."

      Ashton, I&NS 9.4, sees Sumaida as "more concerned to vindicate his own actions than to dwell in any detail on intelligence structures and methods.... [Some] sections seem to have been sensationalized ... [and] his evidence is little more than hearsay." It would be "difficult to show" that his "claims could be relied on."

      For Karl, WIR 15.2, "there is something not quite right in th[is] story." There is no way "to confirm or verify [Sumaida's] stories regarding his frequent encounters with the Mukhabarat, the CIA, or Canadian intelligence officials." There is also some "questions about who actually wrote this book, and when and why it was written."

Szulc, Tad. The Secret Alliance: The Extraordinary Story of the Rescue of the Jews Since World War II. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1991.

      According to Surveillant 2.2, the "Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society ... created secret intelligence networks, funded by Mossad, to organize illegal immigration... -- essentially a massive and complex covert operation." Glick, WPNWE, 30 Dec. 1991-5 Jan. 1992, praises Szulc for recording the exploits of the participants in the "secret alliance" with an "unadorned precision."

http://intellit.muskingum.edu/israel_fo ... erops.html

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The History of Mossad's framework for creating clandestine relations with countries and national movements under the principle that "my enemy's enemy is my friend."
The aims of this book do not include recounting the history of the secret triangular relationships between Iran, the United States and Israel in the period prior to the rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeini. Nevertheless, one cannot grasp the magnitude of the blow that the revolution dealt to the defense establishments of America and Israel and their intelligence agencies, as well as the hostility that the new regime felt towards those countries, without a brief description of the clandestine aspects of those relationships.

From day one, Israeli strategic planners realized that their country could survive only short wars that featured an immediate shift of the battle to enemy soil. This required military strength and the capability for skilful maneuvering, coupled with a rapid reserve force mobilization system that would be able to powerfully engage the enemy's formations shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. Israel's economy could never withstand a prolonged high-alert situation with its entire army on the border.
In adopting this defense strategy, reliable intelligence about enemy capabilities and intentions became absolutely crucial. This led Israel to establish a strong, well-financed, and influential intelligence community. Later on, espionage agencies were also used for other objectives, mainly for
procurement of valuable technological know-how and acquisition of strategic raw materials, as well as for counter-terrorism. The size of Israel and the threats it faces also created the need for a weapon of last resort, an Armageddon solution. Israel used its intelligence services to advance its nuclear program, acquiring essential materials and technological know-how. It is highly doubtful whether Israel could have developed this capability without the help of its intelligence community.
Israel came to realize that its position in the Third World was hardly secure. It would face an uphill diplomatic struggle with the Arabs, and possibly also with Russia.i If it wished to achieve its foreign and strategic policy targets in Asia and Africa, it would have to do so through the back door, in secrecy.ii
Thus, Israel aimed to forge regional alliances with forces that were hostile to its own enemies, mainly the Arab states, on the principle that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." The founder of the Mossad, Reuven Shiloah, termed this effort the "Peripheral Alliance Strategy," a reference to the establishment of contacts, mostly clandestine, with countries located in the "outer belt" surrounding Israel (namely countries that border Israel's neighboring enemies from the other side – Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia) and with underground movements of minorities having shared interests (like the Kurds in Iraq or Christians in Lebanon and Southern Sudan). David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, was a strong proponent of this policy. With the Mossad taking the lead, the Peripheral Alliance Strategy provided a compass for Israeli activity in the Middle East and Africa.iii

Another cornerstone of Israel's foreign policy was the attempt to forge itself into a strategic and intelligence asset to United States. The latter had tried
to establish a presence in several African states, but was rejected by some because of the fear of imperialist motives common among the young political entities of Africa. Israel was eager to demonstrate that despite its diminutive size and lack of natural resources, it could succeed where Uncle Sam could not. Israel sought to position itself as the final frontier protecting the West from the spread of Communism into Asia and Africa.iv Harel says that it was then that he realized how Israel could operate as "the long arm of the United States" in these arenas.
Isser Harel, who headed the Mossad from 1952 to 1963 and was probably the most influential figure in the history of Israeli intelligence,v refers to the Suez Campaign of 1956 as a turning point in his ability to gain a foothold in the Third World.vi Though a political fiasco, the Sinai Campaign bolstered the prestige and image of the IDF as a first-rank fighting force and convinced many decision-makers around the world that Israel – eight years after its establishment – was a fact of life in the Middle East, and that it was there to stay. Later on, Iranian military personnel conveyed to their Israeli counterparts how deeply impressed they had been by the IDF's performance in the Sinai Campaign.vii

After the Suez Campaign, the Mossad spearheaded the Israeli offensive in Asia and Africa. With Ben-Gurion's blessing, Harel sought to help friendly countries build up their domestic secret services and military strength, not to confront external enemies, but against what he describes as "the fifth column that Russia and Egypt tried to establish wherever they could, through coercion and subversion." Harel insisted that though intelligence instruction would be
provided by the intelligence services and military training by the army, the Mossad would retain overall control.viii
In the mid- and late-1950's Shiloah, then adviser to the Foreign Minister and envoy to the United States, forged a special relationship between the Israeli and American intelligence communities. He made the Asian and African initiative one of his top priorities and used his contacts in the State Department and CIA to convince the United States of the importance of an Israeli presence on those continents.ix Shiloah met with high-ranking African officials on American soil.x This was also one the topics discussed between him and James Angleton, the CIA's head of counterespionage, and probably the most powerful and loyal ally of Israel within the agency, past or present.xi As early as 1960, CIA director Allen Dulles was quoted as saying that Israel was now the only ally in the Middle East on which the CIA could rely.xii
The foundations built by Shiloah, together with the evidence of the Mossad's ability to collect information that was made available to the CIA,xiii resulted in a close relationship between the two organizations with regular, daily discussions since the mid-1960's and the sharing of top secret information and assessments. Apart from the political and diplomatic angles, from the intelligence point of view the bottom line was a genuine American interest in Israeli intelligence achieving deep penetration of both the Middle East and Africa. For its part, Israel wanted to prove itself extremely important to the Americans, and thereby qualify for funding and for information obtained with technologies that, at the time, were far beyond Israeli reach such as advanced communications interception (SIGINT), and satellite and aerial photography (IMINT ).xiv

The Mossad's cooperation with the CIA evolved at the same time as DID relations between the IDF and the American army and navy, between the U.S. National Security Agency and Unit 8200 (Israeli Military Intelligence's SIGINT unit), between the Shin Bet, Israel's internal security agency and its American counterpart the FBI, and between the Israeli Defense Ministry and the Pentagon, concerning weapons sales and joint development projects.
Israel maintained close surveillance over Egyptian and Soviet activity in Asia and Africa, including even in spheres such as agriculture and commerce.xv The information it derived was used in barter deals with Western intelligence agencies, mainly the CIA. Israel supplied the United States with information about collaboration and military transactions between countries in the Middle East and Africa and the Soviets that, according to Harel (in the last interview he gave in his life, to the author of this book) "were on a scale that amazed the Americans."xvi The American government did not fail to acknowledge Israel's contribution.xvii
The Peripheral Alliance Strategyxviii was given the codename "Klil" (Hebrew for "perfection"). Within its framework, a cooperation agreement was signed in August 1958 between the Mossad and its Turkish counterpart, MIT (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati, National Intelligence Organization). Later, through the mediation of Reuven Shiloah, it was joined by the Iranian SAVAK, the Persian acronym for "the Royal Organization for Security and Intelligence." xix The tripartite agreement was named Trident, or "Ultra-Watt"

Immediately afterwards, Ben-Gurion sent a personal letter to President Eisenhower, in which he explained: "With the goal of erecting a high dam to stem the Nasserite-Soviet tidal wave, we have begun tightening our links with
several states on the outside perimeter of the Middle East ... . Our goal is to organize a group of countries, not necessarily an official alliance, that would be able to resist Soviet expansion by proxy, such as Nasser."

The Trident agreement called for periodic meetings between the heads of the intelligence bodies of the three states, with a different country serving as host each time. Israel considered this an unprecedented strategic achievement, having positioned itself as the central axis between two Muslim countries in a military-intelligence pact. In regional disputes that arose between Turkey and Iran, Trident served as a platform and Israel as arbitrator. Harel even ordered the construction of a special luxury installation near the Mossad Academy, north of Tel-Aviv, in order to host these meetings and other secret guests.xx
The Six-Day War of June 1967 gave a sharp boost to the military and intelligence ties between Iran and Israel. The shah was highly appreciative of Israel's military achievements and admired Moshe Dayan, Israel's charismatic defense minister, and his orders for weaponry grew in direct proportion. From 1967 and up to his ouster in 1979, the shah was Israel's greatest friend. His fear of a Soviet invasion and his detestation of the Arabs brought him closer and closer to the state of the Jews and of course, the arsenal of deadly playthings that it possessed.

After the Six-Day War, relations between Israel and another target of Klil, the Peripheral Alliance Strategy, Ethiopia, peaked as well, particularly in the intelligence realm. Israel's grasp of Ethiopian domestic affairs was so highly-rated that the Iranian intelligence attaché to Addis requested permission to use the Mossad's annual assessment of Ethiopia for his own reports.xxi Given the close relationship, Mossad director Maj. Gen. (res.) Meir Amit (who had
succeeded Isser Harel in 1963) decided that the time had come to make Ethiopia the fourth prong in Trident.
Emperor Haile Selassie, who considered it a great honor for Ethiopia to be asked to cooperate with other regional powers, gladly agreed to join in.xxii In early 1968, the annual meeting of the intelligence alliance took place in Addis Ababa. Three relatively large delegations from the Mossad, the SAVAK and the Turkish MIT landed in Ethiopia in special aircraft. For three days, the delegations discussed the mutual strategic interests of all the parties and, to the host's delight, dedicated special time to Ethiopia's place in the pact.xxiii

"At the time," observed a former top Mossad official who was involved in planning the Klil meetings: "All the heads of intelligence in Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia had a direct link to the boss, whether it was the shah or the Turkish prime minister or Haile Selassie. Through Klil, it was possible to pass messages and ideas directly to the ruler. It gave us a double orgasm, and with the inclusion of Ethiopia, a triple orgasm."xxiv
Israel's successes in enhancing and enlarging the Klil agreement enhanced its position in Washington, strengthening James Angleton's ability to promote his pro-Israel approach in the CIA.

The most secret operation of that period was carried out by Israel with the cooperation of the United States and Iran, behind Turkey's back though literally in it's back yard. As part of the Peripheral Alliance Strategy, the Mossad had established covert ties with the Iraqi Kurdish underground, headed by Mulla Mustafa Barazani, which was fighting the central government in Baghdad with the aim of achieving independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. The Israelis decided to come to their help, in order to make them into as much of a nuisance to the Iraqis as possible, and to establish an intelligence foothold in the Arab world's rear.
Two problems had to be surmounted: Firstly, to get agents and materiel into Iraqi Kurdistan, permission was required from the Iranians and secondly, any mention of the Kurdish issue was like a red flag to the Turks, who had a large Kurdish minority and were battling its underground militia, the PKK. Mossad director Amit relates: "The Americans were also interested in links with the Kurds, mainly to bolster their intelligence surveillance of the Soviet Union, but in view of their close ties with Turkey they were in an even more delicate situation and had an even more difficult problem than us. The upshot was that the CIA asked us to handle the matter, to build a secret channel of communications with the Kurds, so that the Americans could use it without the Turks knowing about it."
Amit met the shah, and persuaded him to give the Israelis free passage to Kurdistan, without telling the Turks. After clearing it with the United States, the Iranian monarch agreed, but without any great joy. For seven years, Israel provided assistance to the Kurds in a variety of fields – intelligence and military advisers, instructors in commando and terrorist tactics, enormous amounts of weaponry, food, medical equipment and more. All of the shipments passed though Iran, whether by sea or by air. CIA personnel were allowed to use these supply channels in order to infiltrate Iraq and the Soviet Union and carry out various missions there, enjoying the protection and means provided by the Israelis. The Mossad managed to combine the operation with another assignment: the rescue of tens of thousands of Jews from Iraq, where they suffered persecution and humiliation because of their religion, and to bring them to Israel via Kurdistan and Iran.
Shimon Peres, who was Israel's defense minister in the mid-1970s (and in 2007 became Israel's figurehead state president, at the age of 83): "The shah was trying to put Iran through a revolution of modernity, and that revolution seemed very problematic indeed. One day I came to see the shah, and he suggested that we go and take a look at his helicopter base. There were thousands of the things there, from America, at five million dollars each. I spoke to some of the pilots. Some were village boys who'd hardly finished elementary school, not to speak of the education that a pilot needs. I asked the shah why he needed all those helicopters. He replied in all seriousness that if the Russians invaded Iran, they would do so in thousands of tanks across the mountains, and the helicopters would be higher than the mountains." It's clear Peres didn't think much of the shah's strategy, but to grasp what he really thought, you had to see his eyes as he spoke.
In those days, Iran was being very careful not to put all its eggs in one basket. It did not purchase complete weapons systems from Israel, but only spare parts and ammunition, buying its tanks from Britain and its aircraft from America. And to maintain a balance, it bought "soft vehicles" and artillery from the Soviet Union. The Israelis were trying to increase Iran's dependence on the local military industries. "We wanted to get a grip on the buyer," explains a source who was involved in the deals. "We understood that if they bought an entire system, later they would have to have the parts and the technicians and the upgrades. That way, they are tied to us for ever and ever."

The point man in these endeavors was Uri Lubrani, the Israeli ambassador to Iran. At first, they bore little fruit, and even a secret visit to Iran by prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in July 1975 and his meeting with the shah never helped. The way was cleared only in the wake of Egypt's rapprochement with the United States once Gamal Abdel Nasser was out of the way and Anwar Sadat had taken over, and Henry Kissinger had begun his relatively successful efforts to thaw the freeze in the political processes between Israel and the Arab states. Once the shah sensed that a peace process between Israel and the Arabs and was making headway, he felt more comfortable with strengthening his secret ties with the Jewish state.

http://www.thesecretwarwithiran.com/The ... rategy.pdf

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Index to International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence

Volumes 1 to 16 (1986–2003)

by Ralph Erskine
Adams, Jefferson, Crisis and Resurgence: East German State Security: 2(4) 487-512
Adams, Jefferson, Probing the East German State Security Archives: 13(1) 21-34
Albini, Joseph L. and Julie Anderson, Whatever Happened to the KGB?: 11(1) 26-56
Al-Marashi, Ibrahim, The Family, Clan, and Tribal Dynamics of Saddam's Security and Intelligence Network: 16(2) 202-211
Alvarez, David, Diplomatic Solutions: German Foreign Office Cryptanalysis, 1919-1945: 9(2) 169-185
Alvarez, David, Left in the Dust: Italian Signals Intelligence, 1915-1943: 14(3) 388-408
Amon, Moshe, Cultural Clues: The Nature of Intelligence After Rabin's Assassination: 9(1) 1-15
Anderson, Elizabeth E., The Security Dilemma And Covert Action: The Truman Years: 11(4) 403-427
Anderson, Julie and Joseph L. Albini, Ukraine's SBU and the New Oligarchy: 12(3) 282-324
Anderson, William Henry, Probability Analysis for the Case of Yellow Rain: 3(1) 77-82
Andradé, Dale, The Vietnam War's Secret Side: 14(4) 582-586

Bacon, John, The French Connection Revisited: 4(4) 507-523
Bagley, Tennent H., Bane of Counterintelligence: Our Penchant for Self-Deception: 6(1) 1-20
Bagley, Tennent H., Treason in the KGB: New Facts from Inside: 5(1) 63-75
Baker, Jeffrey L., Domestic and National Security Wiretaps: A Fourth Amendment Perspective: 12(1) 1-17
Bar-Joseph, Uri and Zachary Sheaffer, Surprise And Its Causes in Business Administration and Strategic Studies: 11(3) 331-350
Bar-Joseph, Uri, A Bull in a China Shop: Netanyahu and Israel's Intelligence Community: 11(2) 154-174
Bar-Joseph, Uri, Israel Caught Unaware: Egypt's Sinai Surprise of 1960: 8(2) 203-220
Barkin, Edward S. and L. Michael Meyer, COMINT and Pearl Harbor: FDR's Mistake: 2(4) 513-531
Barrett, David M., Glimpses of a Hidden History: Sen. Richard Russell, Congress, and Oversight of the CIA: 11(3) 271-298
Barzilai, Gad and Gideon Doron, The Middle East Power Balance: Israel's Attempts to Understand Changes in Soviet-Arab Relations: 5(1) 35-47
Baugher, Thomas R., Swans Swimming in the Sewer: Legal Use of "Dirty Assets" by CIA: 9(3) 435-471
Baumard, Philippe, From Noticing to Making Sense: Using Intelligence to Develop Strategy: 7(1) 29-73
Bell, J. Bowyer, Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communications and the Rebel Ecosystem: 3(1) 15-43
Bell, J. Bowyer, Dragonworld (II): Deception, Tradecraft, and the Provisional IRA: 8(1) 21-50
Bell, J. Bowyer, Toward a Theory of Deception: 16(2) 244-279
Bellocchi, Luke P., Assessing the Effectiveness of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996: 14(3) 366-387
Ben-Zvi, Abraham, Between Warning and Response: The Case of the Yom Kippur War: 4(2) 227-242
Beres, Louis René, Getting Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Israel, Intelligence and False Hope: 10(1) 75-90
Beres, Louis René, Intelligence and Nuclear Terrorism: Preventing "Pain into Power": 9(2) 159-167
Beres, Louis René, Preventing the Ultimate Nightmare. Nuclear Terrorism Against the United States: 10(3) 333-342
Beres, Louis René, The Iranian Threat To Israel: Capabilities And Intentions: 9(1) 159-167
Bisher, Jamie, German and Chilean Agents in Peru: Entwined by a Yen for Espionage: 6(2) 205-212
Bittman, Ladislav, The Use of Disinformation by Democracies: 4(2) 243-261
Blash, Edmund Charles II, Strategic Intelligence Analysis and National Decisionmaking: A Systems Management Approach: 6(1) 55-68
Bloom, Murray Teigh, The Bank Note World's Security Obsession: 2(4) 533-545
Bloom, Murray Teigh, Uncle Sam: Bashful Counterfeiter: 2(3) 345-358
Bloomfield Jr., Lincoln P., The Legitimacy of Covert Action: Sorting Out the Moral Responsibilities: 4(4) 525-537
Bonthous, Jean-Marie, Understanding Intelligence Across Cultures: 7(3) 275-311
Bowman, M. E., Intelligence and International Law: 8(3) 321-336
Breckinridge, Scott D., The Shape of Post-Cold War Intelligence: 8(1) 1-10
Breemer, Jan S., Soviet Naval Capabilities: 1(4) 119-132
Bruneau, Thomas C., Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies: 14(3) 323-341
Bullock, Joan G., Intelligence Support of Military Operations: A Perspective: 4(2) 181-198
Burke, James F., The Role of Capital Markets Intelligence in Corporate Management: 7(4) 429-433
Burris, William C., The Uses of History in Intelligence Analysis: 6(3) 297-301

Cable, Larry, Piercing the Mists: Limited and Ambiguous Conflicts: 4(1) 59-76
Callum, Robert, The Case for Cultural Diversity in the Intelligence Community: 14(1) 25-48
Campbell, Kenneth J., Bedell Smith's Imprint on the CIA: 1(2) 45-62
Canfield, Jeffrey L., Gerbil Redux: What Course Ahead for Naval Intelligence?: 6(3) 271-295
Carroll, Thomas Patrick, The Case Against Intelligence Openness: 14(4) 559-574
Castagna, Michael J., Virtual Intelligence: Reengineering Doctrine for the Information Age: 10(2) 180-195
Cavallini, Enrique H. J., The Malvinas/Falkland Affair: A New Look: 2(2) 203-216
Cepik, Marco and Priscila Antunes, Brazil's New Intelligence System: An Institutional Assessment: 16(3) 349-373
Champion, Brian, Subreptitious Aircraft in Transnational Covert Operations: 11(4) 453-478
Chapman, Robert D., Reflections on Terrorism: A Sideline View: 12(2) 207-226
Chase, Michael S. and James C. Mulvenon, The Decommercialization of China's Ministry of State Security: 15(4) 481-495
Chomeau, John B., Covert Action's Proper Role in U.S. Policy: 2(3) 407-413
Cimbala, Stephen J., Amorphous Wars: 2(1) 73-89
Cimbala, Stephen J., Mainstreaming Military Deception: 3(4) 509-535,
Claburn, Jeffrey, Public Constraints on Assassination as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: 7(1) 97-109
Cline, Lawrence E., Operational Intelligence in Peace Enforcement and Stability Operations: 15(2) 179-194
Cochran, Edwin S., South Korea's Intelligence Targets U.S. Technology: 16(2) 179-201
Cohen, Edmund, The CIA and the Declassification of History: 12(3) 338-345
Cohen, Sam, Ted Hall: A Soldier From Venona: 11(3) 351-366
Cohen, William S., Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions: 2(2) 155-162
Collins, J. Foster, The Debate Continues: The CIA In Indonesia: The Scholars vs. The Professionals – III. No U.S. Intrigue: 10(2) 222-226
Constantinides, George C., Tradecraft: Follies and Foibles: 1(4) 97-110
Crabb Jr. Cecil V., and Kevin V. Mulcahy, The National Security Council and The Shaping of U.S. Foreign Policy: 3(2) 153-168
Croddy, Eric, Dealing with Al Shifa: Intelligence and Counterproliferation: 15(1) 52-60
Cummings, Richard, A Diamond Is Forever: Mandela Triumphs, Buthelezi and de Klerk Survive, and ANC on the U.S. Payroll: 8(2) 155-178
Currie, James T., Iran-Contra and Congressional Oversight of the CIA: 11(2) 185-210

Dabelko, David D. and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, The International Environment and the U.S. Intelligence Community: 6(1) 21-41.
Damask, Nicholas and Abraham H. Miller, Thinking About Intelligence After the Fall of Communism: 6(3) 257-269
Daugherty, William J., Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran: 14(4) 449-484
Daugherty, William J., Truman's Iranian Policy, 1945-1953: The Soviet Calculus: 15(4) 580-593
Dedijer, Stevan, British Intelligence: The Rainbow Enigma: 1(2) 73-90
Dedijer, Stevan, Ragusa Intelligence and Security (1301-1806): A Model for the Twenty-First Century? 15(1) 101-114
Defalco III, Ralph Lee, Blind to the Sun: U.S. Intelligence Failures Before the War with Japan: 16(1) 95-107
DeLuca, John Vito, Shedding Light on the Rising Sun: 2(1) 1-20
DeMars, William E., Hazardous Partnership: NGOs and United States Intelligence in Small Wars: 14(2) 193-222
Dennison, M. G. and Dale F. Eickelman, Arabizing the Omani Intelligence Services: Clash of Cultures?: 7(1) 1-28
Diamond, John M., Re-examining Problems and Prospects in U.S. Imagery Intelligence: 14(1) 1-24
Dippel, John V. H., Jumping to the Right Conclusion: The State Department Warning on Operation "Barbarossa": 6(2) 213-227
Donovan, G. Murphy, Evidence, Intelligence, and the Soviet Threat: 1(2) 1-28
Dorn, A. Walter, The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping: 12(4) 414-447
Doron, Gideon and Martin Sherman, Free Societies And Their Enemies: An Intelligence Assessment: 8(3) 307-320
Doron, Gideon and Boaz Shapira, Accountability for Secret Operations in Israel: 4(3) 371-382
Doron, Gideon and Reuven Pedatzur, Israeli Intelligence: Utility and Cost-effectiveness in Policy Formation: 3(3) 347-361
Doron, Gideon, Changes in Soviet-Arab Relations: 5(1) 35-47
Doron, Gideon, Israeli Intelligence: Tactics, Strategy, and Prediction: 2(3) 305-319
Doron, Gideon, The Vagaries of Intelligence Sharing: The Political Imbalance: 6(2) 135-146

Ebon, Martin, KGB in Transition: The Bakatin Interregnum: 6(3) 327-338
Eriksson, Pär, Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations: 10(1) 1-18
Erskine, Ralph, Churchill and the Start of the Ultra-Magic Deals: 10(1) 57-74
Erskine, Ralph, Naval Enigma: A Missing Link: 3(4) 493-508
Evans, Joseph C., Berlin Tunnel Intelligence: A Bumbling KGB: 9(1) 43-50
Evans, Joseph C., U.S. Business Competitiveness and the Intelligence Community: 7(3) 353-361

Feer, Fredric S., Intelligence Storytelling: Moshe Dayan and the 1970 Cease-fire: 11(4) 429-445
Feldman, Daniel L., Constitutional Dimensions of the Iran-contra Affair: 2(3) 381-397
Fischer, Ben B., "One of the Biggest Ears in the World:" East German SIGINT: 11(2) 142-153
Fischer, Benjamin B., Farewell to Sonia, the Spy Who Haunted Britain: 15(1) 61-76
Fishel, Edwin C., Myths That Never Die: 2(1) 27-58
Fishel, Reverdy S., The Attack on the Liberty: An "Accident"?: 8(3) 345-352

Godson, Roy and James J. Wirtz, Strategic Denial and Deception: 13(4) 424-437
Gollin, James, Stirring Up The Past: KAL Flight 007: 7(4) 445-463
Gordon, Don E., Private Minnock's Private War: 4(2) 199-218
Gordon, Don E., Winners and Losers: 1(3) 1-24
Goulden, Joseph C., The Rogue of Rogues: 1(1) 76-82
Grabo, Cynthia M., The Watch Committee and the National Indications Center: The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Warning 1950-1975: 3(3) 363-385
Grant, Natalie, Deception on a Grand Scale: 1(4) 51-77
Greenberg, Maurice B. and Richard N. Haas, Making Intelligence Smarter: 9(2) 135-1444
Gunter, Michael M., Susurluk: The Connection Between Turkey's Intelligence Community and Organized Crime: 11(2) 119-141
Gunter, Michael M., The Iraqi Opposition and the Failure of U.S. Intelligence: 12(2) 135-167
Gunter, Michael, Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish Rebellion in Iraq: The Intelligence Factor: 7(4) 465-474

Halpern, Samuel and Hayden Peake, Did Angleton Jail Nosenko?: 3(4) 451-464
Hansen, James H., RX: Intelligence Communications – Use Acronyms, Allegories, and Metaphors Only as Directed: 2(1) 21-26
Hansen, James H., The Kremlin Follies of '53... The Demise of Lavrenti Beria: 4(1) 101-114
Hastedt, Glenn P., Controlling Intelligence: The Role of the DCI: 1(4) 25-40
Hastedt, Glenn P., Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy; How to Measure Success?: 5(1) 49-62
Hastedt, Glenn, CIA's Organizational Culture and the Problem of Reform: 9(3) 249-269
Hastedt, Glenn, Seeking Economic Security Through Intelligence: 11(4) 385-401
Hedley, John Hollister, The CIA's New Openness: 7(2) 129-141
Henderson, Robert D'A., "Project Rodriguista": Opposing Pinochet's Regime in Chile: 13(4) 438-489
Henderson, Robert D'A., Operation Vula Against Apartheid: 10(4) 418-455
Henderson, Robert D'A., South African Intelligence Transition from de Klerk to Mandela: An Update: 8(4) 471-485
Henderson, Robert D'A., South African Intelligence Under de Klerk: 8(1) 51-90
Hitz, Frederick P., Obscuring Propriety: The CIA and Drugs: 12(4) 448-462
Hitz, Frederick P., The Future of American Espionage: 13(1) 1-20
Horowitz, Richard, A Framework for Understanding Intelligence: 8(4) 389-410
Horton, John, Mexico, The Way of Iran?: 1(2) 91-101
Horton, John, Reflections on Covert Action and Its Anxieties: 4(1) 77-90
Houston, Lawrence R., The CIA's Legislative Base: 5(4) 411-415
Hulnick, Arthur S., CIA's Relations with Academia: Symbiosis Not Psychosis: 1(4) 41-50
Hulnick, Arthur S., Determining U.S. Intelligence Policy: 3(2) 211-224
Hulnick, Arthur S., Dirty Tricks for Profit: Covert Action in Private Industry: 14(4) 529-544
Hulnick, Arthur S., Intelligence and Law Enforcement: The "Spies Are Not Cops" Problem: 10(3) 269-286
Hulnick, Arthur S., Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Game Plan: 5(4) 455-465
Hulnick, Arthur S., Learning About U.S. Intelligence: Difficult But Not Impossible: 5(1) 89-99
Hulnick, Arthur S., Managing Analysis: Strategies for Playing the End Game: 2(3) 321-343
Hulnick, Arthur S., Openness: Being Public About Secret Intelligence: 12(4) 463-483
Hulnick, Arthur S., The Ames Case: HOW Could It Happen?: 8(2) 133-154
Hulnick, Arthur S., The Downside of Open Source Intelligence: 15(4) 565-579
Hulnick, Arthur S., The Uneasy Relationship Between Intelligence And Private Industry: 9(1) 17-31
Hulnick, Arthur, S., U.S. Covert Action: Does It Have A Future?: 9(2) 145-157
Hyde Jr., Earl M., Bernard Schuster and Joseph Katz: KGB Master Spies in the United States: 12(1) 35-57
Hyde Jr., Earl M., Still Perplexed About Krivitsky: 16(3) 428-441

Ilardi, Gaetano Joe, The Whitlam Government's 1973 Clash With Australian Intelligence: 14(1) 62-88
Indinopulos, Thomas, Shin Bet's Blind Side: 10(1) 91-96

Jelen, George F., The Defensive Disciplines of Intelligence: 5(4) 381-399
Jervis, Robert, What's Wrong with the Intelligence Process?: 1(1) 28-41
Johnson, Loch K. and Annette Freyberg, Ambivalent Bedfellows: German-American Intelligence Relations, 1969-1991: 10(2) 167-179
Johnson, Loch K., DCI Webster's Legacy: The Judge's Self-Assessment: 5(3) 287-290
Johnson, Loch K., Making the Intelligence "Cycle" Work: 1(4) 1-23
Johnson, Loch K., Preface to a Theory of Strategic Intelligence: 16(4) 638-663
Johnson, Loch K., Strategic Intelligence: An American Perspective: 3(3) 299-332
Johnson, Loch K., The DCI vs the Eight-Hundred-Pound Gorilla: 13(1) 35-48
Johnson, William R., The Ambivalent Polygraph: 1(3) 71-83
Johnson, William R., The Elephants and the Gorillas: 1(1) 42-56
Johnson, William R., Tricks of the Trade: Counterintelligence Interrogation: 1(2),103-113
Jones, Christopher M., The CIA Under Clinton: Continuity and Change: 14(4) 503-528
Judd, Stephen G., The CIA and the University: A Problem of Power: 6(3) 339-358
Jumper, Roy D. L., Malaysia's Senoi Praaq Special Forces: 13(1) 64-93

Kahana, Ephraim, Mossad-CIA Cooperation: 14(3) 409-420
Kahana, Ephraim, Reorganizing Israel's Intelligence Community: 15(3) 415-428
Kahin, Audrey and George McT. Kahin, The Debate Continues: The CIA In Indonesia: The Scholars vs. The Professionals – I. CIA's Men Disingenuous: 10(2) 206-217
Kaiser, Frederick M., GAO Versus the CIA: Uphill Battles Against an Overpowering Force: 15(3) 330-389
Kaiser, Frederick M., Impact and Implications of the Iran-contra Affair on Congressional
Kaiser, Frederick M., Oversight of Covert Action: 7(2) 205-234
Kaiser, Frederick M., The Watcher's Watchdog: The CIA Inspector General: 3(1) 55-75
Kalaris, George and Leonard McCoy, Counterintelligence for the 1990s: 2(2) 179-187
Katz, Ytzhak and Ygal Vardi, Strategies for Data Gathering and Evaluation in the Intelligence Community: 5(3) 313-328
Kenney, Michael C., Intelligence Games: Comparing the Intelligence Capabilities of Law Enforcement Agencies and Drug Trafficking Enterprises: 16(2) 212-243
Kerr, Sheila, Oleg Tsarev's Synthetic KGB Gems: 14(1) 89-116
Knight, Amy, Russian Archives: Opportunities and Obstacles: 12(3) 325-337
Knott, Stephen F., Covert Action Comes Home: Daniel Webster's Secret Operations Against the Citizens of Maine: 5(1) 77-87
Knott, Stephen F., The Great Republican Transformation on Oversight: 13(1) 49-63
Knott, Stephen F., Thomas Jefferson's Clandestine Foreign Policy: 4(3) 325-355
Koenen-Grant, Julie and Dick Nelson, A Case of Bureaucracy "in Action": The U.S. Embassy in Moscow: 6(3) 303-317
Kovacs, Amos, The Nonuse of Intelligence: 10(4) 383-417
Krause, Lincoln B., Insurgent Intelligence: The Guerrilla Grapevine: 9(3) 291-311
Krepon, Michael, Glasnost and Multilateral Verification: Implications for the U.S. Intelligence Community: 4(1) 47-57

Lahneman, William J., Outsourcing the IC's Stovepipes?: 16(4) 573-593
Leadbetter Jr., Col. Wyland F. and Cdr. Stephen J. Bury, Prelude to Desert Storm: The Politicization of Intelligence: 6(1) 43-54
Lefebvre, Stéphane, The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation: 16(4) 527-542
Lewis, Jeremy R. T., Freedom of Information: Developments in the United Kingdom: 3(4) 465-473
Lewis, Jonathan E., National Security and Capital Markets: 6(4) 507-517
Loureiro, Pedro, The Imperial Japanese Navy and Espionage: The Itaru Tachibana Case 1941: 3(1) 105-121
Lowenthal, Mark M., Intelligence Epistemology: Dealing with the Unbelievable: 6(3) 319-325
Lukes, Igor, Great Expectations and Lost Illusions: Soviet Use of Eastern European Proxies in the Third World: 3(1) 1-13
Lukes, Igor, The GPU and GRU in Pre-World War II Czechoslovakia: 8(1) 91-104

Macartney, John, Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide: 2(4) 457-486
MacDonnell, Francis, The Search for a Second Zimmermann Telegram: FDR, BSC, and the Latin American Front: 4(4) 487-505
MacPherson, Nelson, Reductio Ad Absurdum: The R&A Branch of OSS/London: 15(3) 390-414
Madsen, Wayne, Intelligence Agency Threats to Computer Security: 6(4) 413-488
Maechling Jr., Charles., Official Secrets: British Style/American Style: 2(3) 359-380
Maechling Jr., Charles., Scandal in Wartime Washington: The Craufurd-Stuart Affair of 1918: 4(3) 357-370
Maguire, Keith, The Intelligence War in Northern Ireland: 4(2) 145-165
Mahoney, Harry Thayer, The Saga of Xenophon Dmitrivich Kalamatiano: 8(2) 179-202
Manget, Fred F., Presidential Powers and Foreign Intelligence Operations: 5(2) 131-153
Manget, Fred F., Restitution: A Better Way of Dealing with the Wrongful Appropriation of Classified Government Secrets?: 4(1) 23-37
Mapother, John R., Watching the Evil Empire Dissolve: 14(4) 578-581
Marrin, Stephen, CIA's Kent School: Improving Training for New Analysts: 16(4) 609-637
Martin, David, Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder: Precursor to the Yugoslav Tragedy: 5(4) 417-431
Matthews, John P. C., The West's Secret Marshall Plan for the Mind: 16(3) 409-427
McCarthy, Gregory C., GOP Oversight of Intelligence in the Clinton Era: 15(1) 26-51
McCarthy, Shaun, South Africa's Intelligence Reformation: 9(1) 63-71
McGill, G. M. (Mert), OSCINT and the Private Information Sector: 7(4) 435-443
Melman, Yossi and Dan Raviv, The Journalist's Connections: How Israel Got Russia's Biggest Pre-glasnost Secret: 4(2) 219-225
Mescall, Patrick Neil, A Creature of Compromise: The Establishment of the DIA: 7(3) 251-274
Michal, Kristen, Business Counterintelligence and the Role of the U.S. Intelligence Community: 7(4) 413-427
Mierzejewski, Alfred C., Intelligence and the Strategic Bombing of Germany: The Combined Strategic Targets Committee: 3(1) 83-104
Miller, Abraham H. and Brian Alexander, Structural Quiescence in the Failure of IC21 and Intelligence Reform: 14(2) 234-261
Miller, Abraham H., How the CIA Fell Victim to Myth Posing as Journalism: 10(3) 257-268
Miller, Dawn M., Dark Waters: Britain and Italy's Invasion of Albania, 7 April 1939: 16(2) 290-323
Mitchell, Fredric, Lots of Smoke – Little Fire: 1(4) 111-118
Mobley, Richard A., North Korea's Surprise Attack: Weak U.S. Analysis?: 13(4) 490-514
Moriarity, Anthony R., Abating Military Espionage Problems: 4(4) 475-485
Motley, James Berry, International Terrorism: A Challenge for U.S. Intelligence: 1(1) 83-96
Motley, James Berry, The Army's Need: A Relevant LIC Environment: 4(3) 383-405
Mrozinski, Lawrence G., Thomas Williams, Roman H. Kent and Robin D. Tyner, Countering China's Threat to the Western Hemisphere: 15(2) 195-210
Mulcahy, Kevin V., The Bush Administration and National Security Policymaking: A Preliminary Assessment: 4(2) 167-180
Murphy Jr., John F., Secret Weapons of the Secret War: 14(2) 262-278
Murphy Jr., John F., The Alaskan Mystery Flights: 9(1) 97-111

Nelsen, Harvey, The U.S. Intelligence Budget in the 1990s: 6(2) 195-203
Nelson, Patricia and Jon Sigurdson, Intelligence Gathering and Japan: The Elusive Role of Grey Intelligence: 5(1) 17-34
Nolan, Cynthia M., Seymour Hersh's Impact On The CIA: 12(1) 18-34

O'Brien, Kevin A., Interfering with Civil Society: CIA and KGB Covert Political Action During the Cold War: 8(4) 431-456
O'Brien, Kevin A., South Africa's Evolving Intelligence and Security Structures: 9(2) 187-232
O'Toole, George J. A., Benjamin Franklin: American Spymaster or British Mole?: 3(1) 45-53
O'Toole, George J. A., Kahn's Law: A Universal Principle of Intelligence?: 4(1) 39-46
O'Toole, George. J. A., The Chesapeake Capes: American Intelligence Coup?: 10(2) 196-205
Oros, Andrew L., Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability: 15(1) 1-25
Orton, J. Douglas and Jamie L. Callahan, Important "Folk Theories" in Intelligence Reorganization: 8(4) 411-430
Orton, James Douglas, Cross-National Ethical Dilemmas in Competitive Intelligence: 15(3) 440-456
Ott, Marvin C., Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight: 16(1) 69-94

Paritzky, Ethan J., Removing Opacity: Putting Israel's Nuclear Capability Under the LAMP: 16(3) 389-408
Peter Callamari and Derek Reveron, China's Use of Perception Management: 16(1) 1-15
Phares, Walid, The Intelligence Services in Lebanon During the War of 1975-1990: 7(3) 363-381
Phillips, David Atlee, "Goodbye, Mr. President." "Enjoy Your Retirement, Director": 1(2) 127-132
Phillips, David Atlee, CIA-Bashing Time Again: Covert Action Is the Blunt Instrument: 2(1) 115-121
Phillips, David Atlee, Intelligence Is No Laughing Matter: 2(2) 267-272
Phillips, David Atlee, Some Truth, Some Untruth, Some Half-Truth: 1(3) 109-114
Phillips, David Atlee, The Great White Case Officer: 1(1) 97-102
Phillips, David Atlee, The Walker Family Revisited. Philip Agee Returns: 1(4) 133-139
Pine, Shawn M., CISOC: The Army's Counterintelligence Special Operations Concept: 9(1) 81-95
Pine, Shawn M., Deficiencies in Military Counterintelligence: A View From the Field: 8(2) 221-228
Polgar, Tom, Defection and Redefection: 1(2) 29-42
Polgar, Tom, The Intelligence Services of West Germany: 1(4) 79-96
Politi, Alessandro, The Citizen as "Intelligence Minuteman": 16(1) 34-38
Porteous, Samuel D., Economic/Commercial Interests and the World's Intelligence Services: A Canadian Perspective: 8(3) 275-306
Pringle, Robert W., Andropov's Counterintelligence State: 13(2) 193-203
Pringle, Robert W., Putin: The New Andropov?: 14(4) 545-558
Pringle, Robert W., The Heritage and Future of Russian Intelligence: 11(2) 175-184
Pringle, Robert W., The Limits of OSINT: Diagnosing the Soviet Media, 1985-1989: 16(2) 280-289

Quinn, James L. Staffing the Intelligence Community: The Pros and Cons of an Intelligence Reserve: 13(2) 160-170

Reese, John R., A Case Study in Operational Intelligence: 11(1) 73-92
Reich, Robert C., Re-examining the Team A-Team B Exercise: 3(3) 387-403
Rhee, Will, Comparing U.S. Operations Kingpin (1970) and Eagle Claw (1980): 6(4) 489-506
Richelson, Jeffrey T., "Truth Conquers All Chains": The U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity, 1981-1989: 12(2) 168-200
Richelson, Jeffrey T., From MONARCH EAGLE to MODERN AGE: The Consolidation of U.S. Defense HUMINT: 10(2) 131-164
Richelson, Jeffrey T., MASINT: The New Kid in Town: 14(2) 149-192
Richelson, Jeffrey T., Out of the Black: The Disclosure and Declassification of the National Reconnaissance Office: 11(1) 1-25
Richelson, Jeffrey T., Restructuring the NRO: From the Cold War's End to the 21st Century: 15(4) 496-539
Richelson, Jeffrey T., The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation: 4(3) 307-323
Richelson, Jeffrey T., The IPCRESS File: The Great Game in Film and Fiction, 1953-2002: 16(3) 462-498
Richelson, Jeffrey T., Undercover in Outer Space: The Creation and Evolution of the NRO, 1960-1963: 13(3) 301-344
Richelson, Jeffrey T., When Kindness Fails: Assassination as a National Security Option: 15(2) 243-274
Riley, Patrick R., CIA And Its Discontents: 11(3) 255-270
Robertson, Kenneth G., Canadian Intelligence Policy: The Role and Future of CSIS: 3(2) 225-248
Rodman, David, Against Fishel: Another Look At The Liberty Incident: 9(1) 73-80
Rudner, Martin, The Future of Canada's Defence Intelligence: 15(4) 540-564
Russell, Richard L., CIA: A Cold War Relic?: 8(1) 11-20

Sakkas, Peter E., Espionage and Sabotage in the Computer World: 5(2) 155-202
Sayle, Edward F., Nuggets from Intelligence History: 1(2) 115-126
Sayle, Edward F., The Déja Vu of American Secret Diplomacy: 2(3) 399-406
Sayle, Edward F., The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S. Intelligence Community: 1(1) 1-27
Sayle, Edward F., Tradecraft in Ancient Greece: 2(2) 189-202
Scalingi, Paula L., Intelligence Community Cooperation: The Arms Control Model: 5(4) 401-410
Schwartau, Winn, "Defense in Depth" for Information Systems Survival: 8(2) 229-234
Segell, Glen M., French Cryptography Policy: The Turnabout of 1999: 13(3) 345-358
Sheldon, Rose Mary, Caesar, Intelligence, and Ancient Britain: 15(1) 77-100
Sheldon, Rose Mary, Hannibal's Spies: 1(3) 53-70
Sheldon, Rose Mary, The Ancient Imperative: Clandestine Operations and Covert Action: 10(3) 299-315
Sheldon, Rose Mary, The Spartacus Rebellion: A Roman Intelligence Failure?: 6(1) 69-84
Shoham, Dany, The Anthrax Evidence Points to Iraq: 16(1) 39-68
Shpiro, Shlomo, The Media Strategies of Intelligence Services: 14(4) 485-502
Shreeve, Thomas W. and James J. Dowd Jr., Building a Learning Organization: Teaching with Cases at CIA: 10(1) 97-107
Simmons, Robert Ruhl, Intelligence Policy and Performance in Reagan's First Term: A Good Record or Bad?: 4(1) 1-22
Smith, Bradley F., Sharing Ultra in World War II: 2(1) 59-72
Smith, Michael Douglas, CIA Publications: Serving the President with Daily Intelligence: 12(2) 201-206
Smith, Richard Harris, The First Moscow Station: An Espionage Footnote to Cold War History: 3(3) 333-346
Sommers, Marilyn P., Law Enforcement Intelligence: A New Look: 1(3) 25-40
Sparrow, Malcolm K., Network Vulnerabilities and Strategic Intelligence in Law Enforcement: 5(3) 255-274
Spence, Richard B., Secret Agent 666: Aleister Crowley and British Intelligence in America, 1914-1918: 13(3) 359-371
Spence, Richard B., The Strange Case of Sergius Riis: 15(2) 222-242
Spence, Richard B., The Tragic Fate of Kalamatiano: America's Man in Moscow: 12(3) 346-374
Stack, Kevin P., A Negative View of Competitive Analysis: 10(4) 456-464
Stack, Kevin P., Appreciating President Ford's Legacy to Intelligence: 12(1) 73-79
Steele, Robert D., The Importance of Open Source Intelligence To The Military: 8(4) 457-470
Steele, Robert David, A Critical Evaluation of U.S. National Intelligence Capabilities: 6(2) 173-193
Steele, Robert David, Crafting Intelligence in the Aftermath of Disaster: 15(2) 161-178
Steele, Robert David, Possible Presidential Intelligence Initiatives: 13(4) 409-423
Steele, Robert David, Reinventing Intelligence: Holy Grail or Mission Impossible?: 7(2) 199-203
Steinacher, Gerald, The Special Operations Executive (SOE) in Austria, 1940-1945: 15(2) 211-221
Stempel, John D., Error, Folly, and Policy Intelligence: 12(3) 267-281
Stempel, John D., Robert W. Pringle Jr. and Tom Stempel, Intelligence and the Cinema: 15(1) 115-124
Strong, J. Thompson, Covert Activities and Intelligence Operations: Congressional and Executive Roles Redefined: 1(2) 63-72
Strong, J. Thompson, Tilting with Machiavelli: Fighting Competitive Espionage in the 1990s: 7(2) 161-174
Swenson, Russell G., Intelligence Education in the Americas: 16(1) 108-130

Taplin, Winn L., Six General Principles of Intelligence: 3(4) 475-491
Tenet, George J., The CIA and the Security Challenges of the New Century: 13(2) 133-143
Theodorou, Jerry, Political Risk Reconsidered: 6(2) 147-171
Thomas Jr., Ronald C., Influences on Decisionmaking at the Bay of Pigs: 3(4) 537-548
Thomas Jr., Stafford T., Hidden in Plain Sight: Searching for the CIA's "New Missions": 13(2) 144-159
Thomas, Stafford T., A Political Theory of the CIA: 11(1) 57-72
Thomas, Stafford T., Assessing Current Intelligence Studies: 2(2) 217-244
Thomas, Stafford T., Presidential Styles and DCI Selection: 7(2) 175-198
Thomas, Stafford T., The CIA's Bureaucratic Dimensions: 12(4) 399-413
Thornton, Richard C., The Unfulfilled Promise of Declassification: 11(4) 447-451
Toffler, Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Powershift: The World's Most Dangerous Brain Drains: 5(3) 329-331
Toscano, Mario, "Machiavelli" Views World War II Intelligence: 1(3) 41-52
Tovar, B. Hugh, The Indonesian Crisis of 1965-1966: A Retrospective: 7(3) 313-338
Tovar, B. Hugh, Thoughts on Running a Small War: 1(3) 85-93
Tovar, B. Hugh, Vietnam Revisited: The United States and Diem's Death: 5(3) 291-312
Tovar, Hugh, The Debate Continues: The CIA In Indonesia: The Scholars vs. The Professionals – II. The Professionals: The Kahin's CIA Fever: 10(2) 218-221
Trim, Peter R. J., Public and Private Sector Cooperation in Counteracting Cyberterrorism: 16(4) 594-608
Trim, Peter R. J., The Company-Intelligence Interface and National Security: 13(2) 204-214
Troy, Thomas F., Knifing of the OSS: 1(3) 95-108
Troy, Thomas F., The "Correct" Definition of Intelligence: 5(4) 433-454
Troy, Thomas F., The British Assault on J. Edgar Hoover: The Tricycle Case: 3(2) 169-209
Troy, Thomas F., The Gaunt-Wiseman Affair: British Intelligence in New York in 1915: 16(3) 442-461
Troy, Thomas F., The Quaintness of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Its Origin, Theory, and Problems: 2(2) 245-266
Troy, Thomas F., Writing History in CIA: A Memoir of Frustration: 7(4) 397-411
Turner, Michael A., CIA-FBI Non-Cooperation: Cultural Trait or Bureaucratic Inertia?: 8(3) 259-274
Turner, Michael A., Issues in Evaluating U.S. Intelligence: 5(3) 275-285
Turner, Michael A., Setting Analytical Priorities in U.S. Intelligence: 9(3) 33-41
Turner, Michael A., Understanding CIA's Role in Intelligence: 4(3) 295-305
Turner, Robert F., The CIA's Nicaragua "Murder Manual": A Sandinista Dirty Trick?": 9(1) 33-41
Tyson, James L., The EOU vs. Hitler's Mini-Missiles: 12(1) 80-87

Unsinger, Peter C., Three Intelligence Blunders in Korea: 3(4) 549-561
Unsinger, Peter Charles, Meeting A Commercial Need for Intelligence: The International Maritime Bureau: 12(1) 58-72
Usowski, Peter S., John McCone and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Persistent Approach to the Intelligence-Policy Relationship: 2(4) 547-576

Valcourt, Richard R., Controlling U.S. Hired Hands: 2(2) 163-178
Vital, David, Images of Other Peoples in the Making of Intelligence and Foreign Policy: 16(1) 16-33

Waller, John H., Josiah Harlan: American Freebooter in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: 15(3) 429-439
Waller, John H., The Devil's Doctor: Felix Kersten: 11(3) 299-330
Waller, John H., The Double Life of Admiral Canaris: 9(3) 271-289
Wannall, W. Raymond, The FBI's Domestic Intelligence Operations: Domestic Security in Limbo: 4(4) 443-473
Wannall, W. Raymond, Undermining Counterintelligence Capability: 15(3) 321-329
Warner, Michael, Sophisticated Spies: CIA's Links to Liberal Anti-Communists, 1949-1967: 9(3) 425-433
Warner, Michael, The CIA's Office of Policy Coordination: From NSC 10/2 to NSC 68: 11(2) 211-220
Warner, William T., International Technology Transfer and Economic Espionage: 7(2) 143-160
Warren, Ward, Politics, Presidents, and DCIs: 8(3) 337-344
Waxman, Matthew C., Emerging Intelligence Challenges: 10(3) 317-331
Wege, Carl Anthony, Assad's Legions: The Syrian Intelligence Services: 4(1) 91-100
Wege, Carl Anthony, Iranian Intelligence Organizations: 10(3) 287-298
Wege, Carl Anthony, The Syrian Socialist Party: An Intelligence Asset?: 7(3) 339-351
Weller, Geoffrey R., Accountability in Canadian Intelligence Services: 2(3) 415-441
Weller, Geoffrey R., Assessing Canadian Intelligence Literature: 1980-2000: 14(1) 49-61
Weller, Geoffrey R., Comparing Western Inspectors General of Intelligence and Security: 9(3) 383-406
Weller, Geffrey R., Oversight of Australia's Intelligence Services: 12(4) 484-503
Weller, Geoffrey R., Political Scrutiny and Control of Scandinavia's Security and Intelligence Services: 13(2) 171-192
Weller, Geoffrey R., The Internal Modernization of Western Intelligence Agencies: 14(3) 299-322
Westerfield, H. Bradford, Inside Ivory Bunkers: CIA Analysts Resist Managers' "Pandering" – Part I: 9(3) 407-424
Westerfield, H. Bradford, Inside Ivory Bunkers: CIA Analysts Resist Managers' "Pandering" – Part II: 10(1) 19-54
Wettering, Frederick L., (C)overt Action: The Disappearing "C": 16(4) 561-572
Wettering, Frederick L., The Internet and the Spy Business: 14(3) 342-365
Wheaton, Kristan J., Analysis in Crisis Prevention: 14(2) 223-233
Wheeler, Douglas L., The Archives of Portugal: A Guide to an Intelligence Treasure Trove: 4(4) 539-550
White, Ralph K., Empathy as an Intelligence Tool: 1(1) 57-75111
White, William, The Microdot: Then and Now: 3(2) 249-269
Winchell, Sean P., Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government: 16(3) 374-388
Windmiller, Marshall, A Tumultuous Time: OSS and Army Intelligence in India, 1942-1946: 8(1) 105-124
Wirtz, James J., Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension: 6(1) 85-99
Wirtz, James J., Miscalculation, Surprise and American Intelligence after the Cold War: 5(1) 1-16
Wittkoff, E. Peter, Brazil's SIVAM: Surveillance Against Crime and Terrorism: 16(4) 543-560
Wright, Jeffrey W., Intelligence and Economic Security: 5(2) 203-221

Yu, Maochun, OSS In China – New Information About an Old Role: 7(1) 75-96

Ziegler, David W., Yellow Rain: An Analysis That Went Awry: 2(1) 91-113

http://cryptocellar.web.cern.ch/cryptoc ... index.html

[CrackSmokeRepublican]

Ostrovsky, Victor and Hoy, Claire. By Way of Deception: The Making and Unmaking of a Mossad Officer. New York: St.Martin's Press, 1990. 371 pages.
Steven, Stewart. The Spymasters of Israel. New York: Ballantine Books, 1982. 400 pages.
Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi. Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1990. 466 pages.
Several books in NameBase tell the history of Israel's Mossad, which is responsible for "foreign intelligence collection, political action and counterterrorism, ... [and which] conducts agent operations against the Arab nations and their official representatives and installations, particularly in Western Europe and the United States." This is from a CIA analysis that was discovered by Iranian students in Tehran in 1979, and reprinted in CounterSpy. Former Mossad chief Isser Harel called the CIA document "anti- Semitic" and a "nightmare" for him, and said that it was "shockingly irresponsible" for the CIA to keep a document like this "rolling around" in the U.S. Embassy. Mossad and Shin Beth have only 1,000 staff officers, but they manage to create more than their fair share of controversy.

Victor Ostrovsky was a Mossad case officer from 1984-1986, and was in Canada when two Mossad agents showed up to say that for his "own safety" he should try to stop publication. Israel obtained injunctions against the publisher, but in the U.S. it was lifted because 17,000 copies had already been shipped. This is the first book to offer some major dirty laundry. Among other things, it charges that Mossad had advance knowledge of the 1983 truck bombing in Lebanon that killed 241 U.S. Marines, but refused to warn the American authorities for policy reasons.

http://www.namebase.org/books26.html