Germans are now booing Merkel....

[MikeWB]

13 minutes of booing  during her speech today:

[Christopher Marlowe]

That's awesome.

[Idaho Kid]

One of the commenters says it's from 2012 in Stuttgart.  Don't know.  Do these maggots even appear in public anymore.  Hope it's just a troll. 

[rmstock]

One of the commenters says it's from 2012 in Stuttgart.  Don't know.  Do these maggots even appear in public anymore.  Hope it's just a troll.

I don't think so, Merkel has simply bypassed the main objective of the
Treaty of Dublin without allowing any democratic process whatsoever.
The Dublin Regulation states : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dublin_Regulation

  "One of the principal aims of the Dublin Regulation is to prevent an
   applicant from submitting applications in multiple Member States.
   Another aim is to reduce the number of "orbiting" asylum seekers, who
   are shuttled from member state to member state. The country that the
   asylum seeker first applies for asylum is responsible for either
   accepting or rejecting asylum, and the seeker may not restart the
   process in another jurisdiction."

[rmstock]

[rmstock]

full scale : https://donquijotte.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/angela_merkel.jpg

Didn't know at least 80% of the claims made here ....

[rmstock]

A refugee, arriving at Munich main station, carries a portrait of German chancellor Angela Merkel. © Michael Dalder/Reuters
Angela Merkel: In the eye of the storm
Mass exodus to Germany: Never before have the stakes been so high – and Angela Merkel is betting it all. She is the crisis chancellor.
Von Tina Hildebrandt und Bernd Ulrich
20. September 2015, 12:03 Uhr 3 Kommentare
http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-09/angela-merkel-refugees-crisis-chancellor/komplettansicht?sort=desc

   Lesen Sie diesen Text auf Deutsch
   
   The most striking thing is what's missing: noise, bustle and haste.
   When entering the Chancellery and taking one of the mint-colored
   elevators to the upper floors, one gets the impression that someone
   abruptly turned off the volume. Outside, the traffic hums and
   demonstrators chant. It is hot, wet or cold. Inside, one hears, smells
   and feels almost nothing. Only now and then does a dish caddy roll back
   into the kitchen very quietly. Then one suspects that there's been
   another emergency meeting.
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   This feeling of being in the eye of the storm is not new. But it's
   never seemed so surreal. There outside, there isn't just humming
   traffic. There outside, peoples are migrating.
   
   And no one has ever asked themselves the question: Is Angela Merkel,
   the woman sitting here in the eye of the storm and in charge, really
   not afraid? Of what's brewing there outside? Of what she's brewing for
   us there?
   
   Merkel is the most rational politician he has ever met, says a man who
   has known her for a long time and met many politicians from Germany and
   around the world. He's never detected fear in the chancellor, he says.
   He's always found this to be her greatest strength. In recent days, it
   has occurred to him that maybe this could also be a flaw.
   
   During all the many crises of recent years, Merkel has always been a
   reliable player for Germans, like the flight crew on an airplane. As
   long as Merkel wasn't unsettled, as long as the chancellor didn't
   frantically buckle her seatbelt and rummage about for the safety vest,
   one could also stay calm oneself. Now she says: "If we start having to
   apologize for showing a friendly face in emergencies, then that isn't
   my country." Bang. One sentence showing that, for Merkel, this is the
   moment of truth. One sentence uttered spontaneously from very deep
   within.
   
   This crisis is different. It's closer – to Merkel, too – and it goes
   deeper. It's bigger than September 11 and harder than German
   reunification. It's more complicated than both, as the echo chambers of
   communication have become amplified. When Merkel says "asylum knows no
   upper limit," it's a response to the CSU, the Bavarian sister party of
   her own Christian Democratic Union (CDU) led by Horst Seehofer. What
   she means is the human right to asylum. But, in Iraq, this is
   understood as meaning: "Germany won't just take Syrians – it will take
   us, too!" In Afghanistan, according to rumors wafting in government
   circles in Berlin, hundreds of thousands of people have applied for
   passports so that they can leave the country. It's a humane gesture
   when Merkel takes a selfie with a refugee. On social media, this is
   interpreted as a denial of information campaigns and assertions that
   not everyone can come.
   It's Merkel's first crisis in real time. Everything she says sets
   things in motion. Literally.
   
   Merkel is also different herself. After a decade in office, she has
   shed one of the strongest motives driving politicians: the fear of
   losing power. Merkel no longer occupies herself with the question, "How
   can I get in?" If anything, she's more worried about, "How can I ever
   get back out?"
   
   Daily inquiries in the Chancellery about whether Germany's opening up
   has been right always elicit the same response: "Absolutely right." Is
   that just good nerves, or is there also a good plan?

   Merkel is born of crisis in two senses
   
   Whoever wants to answer this question must first look at this crisis
   through the previous crises in Merkel's life. They must understand that
   Merkel is the German crisis chancellor par excellence, even more so
   than Helmut Schmidt with the Hamburg flood, the oil crisis, the RAF
   kidnapping of Hanns Martin Schleyer and the hijacking in Mogadishu.
   
   Merkel is born of crisis in two senses. The Hamburg native came to the
   GDR as a child refugee. It was an unusual flight, in the wrong
   direction in a way, but out of conviction. For her father, Horst
   Kasner, a Protestant minister, the GDR was the better state because it
   was anti-fascist. This is also where Merkel gets her unwavering loyalty
   to Israel, her unwillingness to compromise regarding anything too far
   on the right.
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   The collapse of the GDR, its economic, communicative and moral failure,
   brought Merkel into politics and became her first big mentor. From it,
   she has her desire for things to function. For her, the pragmatic is
   not some ancillary matter for politics; it's the test of truth. The
   thing that particularly bothered her about the GDR, she has said, was
   that people weren't able to go to the limits of their abilities, that
   the limitation always came from outside. In 2010, Merkel said that
   going to her limits and beyond remained a "beautiful feeling." But now
   she isn't testing just her own limits. She's testing ours, too.
   
   Merkel's political ascent also started with a crisis. The contributions
   scandal of 1999 pitched the CDU into an identity conflict. Helmut Kohl,
   who had made Merkel a cabinet minister, became her second political
   mentor. But unlike the many others who were part of the Kohl system,
   Merkel was an outsider who recognized that the party had to not only
   move beyond Kohl, but also separate itself from him. With her famous
   letter to the FAZ newspaper, she called on the CDU to emancipate itself
   from Kohl. Did Merkel know that this moment would lead to her ascent?
   Whatever the case may be, that's what it did.
   
   Merkel had made the decision independently, without consulting with the
   party committees or with Wolfgang Schäuble, then chairman of the CDU.
   And, for the first time, she learned: This can work, provided the
   moment is right.
   
   The path forward was bumpy. Merkel made mistakes in tone and in
   measures. She often seemed to be at odds with the republic and with her
   own party. In 2002, by announcing that she wanted to be her party's
   chancellor candidate, Merkel mobilized in less than a week such a
   powerful opposition among the state premiers from her party that she,
   the party's head, drove to Wolfratshausen on January 11 to offer the
   candidacy to her rival Edmund Stoiber. It was holding on to power by
   relinquishing it.
   
   Politically, that was a near-death experience. And, at the same time,
   she learned: I can survive this way.
   
   Stoiber lost. Merkel got her chance – and immediately paid the price
   for following her own convictions. By insisting on turbo reforms, the
   CDU only secured 35.2 percent of the vote in the early elections of
   2005. In the televised debate of the so-called heavyweight round,
   Merkel, the CDU head, sat across from an electrified Gerhard Schröder,
   Germany's Social Democratic chancellor at the time, and looked like
   she'd been run over by a truck. "Do you seriously believe that my party
   will accept Ms. Merkel's offer for (coalition) talks in which, she
   says, she wants to be chancellor?" Schröder ranted.
   
   This coming Tuesday, exactly ten years after Schröder's drunken attack,
   Merkel will present his biography "in the Presence of the Former
   Chancellor," as it says in the announcement. It is her personal tit for
   tat. And now a second thing is unexpectedly coming full circle: Whereas
   Schröder once tied his chancellorship to his Agenda 2010 labor and
   unemployment-benefits reforms, these days, Merkel is tying hers tighter
   and tighter to her "yes" to the refugees.
   
   In the fall of 2005, when Merkel moved into the Chancellery by the skin
   of her teeth, she could have sensed: She's good at crises, but not so
   good without them. Despite starting off in a superb position, her
   programmatic attempt to remodel Germany and to intend to govern in a
   my-way-or-the-highway manner almost led her to lose the election
   against Schröder. But, for her government's first project, she once
   again chose something programmatic, a major healthcare reform – and
   lost her way in a maze of special interests.
   The method she used at that time while wrangling with doctors and
   health insurance companies looks at first glance like that of today's
   crisis chancellor: systematic penetration, studying the details to the
   point of political microscopy. What was lacking was strong energy for
   change. Lacking were the opponents who would sooner or later lose their
   nerve because the pace was too swift. In short, the thing missing was
   this: a crisis. And so her reforms got tangled up. Angela Merkel, the
   young chancellor, had yet to come into her own.
   
   In the first days of October 2008, the leadership of the grand
   coalition of the time discretely received unsettling news: The world
   was in the middle of a financial crisis triggered by the collapse of an
   American bank. All of a sudden, Germans started going to ATMs much more
   frequently than normal. What the individual saver couldn't have known
   yet, and wasn't supposed to know, was this: The dreaded bank run that
   can cause the entire financial system to collapse within just a few
   days had already started.
   
   Angela Merkel and Peer Steinbrück, her finance minister, saw themselves
   facing a task that was extremely risky in psychological terms: How can
   we put Germans' minds at ease with a dramatic gesture without creating
   fresh unease with the drama itself? And how can we make individual
   savers believe that their deposits are secure when these will only be
   secure if they believe they are? The result was the right sentence at
   the right time: "We say to savers that their deposits are safe. And the
   federal government will also vouch for that." That was high-stakes
   gambling, cold-bloodedly executed and, more than anything, successful.
   
   Once, when asked why she hadn't been part of the opposition in the GDR,
   Merkel cited as a reason the fact that civil activists had been opposed
   to atomic energy because of the reactor accident in Chernobyl, whereas
   she had thought that the Soviet Union just needed better nuclear power
   plants. She even hung on to this sympathy for nuclear power, born from
   her background in the natural sciences, after German reunification.
   During her second term as chancellor, she was planning to abandon the
   nuclear phase-out of Schröder's SPD-Greens coalition government –
   despite the constant survey majorities opposed to doing so and the
   unresolved questions about sites for permanently disposing of nuclear
   waste.
   
   On March 11, 2011, at 2:47 p.m. Japanese time, the earthquakes and
   tsunamis that would cause the Fukushima reactors to melt down a short
   time later started. On March 12, Chancellor Merkel asserted that
   nuclear power was still "sound and justifiable." Two days later, the
   government declared a moratorium on the operation of German nuclear
   power plants. The phase-out of the phase-out of the phase-out of atomic
   power had begun. And with it began the energy turnaround (Energiewende)
   that would transform the country as one of the biggest infrastructure
   projects in the history of the republic.
   
   Fukushima was chancellor's first creative crisis. Here, she got a taste
   of the creative power she can tap in such heated moments. It's a
   paradox: The systematic, cautious, step-by-step Angela Merkel functions
   best in combination with a bit of chaos, anxiety and euphoria for
   change. We'll come back to this later.

   She wants to do right
   
   For Germans, the chancellor's blatant flip-flopping was an important
   experience: She doesn't want to be right; she wants to do right.
   Whenever a mistake is made, she corrects it. This can also help build
   trust. Merkel is now using this trust while simultaneously straining it
   like never before. Indeed, there is also something different about the
   refugee crisis: If the way Merkel is reacting to it turns out to be a
   mistake, it won't be so easy to correct this time. Nuclear power plants
   can be turned on and off. But Syrians can't.
   Merkel has often been reproached for using a stubbornly silent style of
   pragmatic "so-what?" governing that supposedly depoliticizes people and
   even imperils the democracy. In reality, however, before history became
   a permanent guest in the Chancellery, there were time and again phases
   of stagnation – or perhaps more nicely put, of administration. Merkel's
   respective coalition partners have usually looked like the driving (and
   thereby self-consuming) force, whether it was the gung-ho Free
   Democrats or the SPD on its eternal quest for the lost social part. One
   could even say that Merkel doesn't make a particularly good impression
   as a non-crisis chancellor.
   
   But wait. When was the last time there wasn't a crisis? Can anyone
   remember the last summer slump, the cultivated boredom of a sated
   republic? For some time now, Germany and Europe, as well, have not only
   constantly been in a crisis, but in several crises. Merkel doesn't have
   to have visions anymore. The visions come to her, and the nightmares,
   too.
   
   Tibetan monks sometimes swat their pupils' shoulders with a stick, but
   this is meant to help them concentrate rather than to punish them. A
   similar effect can be seen on Merkel whenever she is swatted. It
   sharpens her senses, but it rarely changes her policies. During this
   summer's Greece crisis, practically the entire global public was
   lashing out at her, but the chancellor pushed through her line – right
   or wrong – with only minor changes. She had learned that this also
   works on the international stage. In the Euro crisis, she is now using
   the principle that she had already employed with her Fukushima
   turnaround – namely, that you should come out of a crisis stronger than
   you went into it. She wants to make the EU stronger. It's crisis energy
   as creative force. However, with a view to the present, one must also
   keep in mind what's different: During the Greece crisis, Merkel enjoyed
   a whole lot of leverage, as absolutely nothing was going to happen
   without Germany.
   
   And something else happened, too: During the Euro crisis, Angela Merkel
   has emancipated herself once and for all from one of major authorities
   in her life – from Helmut Kohl. Since the contributions scandal, he no
   longer represented an authority as CDU chairman; and at least since the
   Euro crisis and the one in Ukraine, he has no longer represented an
   authority as a great European. He has publicly opposed her; he has
   warned her that she shouldn't destroy Europe. For her, that was the
   last straw. Today, if she asks Helmut Kohl a question in her head, she
   doesn't get any answers for the crises she currently faces.
   
   The case is similar when it comes to the United States. In 2002, when
   war in Iraq was being debated, she still had a hard time objecting to
   US government policy. But, since then, there have been American
   invasions that she has rejected. Still, it was during the Ukraine
   crisis more than anything that the chancellor emerged as the chief
   negotiator of the West, and even today, she is the one who determines
   the choice of means. The crises have also brought this about: Merkel
   allows herself to be advised, but she no longer allows herself to be
   lectured. The sky above the Chancellery is empty.
   
   These, then, were the circumstances Merkel found herself in this summer
   before the number of refugees suddenly skyrocketed: She has found her
   political form in the crisis; she isn't afraid of it; she embraces it.
   All the crises that Europe is going through come close to being a new
   formation, or at least a restructuring, of the EU – economically, in
   terms of security policies, fiscally and humanly. It's a metamorphosis
   that Merkel has helped shape at least as much as Jacques Delors or even
   Helmut Kohl once did. She doesn't wake up in the morning with such
   thoughts, as all that would be too much for her – but she still knows
   it. At the same time, Merkel feels free, free from old men and distant
   powers, but also free from the necessity of holding on to power. It's
   an enviable position. But could it also be a risky one?
   
   Members of the Green Party and the Left Party criticize the government,
   saying that it underestimates the refugee issue, that it's sleeping
   through it. The truth is, Merkel did underestimate it, but she hasn't
   sleep through it. In fact, she almost had to underestimate it, seeing
   that it swelled without interruption – not linearly, but exponentially.
   The decision that Merkel made 10 days ago was not the cause of an
   escalation, but a reaction to it – even if she has maybe overdone it a
   bit since then with the signals of openness.

   "We can do it"
   
   Since the beginning of May, a new story has been unfolding for Germany
   and for the chancellor – not as a big plan, but as a rapid sequence of
   actions and reactions. Events are constantly shifting from immediate
   facts to larger principles:
   
   May 7, 2015: Federal Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière announces in
   Berlin that 450,000 refugees are expected to arrive in Germany this
   year.
   
   August 19, 2015: The Interior Ministry revises this figure steeply
   upward, to 800,000. Between May and August, the situations in Syria,
   northern Iraq and Afghanistan worsen dramatically; hundreds of boat
   refugees die; Greece is completely consumed with its own problems;
   there's an election campaign in Turkey. Both countries simply wave
   through huge numbers of refugees.
   
   Less than a week later, at a meeting of representatives from the
   Interior Ministry, the federal states and the Federal Office for
   Migration and Refugees (BAMF), someone asks the question: "What will we
   do with the people who come? Should we send them back to Hungary?" An
   agreement is reached: No, we can't do that.
   
   August 25, 2015, at 4:30 a.m.: The BAMF confirms via Twitter (in
   German): "We are at present largely no longer enforcing #Dublin
   procedures for Syrian citizens." The tweet goes around the world
   thousands of time. Neither Angela Merkel nor Chancellery Minister Peter
   Altmaier, her chief of staff, know about it.
   
   August 25, at around noon in the Marxloh neighborhood of the western
   German city of Duisburg: During an event on "living well," citizens
   tell the chancellor that the refugees are perceived as an "invasion."
   
   August 25, 2015: In Heidenau, a small town in Saxony, an uninhibited
   mob calls Merkel a "traitor to the people" and a "whore."
   
   August 31, 2015, in Berlin: Merkel holds her summer press conference.
   Austria and Hungary have deployed trains to transfer the influx of
   refugees to Germany. "We live in orderly, in very orderly
   circumstances," the chancellor said. "Most of us do not know the
   feeling of complete exhaustion combined with fear." The state will
   respond to excesses with the utmost severity, she goes on. "No
   experience in one's own life justifies this kind of behavior," she
   adds. Journalists ask questions. The government wonders once again what
   it will do with the trains. The Chancellery decides to put the concerns
   of the Interior Ministry on the back burner and to not turn the trains
   away. After all, how is turning away the refugees coming from Hungary
   supposed to happen in concrete terms?
   September 1, 2015: Syrians, Albanians and Iraqis shout "Germany,
   Germany!" and "Merkel! Merkel!" at a train station in Budapest.
   
   When the chancellor sees this on television, she is touched.
   
   September 3, 2015: Hungary halts the trains, so the refugees continue
   their journey on foot. They march alongside highways, on railway
   tracks, through meadows. They march toward Germany, to Merkel.
   
   September 4, 2015: Germany's federal government reckons that the high
   point of the flood of refugees will be reached that weekend, that the
   refugees can no longer be held back. Merkel suspects that terrible
   images are also now imminent – images of run-over refugees, images of
   police taking action against distraught people, possibly even images of
   Hungarian soldiers. These are images, as one member of her cabinet puts
   it, "that Europe can't allow itself to be associated with."
   
   September 5, 2015: Merkel speaks by telephone with Prime Minister
   Viktor Orbán of Hungary and Chancellor Werner Faymann of Austria. Orbán
   says the situation is no longer under control. Merkel and Faymann
   decide to allow the refugees to leave Hungary. Vice Chancellor Sigmar
   Gabriel, who also serves as minister of economic affairs and energy as
   well as chairman of the SPD, is included in the decision-making
   process, but the telephone conversation has more of a "briefing-like
   character." The chancellor is on the move. Late in the evening, Merkel
   has Georg Streiter, her deputy spokesman, declare that Germany will not
   turn the refugees away. "We have now addressed an acute emergency,"
   Streiter says. No big speech to the nation, no big production marks
   this decision, which might possibly be the most important of Merkel's
   time in office. Pragmatism with historical consequences.
   
   Back in July, Merkel had said to Reem, a 14-year-old Palestinian
   refugee living in northern Germany: "We can't accept everybody." What
   has gotten into Merkel since then? The answer is: reality. Plus a big
   dose of global history – as the crises in the Near and Middle East are
   also consequences of European colonial policies, the upheavals are also
   an echo of September 11. Plus, perhaps, a dose of emotions. In the
   following week, refugees arrive in Munich almost hourly. "We can do
   it," Merkel says.
   
   September 13, 2015: Interior Minister de Maizière announces that
   Germany will reintroduce border controls. It's his suggestion, but it's
   been OK'd by SPD chairman Gabriel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter
   Steinmeier. Confusion reigns for a few hours. Does this mean that the
   borders will be shut? Is the government backpedaling? From the outset,
   one hears in the Chancellery, it has been clear that the exception to
   Dublin needed to be limited, that one had to find a way back to an
   orderly procedure.
   
   Thus, openness, but an orderly one. No change in course, just a
   slowdown. However, it's more of a symbolic slowdown meant to show
   Germany's European partners: We can also do this differently. The
   problem, as everyone knows, won't be solved with border controls.
   
   September 15, 2015: The chancellor is in a defiant, defensive mode.
   When asked if she has contributed to the escalation herself, she says:
   "There are situations in which one can't think things over for 12
   hours." In these cases, she adds, one simply has to make a decision. Of
   course, those in her inner circle do everything they can to convey the
   impression that the chancellor is neither livid about the hostility she
   is facing nor stirred by the inundation of love from the refugees. At
   most, they admit that the chancellor is "impressed" by the readiness to
   help of her fellow countrymen and -women, who are fueling this yearning
   for Germany in the same way as the chancellor's selfies.

   Being chancellor is a special position
   
   This much is probably true: Being chancellor is a special position.
   Along with the office comes the fact that one can never have any
   experiences without being recognized, like Caliph Harun al-Rashid, who
   traveled the streets at night in disguise in One Thousand and One
   Nights. Merely being present inevitably alters the situation and
   thereby the experiences one can have, as well. Harshly put, a
   chancellor can no longer have any "genuine" experiences. One can be
   conscious of this to a greater or lesser degree. Kohl knew it less;
   Merkel more. But she still can't change it.
   
   This is why Merkel is so frugal with what she says. She knows that if
   she says something, it's something different than if someone else had
   said it. For all that, she is still surprised time and again by the
   impact of what she says – as well as by the impact of what she doesn't
   say, but merely allows to be conveyed, such as what was said by Mr.
   Streiter, whom nobody knows.
   Merkel is different in this crisis. Perhaps because everything about
   her is now coming together: Her warning right-wingers not to set the
   lodgings of asylum seekers on fire fits with her anti-fascist
   upbringing. Her own personal history causes her to be moved when people
   climb over fences in Hungary. As a Christian, which she still is, she
   doesn't want it any other way. She senses within herself the
   accumulated power of the previous crises.
   
   This time, unlike in the other crises, Merkel only has limited
   leverage. While Europe couldn't manage without the Germans during the
   debt crisis, Germany now can't manage without the Europeans. Whoever
   asks members of the federal government how one could build up pressure
   in the EU, one will say: "Can't be done." Another will speculate: "If
   we hoist a white flag." A third will say: "If we apply financial
   pressure." But that's already the crowbar, a tool that doesn't become
   Germans – or only too well, depending on how you see it.
   
   The crisis is also different because, this time, the chancellor has put
   all her trust in the people. Without the thousands of volunteers, the
   state would have collapsed. But she must also rely on a continued sense
   of urgency. Merkel has always had the feeling that Germans are a bit
   spoiled and whiny, but now she has tied her biggest project to the
   belief that this actually isn't the case. Can one be sure of that? Hard
   to say. In any case, two bitterly inimical mindsets are now working
   against each other here in Germany and in Europe: We are opening our
   arms because people are coming (Merkel) vs. Because we are opening our
   arms, people are coming (Seehofer). Being a Christian means helping all
   people in need (Germany) vs.: Being a Christian means keeping Muslims
   out (Hungary).
   
   But this crisis is also different because it's bigger. This time, it's
   not about money flows or solar roof panels. Nor is it merely about
   people in search of protection. Instead, it's about the kind of people
   who will remain and thereby change the identity of this country. Angela
   Merkel, the woman who grew up in a homogenous society and was long
   skeptical toward multiculturalism, believes in diversity. She believes
   that diversity will help Germans succeed in the face of global
   competition. In short, she believes it's better to be too multicolored
   than too old.
   
   As in other battles, Chancellor Merkel won't engage in this one with
   big speeches. So what will she do? If one asks around in the
   Chancellery about what is keeping her occupied at the moment, one
   always hears the word "beds": Do the refugees have enough places to
   sleep? Antje Vollmer, a former prominent parliamentarian with the
   Greens, once criticized the men who participated in the political
   movements and social protests of the late 1960s (known in German as the
   "68ers"), saying: You, always with your big speeches and your
   "eternally unmade beds"! But, with Merkel, it's exactly the opposite:
   No big speeches, but the chancellery minister is asked every evening
   whether beds have been made for the foreigners. In the tenth year of
   her chancellorship, this is how it is with Merkel: Pragmatism begets
   strategy, and strategy thrives on pragmatism.
   
   With this crisis, Angela Merkel is leading Germans into a risky
   situation and to a decision. Once again, a wall is falling. But unlike
   when the Berlin Wall fell, this time, Merkel isn't sitting in the
   sauna. She is sitting in the washing machine. Is that better? We'll see.
   
   Translation: Josh Ward

   The crises: 1999 - 2008
   
   1999: Kohl
   Merkel advises Helmut Kohl to retire from politics due to the
   contributions scandal. Wolfgang Schäuble, who succeeded Kohl as CDU
   chairman, also has to go. Merkel becomes the party's new head.
   
   2002: Stoiber
   Merkel announces her intention to become the CDU's chancellor
   candidate, sending party grandees through the roof. Merkel cedes the
   candidacy to Edmund Stoiber. He loses against SPD incumbent Gerhard
   Schröder. Merkel gets her chance at the next election.
   
   2005: Setback Despite Victory
   The CDU wins the national election – but the party has its worst
   results since Kohl was voted out of office. However, the results for
   the rival Social Democrats are even worse.
   
   2008: Financial Earthquake
   What started as a crisis in the US real-estate market quickly becomes a
   global financial crisis that climaxes in the collapse of Lehman
   Brothers, a large American bank. Merkel makes a major gamble by
   guaranteeing the deposits of individual savers.

   The crises: 2011 to 2015

   2011: Fukushima
   On March 11, a tsunami triggers a worst-case scenario at the Fukushima
   nuclear power plant in Japan. Chancellor Merkel asserts that Germany's
   nuclear power plants are safe, but she nevertheless backs a decision to
   phase out nuclear energy in Germany. Before the catastrophe, she had
   advocated allowing the country's nuclear power plants to have longer
   lifespans.

   2013: Specters of Insolvency
   Over time, the financial crisis morphs into a euro crisis, a banking
   crisis and a sovereign-debt crisis. In one emergency summit after
   another, the EU tries to keep heavily indebted euro states from
   becoming insolvent. Greece proves to be the toughest case.

   2014: Ukraine
   Following protests on Maidan Square in Kiev, the Ukrainian parliament
   declares that President Viktor Yanukovych has been deposed. Russia, in
   turn, declares the revolt unlawful and exploits the situation to annex
   Crimea. Since then, a war has raged in eastern Ukraine between forces
   of the government in Kiev and separatists. Merkel becomes the West's
   chief negotiator for the ceasefire agreement reached in Minsk.

   2015: Mass Exodus
   War in the Middle East, persecution in Africa, economic plight in the
   Balkans: Millions make their way toward Europe. More than 800,000
   refugees are expected to arrive in Germany alone. Merkel opens the
   country's borders to them, thereby arousing the anger of her European
   partners. The EU states argue over the right course to pursue in the
   crisis.

   http://pdf.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-09/angela-merkel-refugees-crisis-chancellor.pdf
   
   3 Kommentare Kommentieren
   Älteste zuerst
   
   brianjones
   #3  —  vor 2 Wochen
   You ought to watch this clip. An interesting canadian point of view on
   Ms Merkel, a really insightful comment.
   

   
   Thomas Holm
   #2  —  vor 2 Wochen
   "the kind of people who will remain and thereby change the identity of
   this country"
   A kind of people capable of achieving "change" with regard to the
   identity of another country ? After in their (former ?) lands
   everything went kinda went wrong ?
   Change by remaining in a new country; is that a new concept of Global
   governance?
   Is there a need for developing a will to change another country, or
   does rather a third decide with barrel-bombs who has to run, stay and
   change another country.
   And by the way: What might "Deconflicting Russia" mean ? Min. 1.18
   Making erverything look less ugly ?
   

   
   Kh. Owenn
   #1  —  vor 2 Wochen
   What a perfect Lady and Chancellor. You just forgot to mention, that
   Merkel was in the FDJ (the communist organization for young people in
   the former GDR) and also got a function as "Agitator".
   Read the German comments, almost all are against this article and also
   against Merkel. It's already ridiculous to publish such things. It
   really sounds like the political propaganda in the former communist
   countries. "

[Michael K.]

That last video about Russia in Syria, my internet connection says that the video is not available for upload in my country.  Funny, because many other Al Jazeera videos are.  What is that video saying?

[rmstock]

That last video about Russia in Syria, my internet connection says that the video is not available for upload in my country.  Funny, because many other Al Jazeera videos are.  What is that video saying?

dl : https://crashrecovery.org/daily/20.09.2015/Concerns_grow_about_Russia_s_military_presence_inside_Syria.mp4 or
https://83.160.76.184/daily/20.09.2015/Concerns_grow_about_Russia_s_military_presence_inside_Syria.mp4
It shows a Syrian guy monitoring Russian air radio traffic in ... Homs

example : wget --no-check-certificate https://83.160.76.184/daily/20.09.2015/Concerns_grow_about_Russia_s_military_presence_inside_Syria.mp4