Trump ain't got no money

[yankeedoodle]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BHvBZKWDyQI

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Id5SDKHjOM

[rmstock]

SPECIAL REPORT: Fed. Promises More QE! And Reverses Aggressive Hike Stance. By Gregory Mannarino
by Gregory Mannarino , Published on Feb 23, 2018
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TMMbdxYI1Gs

SPEECH
Comments on "A Skeptical View of the Impact of the Fed's Balance Sheet"
February 23, 2018
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2018/dud180223

  "William C. Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer
   Remarks at the 2018 U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New York City
   As prepared for delivery

   It is a pleasure to be able to comment on this year's U.S. Monetary
   Policy Forum paper. As always, what I have to say here today reflects
   my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market
   Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System.1
   To say that I was interested in this year's topic is an understatement.
   The use of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet has been an important
   element of U.S. monetary policy over the past decade. The start of the
   reversal of that expansion—the so-called process of balance sheet
   normalization—has been a key focus of the FOMC's monetary policy
   deliberations over the past year. I am pleased that the start of this
   process—in contrast to the bond market taper tantrum of 2013—has been
   non-disruptive. The normalization process is now running in the
   background, essentially on autopilot, with short-term interest rates
   serving as the primary tool for adjusting the stance of monetary policy.
   Let me start with my main point: Although I agree with many of the
   authors' findings in this year's paper, I would take a much less
   skeptical view of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet as a tool of
   monetary policy. While additional study of the effects of large-scale
   asset purchase (LSAP) programs should be encouraged—as it furthers our
   understanding of the use of these unconventional monetary policy
   tools—the paper's findings do not, in my mind, invalidate the use of
   LSAPs when the Federal Reserve is operating at or close to the zero
   lower bound for short-term interest rates. That is the key issue—not
   the magnitude of the effects of LSAPs or whether short-term interest
   rates should be the primary tool of monetary policy. On the latter
   point, which is consistent with the FOMC's statements about policy
   normalization, I see broad agreement.
   Concluding that LSAPs are less powerful than suggested by some of the
   estimates from the event study literature does not imply that there is
   no role for LSAPs at the zero lower bound. In such circumstances, LSAPs
   can be used to provide additional monetary accommodation by depressing
   bond term premia and the spread between agency mortgage-backed
   securities (MBS) and Treasury securities, as well as by strengthening
   the credibility of forward guidance on the path of short-term interest
   rates. This can provide support to asset values more generally and make
   financial conditions more accommodative. Thus, discarding such a tool
   or ruling out its use seems counterproductive for two reasons. First,
   to the extent that such a tool can provide accommodation, ruling out
   its use would raise the risks of insufficient monetary policy
   accommodation when interest rates are pinned at the zero lower bound.
   Second, expectations matter. If households and businesses believe that
   the Fed has run out of tools to provide monetary policy accommodation
   or is unwilling to use certain tools for that purpose, the risk of
   inflation expectations becoming unanchored to the downside would
   increase, which would make it even more difficult for the central bank
   to achieve its goals. For these reasons, LSAPs should be viewed as a
   viable tool in our arsenal to be used when the zero lower bound is a
   relevant policy concern.
   In terms of calibration, if LSAPs are not as powerful as some of the
   event studies imply, the answer is not to simply discard the tool, but
   instead to look for ways to enhance its efficacy and use it more
   aggressively. In this respect, I believe that LSAPs work best when they
   are open-ended. In such circumstances, the use of the tool is likely to
   be helpful in reducing tail risks and making the bad states of the
   world less likely rather than signaling to market participants a
   significant deterioration in the Federal Reserve's outlook. LSAPs may
   also be a useful means of making forward guidance more credible. If the
   monetary authority were to commit to a program of asset purchases until
   some economic objective is reached and, at the same time, were to make
   it clear that the policy rate would not begin to rise until the asset
   purchase program were completed, these steps might help anchor
   expectations about the likely path of short-term rates more
   effectively. The Federal Reserve's third round of LSAPs, which was
   open-ended, was an important innovation of policy that the paper might
   have discussed in greater detail.
   I also don't agree with the paper's conclusions about agency MBS
   purchases. Such purchases do not represent "credit easing" as argued in
   the paper. The government's interventions to support Fannie Mae and
   Freddie Mac have made it clear that there is no credit risk in the
   Federal Reserve's purchase of such obligations. Also, the authors don't
   acknowledge that the ability to purchase agency MBS has two benefits.
   First, it enables the Federal Reserve to purchase longer-duration
   assets at a faster pace without disrupting market functioning. This
   facilitates larger LSAP programs, when a larger program is viewed as
   necessary. Second, it opens up another channel by which asset purchases
   can provide stimulus—by narrowing the spread between agency MBS and
   Treasuries, the Federal Reserve can drive down long-term mortgage rates
   and provide support to the housing sector and to home prices. When
   monetary policy is constrained at the zero lower bound for interest
   rates, being able to purchase agency MBS seems like a good tool to have
   available.
   I am also a bit baffled by the conclusion that the Fed should "consider
   larger and looser caps, possibly specified in terms of quarterly rather
   than monthly changes, with caps perhaps removed completely by 2019." It
   seems to me that the current process of balance sheet normalization is
   proceeding very smoothly. We placed caps on redemptions because we
   wanted to limit the potential for market disruption that might occur if
   the amount of securities that had to be absorbed by private markets
   fluctuated unduly. The cost of the caps in terms of delaying the
   shrinkage of the balance sheet is very low. Even if the caps were to be
   removed completely at the end of 2018, it would most likely pull
   forward the timing of normalizing the balance sheet size by only two
   quarters. The delay due to the caps is small because, when they are
   fully phased in, they are likely to be binding only for Treasuries and
   then only in the middle month of each quarter.
   While I don't agree with some of the broader conclusions of the paper,
   I do agree that a healthy skepticism about event studies is warranted.
   The major theme of the paper is that event studies that have sought to
   measure the impact of the Federal Reserve's three major LSAP programs
   are flawed for a number of reasons. These include potential selection
   bias of the events chosen and the fact that event studies may not
   capture all the factors that influence how market prices respond to
   LSAP announcements.
   The first problem with event studies, of course, is the issue of how
   much new information is revealed by the actual policy announcement. I
   would argue that LSAPs were always a possibility, so the probability of
   their use never went from 0% to 100%, even for the first LSAP program.
   This suggests that event studies could lead to downwardly biased
   estimates of the impact of LSAPs. In fact, if the announcement
   indicated that the program was smaller than expected, then bond yields
   could rise on the program's announcement. This scenario could occur
   even though the overall program—including its anticipation—was
   effective in reducing yields. This makes interpreting the direction of
   changes in bond yields on the day of an announcement difficult.
   The second problem with event studies is that there are always other
   things going on. When the Fed announces an LSAP program, long-term
   rates might drop because of the announcement, or because market
   participants were revising downward their views about the state of the
   economy and the economic outlook in light of the Fed's actions. Or,
   conversely, long-term yields could conceivably even rise as market
   participants became more confident that the policy actions would be
   sufficient to push the economy toward the central bank's goals of
   maximum sustainable employment and price stability.
   The third problem with event studies is the difficulty in disentangling
   the various factors behind the moves in long-term yields. If an
   open-ended LSAP program pushes back the perceived timing of short-term
   rate hikes, it will be difficult to apportion the impact on long-term
   yields between LSAPs and an expectation of a flatter path for
   short-term rates.
   These conclusions argue for putting less reliance on event studies to
   measure the impact of LSAPs, rather than more. In this regard, I would
   advocate taking a different tack: rely more on an evaluation of bond
   term premia to assess the potential impact of LSAPs. Bond term premia
   currently are unusually low, and I suspect that LSAP programs here and
   abroad have been an important factor. Evaluating the factors that have
   been affecting bond term premia over time might be a good alternative
   way of estimating the impact of LSAPs.
   To sum up, while the impact of LSAPs on long-term bond yields is likely
   lower than what is implied by some of the event study literature, this
   does not mean that LSAPs aren't a useful tool when the FOMC is
   constrained by the zero lower bound. LSAPs can not only narrow bond
   term premia, but also make forward guidance more credible. Thus, LSAPs
   remain useful to have in the toolkit for those times when the
   short-term interest rate tool may not be available.
   
   1 Lorie Logan and Paolo Pesenti assisted in the preparation of these remarks. "


Next up for markets: New Fed Chair Powell weighs in on the interest rate debate
* Fed Chair Jerome Powell's testimony next week is the next big
   catalyst markets are watching, hoping the new central bank chair
   will be a referee in the tug-of-war between stocks and bonds.
* Ahead of his testimony, the Fed is scheduled to release its
   Monetary Policy Report on Friday morning, a blueprint of sorts for
   his comments.
* Powell may stray from the report with his personal outlook next
   week, and markets are watching for comments on inflation and
   interest rates after Wednesday's wild reaction to the minutes from
   Janet Yellen's last meeting.
Patti Domm      | @pattidomm
Published 3:06 PM ET Thu, 22 Feb 2018  Updated 22 Hours Ago
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/22/next-up-for-markets-new-fed-chair-powell-weighs-in-on-the-interest-rate-debate.html

[rmstock]

The Deep State Empire Has Been Challenged & Is In The Process Of Being Destroyed:Harley Schlanger
by X22Report Spotlight , Published on Feb 24, 2018
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yEc6UIQQDtM

[yankeedoodle]

Lyndon LaRouche is - or pretends to be - vehemently anti-British.  Who knows what he's about?

But, we might know a little bit about this Harley Schlanger, who is spouting in this video.  It seems that he's involved with something called the Schiller Institute, in Washington, DC.  Yes, Schiller, as in shiller, i.e. a shill.  http://schillerinstitute.org/biographys/bio_harley.html

The reason Schlanger is shilling for shabbos goy Donnie-boy is not because of the Brits, but because shabbos goy Donnie-boy is known to be totally controlled by Israhell, and people in the American government know it, and are determined to bring America back under the control of Americans.  Under the ruse of saving America from the Brits, he is trying to to keep America securely under the control of Israhell, through their puppet, shabbos goy Donnie-boy.

It's not about Britain, it's not about Russia, it's about Israhell, and saving America from Israhell, and their puppet, shabbos goy Donnie-boy.

The Schiller Institute

Board of Directors

Helga Zepp LaRouche,
Fred Huenefield, Theo Mitchell, Harley Schlanger, John Sigerson

Harley Schlanger

schiller@schillerinstitute.org

The Schiller Institute
PO BOX 20244
Washington, DC 20041-0244
703-297-8368

[rmstock]

Harvey Slanger in the interview disavows himself from Netanyahu with
his advocating to goto war with Iran. And thats what not addressed in
this interview, the Iran deal by Obama, which almost all Trump cabinet
members are willing to go to war over with Iran. Another important
employee is of course Jeffrey Steinberg. This is what happens when you
type in : en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffrey_Steinberg :

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Intelligence_Review
Executive Intelligence Review
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  (Redirected from Jeffrey Steinberg)

Actually it was quite funny to see how Lyndon Larouche was cheering the
day after the election of Donald Trump, where another former Larouchie,
Webster Tarpley went total batshit crazy.

[rmstock]

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell - Monetary Policy and the Economy
by rmstock , Published on Feb 28, 2018
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZC59P-K7Mk
  "FEBRUARY 27, 2018
   Monetary Policy and the Economy
   https://www.c-span.org/video/?440903-...
   Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell appeared before the House Financial
   Services Committee to deliver the central bank's semiannual monetary
   policy report. He said the economic outlook remained strong despite
   recent market volatility and rising rates on U.S. government debt, thus
   continuing the policy of gradual increases of interest rates. He also
   predicted more productivity and an increase in wages due to more
   investment spending. This was Mr. Powell's first address to Congress
   since succeeding Janet Yellen as chair earlier in 2018."

[rmstock]

01:14:40 : Rep. Pittenger, R-North Carolina, 9th District :
The Federal Reserve will be phasing out the London Inter-bank Offered Rate (LIBOR)
and has, after investigation in the last fiscal quarter of 2017, introduced the
Secured Overnight Funding Rate (SOFR) :

August 24, 2017
Federal Reserve Board requests public comment on proposal to produce
three new reference rates based on overnight repurchase agreement (repo)
transactions secured by Treasuries
For release at 3:00 p.m. EDT
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20170824a.htm

  "The Federal Reserve Board on Thursday requested public comment on a
   proposal for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in cooperation with
   the Office of Financial Research, to produce three new reference rates
   based on overnight repurchase agreement (repo) transactions secured by
   Treasuries.
   
   The most comprehensive of the rates, to be called the Secured Overnight
   Financing Rate (SOFR), would be a broad measure of overnight Treasury
   financing transactions and was selected by the Alternative Reference
   Rates Committee as its recommended alternative to U.S. dollar LIBOR.
   SOFR would include tri-party repo data from Bank of New York Mellon
   (BNYM) and cleared bilateral and GCF Repo data from the Depository
   Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC).
   
   "SOFR will be derived from the deepest, most resilient funding market
   in the United States. As such, it represents a robust rate that will
   support U.S. financial stability," said Federal Reserve Board Governor
   Jerome H. Powell.
   
   Another proposed rate, to be called the Tri-party General Collateral
   Rate (TGCR) would be based solely on triparty repo data from BNYM. The
   final rate, to be called the Broad General Collateral Rate (BGCR) would
   be based on the triparty repo data from BNYM and cleared GCF Repo data
   from DTCC.
   
   The three interest rates will be constructed to reflect the cost of
   short-term secured borrowing in highly liquid and robust markets.
   Because these rates are based on transactions secured by U.S. Treasury
   securities, they are essentially risk-free, providing a valuable
   benchmark for market participants to use in financial transactions.
   
   Comments on the proposal to produce the three rates are requested
   within 60 days of publication in the Federal Register, which is
   expected shortly. [ ... ]"
   
[pdf]https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/speeches/2017/Frostpresentation.pdf[/pdf]
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/speeches/2017/Frostpresentation.pdf
CreationDate:   Fri Jan 19 17:09:50 2018
ModDate:        Fri Jan 19 17:09:50 2018
Tagged:         yes
Pages:          13
Encrypted:      no
Page size:      720 x 540 pts
File size:      700465 bytes
Optimized:      no
PDF version:    1.5

This document obviously was created after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 which
was Signed into law by President Donald Trump on  December 22, 2017

[rmstock]

01:29:40 : Rep. Hensarling, R-Texas, Financial Services Committee Chair:
"What about the difference between The interest rate on required reserves
(IORR rate) and the interest rate on excess reserves (IOER rate) ? Your
predecessor was quiet vague here." zerohedge even published this story :

40% Of The Fed's Interest On Excess Reserves Is Paid To Foreign Banks
by Tyler Durden  Thu, 07/13/2017 - 12:07
https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-07-13/40-feds-interest-excess-reserves-paid-foreign-banks

After the hearing on Feb 27, '18 had finished the Federal Reserve acted
quickly and published a new Policy Tool :

Interest on Required Reserve Balances and Excess Balances
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reqresbalances.htm

  "The Federal Reserve Banks pay interest on required reserve balances and
   on excess reserve balances. The Board of Governors has prescribed rules
   governing the payment of interest by Federal Reserve Banks in
   Regulation D (Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 12 CFR
   Part 204).
   
   The Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 authorized the
   Federal Reserve Banks to pay interest on balances held by or on behalf
   of depository institutions at Reserve Banks, subject to regulations of
   the Board of Governors, effective October 1, 2011. The effective date
   of this authority was advanced to October 1, 2008, by the Emergency
   Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
   
   The interest rate on required reserves (IORR rate) is determined by the
   Board and is intended to eliminate effectively the implicit tax that
   reserve requirements used to impose on depository institutions. The
   interest rate on excess reserves (IOER rate) is also determined by the
   Board and gives the Federal Reserve an additional tool for the conduct
   of monetary policy. According to the Policy Normalization Principles
   and Plans adopted by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), during
   monetary policy normalization, the Federal Reserve intends to move the
   federal funds rate into the target range set by the FOMC primarily by
   adjusting the IOER rate. As indicated in the minutes of the March 2015
   FOMC meeting, the Federal Reserve intends to set the IOER rate equal to
   the top of the target range for the federal funds rate. For the current
   setting of the IOER rate, see the most recent implementation note
   issued by the FOMC. This note provides the operational settings for the
   policy tools that support the FOMC's target range for the federal funds
   rate.
   
   The Board will continue to evaluate the appropriate settings of the
   interest rates on reserve balances in light of evolving market
   conditions and will make adjustments as needed.
   
   The interest rates on reserve balances that are set forth in the table
   below are determined by the Board and officially announced in the most
   recent implementation note. The table is generally updated each
   business day at 4:30 p.m., Eastern Time, with the next business day's
   rates. This table will not be published on federal holidays.
   
   Implementation Note
   
   
   Interest Rates on Reserve Balances for            Rates      Effective
   March 1, 2018 Last Updated: February 28,       (percent)   Date
   2018 at 4:30 p.m., Eastern Time   
   --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Rate on Required Reserves (IORR rate)           1.50      12/14/2017
   Rate on Excess Reserves (IOER rate)               1.50      12/14/2017
   
   Related Press Releases
   
     * Federal Reserve Board announces approval of final rule amending
       Regulation D (June 18, 2015)
     * Federal Reserve Board requests public comment on proposed technical
       changes to Regulation D (April 13, 2015)
     * Federal Reserve issues technical note concerning the calculation of
       interest rates on required reserve balances and excess balances for the
       maintenance periods ending December 17, 2008 (December 16, 2008)
     * Federal Reserve announces it will alter formulas used to determine
       interest rates paid to depository institutions on required reserve
       balances and excess reserve balances (November 5, 2008)
     * Federal Reserve announces it will alter the formula used to determine
       the interest rate paid to depository institutions on excess balances
       (October 22, 2008)
     * Board announces that it will begin to pay interest on depository
       institutions' required and excess reserve balances (October 6, 2008)
   
   Last Update: February 28, 2018 "

[rmstock]

02:39:10 : Rep. Poliquin, R-Maine, 2nd District :
Poliquin hammers Fed Chair Powell over the National Debt of 21 trillion.
During Greg Hunter Weekly News Wrap-Up 3.2.18 Greg Hunter became
totally crazy after he had seen the following CNBC report :


Powell: We're not on a sustainable fiscal path
12:43 PM ET Tue, 27 Feb 2018
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2018/02/27/powell-were-not-on-a-sustainable-fiscal-path.html
  "In front of the House Financial Services Committee, Federal Reserve
   Chair Jerome Powell answers questions from Rep. Bruce Poliquin
   (R-Maine)."

The exchange of arguments was between (02:39:10 into the c-span video,
at 12:42pm ET) Rep. Poliquin, R-Maine, 2nd district. and Fed Chair
Powell. Powell is the only and first Fed. Chair who admits and
recognizes the problem of the National Debt of 21 trillion and 245
billion in annual interest payments.  At 12:46pm ET Poliquin : "Mr
Powell, do you take a different take from the folks that were before
you, do you think that this is a problem ?" Powell : "Do I think that
is a problem ?" Poliquin : "yes, its 21 trillion dollars in debt" 
Powell : "Well, yeah, I think we're not on a sustainable fiscal path".
Powell is however not a supporter of the balanced budget approach, but
is a supporter of a sustainable fiscal path. CNBC.com published this
online at 12:43 ET : "Powell: We're not on a sustainable fiscal path"
12:43 PM ET Tue, 27 Feb 2018 CNBC.COM , where Powell still had to make
his remark about the sustainable fiscal path minutes later at 12:46pm ET.